Emotion and Religion Revisited: A Response to O'Connor and Averill

O'Connor is critical of Watts' suggestion that emotion can serve as a model for religion. The proposal arises from recent developments in the psychology of emotion that emphasize that it is socially embedded and dependent on processes of interpretation. Similar points have been made about religion: Neither religion nor emotion are purely private matters. More generally, it is urged that there be stronger links between general psychology and the psychology of religion, and also that the psychology of religion be broadened to include a two-way dialogue between theology and psychology. Averill's point is accepted that emotional experience is too much shaped by religion to be allowed to validate it. As a contribution to Averill's question about emotions in the afterlife, points are made about the bodily aspect of the afterlife, the emotions of God, and redeemed emotions.     

Promoting a Brand's Emotion Benefits: The Influence of Emotion Categorization Processes on Consumer Evaluations

Research in psychology has demonstrated that people have a shared knowledge of emotion categories. Building on this research and our understanding of categorization processes, this article proposes a mechanism by which consumers utilize information about a brand's “emotion benefits” in forming attitudes. The results of 2 experimental studies show that (a) consumers’ processing of a brand's emotion benefit information is consistent with categorization processes such that emotion category congruity effects are large in basic—versus subordinate—level conditions, (b) associating a brand with certain emotions can influence brand and ad attitudes without necessarily eliciting emotions during exposure to advertising, (c) emotion category congruity “works” through attitude‐toward‐the‐ad and emotion benefit beliefs in influencing brand attitudes, and (d) subjective product category knowledge moderates the strength of these effects. Taken together, these results explicate the process by which a knowledge‐based consideration of a brand's emotional benefits can influence consumers’ beliefs about the brand and brand attitudes.     

Attitudes toward emotions

The present work outlines a theory of attitudes toward emotions, provides a measure of attitudes toward emotions, and then tests several predictions concerning relationships between attitudes toward specific emotions and emotional situation selection, emotional traits, emotional reactivity, and emotion regulation. The present conceptualization of individual differences in attitudes toward emotions focuses on specific emotions and presents data indicating that 5 emotions (anger, sadness, joy, fear, and disgust) load on 5 separate attitude factors (Study 1). Attitudes toward emotions predicted emotional situation selection (Study 2). Moreover, attitudes toward approach emotions (e.g., anger, joy) correlated directly with the associated trait emotions, whereas attitudes toward withdrawal emotions (fear, disgust) correlated inversely with associated trait emotions (Study 3). Similar results occurred when attitudes toward emotions were used to predict state emotional reactivity (Study 4). Finally, attitudes toward emotions predicted specific forms of emotion regulation (Study 5).     

Basic emotions,rationality, and folk theory

Abstract

Answering the question of whether there are basic emotions requires considering the functions of emotions. We propose that just a few emotions are basic and that they have functions in managing action. When no fully rational solution is available for a problem of action, a basic emotion functions to prompt us in a direction that is better than a random choice. We contrast this kind of theory with a componential approach which we argue is either a version of the theory of basic emotions or else leads to the doctrine that emotions are mistaken tenets of folk psychology. We defend the psychological reality of the folk theory of emotions, and we argue that universal basic emotions make it possible to understand people from distant cultures, and to translate emotional terminology from one language to another. Finally, we show how theories of basic emotions can be tested, and indicate the kinds of empirical result that can bear on the issue.     

Religious Fundamentalism and Responses to Mortality Salience: A Quantitative Text Analysis

Investigating an issue of critical importance for the psychology of religion and for terror management theory, this study examines the relationship between religious fundamentalism and beliefs about death as articulated during a mortality salience (MS) manipulation. Participants wrote about the emotions and events surrounding their own death (MS), or a control topic, and linguistic content in the essays was related to levels of self-reported fundamentalism of the essay authors. Higher levels of fundamentalism were associated with responses to MS that were less cognitively complex, contained more positive emotion, and were more future and socially oriented. There was virtually no relationship between fundamentalism and linguistic properties of writings about a control topic. The discussion centers on the influence of fundamentalist belief systems on attitudes toward death and suggests how the current results might aid future study of religious belief and of terror management.     

