Phenomenal Causality I: Varieties and Variables

The empirical literature on phenomenal causality (i.e., the notion that causality can be perceived) is reviewed. In Part I of this two-part series, different potential types of phenomenal causality (launching, triggering, reaction, tool, entraining, traction, braking, enforced disintegration and bursting, coordinated movement, penetration, expulsion) are described. Stimulus variables (temporal gap, spatial gap, spatial overlap, direction, absolute velocity, velocity ratio, trajectory length, radius of action, size, motion type, modality, animacy) and observer variables (attention, eye movements and fixation, prior experience, intelligence, age, culture, psychopathology) that influence phenomenal causality are reviewed. This provides the necessary background for consideration in Part II (Hubbard, in press) of broader questions regarding properties of phenomenal causality, empirical and theoretical connections of phenomenal causality to other perceptual or cognitive phenomena or processes, and potential mechanisms and models of phenomenal causality.     

Perceptual reasons

The two main theories of perceptual reasons in contemporary epistemology can be called Phenomenalism and Factualism. According to Phenomenalism, perceptual reasons are facts about experiences conceived of as phenomenal states, i.e., states individuated by phenomenal character, by what it’s like to be in them. According to Factualism, perceptual reasons are instead facts about the external objects perceived. The main problem with Factualism is that it struggles with bad cases: cases where perceived objects are not what they appear (illusions, broadly speaking) or where there is no perceived object at all (hallucinations). The main problem with Phenomenalism is that it struggles with good cases: cases where everything is perfectly normal and the external object is correctly perceived, so that one’s perceptual beliefs are knowledge. In this paper we show that there is a theory of perceptual reasons that avoids the problems for Factualism and Phenomenalism. We call this view Propositionalism. We use ‘proposition’ broadly to mean the entities that are contents of beliefs and other doxastic attitudes. The key to finding a middle ground between Phenomenalism and Factualism, we claim, is to allow our reasons to be false in bad cases. Despite being false, they are about the external world, not our phenomenal states.     

What are the objects of perceptual consciousness?

Four answers to the title question are critically reviewed. (a) The first answer proposes that we perceive our brain events, certain occurrences in our brain that appear to us as parts of the environment. (b) Gestalt psychology distinguishes the phenomenal from the physical and proposes that we always perceive some aspect of our own phenomenal world--which is isomorphic but not identical to certain of our brain events. (c) J. J. Gibson held that our perceptual experiences are registrations of properties of the external environment--which is, therefore, perceived directly (i.e., without experiencing anything else). (d) The fourth answer comprehends perceptual experience to be a qualitative form of noninferential awareness of the apparent properties of specific environmental things. It differs from Gibson's answer in several respects, including the claim that some aspect of the external world appears to us whenever we have perceptual experience.     

Everything is clear: All perceptual experiences are transparent

The idea that perceptual experience is transparent is generally used by naïve realists and externalist representationalists to promote an externalist account of the metaphysics of perceptual experience. It is claimed that the phenomenal character of our perceptual experience can be explained solely with reference to the externally located objects and properties which (for the representationalist) we represent, or which (for the naïve realist) partly constitute our experience. Internalist qualia theorists deny this and claim that the phenomenal character of our perceptual experience is internally constituted. However, my concern in this paper is not with the metaphysical debate but with transparency as a phenomenological feature of perceptual experience. Qualia theorists have presented a number of examples of perceptual experiences which, they claim, do not even seem to be transparent; these experiences involve objects or properties which seem to be internally realized. I argue, contrary to the qualia theorist's claim, that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can in fact be characterized solely with reference to externally located objects and properties, and the sense in which some features of our perceptual experiences do not seem external is due to cognitive, not perceptual, phenomenology.     

An information integration approach to phenomenal causality

Phenomenal causality was studied by using Michotte's launch event, in which successive motion of two objects evokes an immediate perception that the first motion causes the second. Information integration theory was used to address the complementary issues of invariant perceptual structure and individual differences in phenomenal causality. Three informational cues were varied conjointly: temporal and spatial contiguity of the two motions, and the ratio of their speeds. The dependent measure was a judgment of degree of causality or naturalness. The results showed that individual differences were related to these instruction conditions; the subjects showed five distinctive response patterns. Two were the modal patterns elicited by the instructions, and the others fell in between. The averaging model gave a good account of the data, with meaningful parameter estimates. Individual differences were localized in cueevaluation, whereas theirintegration into a unified judgment followed an invariant averaging rule. The results allow some reconciliation between Michotte and his critics.     

Iterated Non‐Refutation: Robert Lockie on Relativism 1

Abstract

I argue that an experience’s sensuous elements play an ineliminable role in our being intentionally directed upon an entity through perception. More specifically, I argue that whenever we appreciate a sensuous element in experience, we appreciate an intrinsic and irreducibly phenomenal aspect of experience that I call phenomenal presence – an aspect of experience that I show is central to its presentational character – and that the appreciation of phenomenal presence is necessary for perceptual intentionality. If an experience is to possess intentionality, the experience itself must make an entity available as an object of perceptually-based singular beliefs and the experiencing subject, by virtue of undergoing the experience, must in some sense be able to appreciate that it has done so. Phenomenal presence is necessary for perceptual intentionality because it plays an ineliminable role in making an entity available to its subject in this way.     

