Parental Attention Deficit Disorder

abstract   This essay considers the moral status of certain practices that aim to enhance offspring traits. I develop an objection to offspring enhancement that draws on an account of the role morality of parents. I work out an account of parental ethics by reference to premises about child development and to observations about parenting culture in the United States. I argue that excellence in parenthood consists in a dual responsibility both to guide children toward the good life and to accept them as they are. I conclude that prenatal manipulation of healthy and normal characteristics in human offspring fails to balance the dispositional extremes of control and restraint to which many parents today are susceptible. I apply this account of good parenting to the challenging case of height enhancement for short but otherwise healthy children. Finally, I reply to objections, first, about the phenomenology of bearing normative obligations to people who do not yet exist and, second, about the moral logic of criticizing embryo selection in the context of assisted reproduction when we accept child selection in the context of adoption.     

Supplementing Virtue: The Case for a Limited Theological Transhumanism

This paper considers the prospect of moral transhumanism from the perspective of theological virtue ethics. I argue that the pursuit of goodness inherent to moral transhumanism means that there is a compelling prima facie case for moral enhancement. However, I also show that the proposed enhancements would not by themselves allow us to achieve a life of virtue, as they appear unable to create or enhance prudence, the situational judgement essential for acting in accordance with virtue. I therefore argue that moral enhancement technologies should take a limited or supporting role in moral development, which I call “moral supplementation.”     

Eliciting children's thinking in families and family therapy.

In this article, I introduce a way of talking between a therapist and children, which aims to be more adaptive to the family therapy context than the modes of communication with children often reported by individual psychotherapists. Although the recent increase in articles concerned with the role of children in family therapy is welcomed, I suggest that the common recommendation of the use of "play" and nonverbal methods of communication with young children can at times introduce its own constraints on a child's thinking. A method of engagement in "dialectical" conversations with children is described, and illustrated with verbatim case examples. It is argued that this offers one route to a discourse commonly used between children, and one that acknowledges their capacity to think.     

On Understanding Worship in School. Part One: on schooling and education

As worship in school is currently a topic of public debate, it may be useful to re‐examine one of the influential books on the subject,School Worship, an Obituary, by Professor J.M. Hull, published in 1975. I shall argue that it was mistaken in important respects. His case for the abolition of worship in schools was made on essentially philosophical grounds. He sought not just to make the weak point that it is increasingly difficult to overcome many of the practical obstacles, but to make the stronger claim that the practice is conceptually incoherent. This is what makes his position a philosophical one and, as such, subject to philosophical scrutiny. One of the factors that appears to influence Hull's position is his conception of philosophy. Despite his careful analysis of the concepts of education and worship, at a critical point his account seems to rely on a form of philosophical evidential‐ism. In opposition to Hull, I take the view that this is a mistake. A more consistent, philosophical approach of conceptual clarification would have shown that there are various forms of education and that, in at least one case, it not only makes sense to worship as a part of the educational process, but that worship is of its essence as its motivation, substance and goal. The implication of this conclusion is that politicians are not intellectually confused in insisting on a form of education in which worship has an integral role. Whether it is practicable, socially desirable and politically reasonable in an increasingly secular and religiously plural society is quite another matter. Given the current state of society, one might conclude that the government should take a more pluralistic approach through its legislation. The government is there to serve a variety of communities and interests. One might reasonably argue that if the state‐school system is genuinely to serve this plural society there should be more scope for incorporating into the education system a diversity of practice. There might then be different schools with distinctive concepts of education, consistent with the needs and aspirations of the diverse communities and interests. In this part of the article I shall look particularly at the way in which schooling might accommodate a variety of activities and raise the question as to why worship might not be one of them. Hull's answer seems to hinge on the definition of worship and on the definition of education. The former I shall examine in Part Two, but here I shall seek to identify and examine that feature of education that Hull claims would exclude worship in school.     

True to oneself? Broad and narrow ideas on authenticity in the enhancement debate

Our knowledge of the human brain and the influence of pharmacological substances on human mental functioning is expanding. This creates new possibilities to enhance personality and character traits. Psychopharmacological enhancers, as well as other enhancement technologies, raise moral questions concerning the boundary between clinical therapy and enhancement, risks and safety, coercion and justice. Other moral questions include the meaning and value of identity and authenticity, the role of happiness for a good life, or the perceived threats to humanity. Identity and authenticity are central in the debate on psychopharmacological enhancers. In this paper, I first describe the concerns at issue here as extensively propounded by Carl Elliott. Next, I address David DeGrazia’s theory, which holds that there are no fundamental identity-related and authenticity-related arguments against enhancement technologies. I argue, however, that DeGrazia’s line of reasoning does not succeed in settling these concerns. His conception of identity does not seem able to account for the importance we attach to personal identity in␣cases where personal identity is changed through enhancement technology. Moreover, his conception of authenticity does not explain the reason why we find inauthentic values objectionable. A broader approach to authenticity can make sense of concerns about changes in personal identity by means of enhancement technologies.     

