Knowledge is power: How conceptual knowledge transforms visual cognition

In this review, we synthesize the existing literature demonstrating the dynamic interplay between conceptual knowledge and visual perceptual processing. We consider two theoretical frameworks that demonstrate interactions between processes and brain areas traditionally considered perceptual or conceptual. Specifically, we discuss categorical perception, in which visual objects are represented according to category membership, and highlight studies showing that category knowledge can penetrate early stages of visual analysis. We next discuss the embodied account of conceptual knowledge, which holds that concepts are instantiated in the same neural regions required for specific types of perception and action, and discuss the limitations of this framework. We additionally consider studies showing that gaining abstract semantic knowledge about objects and faces leads to behavioral and electrophysiological changes that are indicative of more efficient stimulus processing. Finally, we consider the role that perceiver goals and motivation may play in shaping the interaction between conceptual and perceptual processing. We hope to demonstrate how pervasive such interactions between motivation, conceptual knowledge, and perceptual processing are in our understanding of the visual environment, and to demonstrate the need for future research aimed at understanding how such interactions arise in the brain.     

Justification is potential knowledge

This paper will articulate and defend a novel theory of epistemic justification; I characterize my view as the thesis that justification is potential knowledge (JPK). My project is an instance of the ‘knowledge-first’ programme, championed especially by Timothy Williamson. So I begin with a brief recapitulation of that programme.     

Comments on Shimp's (1983) double dissociation between knowledge and tacit knowledge

Shimp (1983) found in five pigeons “double dissociation” between the distribution of pairs of long and short reinforced interresponse times and “self-reports,” obtained by symbolic matching to sample, concerning these interresponse times. This result can be explained by assuming that the birds used a fixed temporal interval as matching criterion, independently of which pattern of interresponse times was reinforced.     

Neurochemical knowledge in electroconvulsive therapy (ECT)

The paper is concerned with an attempt to generalize and categorize current hypotheses on the biochemical basis of ECT. The hypotheses are critically evaluated with respect to the relevance of their experimental fundamentals. Thus, certain hypotheses are valid only in a qualified sense. Particular interest is focussed on those conceptions which try to correlate ECT-induced changes in synaptic receptor sensitivities (up-/down-regulation) with super- resp. subsensitivity hypotheses of psychoses. In this connection, noradrenergic and opioid systems on the one hand, and the axis hypothalamus-hypophysis on the other hand seem to play a dominant role.     

Consciousness of the self (COS) and explicit knowledge

Starting with distinction between explicit and implicit knowledge and the traditional philosophical distinction between COS (the consciousness of self) as an object and COS as a subject, we suggest a triple classification of COS experience into three modes, each corresponding to a different state of consciousness. When one acts automatically COS is totally embedded within the representation of the environment. When one monitors or attends to one's experience, the self is implied by an explicit representation of one's attitudes, consistent with Descartes' cogito insight 'I think therefore I am' (1641,1984). However, a reflexive thought, e.g., 'I know fact x,' requires an explicit representation of the self. This analysis highlights the existence of an intermediate mode of COS as a subject and suggests its possible connection to monitoring one's behavior.     

Knowledge,safety, and Gettierized lottery cases: Why mere statistical evidence is not a (safe) source of knowledge

The lottery problem is the problem of explaining why mere reflection on the long odds that one will lose the lottery does not yield knowledge that one will lose. More generally, it is the problem of explaining why true beliefs merely formed on the basis of statistical evidence do not amount to knowledge. Some have thought that the lottery problem can be solved by appeal to a violation of the safety principle for knowledge, i.e., the principle that if S knows that p, not easily would S have believed that p without p being the case. Against the standard safety‐based solution, I argue that understanding safe belief as belief that directly covaries with the truth of what is believed in a suitably defined set of possible worlds forces safety theorists to make a series of theoretical choices that ultimately prevent a satisfactory solution to the problem. In this way, I analyze several safety principles that result from such choices—the paper thus gives valuable insights into the nature of safety—and explain why none solves the lottery problem, including their inability to explain away Gettierized lottery cases. On a more positive note, I show that there is a viable solution in terms of safety if we get rid of the unquestioned assumption that safe beliefs directly track the truth. The alternative is a conception of safe belief according to which what safe beliefs directly track is the appropriateness of the circumstances and, indirectly, the truth. The resulting safety principle, I argue, explains why mere statistical evidence is not a safe source of knowledge.     

