Strategy Selection in Risky Choice: The Impact of Numeracy,Affect, and Cross‐Cultural Differences

Real‐world decisions often involve options with outcomes that are uncertain and trigger strong affect (e.g., side effects of a drug). Previous work suggests that when choosing among affect‐rich risky prospects, people are rather insensitive to probability information, potentially compromising decision quality. We modeled the strategies of less and more numerate participants in the United States and in Germany when choosing between affect‐rich prospects and between monetarily equivalent affect‐poor prospects. Using large probabilistic national samples (n = 1047 from the United States and Germany), Study 1 showed that compared with more numerate participants, less numerate participants chose the normatively better option (i.e., the one with the higher expected value) less often, guessed more often, and relied more on a simple risk‐minimizing strategy. U.S. participants—although less numerate—selected the normatively better option more frequently and were more consistent across affect‐rich and affect‐poor problems than the German participants. Using a targeted quota sample (n = 118 from Germany), Study 2 indicated that although both more and less numerate participants paid less attention to probability information in affect‐rich than in affect‐poor problems, the two numeracy groups relied on different outcome‐based heuristics: More numerate participants often followed the minimax heuristic, and less numerate participants the affect heuristic. The observed strategy differences suggest that attempts to improve decision‐making need to take into account individual differences in numeracy as well as cultural‐specific experiences in making trade‐offs. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

One and Done? Optimal Decisions From Very Few Samples

In many learning or inference tasks human behavior approximates that of a Bayesian ideal observer, suggesting that, at some level, cognition can be described as Bayesian inference. However, a number of findings have highlighted an intriguing mismatch between human behavior and standard assumptions about optimality: People often appear to make decisions based on just one or a few samples from the appropriate posterior probability distribution, rather than using the full distribution. Although sampling‐based approximations are a common way to implement Bayesian inference, the very limited numbers of samples often used by humans seem insufficient to approximate the required probability distributions very accurately. Here, we consider this discrepancy in the broader framework of statistical decision theory, and ask: If people are making decisions based on samples—but as samples are costly—how many samples should people use to optimize their total expected or worst‐case reward over a large number of decisions? We find that under reasonable assumptions about the time costs of sampling, making many quick but locally suboptimal decisions based on very few samples may be the globally optimal strategy over long periods. These results help to reconcile a large body of work showing sampling‐based or probability matching behavior with the hypothesis that human cognition can be understood in Bayesian terms, and they suggest promising future directions for studies of resource‐constrained cognition.     

What a Feeling: The Role of Immediate and Anticipated Emotions in Risky Decisions

The risk‐as‐feelings hypothesis argues that many risky decisions are not only predicted by anticipated emotions, as most consequentialistic decision making theories would presume, but also by immediate emotions. Immediate emotions refer to the “hot” visceral feelings people feel as they contemplate a specific decision option at the cusp of making a decision, whereas anticipated emotions are those emotions that people forecast that they will feel once they experience possible consequences of that decision. Four studies focused on the role of both types of emotions in decisions under risk and uncertainty. Decisions were substantively predicted by immediate emotional states beyond anticipated emotions or the subjective probability attached to outcomes. Thus, risky choices may be prompted, in part, by how people feel about the “riskless” portion of the decision—specifically, the various decision options they are contemplating—rather than the potential outcomes those options may produce. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The long‐term effects of counselling: The process and mechanisms that contribute to ongoing change from a user perspective

Aims: This qualitative study aimed to expand the limited evidence base about the long‐term effects of psychological therapies.Method: We conducted in‐depth interviews with 15 people, 1–3 years after primary care counselling, to investigate whether they could identify enduring benefits and the mechanisms that brought about and maintained them. From their narratives, we developed a model of the change process of counselling and mechanisms that were perceived as essential to produce lasting benefit. The model conceptualised movement through distinct phases: engagement; exploration of internal and external worlds; consolidation and negotiated ending. Results: Mechanisms integral to sustained impact were: the active engagement of people during and between sessions to work toward their own solutions; and acquisition through the change process of skills which could be further built on after the counselling ended. These enabled ongoing, dynamic change in the way people conducted their lives and relationships. Conclusion: A key concept in securing long‐term benefit was co‐production, both during counselling and in taking ownership of and using the ‘box of skills’ acquired. Support of the model was reinforced through comparison with the experience of three interviewees who reported no long‐term benefit.     

Explaining early moral hypocrisy: Numerical cognition promotes equal sharing behavior in preschool‐aged children

Recent work has documented that despite preschool‐aged children's understanding of social norms surrounding sharing, they fail to share their resources equally in many contexts. Here we explored two hypotheses for this failure: an insufficient motivation hypothesis and an insufficient cognitive resources hypothesis. With respect to the latter, we specifically explored whether children's numerical cognition—their understanding of the cardinal principle—might underpin their abilities to share equally. In Experiment 1, preschoolers’ numerical cognition fully mediated age‐related changes in children's fair sharing. We found little support for the insufficient motivation hypothesis—children stated that they had shared fairly, and failures in sharing fairly were a reflection of their number knowledge. Numerical cognition did not relate to children's knowledge of the norms of equality (Experiment 2). Results suggest that the knowledge–behavior gap in fairness may be partly explained by the differences in cognitive skills required for conceptual and behavioral equality.     