Mindfulness: Towards A Critical Relational Perspective

Significant attention has been given to mindfulness and mindfulness meditation in Western culture – often allied with a concern to enhance ‘subjective wellbeing’ through interventions aiming to ameliorate stress, depression and anxiety. While much professional and scientific research has been conducted which studies the nature and effectiveness of mindfulness‐based interventions, few critical accounts exist. I seek to produce a social critique of current understandings of mindfulness in relation to contemporary psychology. I illustrate how mindfulness has become individualised as an object of contemporary psychological investigation. I then propose a relational approach which instead sees mindfulness as socially contingent and as a potential resource for individuals and communities to cultivate a critically distant stance towards society. This involves revisioning our basic understanding of mindfulness as not only an inner state of mind, but also as a public social practice.     

Should Fertility Treatment be State Funded?

Many states offer generous provision of fertility treatment, but this article asks whether and how such state funding can be justified. I argue that, at most, there is limited justification for state funding of fertility treatment as one good among many that could enable citizens to pursue valuable life projects, but not one that should have the privileged access to funding it is currently given. I then consider and reject reasons one might think that fertility treatment has a special claim to funding, over the other goods that might enable life projects. First, I deny that fertility treatment has a special claim to funding on the grounds that infertility is a disease or disability. Second, I argue that individuals do not have a right to assistance with the project of having a child of their own. Third, I deny that providing fertility treatment is a special case on the grounds that having children is good for society. However, there may be one exception: states have a reason to fund fertility treatment for same sex couples that does not apply to heterosexual couples.     

II—Reflections on the Reasonable and the Rational in Conflict Resolution

Most familiar approaches to social conflict moot reasonable ways of dealing with conflict, ways that aim to serve values such as legitimacy, justice, morality, fairness, fidelity to individual preferences, and so on. In this paper, I explore an alternative approach to social conflict that contrasts with the leading approaches of Rawlsians, perfectionists, and social choice theorists. The proposed approach takes intrinsic features of the conflict—what I call a conflict's evaluative 'structure'—as grounds for a rational way of responding to that conflict. Like conflict within a single person, social conflict can have a distinctive evaluative structure that supports certain rational responses over others. I suggest that one common structure in both intra- and interpersonal cases of conflict supports the rational response of 'self-governance'. Self-governance in the case of social conflict involves a society's deliberating over the question, 'What kind of society should we be?' In liberal democracies, this rational response is also a reasonable one.     

Bifurcated loyalty and religious actors’ behaviour in democratic politics: the case of post-1967 religious Zionism in Israel

This paper deals with the political behaviour of religious groups in a democratic setting. In particular, it suggests an explanation as to why the same religious group might adopt very different modes of engagement with the state, over the same issues, at different times. The proposed framework combines two components: (1) a communitarian understanding of civil society; and (2) the concept of bifurcated loyalty which grasps the unique tension experienced by religious groups in democratic regimes, and its effect on their political behaviour. I go on to apply this framework in the case of religious Zionism in Israel. This case, which explores important events and trends in the history of the religious Zionist group in Israel, with special emphasis on the post-1967 era, nicely demonstrates the shifting strategies of engagement of this group with the state. The behaviour of this group ranged from constructive collaboration through participation in government to outright violent clashes with the state. Such dramatic changes expose the link between changing levels of bifurcated loyalty and political behaviour in response to changes in state policies towards religious actors and contents. The paper concludes with a brief discussion about the general applicability of such an approach to the study of religious groups in democratic politics and civil society.     

Participatory Policy-Making,Participatory Civil Society: A Key for Dissolving Elite Rule in New Democracies in the Era of Globalization

The author argues that in democracies a strong state and strong civil society are not mutually exclusive. Only a democratic, legitimate, and strong state can provide the environment for civil society activities to flourish; in return, only a strong and a participatory civil society can outline the reach of state strength vis-à-vis the society. The author discusses the need for civil society organizations to collaborate with policy-making institutions, in which they can negotiate policy concerns with ministers and officials while retaining an independent distance from the state and the political parties. Further, the author argues that an environment as such would provide for the transformative capacity of human agency to manifest itself in full in a globalizing world. The author discusses how participatory state and civil society structures will enhance the role of the human agency in order to dissolve elite rule, especially in new democracies.     

