Analogical reasoning and the differential outcome effect: transitory bridging of the conceptual gap for rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta)

Monkeys, unlike chimpanzees and humans, have a marked difficulty acquiring relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) tasks that likely reflect the cognitive foundation upon which analogical reasoning rests. In the present study, rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) completed a categorical (identity and nonidentity) RMTS task with differential reward (pellet ratio) and/or punishment (timeout ratio) outcomes for correct and incorrect choices. Monkeys in either differential reward-only or punishment-only conditions performed at chance levels. However, the RMTS performance of monkeys experiencing both differential reward and punishment conditions was significantly better than chance. Subsequently when all animals experienced nondifferential outcomes tests, their RMTS performance levels were at chance. These results indicate that combining differential reward and punishment contingencies provide an effective, albeit transitory, scaffolding for monkeys to judge analogical relations-between-relations.     

Generalized relational matching by guinea baboons (Papio papio) in two-by-two-item analogy problems

Analogical reasoning is considered the hallmark of human reasoning, but some studies have demonstrated that language- and symbol-trained chimpanzees can also reason analogically. Despite the potential adaptive value of this ability, evidence from other studies strongly suggests that other nonhuman primates do not have this capacity for analogical reasoning. In our three experiments, 6 of 29 baboons acquired the ability to perform a relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) task in which pairs of shapes composed relational displays. Five of these 6 monkeys then transferred this ability to RMTS tasks using novel exemplars of identity (elements in a pair are the same) and nonidentity (elements in a pair are different) relations. This transfer occurred even on trials in which the incorrect pair shared an element with the sample pair with which it was being compared. The baboons retained this ability 12 months later. The findings from our study of symbol-naive monkeys indicate that although language and symbol training facilitate conceptual thinking in nonhuman primates, such training is not a prerequisite for analogical reasoning.     

Chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) relational matching: playing by their own (analogical) rules

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) have been known to exhibit rudimentary abilities in analogical reasoning (Flemming, Beran, Thompson, Kleider, & Washburn, 2008; Gillian, Premack, & Woodruff, 1981; Haun & Call, 2009; Thompson & Oden, 2000; Thompson, Oden, & Boysen, 1997). With a wide array of individual differences, little can be concluded about the species' capacity for analogies, much less their strategies employed for solving such problems. In this study, we examined analogical strategies in 3 chimpanzees using a 3-dimensional search task (e.g., Kennedy & Fragaszy, 2008). Food items were hidden under 1 of 2 or 3 plastic cups of varying sizes. Subsequently, chimpanzees searched for food under the cup of the same relative size in their own set of cups--reasoning by analogy. Two chimpanzees initially appeared to fail the first relational phase of the task. Meta-analyses revealed, however, that they were instead using a secondary strategy not rewarded by the contingencies of the task--choosing on the basis of the same relative position in the sample. Although this was not the intended strategy of the task, it was nonetheless analogical. In subsequent phases of the task, chimpanzees eventually learned to shift their analogical reasoning strategy to match the reward contingencies of the task and successfully choose on the basis of relative size. This evidence not only provides support for the analogical ape hypothesis (Thompson & Oden, 2000), but also exemplifies how foundational conceptually mediated analogical behavior may be for the chimpanzee.     

Fading perceptual resemblance: A path for rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) to conceptual matching?

Cognitive, comparative, and developmental psychologists have long been intrigued by humans’ and animals’ capacity to respond to abstract relations like sameness and difference, because this capacity may underlie crucial aspects of cognition like analogical reasoning. Recently, this capacity has been explored in higher-order, relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) tasks in which humans and animals try to complete analogies of sameness and difference between disparate groups of items. The authors introduced a new paradigm to this area, by yoking the relational-matching cue to a perceptual-matching cue. Then, using established algorithms for shape distortion, the perceptual cue was weakened and eliminated. Humans’ RMTS performance easily transcended the elimination of perceptual support. In contrast, RMTS performance by six macaques faltered as they were weaned from perceptual support. No macaque showed evidence of mature RMTS performance, even given more than 260,000 training trials during which we tried to coax a relational-matching performance from them. It is an important species difference that macaques show so hesitant a response to conceptual relations when humans respond to them so effortlessly. It raises theoretical questions about the emergence of this crucial capacity during humans’ cognitive evolution and during humans’ cognitive development.     