An epistemic argument for liberalism about perceptual content

This paper concerns the question of which properties figure in the contents of perceptual experience. According to conservatives, only low-level properties figure in the contents of perceptual experience. Liberals, on the other hand, claim that high-level properties, such as natural kind properties, artifacts, and even moral properties, can figure in the contents of perceptual experience. I defend a novel argument in favor of liberalism, the Epistemic Argument, which hinges on two crucial claims. The first is that many perceptual experiences of even neurotypical human beings can justify beliefs in high-level properties without providing justification for their low-level constituents. The second claim, roughly, is that any experience that alone provides (defeasible) justification for beliefs about some property p, other things being equal, has p as part of its content. In short, certain perceptual experiences represent high-level but not low-level properties, which entails that liberalism is true.     

Visual impressions of forces between objects: Entraining,enforced disintegration,and shattering

When a moving object (A) contacts a stationary one (B) and Object B then moves, visual impressions of force occur along with a visual impression of causality. It is shown that findings about force impressions that occur with launching effect stimuli generalize to other forms of phenomenal causality, namely entraining, enforced disintegration, and shattering stimuli. In particular, evidence is reported for generality of the force asymmetry, in which the amount of perceived force exerted by Object A is greater than the amount of perceived resistance put up by Object B. Effects of manipulations of kinematic variables also resembled those found in previous experiments. Some unpredicted findings occurred. It is argued that these reflect a change in perceptual interpretation when both objects are in motion prior to contact, due to both objects being perceived as in autonomous motion. The results are consistent with a theoretical account in which force impressions occur by a process of matching kinematic information in visual stimuli to stored representations of actions on objects, which supply information about forces.     

Visual perception of force: comment on White (2012)

White (2012) proposed that kinematic features in a visual percept are matched to stored representations containing information regarding forces (based on prior haptic experience) and that information in the matched, stored representations regarding forces is then incorporated into visual perception. Although some elements of White's (2012) account appear consistent with previous findings and theories, other elements do not appear consistent with previous findings and theories or are in need of clarification. Some of the latter elements include the (a) differences between perception and impression (representation of force; relationship of force and resistance; role and necessity of stored representations and of concurrent simulation; roles of rules, cues, and heuristics), (b) characteristics of object motion and human movement (whether motion is internally generated or externally generated and whether motion is biological or nonbiological; generalization of human action and the extent to which perceived force depends upon similarity of object movement to human patterns of movement), (c) related perceptual and cognitive phenomena (representational momentum, imagery, psychophysics of force perception, perception of causality), and (d) scope and limitations of White's account (attributions of intentionality, falsifiability).     

Perception and Representation

I oppose the popular view that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience consists in the subject's representing the (putative) perceived object as being so-and-so. The account of perceptual experience I favor instead is a version of the "Theory of Appearing" that takes it to be a matter of the perceived object's appearing to one as so-and-so, where this does not mean that the subject takes or believes it to be so-and-so. This plays no part in my criticisms of Representationalism. I mention it only to be up front as to where I stand. My criticism of the Representationalist position is in sections. (1) There is no sufficient reason for positing a representative function for perceptual experience. It doesn't seem on the face of it to be that, and nothing serves in place of such seeming. (2) Even if it did have such a function, it doesn't have the conceptual resources to represent a state of affairs. (3) Even if it did, it is not suited to represent, e.g., a physical property of color. (4) Finally, even if I am wrong about the first three points, it is still impossible for the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience to consist in it's representing what it does. My central argument for this central claim of the paper is that it is metaphysically, de re possible that one have a certain perceptual experience without it's presenting any state of affairs. And since all identities hold necessarily, this identity claim fails.     

Ambiguous figures and representationalism

Macpherson (Nous 40(1):82–117, 2006) argues that the square/regular diamond figure threatens representationalism, construed as the theory which holds that the phenomenal character is explained by the nonconceptual content of experience. Her argument is the claim that representationalism is committed to the thesis that differences in the experience of ambiguous figures, the gestalt switch, should be explained by differences in the NCC of perception of these figures. However, with respect to the square/regular diamond and some other ambiguous figure representationalism fails to offer a unified account of how representational content makes them ambiguous. In this paper, I aim, first, to offer a representationalist account of ambiguous figures and, second, to examine and rebut Macpherson’s arguments. My main point is that in each ambiguous figure Macpherson discusses there are differences in representational content that can explain differences in phenomenal character or content. The representational differences are due to the ways the Cartesian frame of reference in which perceptual content is always cast cuts the figure, underlying different properties of the figure with respect to the axes of the Cartesian frame of reference.     

