Precarity is a Feminist Issue: Gender and Contingent Labor in the Academy

Feminist philosophers have challenged a wide range of gender injustices in professional philosophy. However, the problem of precarity, that is, the increasing numbers of contingent faculty who cannot find permanent employment, has received scarcely any attention. What explains this oversight? In this article, I argue, first, that academics are held in the grips of an ideology that diverts attention away from the structural conditions of precarity, and second, that the gendered dimensions of such an ideology have been overlooked. To do so, I identify two myths: the myth of meritocracy and the myth of work as its own reward. I demonstrate that these myths—and the two‐tier system itself—manifest an unmistakably gendered logic, such that gender and precarity are mutually reinforcing and co‐constitutive. I conclude that feminist philosophers have particular reason to organize against the casualization of academic work.     

Including Early Modern Women Writers in Survey Courses

There are many reasons to include texts written by women in early modern philosophy courses. The most obvious one is accuracy: women helped to shape the philosophical landscape of the time. Thus, to craft a syllabus that wholly excludes women is to give students an inaccurate picture of the early modern period. Since it seems safe to assume that we all aim for accuracy, this should be reason enough to include women writers in our courses. This article nonetheless offers an additional reason: when students are exposed to philosophical texts written by women, they learn that women have been, are, and can be philosophers. Given how underrepresented women are in philosophy, this finding is significant. If we aim to change the face of philosophy—so that it includes more women—we must include texts written by women in our syllabi. The article considers various obstacles faced by those who work to respond to this call to action.     

From a ‘memorable place’ to ‘drops in the ocean’: on the marginalization of women philosophers in German historiography of philosophy

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the striking absence of women philosophers from German historiography of philosophy during the nineteenth and early twentieth century. While the general topic has been considered before, additional documents and considerations are presented that will help us better understand the omission of women philosophers in the German context. Firstly, material is presented showing that women philosophers were widely discussed in Germany prior to 1800. These discussions stand sharply in contrast with the silence about women in subsequent general histories of philosophy. Secondly, it is shown that the absence of women philosophers in German historiography of philosophy during the nineteenth century is not entirely new but has to be seen as a continuation of tendencies characteristic for the historiography of philosophy already during the eighteenth century. Thirdly, it is argued that, towards the end of the nineteenth century, there was a new stimulus for thinking about women in the history of philosophy, namely women’s emancipation and, more specifically, the right to a university education. Seen in this light, the renewed and intensified effort to diminish women philosophers can be understood as a symptomatic attempt to keep women out of academia in general, and out of philosophy in particular.     

Gender Attitudes and Public Opinion Towards Electoral Gender Quotas in Brazil

Research on public opinion towards affirmative action shows that citizens often support the principle of equality while simultaneously rejecting policies that promote it in a pattern described as the “principle-policy puzzle.” The scholarship also shows that ideology and prejudice towards the targeted group explain the puzzle with respect to racial affirmative action. In this article, we use unique survey questions included in the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer in Brazil to show that citizens tend to support electoral gender quotas while rejecting gender-based egalitarianism in a reversed version of the “principle-policy puzzle.” We argue that a different type of gender attitudes, namely benevolent sexism, shapes support for gender quotas as well as for the principle of equality. While benevolent sexists tend to reject gender equality based on views about gender complementarity and stereotypes about women's purity, they also support quotas as policies to foster such values. Our findings suggest that even though the political and scholarly debates can provide sound normative reasons for the adoption of quotas across different contexts, public support for them often relies on paternalistic views and expectations about the role of women in politics.     

