Approach motivation and the expansion of self in close relationships

The self‐expansion model posits that individuals are fundamentally motivated to expand their sense of self. It is proposed that approach—but not avoidance—motivation underlies self‐expansion and that approach‐motivated individuals should be especially interested in self‐expanding with a person who provides many novel resources, identities, and perspectives. In Studies 1, 2a, and 2b, correlational evidence that self‐expansion is associated with both relationship‐specific and global measures of approach motivation, but is unrelated to avoidance motivation, was found. In Study 3, experimental evidence that approach motivation increases sensitivity to self‐expansion opportunities, such that individuals high in approach motivation are especially attracted to targets who offer many expansion opportunities and unattracted to targets who offer few expansion opportunities was found. Taken together, these studies provide evidence that self‐expansion is rooted in approach motivation.     

Weighted least squares fitting using ordinary least squares algorithms

A general approach for fitting a model to a data matrix by weighted least squares (WLS) is studied. This approach consists of iteratively performing (steps of) existing algorithms for ordinary least squares (OLS) fitting of the same model. The approach is based on minimizing a function that majorizes the WLS loss function. The generality of the approach implies that, for every model for which an OLS fitting algorithm is available, the present approach yields a WLS fitting algorithm. In the special case where the WLS weight matrix is binary, the approach reduces to missing data imputation.This research has been made possible by a fellowship from the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences to the author.     

Distributed Cognition in Scientific Contexts

Even though it has been argued that scientific cognition is distributed, there is no consensus on the exact nature of distributed cognition. This paper aims to characterize distributed cognition as appropriate for philosophical studies of science. I first classify competing characterizations into three types: the property approach, the task approach, and the system approach. It turns out that the property approach and the task approach are subject to criticism. I then argue that the most preferable way to understand distributed cognition in science is provided by the system approach that takes a distributed-cognitive system as the unit of analysis. I clarify this position by considering possible objections and replies.     

Demystifying Meaning

Abstract

Some philosophers find linguistic meaning mysterious. Two approaches suggest themselves for removing the felt mystery, or demystifying meaning. One involves providing a substantive account of meaning in meaning-free terms. Although this approach has come under serious attack in recent years, Paul Horwich has recently presented a version of the approach that might be thought impervious. A preliminary attempt is made to argue that Horwich's version is vulnerable to the considerations felt to undermine other versions of the substantive approach to demystification. That leaves the second approach, quietism, which involves showing that although meaning is primitive it is un-mysterious. It is suggested that this approach is worthy of exploration.     

Bayesian nonparametric model selection and model testing

This article examines a Bayesian nonparametric approach to model selection and model testing, which is based on concepts from Bayesian decision theory and information theory. The approach can be used to evaluate the predictive-utility of any model that is either probabilistic or deterministic, with that model analyzed under either the Bayesian or classical-frequentist approach to statistical inference. Conditional on an observed set of data, generated from some unknown true sampling density, the approach identifies the “best” model as the one that predicts a sampling density that explains the most information about the true density. Furthermore, in the approach, the decision is to reject a model when it does not explain enough information about the true density (according to a straightforward calibration of the Kullback-Leibler divergence measure). The posterior estimate of the true density is based on a Bayesian nonparametric prior that can give positive support to the entire space of sampling densities (defined on some sample space). This article also discusses the theoretical and practical advantages of the Bayesian nonparametric approach over all other types of model selection procedures, and over any model testing procedure that depends on interpreting a p-value. Finally, the Bayesian nonparametric approach is illustrated on four real data sets, in the comparison and testing of order-constrained models, cognitive models, models of choice-behavior, and a test of a general psychometric model.     

Approach and Avoidance Relationship Commitment

The current paper proposes that relationship commitment is a goal; and as such, is regulated by the approach and avoidance dimensions. We suggest that two types of commitment exist: approach commitment, the desire to maintain and continue the relationship, and avoidance commitment, the desire to avoid relationship dissolution. Specifically, approach commitment is associated with a desire for future relationship incentives and rewards; and avoidance commitment is a desire to avoid the negative consequences or costs of relationship dissolution. In this paper, we evaluate previous research on relationship commitment from an approach and avoidance goal theory perspective, and then present an approach and avoidance commitment model and hypotheses testable in future research.     

