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1.
LIEZL VAN ZYL 《Journal of applied philosophy》2011,28(1):80-92
According to qualified‐agent virtue ethics, an action is right if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. I discuss two closely related objections to this view, both of which concern the actions of the non‐virtuous. The first is that this criterion sometimes gives the wrong result, for in some cases a non‐virtuous agent should not do what a virtuous person would characteristically do. A second objection is it altogether fails to apply whenever the agent, through previous wrongdoing, finds herself in circumstances that a virtuous person cannot be in. I focus on Rosalind Hursthouse's account of right action, and argue that it can provide a satisfactory response to both these objections. I do so by drawing attention to the distinction between action guidance and action assessment, and arguing that while the above criterion is adequate as a means of action assessment, we should turn to the virtue‐ and vice‐rules (v‐rules) for action guidance. 相似文献
2.
Seay G 《Kennedy Institute of Ethics journal》2002,12(3):279-298
Moral-theory skepticism is not an option in any sort of thinking that could actually be used in resolving dilemmas in applied ethics, since its characteristic doctrines entail positions that in practice often will lead to a kind of paralysis in in moral reasoning, where persons faced with having to decide what to do in particularly difficulty cases are unable to rule out the most implausible conclusions. Moral-theory skepticism thus makes it difficult to formulate decision-making procedures that will provide guidance in action, and, so, seems not to succeed as a fully coherent account of moral reasoning. 相似文献
3.
Medical decisions regarding end-of-life care have undergone significant changes in recent decades, driven by changes in both medicine and society. Catholic tradition in medical ethics offers clear guidance in many issues, and a moral framework accessible to those who do not share the same faith as well as to members of its faith community. In some areas, a Catholic perspective can be seen clearly and confidently, such as in teachings on the permissibility of suicide and euthanasia. In others, such as withdrawal of nutrition and hydration, the Church does not yet speak with one voice and has not closed out the discussion. Yet, it is not in the teaching on individual issues that a Catholic moral tradition offers the most help and comfort, but in its account of what it means to lead a life in Christ, and to prepare for a Christian death. As in the problem of pain and suffering, it is the spiritual support more than the ethical guidance that helps both patients and physicians bear the unbearable and fathom the unfathomable. 相似文献
4.
Davis M 《Science and engineering ethics》2007,13(2):171-189
Most professional societies, scientific associations, and the like that undertake to write a code of ethics do so using other codes as models but without much (practical) guidance about how to do the work. The existing literature on codes is much more concerned with content than procedure. This paper adds to guidance already in the literature what I learned from participating in the writing of an important code of ethics. The guidance is given in the form of "rules" each of which is explained and (insofar as possible) justified. The emphasis is on procedure. 相似文献
5.
F. Scott McElreath 《South African Journal of Philosophy》2018,37(1):69-79
Many defenders of contemporary virtue ethics contend that it directly competes with modern ethical theories such as consequentialism and deontology. One of the most common responses is that contemporary virtue ethics does not compare well because its proponents fail to provide guidance to an agent who is deliberating about what she should do. There are at least four different types of action-guiding objections to an ethical theory. They are based on moral dilemmas, indeterminacy, knowledge, and reasonable judgment. I will show how three current versions of virtue ethics are subject to at least one of those objections. 相似文献
6.
Frans Svensson 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2010,13(3):255-271
Conceived of as a contender to other theories in substantive ethics, virtue ethics is often associated with, in essence, the
following account or criterion of right action: VR: An action A is right for S in circumstances C if and only if a fully virtuous
agent would characteristically do A in C. There are serious objections to VR, which take the form of counter-examples. They
present us with different scenarios in which less than fully virtuous persons would be acting rightly in doing what no fully
virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. In this paper, various proposals for how to revise VR in
order to avoid these counter-examples are considered. I will argue that in so far as the revised accounts really do manage
to steer clear of the counter-examples to VR, something which it turns out is not quite true for all of them, they instead
fall prey to other damaging objections. I end by discussing the future of virtue ethics, given what has come to light in the
previous sections of the paper. In particular, I sketch the outlines of a virtue ethical account of rightness that is structurally
different from VR. This account also faces important problems. Still, I suggest that further scrutiny is required before we
are in a position to make a definitive decision about its fate. 相似文献
7.
