Casuistry as methodology in clinical ethics

This essay focuses on how casuistry can become a useful technique of practical reasoning for the clinical ethicist or ethics consultant. Casuistry is defined, its relationship to rhetorical reasoning and its interpretation of cases, by employing three terms that, while they are not employed by the classical rhetoricians and casuists, conform, in a general way, to the features of their work. Those terms are (1) morphology, (2) taxonomy, (3) kinetics. The morphology of a case reveals the invariant structure of the particular case whatever its contingent features, and also the invariant forms of argument relevant to any case of the same sort: these invariant features can be called topics. Taxonomy situates the instant case in a series of similar cases, allowing the similarities and differences between an instant case and a paradigm case to dictate the moral judgment about the instant case. This judgment is based, not merely on application of an ethical theory or principle, but upon the way in which circumstances and maxims appear in the morphology of the case itself and in comparison with other cases. Kinetics is an understanding of the way in which one case imparts a kind of moral movement to other cases, that is, different and sometimes unprecedented circumstances may move certain marginal or exceptional cases to the level of paradigm cases. In conclusion, casuistry is the exercise of prudential or practical reasoning in recognition of the relationship between maxims, circumstances and topics, as well as the relationship of paradigms to analogous cases.     

Re‐embedding Moral Agency

The connection between ethics and theological vision has become increasingly important for ethics as we better appreciate how the moral agent is embedded in a framework that affectively and intellectually shapes her moral reasoning. Moral reasoning is always reasoning within (that is, within a moral framework, a religious worldview, and/or a set of ideological commitments). A similar framing occurs in literature, which I refer to as its “horizon.” A literary text's horizon comprises the theological and metaphysical commitments that are implied by the text and that the reader relies on to make sense of it. I suggest that there is a parallel between how moral frameworks and literary horizons operate in that both shape moral judgment. I argue that in using literature as a resource for ethics, the same contemporary currents that have led us to appreciate the embeddedness of moral reasoning should also encourage us to give more careful attention to the theological or metaphysical vision implied by a text. Such a “theo‐ethical” reading of literature provides a richer understanding of particular moral goods and the interplay between those goods and ethical themes like agency, hope, and redemption. I substantiate this claim with a reading of William Blake's Jerusalem: The Emanation of the Giant Albion.     

The ethics of secret diplomacy: a contextual approach

Under what conditions is secret diplomacy normatively appropriate? Drawing on pragmatic theories of political and ethical judgement, this paper argues that a three-dimensional contextual approach centred on actors' reasoning process offers an innovative and reliable analytical tool for bridging the ethical gap of secret diplomacy. Using the case of the US extraordinary rendition programme, the paper concludes that secret diplomacy is ethically unjustifiable when actors fail to invoke normatively relevant principles of justification, inappropriately apply them to the context of the case and when the actors' moral reasoning process suffers from deficient levels of critical reflection concerning the broader implications of secret engagements for diplomatic conduct.     

Attentional bias toward negative and positive pictorial stimuli and its relationship with distorted cognitions,empathy, and moral reasoning among men with intellectual disabilities who have committed crimes

The aims of this study were to examine: (a) whether men with intellectual disabilities who have a history of criminal offending attend to affective pictorial stimuli in a biased manner, and (b) whether there is a relationship between an affective attentional bias and offense‐supportive cognitions, empathy, and moral reasoning. Forty‐six men with intellectual disabilities who had a documented history of criminal offending, and 51 men who also had intellectual disabilities, but no such history, were recruited and asked to complete a computer‐based dot‐probe task using affective pictorial stimuli with randomization, along with measures of distorted cognitions, empathy, and moral reasoning. Those with a history of criminal offending endorsed significantly more offense‐supportive cognitions, had significantly lower general empathy, and more “mature” moral reasoning, as well as a significant attentional bias toward affective pictorial stimuli. Attentional bias significantly predicted offense‐supportive cognitions, and vice versa, having controlled for offense history, and Full‐Scale IQ, but this was not the case for empathy or moral reasoning. While the findings require replication, interventions that aim to modify attention bias with this population should be tested.     