The gap between medical and monetary choices under risk persists in decisions for others

Decisions under risk in the medical domain have been found to systematically diverge from decisions in the monetary domain. When making choices between monetary options, people commonly rely on a decision strategy that trades off outcomes with their probabilities; when making choices between medical options, people tend to neglect probability information. In two experimental studies, we tested to what extent differences between medical and monetary decisions also emerge when the decision outcomes affect another person. Using a risky choice paradigm for medical and monetary decisions, we compared hypothetical decisions that participants made for themselves to decisions for a socially distant other (Study 1) and to recommendations as financial advisor or doctor (Study 2). In addition, we examined people's information search in a condition in which information about payoff distributions had to be learned from experiential sampling. Formal modeling and analyses of search behavior revealed a similarly pronounced gap between medical and monetary decisions in decisions for others as in decisions for oneself. Our results suggest that when making medical decisions, people try to avoid the worst outcome while neglecting its probability—even when the outcomes affect others rather than themselves.     

Principle of Care and Giving to Help People in Need

Theories of moral development posit that an internalized moral value that one should help those in need—the principle of care—evokes helping behaviour in situations where empathic concern does not. Examples of such situations are helping behaviours that involve cognitive deliberation and planning, that benefit others who are known only in the abstract, and who are out‐group members. Charitable giving to help people in need is an important helping behaviour that has these characteristics. Therefore we hypothesized that the principle of care would be positively associated with charitable giving to help people in need, and that the principle of care would mediate the empathic concern–giving relationship. The two hypotheses were tested across four studies. The studies used four different samples, including three nationally representative samples from the American and Dutch populations, and included both self‐reports of giving (Studies 1–3), giving observed in a survey experiment (Study 3), and giving observed in a laboratory experiment (Study 4). The evidence from these studies indicated that a moral principle to care for others was associated with charitable giving to help people in need and mediated the empathic concern–giving relationship. © 2016 The Authors. European Journal of Personality published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European Association of Personality Psychology     

The importance of traits and abilities in supervisors' hirability decisions as a function of method of assessment

Past research on the importance of traits and abilities in supervisors' hirability decisions has ignored the influence of the selection method used to derive information about these traits and abilities. In this study, experienced retail store supervisors (N=163) rated job applicant profiles that were described on the Big Five and General Mental Ability (GMA) personality dimensions. Contrary to past studies, the supervisors were also informed about the method of assessment used (paper‐and‐pencil test vs. unstructured interview). Hierarchical linear modelling analyses showed that the importance attached to extraversion and GMA was significantly moderated by the selection method, with extraversion and GMA decreasing in importance when store supervisors knew that scores on extraversion and GMA were derived from a paper‐and‐pencil test as opposed to from an unstructured interview. Store supervisors with more selection‐related experience also attached more importance to GMA. Results are discussed in relation to the practice–science gap and the extant literature on perceptions of selection procedures.     

Rethinking Affective Experience and Popular Emotion: World War I and the Construction of Group Emotion in International Relations

Research in International Relations (IR) frequently confronts claims about the emotions shared by members of a group. While much attention has been devoted to the potential for affective and emotional experience beyond the individual level, IR scholars have said less about the politics of invoking popular emotion. This article addresses that gap. Specifically, we argue that between individual—and even shared—affective experience on the one hand and group‐based “popular emotion” on the other exists not mechanisms of aggregation but rather processes of framing, projection, and propagation that are deeply political. We distinguish between two tropes that commonly structure references to popular emotion: communal emotion, the idealized attribution of an authentic, unifying emotional response of “the people,” and mass emotion, a volatile and potentially dangerous mob‐like reaction, but one also susceptible to manipulation. Using the outbreak of World War I as a showcase, we demonstrate the political significance of popular emotion, including its enduring relevance for understanding contemporary populism.     

What do People Want from their Jobs? The Big Five,core self‐evaluations and work motivation

If people are differentially motivated on the basis of individual differences, this implies important practical consequences with respect to staffing decisions and the selection of the right motivational techniques for managers. In two different samples (students facing graduation vs full‐time employees), the relationships between personality traits and the preference for job characteristics concerning either extrinsic (job environment) or intrinsic job features (work itself) were investigated. Two personality traits [openness to experience and core self‐evaluations (CSE)] were consistently found to be positively related to the preference concerning work characteristics, and CSE showed incremental validity with regard to intrinsic work motivation factors (e.g., experienced meaningfulness, autonomy). Furthermore, age was differentially linked to those job characteristics. The results are discussed with regards to the optimal Person–Job Fit and the practical utility of the personality constructs.     

The Intention–Behavior Gap

Bitter personal experience and meta‐analysis converge on the conclusion that people do not always do the things that they intend to do. This paper synthesizes research on intention–behavior relations to address questions such as: How big is the intention–behavior gap? When are intentions more or less likely to get translated into action? What kinds of problems prevent people from realizing their intentions? And what strategies show promise in closing the intention–behavior gap and helping people do the things that they intend to do?