REMOVING VEILS OF IGNORANCE1

For more than two millennia the development of philosophy in what is called the West has been the province of men who trace their intellectual heritage to (some) men in ancient Greece. Within “the development of philosophy” I include the training of philosophers as well as publishing and preserving philosophical work in libraries. Thus I regard philosophy as a very material as well as spiritual enterprise. My focus here is on the spiritual impact, actual and potential, of recent changes in the material base of philosophy and the material impact of recent changes in the spiritual focus of philosophers. Before the Twentieth Century, the most significant transitions in the development of Western philosophy were its coming under the domination of Christian religious institutions and then its becoming relatively freed from such domination. Since the advent of the Twentieth Century, the most significant transitions may come from the increasing access to academic institutions of the middle and working classes, of people of color with histories of oppression by white societies, and of women from all classes and ethnic backgrounds—people who do not always or only trace their intellectual heritages to men of ancient Greece. What differences might these changes make to, and call for in, the development of philosophy? What I have thought about most are differences made by women and differences that have drawn in women to academic philosophy in Western democracies, such as the United States. Twentieth Century women in these contexts have published substantial bodies of philosophical inquiry with feminist agendas (both philosophy of feminism and philosophy manifesting feminist perspectives in ethics, epistemology, etc.). I want to comment on two features of such inquiry that often make it attractive to women less readily engaged by the traditions defined by privileged men. These features are holism and what I call “historical particularism.” I begin with “particularism.”     

The Philosophical Personality

The authors adopt a critico‐sociological methodology to investigate the current state of the philosophical profession. According to them, the question concerning the status of philosophy (“What is philosophy?”) cannot be answered from within the precinct of philosophical reason alone, since philosophy—understood primarily as a profession—is marked by a constitutive type of self‐ignorance that prevents it from reflecting upon its own sociological conditions of actuality. This ignorance, which is both cause and effect of the organization and investment of philosophical desire, causes philosophers to lose themselves in an ideological myth (“the philosopher as idea(l)”) according to which philosophers are unaffected by the material conditions in which they exist. This myth prevents philosophers from noticing the extent to which their activity is influenced by extra‐philosophical determinants that shape, empirically, who becomes a professional philosopher (“the philosopher as imago”) and who doesn't. This article explores the relationship between philosophy's “idea(l)” and its “imago” as a way of shedding light on some of the mechanisms that make philosophy inhospitable for so many women, people of color, and economic minorities.     

The Other Philosophy Club: America's First Academic Women Philosophers

Recent research on women philosophers has led to more discussion of the merits of many previously forgotten women in the past several years. Yet due to the fact that a thinker's significance and influence are historical phenomena, women remain relatively absent in “mainstream” discussions of philosophy. This paper focuses on several successful academic women in American philosophy and takes notice of how they succeeded in their own era. Special attention is given to three important academic women philosophers: Mary Whiton Calkins, Ellen Bliss Talbot , and Marietta Kies.     

Can philosophy be an academic discipline?

Richard Rorty notoriously maintained that philosophy is not an academic discipline. He thought that the only viable candidate for philosophy to be an academic discipline—where philosophy consists in a collection of permanent, pure topics—depends on a Cartesian conceptual framework. Once we overcome this framework, he maintained, there will be nothing left to be the distinct subject matter of philosophy. This article argues that there is a conception of philosophy that can be an academic discipline, even if we take Rorty's challenge seriously. It remains even if we overcome the Cartesian conceptual framework. In the end the article goes beyond Rorty's challenge and considers two further criteria for philosophy to be an academic discipline: that it have a distinct method, and that it be able to be done for the public good. The article argues that philosophy can fulfill these two criteria, and therefore that it can be an academic discipline.     

Quotas and affirmative action: Understanding group‐based outcomes and attitudes

More and more countries are adopting quotas to increase group‐based equality in the boardroom and the political sphere. Nevertheless, affirmative action in general and quotas in particular remain a highly controversial subject—eliciting negative reactions from privileged groups, while support among minority and lower‐status groups is generally higher. Focusing on gender, we take a broad approach to the topic and discuss (a) the effects of quotas and affirmative action on the under‐representation of minority groups and on perceptions of their competence, (b) the effects of quotas and affirmative action on organisational performance, and (c) predictors of attitudes towards affirmative action and quotas. We conclude that the benefits of quotas outweigh their costs and that they are an effective way of tackling group‐based inequality. We also discuss strategies that can be used to elicit more support among those groups that are particularly critical of quotas.     

Why So Low?