Analogical reasoning in a capuchin monkey (Cebus apella)

Previous evidence has suggested that analogical reasoning (recognizing similarities among object relations when the objects themselves are dissimilar) is limited to humans and apes. This study investigated whether capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) can use analogical reasoning to solve a 3-dimensional search task. The task involved hiding a food item under 1 of 2 or 3 plastic cups of different sizes and then allowing subjects to search for food hidden under the cup of analogous size in their own set of cups. Four monkeys were exposed to a series of relational matching tasks. If subjects reached criterion on these tasks, they were exposed to relational transfer tasks involving novel stimuli. Three of the monkeys failed to reach criterion on the basic relational matching tasks and therefore were not tested further. One monkey, however, revealed above-chance performance on a series of transfer tasks with 3 novel stimuli. This evidence suggests that contrary to previous arguments, a member of a New World monkey species can solve an analogical problem.     

工作记忆对类比推理的影响

该实验采用2(类比推理类型)×6(组别)双因素实验设计来探讨工作记忆与类比推理之间的关系,尤其关注工作记忆的各个子成分对类比推理的影响。控制组的被试只需完成类比推理测验,而实验组的被试是在双任务的条件下进行实验。结果表明,工作记忆是影响类比推理的一个重要因素。在图形类比推理中,主要有视空间模板中的空间成分,语音回路中的发音成分以及中央执行器的参与;在言语类比推理中,则是视空间模板中的空间成分起主要作用。     

Sequential responding and planning in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)

Previous experiments have assessed planning during sequential responding to computer generated stimuli by Old World nonhuman primates including chimpanzees and rhesus macaques. However, no such assessment has been made with a New World primate species. Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) are an interesting test case for assessing the distribution of cognitive processes in the Order Primates because they sometimes show proficiency in tasks also mastered by apes and Old World monkeys, but in other cases fail to match the proficiency of those other species. In two experiments, eight capuchin monkeys selected five arbitrary stimuli in distinct locations on a computer monitor in a learned sequence. In Experiment 1, shift trials occurred in which the second and third stimuli were transposed when the first stimulus was selected by the animal. In Experiment 2, mask trials occurred in which all remaining stimuli were masked after the monkey selected the first stimulus. Monkeys made more mistakes on trials in which the locations of the second and third stimuli were interchanged than on trials in which locations were not interchanged, suggesting they had already planned to select a location that no longer contained the correct stimulus. When mask trials occurred, monkeys performed at levels significantly better than chance, but their performance exceeded chance levels only for the first and the second selections on a trial. These data indicate that capuchin monkeys performed very similarly to chimpanzees and rhesus monkeys and appeared to plan their selection sequences during the computerized task, but only to a limited degree.     

Categorical Perception and Conceptual Judgments by Nonhuman Primates: The Paleological Monkey and the Analogical Ape

Studies of the conceptual abilities of nonhuman primates demonstrate the substantial range of these abilities as well as their limitations. Such abilities range from categorization on the basis of shared physical attributes, associative relations and functions to abstract concepts as reflected in analogical reasoning about relations between relations. The pattern of results from these studies point to a fundamental distinction between monkeys and apes in both their implicit and explicit conceptual capacities. Monkeys, but not apes, might be best regarded as “paleo‐logicans” in the sense that they form common class concepts of identity on the basis of identical predicates (i.e., shared features). The discrimination of presumably more abstract relations commonly involves relatively simple procedural strategies mediated by associative processes likely shared by all mammals. There is no evidence that monkeys can perceive, let alone judge, relations‐between‐relations. This analogical conceptual capacity is found only in chimpanzees and humans. Interestingly, the “analogical ape,” like the child, can make its analogical knowledge explicit only if it is first provided with a symbol system by which propositional representations can be encoded and manipulated.     

Problem restructuring processes for ill-structured verbal analogies

The processes involved in analogy solving have been an important investigative area in cognitive psychology. Although problem restructuring has been a central construct in problem solving theory, no restructuring processes have been proposed for analogical reasoning. Yet, the stimulus terms for analogies, as they appear on ability tests, are often ill-structured. That is, they are ordered in a way that does not permit direct problem comprehension. In the current study, both perceptual and semantic problem restructuring processes were hypothesized for analogy solving. The independence, stage of execution, and susceptibility to strategic control of the two processes were examined. The results from two experiments indicated that (1) ill-structured analogies are restructured during problem solving, (2) perceptual and semantic restructuring processes are independent and executed at different stages of analogy solving, and (3) both processes exhibited automaticity since repetition of analogy solution attenuated but did not eliminate either restructuring process. A model of analogical reasoning that incorporated both restructuring processes and their execution sequences was proposed. The nature and automaticity of perceptual and semantic analogy restructuring processes were disscussed.     

The development of analogical reasoning processes.