Professor P. Aarne Vesilind 《Science and engineering ethics》1996,2(3):307-318
Engineers and scientists, whose professional responsibilities often influence the natural environment, have sought to develop
an environmental ethic that will be in tune with their attitudes toward the non-human environment, and that will assist them
in decision making regarding questions of environmental quality. In this paper the classical traditions in normative ethics
are explored in an attempt to formulate such an environmental ethic. I conclude, however, that because the discipline of ethics
is directed at person-person interactions, ethics as a scholarly discipline does not help us understand how we ought to treat
non-human nature. We therefore cannot look to ethics as a source for understanding our attitudes and for providing guidance
to our actions with regard to the environment. To do so is to ask too much of ethics.
If we are to find an acceptable environmental morality, it must come from a new paradigm. One approach might be to understand
our attitudes on the basis of spirituality, modeled after animistic religions. 相似文献
8.
Michal S. Raucher 《The Journal of religious ethics》2016,44(4):636-658
This essay offers a Jewish approach to ethnography in religious ethics. Following the work of other ethnographers working in religious ethics, I explore how an ethnographic account of reproductive ethics among Haredi (ultra‐Orthodox) Jewish women in Jerusalem enhances and improves Jewish ethical discourse. I argue that ethnography should become an integral part of Jewish ethics for three reasons. First, with a contextual approach to guidance and application of law and norms, an ethnographic approach to Jewish ethics parallels the way ethical decisions are made on a daily basis in Jewish communities. Second, ethnography bolsters the voices of those involved in ethical discourse. Third, ethnography facilitates the bridge between local ethical questions and global ethical discourse. 相似文献
9.
《Philosophical Papers》2012,41(2):247-265
Abstract Robert Johnson argues that virtue ethical accounts of right action fail because they cannot take account of the fact that there are things we ought to do precisely because we do not possess virtuous character traits. Self-improving actions are his paradigm case and it would indeed be a problem if virtue ethics could not make sense of the propriety of self-improvement. To solve this serious problem, I propose that virtue ethics ought to define right action in terms of the virtuous agent's reasons for action instead of defining right action in terms of the actions that the virtuous agent performs. I argue that this revised definition of right action makes sense of the Tightness of self-improving actions and that it can be given a genuinely virtue ethical interpretation. 相似文献
10.
"必要伤害"是在对不伤害原则理论缺陷的反思、挖掘和借鉴西方生态伦理学有关解决人与自然矛盾和冲突的伦理思想的基础上,提出的新的道德规范原则。它包括:人类为了自身的利益对自然界不得不做出的损害;人类为了自然的完整和稳定不得不对自身的权利做出让步、节制而造成的损害。"必要伤害"原则的提出,既丰富和完善生态伦理学的道德原则体系,又为人们的生态道德实践提供了有效的行为指导。 相似文献
11.
Philippe Chuard 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(2):277-306
Virtue ethicists argue that modern ethical theories aim to give direct guidance about particular situations at the cost of offering artificial or narrow accounts of ethics. In contrast, virtue ethical theories guide action indirectly by helping one understand the virtues—but the theory will not provide answers as to what to do in particular instances. Recently, this had led many to think that virtue ethical theories are self-effacing the way some claim consequentialist and deontological theories are. In this paper I defend virtue ethics against the charge of self-effacement. I distinguish between modestly self-effacing theories, immodestly self-effacing theories and theories that recommend indirect guidance. Though all self-effacing theories are indirect, not all indirect theories are self-effacing. I argue that virtue ethics is not self-effacing, but rather indirectly action-guiding. The response I articulate draws on the distinctive virtue ethical mode of action-guidance: namely, that thinking hard about virtue and what kind of person one aims to be offers the kind of guidance we want (or should want) as we face practical moral problems. 相似文献
12.