Causal knowledge and imitation/emulation switching in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and children (Homo sapiens)

This study explored whether the tendency of chimpanzees and children to use emulation or imitation to solve a tool-using task was a response to the availability of causal information. Young wild-born chimpanzees from an African sanctuary and 3- to 4-year-old children observed a human demonstrator use a tool to retrieve a reward from a puzzle-box. The demonstration involved both causally relevant and irrelevant actions, and the box was presented in each of two conditions: opaque and clear. In the opaque condition, causal information about the effect of the tool inside the box was not available, and hence it was impossible to differentiate between the relevant and irrelevant parts of the demonstration. However, in the clear condition causal information was available, and subjects could potentially determine which actions were necessary. When chimpanzees were presented with the opaque box, they reproduced both the relevant and irrelevant actions, thus imitating the overall structure of the task. When the box was presented in the clear condition they instead ignored the irrelevant actions in favour of a more efficient, emulative technique. These results suggest that emulation is the favoured strategy of chimpanzees when sufficient causal information is available. However, if such information is not available, chimpanzees are prone to employ a more comprehensive copy of an observed action. In contrast to the chimpanzees, children employed imitation to solve the task in both conditions, at the expense of efficiency. We suggest that the difference in performance of chimpanzees and children may be due to a greater susceptibility of children to cultural conventions, perhaps combined with a differential focus on the results, actions and goals of the demonstrator.     

What was yours is (for now) mine: Prior user knowledge reduces product satisfaction but can improve experiential satisfaction in access-based consumption

With the rise of the sharing economy, more consumers than ever are thinking about products not in terms of ownership, but in terms of access necessary to facilitate experiences. In this paper, we build on prior literature, which distinguished product from experiential satisfaction to explore the role that knowledge of a prior user plays in shaping these two types of satisfaction in access-based consumption experiences. Across three studies, we demonstrate that product and experiential satisfaction can be affected differently when consumers are provided with information about previous users of products. We find that information about the previous user of a product consistently negatively impacts product satisfaction. However, we find that when the previous user has positive and experientially relevant traits, experiential satisfaction is increased. When the information about the previous user is negative or experientially irrelevant, experiential satisfaction is decreased. In cases in which we find a positive effect of prior user information on experiential satisfaction, we find it is mediated by transfer of the previous user's traits and that the effectiveness of this mechanism depends on the relevance of traits and the stability of the self-concept of the consumer.     

The agreeableness asymmetry in first impressions: perceivers' impulse to (mis)judge agreeableness and how it is moderated by power

Prior research shows that perceivers can judge some traits better than others in first impressions of targets. However, questions remain about which traits perceivers naturally do infer. Here, the authors develop an account of the "agreeableness asymmetry": Although perceivers show little ability to accurately gauge target agreeableness in first impressions, they find that agreeableness is generally the most commonly inferred disposition among the Big Five dimensions of personality (agreeableness, extraversion, conscientiousness, openness, and emotional stability). Using open-ended impressions based on photographs, videos, and face-to-face encounters, three studies show agreeableness as the most prevalently judged of the Big Five, although it is also poorly judged in both absolute and relative terms. The authors use interpersonal power to reveal an underlying mechanism. Manipulating the power of perceivers relative to targets substantially shifts impression content, suggesting that habitual interaction and relational concerns may partially explain perceiver's chronic interest in assessing agreeableness despite their limited ability to do so.     

Context is Everything (in Emotion Research)

As in many areas of psychological inquiry, context matters for how emotion is experienced, expressed, perceived, and regulated. While this may sound like a truism, emotion research does not always directly theorize, manipulate, or measure emotion with context in mind. To facilitate this process, we present a framework of contextual features that shape emotion‐related processes, and highlight several key factors that have been shown to matter in emotion research. We make four recommendations which we believe will help to better integrate context in emotion science. We argue that a deeper collective understanding, interrogation, and integration of context will propel the field forward theoretically and methodologically, and enhance researchers' ability to probe the mechanisms of human psychological experience. While our focus is on emotion research, we believe that the context framework and associated recommendations will also be useful to other fields of social psychological and personality science.     

A reversed-reward contingency task reveals causal knowledge in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)

In the reversed-reward contingency task, subjects are required to choose the less preferred of two options in order to obtain the more preferred one. Usually, this task is used to measure inhibitory skills, but it could also be used to measure how strong the subjects’ preferences are. We presented chimpanzees with support tasks where only one of two paper strips could physically bring food into reach. Subjects were rewarded for choosing the non-functional strip. In Experiment 1, subjects failed to pick the non-baited strip. In Experiment 2, subjects failed to pick the broken strip. Chimpanzees performed worse in these tasks than in other similar tasks where instead of paper strips, there were similar shapes painted on a platform. The fact that subjects found the reversed-reward contingency task based on causality more difficult to solve than a perceptually similar task with no causality involved (i.e., arbitrary) suggests that they did not treat real strips as an arbitrary task. Instead, they must have had some causal knowledge of the support problem that made them prefer functional over non-functional strips despite the contrary reward regime.     

Truth is not (Very) Intrinsically Valuable

We might suppose it is not only instrumentally valuable for beliefs to be true, but that it is intrinsically valuable – truth makes a non‐derivative, positive contribution to a belief's overall value. Some intrinsic goods are better than others, though, and this article considers the question of how good truth is, compared to other intrinsic goods. I argue that truth is the worst of all intrinsic goods; every other intrinsic good is better than it. I also suggest the best explanation for truth's inferiority is that it is not really an intrinsic good at all. It is intrinsically neutral.