Dealing with missed opportunities: Action vs. state orientation moderates inaction inertia

Inaction inertia refers to the effect that missing a more attractive opportunity decreases the likelihood to act on an attractive current opportunity in the same domain. We studied the influence of how people cope with negative decision outcomes (i.e., action vs. state orientation) on this inaction inertia effect. Experiment 1 used an experimental induction of action vs. state orientation and confirmed our prediction that state oriented people showed more inaction inertia than action oriented people. Experiment 2 replicated these results with a measure of chronic action orientation and showed a mediating effect of valuation of the current opportunity. Experiment 3 showed that temporal segregation of the current from the missed opportunity decreased inaction inertia effects for state oriented, but not for action oriented people. We discuss the implications of these results for the inaction inertia and action vs. state orientation literatures.     

失望情绪在不作为惯性产生中的作用

以往不作为惯性领域的研究发现, 当个体没有获得先前更优机会是源于他人或外界等不可控因素时, 个体仍会倾向于继续放弃当前次优机会, 且后悔情绪未能对此进行解释。本研究认为失望情绪适用于解释此种情况下的不作为惯性, 或可成为后悔情绪解释的有效补充。本研究通过两个实验首次探讨了失望情绪在不作为惯性产生中的作用。结果发现, 各自变量对失望情绪（体验失望和预期失望）和作为可能性均具有一致的影响力, 且预期失望在不作为惯性的产生中具有中介作用。本研究表明, 失望情绪可能也是导致不作为惯性的一个重要因素。     

先前错失选项的数量对不作为惯性的调节机制

在以往涉及不作为惯性的研究中,个体通常只是错失了1个先前选项.本研究旨在考察当之前错失了多个选项后,不作为惯性是否仍会出现,并深入探讨估价和后悔因素在不作为惯性产生或消失中的作用.结果发现,先前错失选项的数量对不作为惯性具有调节作用:当先前只错失了1个选项时,出现了不作为惯性,当先前已错失了两个选项时,不作为惯性消失了.中介分析发现,这一调节作用可被预期后悔所中介.结果表明,预期后悔是导致个体在错失多个选项后不作为惯性消失的主要原因.     

Inaction inertia

Inaction inertia occurs when bypassing an initial action opportunity has the effect of decreasing the likelihood that subsequent similar action opportunities will be taken. This overview of the inaction inertia literature demonstrates the impact of inaction inertia on decision making. Based on research on the causes of inaction inertia, we show that it is a multi-determined phenomenon, explained by both valuation and regret considerations. Moreover, we demonstrate how a sour grapes explanation of inaction inertia might integrate these two accounts. Furthermore, we explain when inaction inertia is most likely to occur and how it can be prevented. We conclude that the inaction inertia literature does not only add to our understanding of this intriguing phenomenon, but also contributes to related social psychological phenomena, such as the sunk cost effect, sequential decision making, decision avoidance (e.g., choice deferral, status quo bias, decisional conflict), and procrastination.     

Inaction inertia in retirement saving

In retirement saving, many people miss out on early opportunities to save and subsequently fail to take adequate actions for a long time thereafter. We examined whether these two observations—the initial failure to act and the subsequent inertia—could be related through the phenomenon of inaction inertia. In Experiment 1 (N = 180), participants were less likely to save for retirement when the difference in annual return between the current opportunity and the missed opportunity was large versus small. In Experiment 2 (N = 180), participants were less likely to start saving for retirement when reminded of a missed opportunity 10 years ago versus 1 year ago. These data constitute the first demonstration of inaction inertia in retirement saving: People's reluctance to act on attractive saving opportunities may be induced by their previous inaction. In Experiment 3 (N = 340) and Experiment 4 (N = 628), we find that the observed inertia is the product of a tendency to underestimate exponential growth combined with a focus on past opportunities. Building on this mechanism, Experiment 5 (N = 916) provided evidence for a potential remedy; the inaction inertia effect completely disappeared when focus was shifted from required contributions to future outcomes.     