Classifying emotion: a developmental account

The aim of this paper is to propose a systematic classification of emotions which can also characterize their nature. The first challenge we address is the submission of clear criteria for a theory of emotions that determine which mental phenomena are emotions and which are not. We suggest that emotions as a subclass of mental states are determined by their functional roles. The second and main challenge is the presentation of a classification and theory of emotions that can account for all existing varieties. We argue that we must classify emotions according to four developmental stages: 1. pre-emotions as unfocussed expressive emotion states, 2. basic emotions, 3. primary cognitive emotions, and 4. secondary cognitive emotions. We suggest four types of basic emotions (fear, anger, joy and sadness) which are systematically differentiated into a diversity of more complex emotions during emotional development. The classification distinguishes between basic and non-basic emotions and our multi-factorial account considers cognitive, experiential, physiological and behavioral parameters as relevant for constituting an emotion. However, each emotion type is constituted by a typical pattern according to which some features may be more significant than others. Emotions differ strongly where these patterns of features are concerned, while their essential functional roles are the same. We argue that emotions form a unified ontological category that is coherent and can be well defined by their characteristic functional roles. Our account of emotions is supported by data from developmental psychology, neurobiology, evolutionary biology and sociology.     

基于情绪认知评价理论的虚拟人情绪模型研究

情感计算是人工智能的前沿领域之一,建立具有情绪表现力的人机智能系统具有广泛的社会需求。本文分析了基于情绪认知评价理论的情绪建模方法,总结了典型的虚拟人情绪计算模型,归纳了情绪和感知的相关成果,梳理了虚拟人情绪表现方法。针对情绪建模所要深入研究的问题,分析现有研究中存在的不足,对虚拟人情绪模型研究的未来发展方向提出了建议,为进一步深入研究虚拟人情绪模型提供了参考。     

中学生的道德情绪内隐观研究

以974名14-18岁的中学生为被试,通过道德情绪的词汇评定和情境评定,考察中学生对典型道德情绪种类和道德情绪典型属性的认识。结果表明,中学生对典型道德情绪的认识涉及情境性、导向性、批评性、赞誉性等多种情绪类别,并在总体上更容易把正性情绪词汇认同为道德情绪。在判断与评价具体情境中的道德情绪过程中,中学生更倾向把无私和有私因素诱发的情绪显著地聚类区分,从而将无私诱因视为其认同道德情绪的典型标准,这种内隐观不受其学段、性别的影响和情绪效价效应的干扰。     

The demanding world of emotion: A Gestalt approach to emotion experience

Psychology is biased towards thinking of emotions as feelings rather than as an experiences of the world. But they are both. World-focused emotion experiences (WFEE) are how the world appears or is consciously perceived in one's emotion experience. For example, when happy the world may seem welcoming, or when sad the world may seem barren of possibilities. What explains these experiences? This article discusses explanations of WFEE from phenomenology and Gestalt psychology. Influenced by Lewin, I propose an “emotional demand model” of WFEE. The emotional demand character of objects (e.g. bear-to-be-run-from) is distinguished from their expressive character (e.g. angry bear). It is a mistake to think of emotion faces only as expressions—they are also demands. This distinction explains some anomalous findings in infancy and autism research. The model highlights another tool for recognizing our own emotions: noticing when we feel “demanded of” by the world, with implications for emotion regulation.     

母亲情绪调节与幼儿情绪理解能力:母亲应对方式的中介作用

对258名幼儿进行情绪理解能力任务测查,其母亲完成情绪调节方式问卷和应对幼儿消极情绪问卷,探讨母亲情绪调节方式、母亲对幼儿消极情绪的反应方式和幼儿情绪理解能力之间的关系。结果表明,幼儿情绪理解能力随年龄增长而提高,女孩情绪理解能力高于男孩。母亲对幼儿消极情绪更多采用情感关注和问题解决,惩罚反应最少,母亲对男孩的消极情绪表现出更多的惩罚反应,对女孩表现出更多的情感关注。母亲鼓励表达在其情绪调节方式和幼儿情绪理解能力之间有中介作用。     

How is Recalcitrant Emotion Possible?