Using Cases with Contrary Facts to Illustrate and Facilitate Ethical Analysis

There has been increasing interest in developing practical, non-theoretical tools for analyzing ethical problems in public health, biomedicine, and other scientific disciplines so that professionals can make and justify ethical decisions in their own research or practice. Tools for ethical decisionmaking, together with case studies on ethics, are often used in graduate education programs and in continuing professional education. Students can benefit from opportunities to further develop their analytical skills, to recognize ethical issues, and to develop their moral sensitivity. One practical approach for illustrating and facilitating ethical analysis uses cases with contrary facts and circumstances, an approach which complements rather than replaces theoretical approaches to moral reasoning. Cases with contrary facts and circumstances are presented in two or more alternative ways so that the facts, circumstances, or framing of one version runs counter to that of the other version (s). Cases with contrary facts, together with practical steps for identifying and analyzing ethical issues, are likely to be useful tools for illustrating and facilitating ethics analysis and stimulating the moral imagination. The findings and conclusions in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.     

Rationalizing our Way into Moral Progress

Research suggests that the explicit reasoning we offer to ourselves and to others is often rationalization, that we act instead on instincts, inclinations, stereotypes, emotions, neurobiology, habits, reactions, evolutionary pressures, unexamined principles, or justifications other than the ones we think we’re acting on, then we tell a post hoc story to justify our actions. This is troubling for views of moral progress according to which moral progress proceeds from our engagement with our own and others’ reasons. I consider an account of rationalization, based on Robert Audi’s, to make clear that rationalization, unlike simple lying, can be sincere. Because it can be sincere, and because we also have a desire to be consistent with ourselves, I argue that rationalization sets us up for becoming better people over time, and that a similar case can be made to explain how moral progress among groups of people can proceed via rationalization.     

Argumentation in ethics, legal dogmatics and legal practice

The author adopts a coherentist approach to legal argumentation.Ceteris paribus, the degree of coherence of argumentation depends on answers to such questions as: How many statements belonging to the justification are supported by reasons, that is, not arbitrary?, How profound is the justification, that is, how long are the chains of reasons it contains?, How closely interconnected are the reasons, for example in such a way that the same conclusion follows from various independent reasons?, How relevant are the reasons in the context in question?, etc.A reasonable legal argumentation is a special case of a reasonable moral argumentation. Both contain moral substantive reasons and legal authority reasons. On the other hand, some particularities of legal argumentation must be noticed, as well. Among other things, the lawyers take for granted that legal reasoning is based on valid law and that some sources of law, such as statutes, are binding.There exist various juristic roles and corresponding types of argumentation, e.g., judicial and doctrinal ones. Yet, all kinds of legal argumentation must use weighing and balancing in order to make the law coherent and morally acceptable. Consequently, all general principles and criteria of coherence are applicable to all these types but their weight varies between them.     

道德推理与道德行为关系的元分析

目前道德心理学中存在对道德推理作用的质疑, 这一质疑源自哲学领域的著名争论。从经典道德心理学理论来说, 道德推理应该是道德行为的重要决定因素, 但新近的观点则否定这一重要作用。本研究采用元分析技术探讨道德推理与道德行为的关系。通过文献搜索与检查, 获得了50项研究和83个独立效应量, 共包含16738名被试。检验表明发表偏差不会影响元分析的结果, 选择随机效应模型是准确的。通过随机效应模型的元分析表明, 道德推理与道德的行为有显著的正相关, 与不道德的行为有显著的负相关。调节效应分析表明, 道德推理测量工具的类型会影响道德推理与道德行为的关系, 被试年龄阶段会影响道德推理与不道德行为的关系。这些结果肯定了道德推理的作用, 也强调了研究过程中要关注测量工具的类型, 指出了需要开发更全面的道德推理测量工具。     

Epistemological and ethical assessment of obesity bias in industrialized countries

Bernard Lonergan's cognitive theory challenges us to raise questions about both the cognitive process through which obesity is perceived as a behaviour change issue and the objectivity of such a moral judgment. Lonergan's theory provides the theoretical tools to affirm that anti-fat discrimination, in the United States of America and in many industrialized countries, is the result of both a group bias that resists insights into the good of other groups and a general bias of anti-intellectualism that tends to set common sense against insights that require any thorough scientific analyses. While general bias diverts the public's attention away from the true aetiology of obesity, group bias sustains an anti-fat culture that subtly legitimates discriminatory practices and policies against obese people. Although anti-discrimination laws may seem to be a reasonable way of protecting obese and overweight individuals from discrimination, obesity bias can be best addressed by reframing the obesity debate from an environmental perspective from which tools and strategies to address both the social and individual determinants of obesity can be developed. Attention should not be concentrated on individuals' behaviour as it is related to lifestyle choices, without giving due consideration to the all-encompassing constraining factors which challenge the social and rational blindness of obesity bias.     