Mediums and messages: an argument against biotechnical enhancement of soldiers in the armies of liberal democracies

Assuming that one believes that individuals and states can morally defend values, beliefs, and institutions with force (in short, that just wars are morally possible), one logically wants just combatants to possess the physical, mental, and spiritual capacities that will enable them to win the war. On the other hand, being a just combatant in a just war does not morally entitle that combatant to do anything to win that war. The moral requirement for just combatants to fight justly is codified in international law of war and in state-specific legal documents such as the United States Uniform Code of Military Justice. While it is almost unequivocally clear to soldiers and civilians who soldiers cannot harm in the performance of their duties, and why these people are exempt from harm, it is less clear what the state itself (assuming throughout the discussion that the state is a just combatant in a just war) can morally do to its own soldiers to enhance their chances of victory: can the state do anything to soldiers to give them an advantage on the field of battle? For United States soldiers and their counterparts in most Western liberal democracies, the answer is obviously no. Deeply embedded social and cultural norms in Western democracies mandate that the state set and enforce rigid lines which drill sergeants and earnest commanders cannot cross, even in the name of combat readiness, grounding these norms in notion of basic rights appealed to in the U.S. Constitution. In this essay, I argue against some types of drug-induced internal biotechnical enhancement of soldiers on the grounds that, in the present state of technology, it is not reasonable to suppose that the military can perform such enhancement operations on soldiers without causing irrevocable psychological damage that would certainly and unjustifiably alienate the soldiers from the very society they serve.     

Accidentally True Beliefs and the Williamsonian Mental State of Knowing

In this paper, I will explore some philosophical implications of Williamson’s thesis that knowing is a state of mind (KSM). Using the fake barn case, I will introduce a way to evaluate Williamson’s KSM thesis and determine whether the Williamsonian mental state of knowing can be plausibly distinguished from certain other similar but epistemologically distinctive states of mind (i.e., accidentally true beliefs). Then, some tentative externalist accounts of the supposed differences between the Williamsonian mental state of knowing and accidentally true beliefs will be critically assessed, implying that the evaluated traditional versions of externalism in semantics and epistemology do not fit well with Williamson’s KSM thesis. Ultimately, I suggest that the extended-mind or extended-knower approach may be more promising, which indicates that active externalism would be called for by Williamson’s KSM thesis.     

Homelessness in the mind

In this article, I am going to present several related, themes, based on data gathered from years of consulting to homelessness services, particularly staff and management working in the voluntary sector, who are responsible for the teams that deliver care to some of the most vulnerable and challenging individuals in society. The three concepts that I will put forward are as follows: firstly, the idea that there is a fundamental human concern, or state, regarding homelessness. What I will refer to as 'homelessness in the mind'. I will consider this from psychoanalytic and systems-psychodynamic viewpoints and explore the idea of an internalised homeless state and the structures which attempt to contain it. Second, is an almost universal hatred and repulsion of this state and a need for its expulsion and relocation, in phantasy, into individuals and services associated with the homeless population. Next, I will link the concept of homelessness in the mind with Bion’s idea of sophisticated/specialised basic assumption groups; groups, budded off from mainstream society to contain specific psychological aspects of the population. I will suggest that the associated psychological stressors and pressures of homelessness, and ‘homelessness in the mind’ and its subdivisions, dependency and shame, relate to aggressive and violent elements associated with the inability to correctly process, engage with, or contain, specific internal states related to homelessness. Throughout, I will refer to my practice as an organisational consultant, and my experience of working with managers and teams who work with the homeless population.     

THE ILLIBERALITY OF ‘LIBERAL EUGENICS’

This essay evaluates the moral logic of ‘liberal eugenics’: the ideal of genetic control which leaves decisions about what sort of people to produce in the hands of individual parents, absent government intervention. I argue that liberal eugenics cannot be justified on the basis of the underlying liberal theory which inspires it. I introduce an alternative to Rawls's social primary goods that might be called natural primary goods: hereditable mental and physical capacities and dispositions that are valued across a range of projects and pursuits. I suggest that reproductive genetic biotechnologies like embryo selection, cellular surgery, and genetic engineering, which aim to enhance ‘general purpose’ traits in offspring are less like childrearing practices a liberal government leaves to the discretion of parents than like practices the state makes compulsory. I argue that if the liberal commitment to autonomy is important enough for the state to mandate childrearing practices such as health care and basic education, that very same interest is important enough for the state to mandate safe, effective, and functionally integrated genetic practices that act on analogous all‐purpose traits such as resistance to disease and general cognitive functioning. I conclude that the liberal case for compulsory eugenics is a reductio against liberal theory.     