Empirical evidence indicates that women philosophers tend to submit their work to journals substantially less often than their male colleagues. This paper points out that this difference in submission behavior comes with other specific aspects of women philosophers’ behavior, such as a tendency to be reluctant to participate in discussions, to be willing to do work low in prestige, and to specialize in certain research topics, and it argues that these differences can be understood as indirect effects of social biases: namely, effects on the working behavior of members of targeted social groups. Recent findings from philosophy journals’ book review sections and from other academic disciplines known to suffer from gender problems, especially from STEM disciplines, lend additional weight to this hypothesis.     

Attitudes about Affirmative Action for Women: The Role of Children in Shaping Parents’ Interests

This paper uses pooled cross-sectional data from the 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006 General Social Surveys (GSS), a nationally representative sample of the U.S. adult population, to assess how employed parents’ attitudes about affirmative action for women are influenced by their children’s gender. The analytic sample includes 1,695 employed respondents. Findings based on logistic regression indicate that having daughters (and no sons) magnifies employed mothers’ support for affirmative action for women and minimizes employed fathers’ support. Conversely, having sons (and no daughters) does not suppress mothers’ support for affirmative action for women, nor does it differentiate men’s attitudes about affirmative action. We speculate about how these patterns in parents’ attitudes relate to self interest and group interest (i.e., their children’s future work experiences).     

Poisoning the Well and Epistemic Privilege

In this paper, a challenge is outlined for Walton’s recent analysis of the fallacy of poisoning the well. An example of the fallacy in action during a debate on affirmative action on a South African campus is taken to raise the question of how Walton’s analysis squares with the idea that disadvantaged parties in debates about race may be “epistemically privileged”. It is asked when the background of a participant is relevant to a debate and it is proposed that a proper analysis of the poisoning the well will outline conditions under which making one participant’s background an issue in a debate would be legitimate and illegitimate. Expanding Walton’s analysis to deal with the challenge, it is concluded that calling into question a participant’s suitability to take part in a debate is never legitimate when it is based simply on a broad fact about their background (like their race or gender).     

In Search of Token Women in Academia

Women faculty in predominantly male departments at a large university were interviewed and responded to paper-and-pencil instruments in a test of Laws' analysis of the necessity for the „token women” adaptation to their marginality for success in academia. By multiple criteria, three clusters were identified: (a) token women, who accepted academia as a meritocracy, were aware of little sex discrimination and belonged to no feminist group; (b) non-token women, who disagreed with academia as a meritocracy and were aware of sex discrimination; and (c) women with mixed or moderate orientations. (Membership in feminist groups was found in the latter two clusters.) Women in the three clusters did not differ significantly by academic rank or marital status and only marginally by age and longevity in academia. As predicted, however, they did differ by tenure status. Contrary to Laws' analysis, token women were not more likely to have had a sponsor, which was significantly related only to rank. Women in the three clusters were equally accurate in recognizing male-female status discrepancies. Their differing definitions of sex discrimination were revealed in differential bias when choosing among alternatives of indeterminate correctness. Token women minimized such discrepancies, in line with beliefs attributing them to women, rather than the system. Others maximized such discrepancies.
The university faculty has traditionally been a man's world, except in those fast-disappearing enclaves considered „women's fields” (e.g., home economics). Today, faculty women are tallied on affirmative action reports in columns for persons with „minority characteristics.”     

From Daily Life to Philosophy

Abstract: This article argues that the little everyday things of life often provide excellent entries into the intellectual problems of academic philosophy. This is illustrated with an analysis of four small stories taken from daily life in which people are in agony because they do not know what to do. It is argued that the crucial question in these stories is a philosophical question—not a closed request for empirical or formal information but an open question about how best to conceive of human experience. A discussion follows of the merits and shortcomings of transcendentalism as an attempt by philosophers to make progress. It is argued that reformulating questions is what philosophers can do to contribute to people's comfort in life. This is illustrated with an argument showing that in the small stories discussed the question of what to do should be reformulated as the question of who to be.     