做会后悔还是不做会后悔?——自我调节模式对不作为惯性的影响

从消费者的不作为惯性反应差异出发,探讨运动模式和评估模式的消费者在错过第一次合意机会、面对第二次次优机会时购买可能性的差异及原因。通过3个研究发现,相比评估模式的消费者而言,运动模式的消费者具有更高的二次购买可能性。在自我调节模式影响次优购买可能性的过程中,预期后悔起到重要的中介作用。此外,研究还发现,当第二次次优机会中提供了与第一次机会中的产品类似但不同的替代产品时,运动模式和评估模式消费者之间的购买可能性差异消失了。     

Regret, Valuation, and Inaction Inertia

In three experiments we sought to determine the cause of the “inaction inertia” effect, which occurs when bypassing an initial opportunity decreases the likelihood that a subsequent similar action will be taken. Experiment 1 required some participants to estimate their likelihood of buying shoes as a function of the magnitude and geographical location of an earlier forsaken bargain; others estimated their amount of regret over failing to take advantage of the bargain. The inverse relation between regret and propensity to buy strongly implicated regret as the cause of inaction inertia. In Experiment 2 we found evidence that experienced regret over having missed an earlier bargain rather than anticipated regret over paying too much for the subsequent purchase was the source of our participants' inaction inertia. In Experiment 3 we demonstrated through a mediational analysis that those who had missed a large bargain placed a significantly lower value on the subsequent purchase opportunity than those who earlier had missed a more modest bargain. This difference in valuation, along with experienced regret, are two factors which play a significant mediational role in the inaction inertia effect.     

Decoupling the past from the present attenuates inaction inertia

Inaction inertia is the phenomenon that one is not likely to act upon an attractive opportunity after having bypassed an even more attractive opportunity. We investigated the boundary conditions of this inaction inertia effect. Based on the mental accounting literature and the transaction decoupling literature we predicted and found in three experiments that tight coupling of the forgone to the current opportunity is a necessary condition for inaction inertia to occur. Inaction inertia decreased when information about the missed opportunity was ambiguous (Experiment 1), when the past opportunity required an extra step to obtain (Experiment 2) and when the past and present opportunity decreased in comparability (Experiment 3). The theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed in view of the literature on inaction inertia and on judgment and decision-making. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The impact of different product formats on inaction inertia

ABSTRACT

The inaction inertia effect describes situations in which a person rejects an opportunity after having forgone a relatively superior opportunity. This study explores whether product format (hedonic vs. utilitarian) affects the inaction inertia effect. The authors build on previous findings that show comparisons of utilitarian benefits are easier than hedonic benefits, and hedonic consumption (vs. utilitarian consumption) usually generates greater pleasure. The authors propose that people show higher inaction inertia after they have missed a superior utilitarian consumption opportunity than after they have missed a superior hedonic consumption opportunity. This prediction was tested and supported in three different experiments. Moreover, the authors found that differences in comparability between products, rather than the hedonic pleasure, explain differences in inaction inertia effects. These findings contribute to the inaction inertia literature and marketing practice.     

Inaction inertia,regret, and valuation: A closer look

Inaction inertia is the phenomenon that one is not likely to act on an attractive opportunity after having bypassed an even more attractive opportunity. So far, all published work has assumed a causal role for the emotion regret in this effect. In a series of 5 experiments we found no support for this regret explanation. In these experiments factors that influenced regret did not influence inaction inertia, and factors that influenced inaction inertia did not influence regret. In addition, in two experiments we found evidence that missing the initial opportunity leads to a devaluation of the later offer. We propose that, in some cases, regret may be a by-product of this devaluation, rather than a cause of inaction inertia.     