Phenomenalist dogmatist experientialism and the distinctiveness problem

Phenomenalist dogmatist experientialism (PDE) holds the following thesis: if $S$ has a perceptual experience that $p$ , then $S$ has immediate prima facie evidential justification for the belief that $p$ in virtue of the experience’s phenomenology. The benefits of PDE are that it (a) provides an undemanding view of perceptual justification that allows most of our ordinary perceptual beliefs to be justified, and (b) accommodates two important internalist intuitions, viz. the New Evil Demon Intuition and the Blindsight Intuition. However, in the face of a specific version of the Sellarsian dilemma, PDE is ad hoc. PDE needs to explain what is so distinct about perceptual experience that enables it to fulfill its evidential role without being itself in need of justification. I argue that neither an experience’s presentational phenomenology, nor its phenomenal forcefulness can be used to answer this question, and that prospects look dim for any other phenomenalist account. The subjective distinctness of perceptual experience might instead just stem from a higher-order belief that the experience is a perceptual one, but this will only serve to strengthen the case for externalism: externalism is better suited to provide an account of how we attain justified higher-order beliefs and can use this account to accommodate the Blindsight Intuition.     

Representationalism and the phenomenology of mental imagery

This paper sketches a phenomenological analysis of visual mental imagery and uses it to criticize representationalism and the internalist-versus-externalist framework for understanding consciousness. Contrary to internalist views of mental imagery imagery experience is not the experience of a phenomenal mental picture inspected by the mind’s eye, but rather the mental simulation of perceptual experience. Furthermore, there are experiential differences in perceiving and imagining that are not differences in the properties represented by these experiences. Therefore, externalist representationalism, which maintains that the properties of experience are the external properties represented by experience, is an inadequate account of conscious experience.     

Why Are Some Phenomenal Experiences ‘Vivid’ and Others ‘Faint’? Representationalism,Imagery, and Cognitive Phenomenology

One central brand of representationalism claims that the specific phenomenal character of an experience is fully determined by its content. A challenge for this view is that cognitive and perceptual experiences sometimes seem to have the same representational content while differing in phenomenal character. In particular, it might seem that one can have faint imagery experiences or conscious thoughts with the same contents as vivid perceptual experiences. This paper argues that such cases never arise, and that they are probably metaphysically impossible. I also suggest a fully representational account of differences in vividness between phenomenal experiences.     

Perceptual Experience and Cognitive Penetrability

This paper starts by distinguishing three views about the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. ‘Low‐level theorists’ argue that perceptual experience is reducible to the experience of low‐level properties (textures, shapes, colors), ‘high‐level theorists’ argue that we have perceptual experiences of high‐level properties (functional properties, causal relations, etc.), while ‘disunified view theorists’ argue that perceptual seemings can present high‐level properties. The paper explores how cognitive states can penetrate perceptual experience and provides an interpretation of cognitive penetration that offers some support for the high‐level view.     

Visual acquaintance,action and the explanatory gap

Much attention has recently been paid to the idea, which I label ‘External World Acquaintance’ (EWA), that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is partially constituted by external features. One motivation for EWA which has received relatively little discussion is its alleged ability to help deal with the ‘Explanatory Gap’. I provide a reformulation of this general line of thought, which makes clearer how and when EWA could help to explain the specific phenomenal nature of visual experience. In particular, I argue that by focusing on the different kinds of perceptual actions that are available in the case of visual spatial vs. colour perception, we get a natural explanation for why we should expect the specific nature of colour phenomenology to remain less readily intelligible than the specific nature of visual spatial phenomenology.

     

University students' achievement goals and approaches to learning in mathematics

Background Achievement goals (AG) and students' approaches to learning (SAL) are two research perspectives on student motivation and learning in higher education that have until now been pursued quite independently. Aims This study sets out: (a) to explore the relationship between the most representative variables of SAL and AG; (b) to identify subgroups (clusters) of students with multiple AG; and (c) to examine the differences between these clusters with respect to various SAL and AG characteristics. Sample The participants were 680 male and female 1st year university students studying different subjects (e.g. mathematics, physics, economics) but all enrolled on mathematics courses (e.g. algebra, calculus). Method Participants completed a series of questionnaires that measured their conceptions of mathematics, approaches to learning, course experience, personal 2 × 2 AG, and perceived AG. Results SAL and AG variables were moderately associated and related to both the way students perceived their academic environment and the way they conceived of the nature of mathematics (i.e. the perceptual‐cognitive framework). Four clusters of students with distinctive multiple AG were identified and when the differences between clusters were analysed, we were able to attribute them to various constructs including perceptual‐cognitive framework, learning approaches, and academic performance. Conclusio This study reveals a consistent pattern of relationships between SAL and AG perspectives across different methods of analysis, supports the relevance of the 2 × 2 AG framework in a mathematics learning context and suggests that AG and SAL may be intertwined aspects of students' experience of learning mathematics at university.     

Ambiguous figures and representationalism

Ambiguous figures pose a problem for representationalists, particularly for representationalists who believe that the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual (MacPherson in Nous 40(1):82–117, 2006). This is because, in viewing ambiguous figures, subjects have perceptual experiences that differ in phenomenal properties without differing in non-conceptual content. In this paper, I argue that ambiguous figures pose no problem for non-conceptual representationalists. I argue that aspect shifts do not presuppose or require the possession of sophisticated conceptual resources and that, although viewing ambiguous figures often causes a change in phenomenal properties, this change is accompanied by a change in non-conceptual content. I illustrate the case by considering specific examples.