A recalcitrant emotion is an emotion that we experience despite a judgment that seems to conflict with it. Having been bitten by a dog in her childhood, Jane cannot shake her fear of dogs, including Fido, the cute little puppy that she knows to be in no way dangerous. There is something puzzling about recalcitrant emotions, which appear to defy the putatively robust connection between emotions and judgments. If Jane really believes that Fido cannot harm her, what is she afraid of? This article seeks to show how recalcitrant emotion is possible. I argue that reductive theories that identify emotions with judgments, desires, or some combination thereof, cannot explain the possibility of emotional irrationality without contradiction. I then show that the appeal to sui generis attitudes also fails to solve the puzzle of recalcitrant emotions, and diagnose this failure as stemming from a misleading analogy between emotions and perceptions, and in particular, between recalcitrant emotions and perceptual illusions. The solution can be found in a different analogy: between emotions and actions; more specifically, between recalcitrant emotions and weakness of the will, akrasia. Like akratic actions, recalcitrant emotions entail responding to reasons, but to inferior reasons. Irrational but non-contradictory emotions are possible just as weakness of will is possible.     

The place of appraisal in emotion

Abstract

The concept of “appraisal” has been used in the literature in a dual way: to refer to the content of emotional experience, as well as to the cognitive antecedents of emotions. I argue that appraisal in the former sense is what is contained in information in self-reports and that this information is of limited use for making inferences on emotion antecedents. This is so because emotional experience may contain appraisals that are part of the emotional response rather than belonging to its causes. They often result from elaboration of the experience after it has begun to be generated. Although in most or all emotions some cognitive appraisal processes are essential antecedents, these processes may be much simpler than self-reports (and the semantics of emotion words) may suggest. The appraisal processes that account for emotion elicitation can be assumed to be of a quite elementary kind.     

Children's understanding of mental states as causes of emotions

Theory of mind studies of emotion usually focus on children's ability to predict other people's feelings. This study examined children's spontaneous references to mental states in explaining others' emotions. Children (4‐, 6‐ and 10‐year‐olds, n = 122) were told stories and asked to explain both typical and atypical emotional reactions of characters. Because atypical emotional reactions are unexpected, we hypothesized that children would be more likely to refer to mental states, such as desires and beliefs, in explaining them than when explaining typical emotions. From the development of lay theories of emotion, derived the prediction that older children would refer more often to mental states than younger children. The developmental shift from a desire‐psychology to a belief‐psychology led to the expectation that references to desires would increase at an earlier age than references to beliefs. Our findings confirmed these expectations only partly, because the nature of the emotion (happiness, anger, sadness or fear) interacted with these factors. Whereas anger, happiness and sadness mainly evoked desire references, fear evoked more belief references, even in 4‐year‐olds. The fact that other factors besides age can also play an influential role in children's mental state reasoning is discussed. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

共情与中国民族音乐情绪识别的关系：来自ERP的证据

音乐情绪识别能力是利用音乐开展情绪调节的基本条件。传统的以五声音阶为基础的具有独特韵味的中国民族音乐反映了中国人独有的情感和价值观念, 在情绪调节和音乐治疗方面具有积极的作用, 是研究音乐情绪识别的有效音乐刺激。本研究采用跨通道情绪启动范式, 通过人际反应指针问卷筛选出高、低共情组被试各36人参加脑电实验, 考察共情能力对中国民族音乐情绪识别的影响。脑电数据显示, 在进行中国民族音乐情绪内隐识别时, 将宫调和羽调音乐作为启动刺激, 诱发了中期的P2、N400以及晚期正成分LPC (Late Positive Component)。低共情组P2和N400成分的波幅大于高共情组, 高共情组LPC成分的波幅大于低共情组。本研究第一次从电生理层面考察了不同共情能力的个体在进行中国民族音乐情绪识别时的神经反应差异。高低共情组在中国民族音乐情绪识别不同阶段的注意投入可能影响了其对音乐刺激的感受, 进而影响音乐情绪识别。     

身体的意义：生成论视域下的情绪理论

生成论的情绪学说从“意义建构”的视角看待情绪的动力作用, 主张情绪与认知相互交织, 与有机体适应环境的身体活动密切联系。情绪是身体的情绪, 身体是情绪体验中的身体。身体在情绪体验中扮演着构成性角色。根据这一观点, 情绪是一种积极的行动倾向, 是在理解环境意义基础上的具身行动。情绪并非发生于有机体头颅内, 而是产生于大脑、身体和环境的互动与耦合之中。由于认知与情绪在生成论的视域下统一在有机体意义建构的活动之中, 因而认知的4E属性也必然反映到情绪上, 使得情绪和情感也具有了具身、嵌入、延展和生成特征。情绪的生成理论为了解情绪, 进而理解意识的本质提供了一个新视角。     