The Case for Pacifism

ABSTRACT I present the case for pacifism by formulating what I take to be the most plausible version of the idea of respect for human life. This generates a very strong, though not necessarily absolute, moral presumption against killing, in war or any other situation. I then show how difficult it is for this presumption to be overridden, either by the considerations invoked in 'just war'theory, or by consequentialist claims about what can be achieved through war.
Despite the strength of the moral case against war, people sometimes say that they have no choice but to fight. In the concluding section of the paper I attempt to identify the relevant sense in which this could be said, and I discuss briefly how this affects the case for pacifism.     

The Roles of Religiosity and Spirituality in Moral Reasoning

To better understand the influence of religiosity and spirituality on moral reasoning, 1,037 college students completed a survey including demographic questions, a religiosity measure, a spirituality measure, and Forsyth's Ethical Position Questionnaire. Religiosity and spirituality positively correlated with moral idealism, whereas spirituality negatively correlated with moral relativism. However, religiosity and spirituality accounted for a very little variability in moral reasoning, suggesting that they do not directly influence moral reasoning. In addition, female participants reported higher spirituality, but there were no gender differences on a spirituality measure. Future research is needed to examine other factors that may influence moral reasoning.     

The importance of meta-ethics in engineering education

Our shared moral framework is negotiated as part of the social contract. Some elements of that framework are established (tell the truth under oath), but other elements lack an overlapping consensus (just when can an individual lie to protect his or her privacy?). The tidy bits of our accepted moral framework have been codified, becoming the subject of legal rather than ethical consideration. Those elements remaining in the realm of ethics seem fragmented and inconsistent.Yet, our engineering students will need to navigate the broken ground of this complex moral landscape. A minimalist approach would leave our students with formulated dogma—principles of right and wrong such as the National Society for Professional Engineers (NSPE) Code of Ethics for Engineers—but without any insight into the genesis of these principles. A slightly deeper, micro-ethics approach would teach our students to solve ethical problems by applying heuristics—giving our students a rational process to manipulate ethical dilemmas using the same principles simply referenced a priori by dogma. A macro-ethics approach—helping students to inductively construct a posteriori principles from case studies—goes beyond the simple statement or manipulation of principles, but falls short of linking personal moral principles to the larger, social context. Ultimately, it is this social context that requires both the application of ethical principles, and the negotiation of moral values—from an understanding of meta-ethics.The approaches to engineering ethics instruction (dogma, heuristics, case studies, and meta-ethics) can be associated with stages of moral development. If we leave our students with only a dogmatic reaction to ethical dilemmas, they will be dependent on the ethical decisions of others (a denial of their fundamental potential for moral autonomy). Heuristics offers a tool to deal independently with moral questions, but a tool that too frequently reduces to casuistry when rigidly applied to “simplified” dilemmas. Case studies, while providing a context for engineering ethics, can encourage the premature analysis of specific moral conduct rather than the development of broad moral principles—stifling our students’ facility with meta-ethics. Clearly, if a moral sense is developmental, ethics instruction should lead our students from lower to higher stages of moral development.     

Morality: An Evolutionary Account

ABSTRACT— Refinements in Darwin's theory of the origin of a moral sense create a framework equipped to organize and integrate contemporary theory and research on morality. Morality originated in deferential, cooperative, and altruistic "social instincts," or decision-making strategies, that enabled early humans to maximize their gains from social living and resolve their conflicts of interest in adaptive ways. Moral judgments, moral norms, and conscience originated from strategic interactions among members of groups who experienced confluences and conflicts of interest. Moral argumentation buttressed by moral reasoning is equipped to generate universal and impartial moral standards. Moral beliefs and standards are products of automatic and controlled information-processing and decision-making mechanisms. To understand how people make moral decisions, we must understand how early evolved mechanisms in the old brain and recently evolved mechanisms in the new brain are activated and how they interact. Understanding what a sense of morality is for helps us understand what it is.     