Two experiments were conducted to test the generalizability to children of a theory of analogical reasoning processes originally proposed for adults (R. J. Sternberg, Psychological Review, 1977a, 84, 353–378; R. J. Sternberg, Intelligence, information processing, and analogical reasoning: The componential analysis of human abilities, Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1977b) and to examine the development of analogical reasoning processes in terms of five proposed sources of cognitive development: (a) availability of component operations; (b) strategy for combining multiple component operation; (c) strategy for combining multiple executions of the same component operation; (d) consistency in use of strategy; (e) component-operation latency and difficulty. Between 15 and 21 subjects in each of grades 2, 4, 6, and adulthood (ages 8, 10, 12, and 19 years, respectively) were tested in their ability to solve analogies of systematically varied difficulty. Performance was measured in terms of latencies for items solved correctly, latencies for all items solved, and error rates. A slightly modified version of the Stenberg, 1977(a), Stenberg, 1977(b) theory was found to be applicable to the data for each of the age levels tested. In analogies with perceptually separable attributes, change over age was found in sources (d) and (e) noted above. In analogies with perceptually integral attributes, change over age was found in sources (a), (c), (d), and (e). Developmental trends were discussed in terms of past theory and findings, and possible reasons for differences in developmental patterns between the two kinds of analogies were suggested.     

Interpretation of instructions: A source of individual differences in analogical reasoning

Two studies were conducted to identify individual differences in the effect of instruction on strategies used to solve figural/numerical analogies. In Study 1, students aged 9, 11, 13, and 19 years were given incomplete instructions and then were assessed for (a) consistent use of an appropriate rule for solving analogies and (b) the type and number of stimulus attributes that are incorporated in those analogical rules. Use of an analogical rule increased with age and corresponded to higher scores on a psychometric test of reasoning within each age group. In Study 2, analysis of verbal protocols was used to identify the strategies of some 9- and 11-year-olds who showed a peculiar pattern of responding in Study 1. These children attended to relevant attributes but used systematic nonanalogical rules to solve problems. When provided with more specific instructions, most of these children adopted an analogical rule but failed to incorporate relevant attributes. Results indicate that selection or construction of task-relevant solution strategies from incomplete instructions may partially account for differential performance on tests of analogical reasoning.     

Historical Analogies and the Definition of Interests: The Iranian Hostage Crisis and Ronald Reagan's Policy Toward the Hostages in Lebanon

Students of political psychology have long shown an interest in exploring how analogical reasoning affects decision-making. However, the existing literature on analogical reasoning has remained within the rationalist explanatory framework by assuming that an actor's interests can be deduced from that actor's position in a certain material structure, thus treating those interests as unaffected by the process of analogical reasoning. This assumption unduly restricts the role that analogies may play. Analogies can do more than simply allow decision-makers to figure out what specific policies will advance their preexisting interests—they can also determine the interests themselves. To demonstrate the benefits of moving the analogical literature beyond rationalism, this article explores the Reagan administration's policy toward American hostages in Lebanon, which culminated in the Iran-Contra scandal.     

任务难度和反馈学习对儿童类比推理能力的影响

该研究采用情景类比任务,通过两个实验对180名小学生进行纸笔测验,探讨了任务难度对儿童类比推理能力的影响.结果发现:进行反馈学习以降低任务难度时,7～8岁儿童能完成更高年龄段儿童才能完成的任务;但增加任务难度,11岁以上儿童也表现出类比推理能力的弱化.结果提示,儿童是否能在类比推理任务中表现出相应的能力可能取决于任务难度,反馈学习可促进一定年龄段内儿童的类比推理能力发展.本结果为有机融合皮亚杰和Goswami等人的观点提供了有效的实验依据.     

A computational account of children's analogical reasoning: balancing inhibitory control in working memory and relational representation

Theories accounting for the development of analogical reasoning tend to emphasize either the centrality of relational knowledge accretion or changes in information processing capability. Simulations in LISA (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003), a neurally inspired computer model of analogical reasoning, allow us to explore how these factors may collaboratively contribute to the development of analogy in young children. Simulations explain systematic variations in United States and Hong Kong children's performance on analogies between familiar scenes (Richland, Morrison & Holyoak, 2006; Richland, Chang, Morrison & Au, 2010). Specifically, changes in inhibition levels in the model's working-memory system explain the developmental progression in US children's ability to handle increases in relational complexity and distraction from object similarity during analogical reasoning. In contrast, changes in how relations are represented in the model best capture cross-cultural differences in performance between children of the same ages (3-4 years) in the United States and Hong Kong. We use these results and simulations to argue that the development of analogical reasoning in children may best be conceptualized as an equilibrium between knowledge accretion and the maturation of information processing capability.     