The Formation of Attitudes Toward New Immigrant Groups1

People often receive information about new immigrant groups prior to any direct contact with group members. However, it is not clear how this information shapes attitudes toward the groups. To explore this issue, 204 subjects were told about an unknown immigrant group that was presented as high or low in personal relevance. Subjects were then given positive or negative consensus information about the emotions that group members elicit from others, group members' personality traits, and group members' values. As expected, results indicated that the presentation of positive information about emotional reactions, personality traits, and values caused attitudes to be more favorable than did the presentation of negative information. Importantly, however, the combined impact of the emotion and personality trait information depended on whether the group was perceived to be of high or low personal relevance. Specifically, when the information about emotions and personality traits was similarly valanced (i.e., both were positive or both were negative), attitudes toward the group tended to be less favorable in the high personal relevance condition than in the low personal relevance condition. In contrast, when mixed information was presented (i.e., positive emotions and negative personality traits or negative emotions and positive personality traits), attitudes tended to be more favorable in the high personal relevance condition. In addition, attitudes, once formed, predicted further perceptions of the group and behavioral intentions toward group members. The implications of the findings for the reduction of prejudice toward new immigrant groups are discussed.     

自我关注重评和情境关注重评情绪调节策略及对随后认知控制的影响

认知重评作为高度适应性的情绪调节策略, 是否消耗随后任务所需的认知资源仍存在争议。以往研究把重评作为单一策略研究, 并未区分重评亚型对这一问题进行探索。本研究采用情绪调节与认知控制结合的任务, 考察自我关注和情境关注两种重评亚型调节情绪的效果, 以及对随后认知控制的影响是否存在差异。结果发现两种重评策略都能有效调节情绪, 但调节效果存在差异。从行为角度看, 与中性刺激相比, 负性刺激会引发更高的负性情绪水平, 对随后冲突任务的认知控制能力更差。进一步从神经机制水平来看, 增加负性情绪可能会进一步消耗随后任务可用的认知资源, 与自我关注重评相比, 采用情境关注重评降低负性情绪后, 对随后冲突任务的认知控制能力更强。说明两种重评亚型并不同质, 不仅在调节情绪的效果上存在差异, 而且会引发不同的认知控制后果; 同时, 负性情绪水平越高, 认知控制能力可能会越差。     

Modeling of emotion elicitation conditions for a cognitive-emotive architecture

To cater to the need of embodying emotional behavior in an autonomous agent, there is a need for modeling computationally apt definitions of emotions. A number of emotion theories have been developed that provide an understanding of human psychology and their emotional behaviors, but it is difficult to directly decipher a theory into a computational model of emotion. Nevertheless, these theories together can serve as the theoretical foundation for designing a model for emotion-eliciting conditions. In this study, the salient features of OCC, Scherer, and Roseman theories of emotions are identified, which complement each other. The features are unified and standardized to bring consistency in deriving the computationally apt definition of five emotions viz. Happiness/Joy, Sadness, Fear, Anger, and Surprise. The objective of this hybridization is to set a ground framework for appraising the emotion-triggering cues (e.g., an event) for a simple, flexible and tolerant computational model of emotions. The underlying emotion-eliciting processes are designed using Fuzzy Logic. Fuzzy rules are framed to model the conditions behind emotion elicitation. Furthermore, the ISEAR data set and the real test-case scenarios are used to validate the accuracy of emotion prediction and rule fulfillment respectively.     

EXAMINING THE STRUCTURE AND ROLE OF EMOTION: CONTRIBUTIONS OF NEUROBIOLOGY TO THE STUDY OF EMBODIED RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

Abstract. Certain properties of the body and emotions facilitate the transmission of religious knowledge and the development of religious states through particular qualities of perception and memory. The body, which is the ground of religious experience, can be understood as transformative: the characteristic that recalled emotion is “refelt” in the present enables emotion to be cultivated or developed. Emotions and the stimuli that evoke them are necessarily culturally specific, but the automatic nature of this process is universal. Religious traditions have made use of these processes to educate the feeling toward certain qualities and to develop religious experience, through the use of sacred images, ritual posture and gesture, and repetition of ritual acts. Neuroscience contributes to our understanding of the emotional processes that take place when emotions are evoked, refelt, and developed; the neurobiological processing of emotion parallels experience. Keeping experience central makes it possible to bring religion and neuroscience together in a nonreductive examination of spiritual experience.