A modal view of the semantics of theoretical sentences

In this paper, a new account of empirical claims in structuralism is developed. Its novelty derives from the use that is made of the linguistic approach to scientific theories despite the presumed incompatibility of structuralism with that approach. It is shown how the linguistic approach can be applied to the framework of structuralism if the semantic foundations of that approach are refined to do justice to the doctrine of indirect interpretation of theoretical terms. This doctrine goes back to Carnap but has been advanced until the present day without a proper semantic explanation.     

Alone and happy: Personality moderates the effect of happy mood on social approach

Happy moods are believed to evoke an approach orientation and to broaden one’s potential courses of action. Although positivity is strongly associated with approach, social approach is a more complex behavior because interacting with other individuals can offer either positive or negative consequences. We provide novel experimental evidence that happiness actually reduces social approach among individuals whose happiness might be threatened by social interaction. Specifically, experimentally induced mood interacted with participants’ personality, such that participants who were high in social inhibition (e.g., shyness, rejection sensitivity) sat further away from another individual when in a happy mood. We suggest that happiness may produce a general orientation to approach other individuals except when such approach threatens mood.     

New account of empirical claims in structuralism

In this paper, a new account of empirical claims in structuralism is developed. Its novelty derives from the use that is made of the linguistic approach to scientific theories despite the presumed incompatibility of structuralism with that approach. It is shown how the linguistic approach can be applied to the framework of structuralism if the semantic foundations of that approach are refined to do justice to the doctrine of indirect interpretation of theoretical terms. This doctrine goes back to Carnap but has been advanced until the present day without a proper semantic explanation.     

Should We Approach Approach and Avoid Avoidance? An Inquiry from Different Levels

Abstract

Approach motivation (striving for desired end-states, eagerly focusing on where one wants to be) is often held up as the best type of motivation: It feels good and is associated with many positive outcomes. Indeed, a common perception is that regulation in terms of approach motivation is almost always better than regulation in terms of avoidance motivation. However, as we discuss, this conclusion is worthy of a deeper look. We consider how approach and avoidance motivation manifest at different levels in a self-regulatory hierarchy and how this can help us understand the upsides and downsides of both approach and avoidance motivation. In other words, approach motivation is not always beneficial and avoidance motivation is not always problematic. Understanding these trade-offs involves a consideration of which level in the hierarchy approach or avoidance is manifested, what types of outcomes are being examined (the experience of regulation vs. performance), and how the approach or avoidance regulation fits or does not fit with an individual’s broad concerns or specific situational demands. Furthermore, a hierarchical approach helps make sense of behaviors that reflect simultaneous approach and avoidance tendencies, such as tactical approach to remove (avoid) a threat, providing a dynamic and nuanced view of motivation.     

Consequentialism and the World in Time

Consequentialism is a general approach to understanding the nature of morality that seems to entail a certain view of the world in time. This entailment raises specific problems for the approach. The first seems to lead to the conclusion that every actual act is right – an unacceptable result for any moral theory. The second calls into question the idea that consequentialism is an approach to morality, for it leads to the conclusion that this approach produces a theory whose truth does not depend in any way on the nature of rational beings or value.     

Toward a new approach to the study of personality in culture

We review recent developments in the study of culture and personality measurement. Three approaches are described: an etic approach that focuses on establishing measurement equivalence in imported measures of personality, an emic (indigenous) approach that studies personality in specific cultures, and a combined emic-etic approach to personality. We propose the latter approach as a way of combining the methodological rigor of the etic approach and the cultural sensitivity of the emic approach. The combined approach is illustrated by two examples: the first with origins in Chinese culture and the second in South Africa. The article ends with a discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of the combined emic-etic approach for the study of culture and personality and for psychology as a science.     