Controversies Involving Gender and Intimate Partner Violence: Response to Commentators

In this response, I raise additional concerns related to controversies about gender and intimate partner violence (IPV). First, I argue that focusing on the dynamics of bi-directionally violent couples will enhance our ability to prevent a large quantity of IPV. Second, while directing resources toward those most impacted by IPV (i.e., women, children) is essential; pre-determining that women are always the appropriate victims is sexist and detrimental to prevention efforts. Third, although I offered a typology of bi-directionally violent couples, most of the factors associated with IPV (i.e., attachment, perceived control, fear, anger) and, most aspects of IPV, are dimensional constructs occurring in a society in which women’s roles are fluid. Making sense of this complexity poses a continued challenge.     

Performatiwiteit en selfonthulling as sleutelbegrippe in Hannah Arendt se etiek van deugdelikheid

Abstract

In this paper I argue that, in a liberal society that confmes itself solely to providing free basic education, children from the higher strata are systematically subjected to developmental opportunities that can reliably be expected to give them an advantage in the process of meritocratic competition. I will show how enforcing the universal education policy can include children from the least fortunate families in the process of meritocratic competition.

I make a case for a commitment to the extensive redistributive tax measures needed to ensure truly universal education as the condition of equal opportunity. I argue that this proposal is, in fact, consistent with real egalitarians’ aim to achieve equality, and consistent with their principle of fair equality of opportunity. Providing an equal opportunity in an educational programme could possibly be an attempt to attain equality.     

Predicting real-world behaviour: Cognition-emotion links across adulthood and everyday functioning at work

ABSTRACT

Inspired by the discovery of positive age trends in emotional well-being across adulthood, lifespan researchers have uncovered fascinating age differences in cognition–emotion interactions in healthy adult samples, for example in emotion processing, memory, reactivity, perception, and regulation. Taking stock of this body of research, I identify four trends and five remaining gaps in our understanding of emotional functioning in adulthood. In particular, I suggest that the field should pay stronger attention to the prediction of real-world behaviour. Using the sample case of work functioning, I outline gaps in current knowledge, including the lack of data on middle-aged adults, the neglect of relevant cognitive-emotional mechanisms, and the unclear role of life experience. Filling these gaps will enable progress in research on emotional aging in and beyond the work setting and enhance its practical utility for individuals, organisations, and society.     

Theorizing Democratic Education from a Senian Perspective

Despite the growing body of literature and general interest in the intersection between the capabilities approach (CA) and education, little work has been done so far to theorize democratic education from a CA perspective. This essay attempts to do so by, first, getting clear about the theory of democracy that has emerged from Amartya Sen’s recent work and understanding how it informs his CA; and, second, by carefully drawing out the implications of these aspects of Sen’s thinking for democratic education. Ultimately, I argue that Senian democratic education (SDE) is a composite of various learning processes that enhance one’s capability for social and political (democratic) participation. Particular attention is given to the learning that happens through one’s actual engagement in democratic practices and that which happens through one’s formal schooling. I call the former of these learning processes SDEp and the latter SDEs. SDEp is democratic life itself, and its effectiveness both depends on and contributes to the development of a culture of political participation within society. SDEs is best understood as the process of facilitating children’s achievement of democratic functioning, that is, children’s achievement of certain “beings and doings” associated with the emergence and exercise of their individual and collective democratic existence.     

The scope of instrumental morality

In The Order of Public Reason (2011a), Gerald Gaus rejects the instrumental approach to morality as a viable account of social morality. Gaus’ rejection of the instrumental approach to morality, and his own moral theory, raise important foundational questions concerning the adequate scope of instrumental morality. In this article, I address some of these questions and I argue that Gaus’ rejection of the instrumental approach to morality stems primarily from a common but inadequate application of this approach. The scope of instrumental morality, and especially the scope of pure moral instrumentalism, is limited. The purely instrumental approach to morality can be applied fruitfully to moral philosophy only in situations of extreme pluralism in which moral reasoning is reduced to instrumental reasoning, because the members of a society do not share, as assumed by traditional moral theories, a consensus on moral ideals as a basis for the derivation of social moral rules, but only an end that they aim to reach. Based on this understanding, I develop a comprehensive two-level contractarian theory that integrates traditional morality with instrumental morality. I argue that this theory, if implemented, is most promising for securing mutually beneficial peaceful long-term cooperation in deeply pluralistic societies, as compared to cooperation in a non-moralized state of nature.