In defense of "lineal causality"

It has often been said that ideas about lineal and circular causality may be theoretically profound, but that the reputed impossibility of lineal causality seems to fly in the face of our experience and our common sense. The above humorous jibe at theory goes straight to the heart of the matter. Bateson's epistemology of lineal and circular causality does not describe our everyday experience. Bateson's epistemology explains our experience.     

On phallic defense

The main theme of this paper is a consideration of some fundamental findings with regard to the oedipus complex and phallicism. By these terms is meant the oedipal sexual wish, the urgent need for defence against it and its attendant problems, and the phallic notion of only one kind of genital—the phallus—existing. The object of investigation is the potential use of phallicism as a defensive organization against the problems of the oedipal phase.     

Anna Freud exposes herself to criticism. "The ego and and the mechanisms of defense" under the magnifying glass]

In the early 1970's members and guests of the Hampstead Clinic, under the guidance of Joseph Sandler, discussed Anna Freud's The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence, which had been published in 1936, with its author. Elrod presents this discussion in excerpts and emphasizes the undogmatic approach to psychoanalytic theory evident in Anna Freud's and Joseph Sandler's contributions.     

In defense of naturalism

History and the modern sciences are characterized by what is sometimes called a “methodological naturalism” that disregards talk of divine agency. Some religious thinkers argue that this reflects a dogmatic materialism: a non-negotiable and a priori commitment to a materialist metaphysics. In response to this charge, I make a sharp distinction between procedural requirements and metaphysical commitments. The procedural requirement of history and the sciences—that proposed explanations appeal to publicly-accessible bodies of evidence—is non-negotiable, but has no metaphysical implications. The metaphysical commitment is naturalistic, but is both a posteriori and provisional, arising from the fact that for more than 400 years no proposed theistic explanation has been shown capable of meeting the procedural requirement. I argue that there is nothing to prevent religious thinkers from seeking to overturn this metaphysically naturalistic stance. But in order to do so they would need to show that their proposed theistic explanations are the best available explanations of a range of phenomena. Until this has been done, the metaphysical naturalism of history and the sciences remains defensible.