Time Flies When You're Having Approach-Motivated Fun: Effects of Motivational Intensity on Time Perception

Time flies when you're having fun, but what is it about pleasant experiences that makes time seem to go by faster? In the experiments reported here, we tested the proposal that approach motivation causes perceptual shortening of time during pleasant experiences. Relative to a neutral state or a positive state with low approach motivation (Experiment 1), a positive state with high approach motivation shortened perceptions of time. Also, individual differences in approach motivation predicted shorter perceptions of time. In Experiment 2, we manipulated approach motivation independently of the affective state and showed that increasing approach motivation caused time to be perceived as passing more quickly. In Experiment 3, we showed that positive approach motivation, as opposed to arousal, shortens perception of time by comparing a highly arousing positive state with a highly arousing negative state. Shortening of time perception in appetitive states may prolong approach-motivated behavior and increase the likelihood of acquiring appetitive objects or goals.     

Blameworthiness, Vice, and The Objectivity of Morals

Abstract: The following thesis is defended: whether actions are morally required is an objective matter – that is, independent of the beliefs, intentions, etc. with which the actions are preformed. This thesis needs defending because it seems vulnerable to certain counterexamples. One approach to dealing with these counterexamples centers on the concept of blameworthiness, but this approach is flawed. An alternative approach is developed that relies on the concept of a vicious action. And although it too centers on the concept of blameworthiness, it lacks the flaws that are present in the original approach.     

Inferences from memory: strategy- and exemplar-based judgment models compared

What are the cognitive processes underlying people's inferences from memory? To provide an answer, the exemplar-based approach to predicting people's inferences is tested against the strategy-based approach. Exemplar models assume that people make inferences about objects by retrieving similar objects from memory. In contrast, the strategy-based approach assumes that people select cognitive strategies that make inferences based on abstracted knowledge and information the inference situation provides. In Experiment 1, in which dichotomous feedback on the level of pair-comparisons was provided, almost all participants were classified as using a simple lexicographic strategy. In Experiment 2, in which continuous feedback for single objects was provided, most participants were classified as using a compensatory strategy. Both experiments suggest that the strategy-based approach is more suitable for predicting people's inferences from memory than the exemplar-based approach. The strategy-based approach shows how people adapt to inference situations by selecting different cognitive strategies.     

Response to Commentaries: Actions as Perceptual-Conceptual "Gestalts"

The author clarifies the objective and essence of the psychological, or perceptual-cognitive, approach to voluntary movement. According to that approach, voluntary movements are organized and performed as meaningful, perceptible events with bodily and environmental aspects. Body-oriented control is thus not neglected in the perceptual-cognitive approach but is actually an important issue. He further clarifies how material and psychological factors relate to each other in motor control and why they are not considered a coalition of constraints. The central importance of the sparse coding principle for the perceptual-cognitive approach is underlined. Finally, the author argues that the psychological information format is particularly suitable for motion control and stresses the power of the perceptual-cognitive approach to possibly provide a unifying framework for understanding human voluntary movements.     

Against the New Fictionalism: A Hybrid View of Scientific Models

This article develops an approach to modelling and models in science—the hybrid view—that is against model fictionalism of a recent stripe (the ‘new fictionalism’ that takes models to be imaginary entities that are analogous to works of fiction). It further argues that there is a version of fictionalism about models to which my approach is neutral and which makes sense only if one adopts a special sort of antirealism (e.g. constructive empiricism). Otherwise, my approach strongly suggests that one stay away from fictionalism and embrace realism directly.     

Death’s Badness and Time-Relativity: A Reply to Purves

According to John Martin Fischer and Anthony Brueckner’s unique version of the deprivation approach to accounting for death’s badness, it is rational for us to have asymmetric attitudes toward prenatal and posthumous nonexistence. In previous work, I have defended this approach against a criticism raised by Jens Johansson by attempting to show that Johansson’s criticism relies on an example that is incoherent. Recently, Duncan Purves has argued that my defense reveals an incoherence not only in Johansson’s example but also in Fischer and Brueckner’s approach itself. Here I argue that by paying special attention to a certain feature of Fischer and Brueckner’s approach, we can dispense of not only Johansson’s criticism but also of Purves’s objection to Fischer and Brueckner’s approach.