Justin Oakley 《Ratio》1996,9(2):128-152
The revival of virtue ethics over the last thirty-five years has produced a bewildering diversity of theories, which on the face of it seem united only by their opposition to various features of more familiar Kantian and Utilitarian ethical theories. In this paper I present a systematic account of the main positive features of virtue ethics, by articulating the common ground shared by its different varieties. I do so not to offer a fresh defence of virtue ethics, but rather to provide a conceptual map that locates its main claims and arguments in relation to those of rival theories, and identifies its distinctive contribution to contemporary ethics. I set out six specific claims which are made by all forms of virtue ethics, and I explain how these claims distinguish the theory from recent character-based forms of Kantian ethics and Utilitarianism. I then use this framework to briefly survey two main strands of virtue ethics which have been developed in the literature.1 相似文献
13.
David C. Thomasma Ph.D. 《The Journal of medical humanities》1984,5(1):63-79
A purely deductive medical ethics cannot properly account for the varieties of circumstances which arise in medical practice. By contrast, a purely inductive medical ethics lacks sufficient guidance from ethical principles. In resolving ethical dilemmas in medicine, most often an appeal is made to middle-level axioms and methodological rules to mediate between theory and practice. I argue that this appeal must be augmented by considerations of context, such considerations, in effect, constituting a moral rule based on the social structure of medical practice. A contextual grid is proposed which assists the process of weighing values in resolving cases. 相似文献
14.
Lekan T 《Journal of applied philosophy》2004,21(2):183-195
In this paper I argue that the standoff between justice and care approaches to animal ethics presents us with a false dilemma. We should take justice's focus on reasoning from principles, and care's use of sympathetic awareness, as two integrated deliberative capacities necessary for the consideration of arguments for extending moral concern to animals. Such an integrated approach rests on a plausible account of the psychology of moral deliberation. I develop my argument as follows. Section I summarizes the nature of the debate between justice and care approaches to animal ethics, focusing on Brian Luke's arguments against justice approaches. Section II provides pro-justice rebuttals to Luke's objections. These rebuttals, while largely successful against Luke's objections, do not account for the intuition that sympathy does play a central epistemological role in animal ethics. Section III explains how sympathy cognitively simulates the perspective of the other, and thus can play an epistemological role in animal ethics. I argue that the abilities to simulate the perspective of the other and to reason from moral principles can complement each other. In section IV, I argue that though it may not be desirable to use both sympathy and reasoning from principles in all moral deliberation, it is a desirable aim when offering, and considering, moral arguments for what I will term the "extensionist project" of extending over moral concern to animals. I make this idea plausible by elucidating the claim that arguments for this project are best thought of as second-order deliberations about our first-order deliberative life. 相似文献
15.
Mario Brandhorst 《Philosophical Investigations》2017,40(1):64-81
In a previous paper, I argued that the later Wittgenstein did not endorse a realist account of ethics, where a realist account is understood to involve a claim to truth as well as objectivity. In this paper, I respond to a number of critical questions that Benjamin De Mesel raises about that interpretation. I agree with him that just as there are uses for expressions such as “truth”, “fact” and “reality” in ethics, there are uses for expressions such as “objectivity” that do not involve a deeper realist commitment. But I uphold and reinforce my claim that objectivity in ethics as the realist conceives it is ruled out by Wittgenstein, who describes the correspondence between ethical expressions and reality in an entirely different way. 相似文献
16.