Betting Against Compatibilism

Some argue that libertarianism represents the riskier incompatibilist view when it comes to the free will problem. An ethically cautious incompatibilist should bet that we are not free in the sense required for moral responsibility, these theorists claim, as doing so means that we no longer run the risk of holding the morally innocent responsible. In this paper, I show that the same reasoning also advises us to bet against compatibilism. Supposing that we are unsure about whether or not the causal order of the world is compatible with the kind of freedom that is required for moral responsibility, an ethically cautious approach would once again bet that hard incompatibilism is true.     

Assessing the automaticity of moral processing: efficient coding of moral information during narrative comprehension

A long-standing theoretical debate concerns the involvement of principled reasoning versus relatively automatic intuitive-emotional processing in moral cognition. To address this, we investigated whether the mental models formed during story comprehension contain a moral dimension and whether this process is affected by cognitive load. A total of 72 participants read stories about fictional characters in a range of moral situations, such as a husband being tempted to commit adultery. Each story concluded with a "moral" or "immoral" target sentence. Consistent with a framework of efficient extraction of moral information, participants took significantly longer to read immoral than moral target sentences. Moreover, the magnitude of this effect was not compromised by cognitive load. Our findings provide evidence of efficient coding of moral dimensions during narrative comprehension and demonstrate that this process does not require cognitively intense forms of principled reasoning.     

Assessing the automaticity of moral processing: Efficient coding of moral information during narrative comprehension

A long-standing theoretical debate concerns the involvement of principled reasoning versus relatively automatic intuitive-emotional processing in moral cognition. To address this, we investigated whether the mental models formed during story comprehension contain a moral dimension and whether this process is affected by cognitive load. A total of 72 participants read stories about fictional characters in a range of moral situations, such as a husband being tempted to commit adultery. Each story concluded with a “moral” or “immoral” target sentence. Consistent with a framework of efficient extraction of moral information, participants took significantly longer to read immoral than moral target sentences. Moreover, the magnitude of this effect was not compromised by cognitive load. Our findings provide evidence of efficient coding of moral dimensions during narrative comprehension and demonstrate that this process does not require cognitively intense forms of principled reasoning.     

The case of Peter: reflections on applied ethics in a neonatal intensive care unit

The case of Peter is reflected upon in order to highlight some of the moral theorising that could be brought to bear in the process of providing palliative care for sick neonates. The situation will be discussed using the theoretical lenses of deontological and virtue ethics. Nursing practice is considered as engaged moral reasoning where the nurse brings his/her beliefs, knowledge and experience into the situation and engages in reflexivity to provide appropriate ongoing patient care. The care should be provided in culturally sensitive manner and tailored to the needs of the newborn and their family. Nurses should initiate early consultations with colleagues, medical staff and families to address concerns about patient well-being in order to enhance the well-being of patients and families and to improve the work environment making it more conducive to care.     

Consequence and Normative Guidance

Logic, the tradition has it, is normative for reasoning. But is that really so? And if so, in what sense is logic normative for reasoning? As Gilbert Harman has reminded us, devising a logic and devising a theory of reasoning are two separate enterprises. Hence, logic's normative authority cannot reside in the fact that principles of logic just are norms of reasoning. Once we cease to identify the two, we are left with a gap. To bridge the gap one would need to produce what John MacFarlane has appropriately called a bridge principle, i.e. a general principle articulating a substantive and systematic link between logical entailment and norms of reasoning. This is Harman's skeptical challenge. In this paper I argue that Harman's skeptical challenge can be met. I show how candidate bridge principles can be systematically generated and evaluated against a set of well‐motivated desiderata. Moreover, I argue that bridge principles advanced by MacFarlane himself and others, for all their merit, fail to address the problem originally set forth by Harman and so do not meet the skeptical challenge. Finally, I develop a bridge principle that meets Harman's requirements as well as being substantive.