Tracking cognitive phases in analogical reasoning with event-related potentials

Analogical reasoning consists of multiple phases. Four-term analogies (A:B::C:D) have an encoding period in which the A:B pair is evaluated prior to a mapping phase. The electrophysiological timing associated with analogical reasoning has remained unclear. We used event-related potentials to identify neural timing related to analogical reasoning relative to perceptual and semantic control conditions. Spatiotemporal principal-components analyses revealed differences primarily in left frontal electrodes during encoding and mapping phases of analogies relative to the other conditions. The timing of the activity differed depending upon the phase of the problem. During the encoding of A:B terms, analogies elicited a positive deflection compared to the control conditions between 400 and 1,200 ms, but for the mapping phase analogical processing elicited a negative deflection that occurred earlier and for a shorter time period, between 350 and 625 ms. These results provide neural and behavioral evidence that 4-term analogy problems involve a highly active evaluation phase of the A:B pair.     

Components of analogical reasoning in a mildly head injured population

This study sought to investigate the effects of mild head injury on a particular type of cognitive ability, verbal analogical reasoning. The performance of 19 individuals with head injuries was compared to a group of 30 control subjects matched for age, education, and gender on 100 verbal analogies. Solution times and error rates were modeled. Unstandardized regression weights for individual subjects were correlated with subjects’ performance on a number of standardized ability tests. Results showed that compared to the control subjects, the head injured subjects: (a) were significantly slower to solve the analogies, and were particularly slow to perform certain processes: encoding/inference and comparison; (b) tended to show greater variability in performance; and (c) had data that had a poorer componential model fit. The data suggest that analogical reasoning is affected by a head injury, and that certain information processes may be responsible for performance deficits.     

5～9岁儿童在不同复杂性任务上类比推理的发展特点

采用经典的A:B:C:D范式,设计两类难度不同的图片任务,依据关系-表征复杂性模型从等级复杂性和水平复杂性角度分析任务难度.在此基础上,选取5～9岁115名儿童探讨两类任务上类比推理的特点和发展趋势.表明:(1)儿童类比推理呈现多样化特点,主要有:充分意义上掌握了类比推理、部分完成了类比推理、位置关系类比推理、不能类比推理和不确定情况类比推理,其中部分完成了类比推理是复杂任务上所特有的.(2)简单、复杂两类任务上,随着年龄增长,5-9岁儿童充分意义上掌握类比推理的人次比例不断上升,不能类比推理的人次比例不断下降.此外,复杂任务上,随年龄增长,部分完成类比任务的人次比例降低.结果表明,在简单任务上,前运算阶段儿童已具备了类比推理能力;但在复杂任务上,儿童到了具体运算阶段才具备类比推理能力.     

Convergent and divergent thinking in verbal analogy

Individual differences in convergent and divergent thinking may uniquely explain variation in analogical reasoning ability. Across two studies we investigated the relative influences of divergent and convergent thinking as predictors of verbal analogy performance. Performance on both convergent thinking (i.e., Remote Associates Test) and divergent thinking (i.e., Alternative Uses Task) uniquely predicted performance on both analogy selection (Studies 1 and 2) and analogical generation tasks (Study 2). Moreover, convergent and divergent thinking were predictive above and beyond creative behaviours in Study 1 and a composite measure of crystallised intelligence in Study 2. Verbal analogies in Study 2 also varied in semantic distance, with results demonstrating divergent thinking as a stronger predictor of analogy generation for semantically far than for semantically near analogies. Results thus further illuminate the link between analogical reasoning and creative cognition by demonstrating convergent and divergent thinking as predictors of verbal analogy.     

The in vivo/in vitro approach to cognition: the case of analogy

A new way of investigating cognition is proposed that combines naturalistic (in vivo) and experimental (in vitro) methods into a single approach. Investigating analogical reasoning by scientists 'live' at laboratory meetings (in vivo) we found that the types of analogies they use change with their goals. Unlike subjects in many cognitive 'reminding' experiments, scientists frequently used structural similarities in their analogies, as opposed to superficial similarities. By subsequently using the in vitro approach, we found that the use of structural information was associated with being asked to generate analogies and with the use of complex scenarios. Similar results are obtained in other areas of reasoning such as hypothesis testing and causal reasoning.     

Recognizing facial cues: individual discrimination by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta)

Faces are one of the most salient classes of stimuli involved in social communication. Three experiments compared face-recognition abilities in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). In the face-matching task, the chimpanzees matched identical photographs of conspecifics' faces on Trial 1, and the rhesus monkeys did the same after 4 generalization trials. In the individual-recognition task, the chimpanzees matched 2 different photographs of the same individual after 2 trials, and the rhesus monkeys generalized in fewer than 6 trials. The feature-masking task showed that the eyes were the most important cue for individual recognition. Thus, chimpanzees and rhesus monkeys are able to use facial cues to discriminate unfamiliar conspecifics. Although the rhesus monkeys required many trials to learn the tasks, this is not evidence that faces are not as important social stimuli for them as for the chimpanzees.