《1844年经济学哲学手稿》伦理思想研究 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
《手稿》较之马克思的其它著作有较为丰富的伦理思想,但其仍不是一本伦理学专著。综观《手稿》,其伦理思想,似可包括如下几方面:一是劳动异化和共产主义理论的人本价值导向;二是人论思想,奠定了马克思主义伦理学的理论基础;三是关于经济伦理或对资产阶级经济伦理的批判;四是其它伦理学观点。 相似文献
17.
Anita J. Tarzian Lucia D. Wocial The ASBH Clinical Ethics Consultation Affairs Committee 《The American journal of bioethics : AJOB》2015,15(5):38-51
For decades a debate has played out in the literature about who bioethicists are, what they do, whether they can be considered professionals qua bioethicists, and, if so, what professional responsibilities they are called to uphold. Health care ethics consultants are bioethicists who work in health care settings. They have been seeking guidance documents that speak to their special relationships/duties toward those they serve. By approving a Code of Ethics and Professional Responsibilities for Health Care Ethics Consultants, the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) has moved the professionalization debate forward in a significant way. This first code of ethics focuses on individuals who provide health care ethics consultation (HCEC) in clinical settings. The evolution of the code's development, implications for the field of HCEC and bioethics, and considerations for future directions are presented here. 相似文献
18.
Champions of virtue ethics frequently appeal to moral perception: the notion that virtuous people can “see” what to do. According
to a traditional account of virtue, the cultivation of proper feeling through imitation and habituation issues in a sensitivity
to reasons to act. Thus, we learn to see what to do by coming to feel the demands of courage, kindness, and the like. But virtue ethics also claims superiority over other theories that adopt
a perceptual moral epistemology, such as intuitionism – which John McDowell criticizes for illicitly “borrow[ing] the epistemological
credentials” of perception. In this paper, I suggest that the most promising way for virtue ethics to use perceptual metaphors
innocuously is by adopting a skill model of virtue, on which the virtues are modeled on forms of practical know-how. Yet I
contend that this model is double-edged for virtue ethics. The skill model belies some central ambitions and dogmas of the
traditional view, especially its most idealized claims about virtue and the virtuous. While this may be a cost that its champions
are unprepared to pay, I suggest that virtue ethics would do well to embrace a more realistic moral psychology and a correspondingly
less sublime conception of virtue. 相似文献
19.
Adela Cortina 《Journal of Global Ethics》2014,10(1):30-37
Our challenge for the twenty-first century consists in showing how to construct a global ethics and in trying to discover a rational foundation for it, which may be used as guidance for action and as a norm for the criticism of specific situations. I argue that four tasks must be accomplished to construct a global ethics: (1) Construct that global governance or that world government that makes cosmopolitan citizenship possible. (2) Foster the joint work of bioethics, economic and business ethics, and development ethics – areas of applied ethics, each one of which on its own has reached the global level. (3) Discover a rational basis for a global ethics, which has a universal normative force, but assumes cultural differences. (4) Develop and promote a dilaogical ethics of cordial reason, which renders one capable of compassion and care. 相似文献
20.
Rhodes R 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2001,22(6):493-504
This paper offers a constructivist account of bioethics as an alternative to previous discussions that explained the ethics
of medicine by an extrapolation of principles or virtues from ordinary morality. Taking medicine as a higher and special calling,
I argue that the practice of medicine would be impossible without the trust of patients. Because trust is a necessary condition
for medical practice, the ethics of the profession must provide the principles for guiding physician behavior and the profession
toward promoting trust and being trustworthy. In a phrase, that principle is “seek trust and deserve it.” I sketch out how
the concept of trust provides a different justification for common sense principles of bioethics and explain how the concept
of trust provides reasonable guidance for resolving moral conflicts within medicine. The trust-seeking approach provides a
new and unexpected ordering of some traditional medical values, it reveals the weightiness of previously undervalued bioethical
precepts, and illuminates the centrality of some largely ignored obligations of medicine. It also has the power to guide clinical
practice and to inform the profession about standards for medical institutions.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献