Obituary: Gillian O. Howie, 1965–2013

The present special issue of Sophia on ‘feminist philosophy of religion’ is dedicated to Gillian O. Howie who died in 2013. This essay is a short obituary touching on Howie’s philosophical and personal legacy. The intention is to give a brief overview of Howie as a courageous woman with boundless intellectual curiosity and passionate commitments to feminist activities; these include writing and living her philosophical vision for creating a just society with collective political action. Howie inspired both women and men in philosophy—especially, but not only, feminist philosophers of religion—with her work on the critical role of sexual difference in life today.     

Assuming preferential selection when the admissions policy is unknown: the effects of gender rarity

One hundred thirty-five undergraduates indicated the degree to which they believed gender played a role in the selection of an applicant for a graduate degree program. Both the gender composition of the cohort and the selection policy (explicitly merit-based, explicitly affirmative action, or ambiguous) were varied. Results indicated that preferential selection on the basis of gender was assumed when women were solos and explicit information about the selection policy was not provided and that these assumptions were as strong as when an affirmative action policy was explicitly stated. This did not occur when the female selectee was not a solo or when a male selectee was a solo. Evaluations of qualifications and prediction of success paralleled the preferential selection assumptions.     

The effects of meritocracy beliefs on women's well-being after first-time gender discrimination

This study examined how meritocracy beliefs may buffer women from the negative psychological effects of an acute situation of gender discrimination. Although some research indirectly suggests that believing that meritocracy exists may increase wellbeing, group consciousness theories suggest that disbelieving that meritocracy exists will enhance psychological adjustment to gender discrimination. Women who reported little past experience with discrimination, and either believed or disbelieved that meritocracy exists, were exposed to either a laboratory situation of discrimination or a nondiscrimination failure (control) condition. Consistent with group consciousness theories, women experiencing discrimination reported greater well-being if they disbelieved that meritocracy exists than if they were believers. In contrast, women in the control condition reported greater wellbeing if they believed that meritocracy exists than if they were disbelievers. Implications for coping with discrimination are discussed.     

Rejecting Beliefs,or Rejecting Believers? On the Importance and Exclusion of Women in Philosophy

Why has gender equality progressed so much more slowly in philosophy than in other academic disciplines? Here, I address both factual and theoretical matters relating to the causes, effects, and potential redress of the lack of women in philosophy. First, I debunk extant claims that women are more likely than men to disagree with their philosophy professors and male peers; that women are more sensitive to disagreements in the philosophy classroom than men are; and that the gender imbalance in philosophy is no worse than in many cognate disciplines. Second, I discuss ways in which the nature of philosophical inquiry and debate may provide uniquely strong opportunities for person‐perception to hinder progress toward egalitarian treatment of interlocutors. And third, I argue that a diversity of perspectives in philosophy is essential not only for reasons of social justice, but also for philosophical progress. Efforts to improve philosophy should therefore countenance the role of person‐perception in the practice of philosophical debate. For philosophy to become more diverse, the steps the profession takes to achieve that goal will have to go beyond—and not merely match—the steps taken to increase the numbers of women and otherwise underrepresented individuals in other fields.     

Reforming intuition pumps: when are the old ways the best?

One mainstream approach to philosophy involves trying to learn about philosophically interesting, non-mental phenomena—ethical properties, for example, or causation—by gathering data from human beings. I call this approach “wide tent traditionalism.” It is associated with the use of philosophers’ intuitions as data, the making of deductive arguments from this data, and the gathering of intuitions by eliciting reactions to often quite bizarre thought experiments. These methods have been criticized—I consider experimental philosophy’s call for a move away from the use of philosophers’ intuitions as evidence, and recent suggestions about the use of inductive arguments in philosophy—and these criticisms point out important areas for improvement. However, embracing these reforms in turn gives wide-tent traditionalists strong reasons to maintain other traditional approaches to philosophy. Specifically, traditionalists’ commitment to using intuitions and to gathering them with bizarre thought experiments is well founded, both philosophically and empirically. I end by considering some problems with gathering trustworthy intuitions, and give suggestions about how best to solve them.