Multiple options in the past and the present: The impact on inaction inertia

Inaction inertia is the effect that people do not act on an attractive opportunity only because they previously missed a more attractive opportunity. We investigated the effect of the presence of alternative options on the occurrence of this effect. We hypothesized and found that the likelihood to act on a current opportunity increases when evaluated in the context of another current option compared to when it is presented separately (Experiments 1 and 2). Likelihood of action decreases when the missed opportunity is presented next to another missed opportunity (Experiment 3). We conclude that when multiple options are currently present, the impact of the missed opportunity as a point of reference decreases, and that when multiple options are missed, the impact of these missed opportunities as a point of reference increases. These results are discussed in light of the literatures about inaction inertia and multiple options. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

To accept or not to accept a job offer: Examining inaction inertia in an organizational context

The purpose of this research was to investigate inaction inertia in a job offer context. Across two studies, we examined the influence of two situational factors (Study 1) and one dispositional factor (Study 2) on inaction inertia in a job offer context. Participants were asked to imagine they had to pass up an initial offer in which they were interested, but that they received a similar but less attractive offer (lower salary) later. Study 1 findings revealed participants in the loss‐framed condition were more likely to accept the second offer than participants in the neutral condition only when they were asked to imagine they were switching careers, versus being laid off. Study 2 results showed that maximizing tendency significantly and negatively predicted the likelihood to accept the second job offer. Exploratory analyses revealed that anticipated regret did not mediate the relationships between any of the factors and inaction inertia, suggesting that anticipated regret was not the causal mechanism underlying the occurrence of inaction inertia in the current research. Overall, this research shed light on the ways inaction inertia may be experienced in a job offer context.     

The Lingering Effects of Our Past Experiences: The Sunk‐Cost Fallacy and the Inaction‐Inertia Effect

The effect of past experiences and actions in shaping current perceptions, emotions, decisions and goals is widely recognized in the psychological literature. When it comes to economic decisions, however, these influences are sometimes seen as impediments to rational decision‐making. In an attempt to explore the enduring consequences of the past, we present, compare, and discuss two familiar behavioral phenomena: The sunk‐cost effect, which refers to situations where continued actions are fueled by past investments, and the inaction‐inertia effect, in which continued inaction is triggered by the shadows of missed opportunities. Although one process elicits continued action and the other continued inaction, we show that there is a great deal of similarity in the psychological underpinnings of these effects, and argue that respecting sunk costs and avoiding actions that are associated with forgone opportunities are not necessarily unreasonable, or maladaptive behaviors.     

How consumers respond to the behavior of missing a free gift promotion: inaction inertia effect on products offered as free gifts

Inaction inertia describes the phenomenon that an individual is unlikely to act on an attractive opportunity after having bypassed an even more attractive one. The results of two experiments indicate that after missing an initial opportunity to obtain a product as a free gift during a promotional period, the inaction inertia effect reduces the likelihood of consumers buying the product at a discounted price (second, inferior opportunity), particularly if the free gift has a high regular price. Additionally, according to the results of Experiment 2, those consumers are less likely to buy a product that has been offered previously as a free gift when a greater total quantity of the free gift is offered during a promotional period. Moreover, the mediation analysis results indicate that anticipated regret and valuation significantly impact the mediating role of inaction inertia.     

不作为惯性产生的原因、条件及应用

不作为惯性指如果个体先前已错过了一个更优的机会, 当次一些的类似机会再出现时(但仍好于一般情况), 个体会倾向于继续放弃这一机会。本文首先简要介绍了不作为惯性的概念、操作定义和基本研究方法; 然后着重探讨了导致不作为惯性的原因及相关实证研究, 目前研究者普遍认为后悔情绪和估价是导致不作为惯性的两个主要原因; 随后探讨了不作为惯性产生的条件及在市场营销及股票市场中的应用研究; 最后未来研究需要更加注重研究方法上的改进以及对不作为惰性的原因探讨。     

Inaction inertia, the sunk cost effect, and handedness: Avoiding the losses of past decisions

Strength of handedness, or the degree to which an individual prefers to use a single hand to perform various tasks, is a neurological marker for brain organization and has been shown to be linked to episodic memory, attribute framing, and anchoring, as well as other domains and tasks. The present work explores the relationship of handedness to both inaction inertia (the inclination to resist an action after previously bypassing a similar action) as well as to the sunk cost effect (the tendency to continue to engage in a behavior after an initial investment of time or money has been made). In Experiment 1, mixed-handers displayed a larger inaction inertia effect than strong-handers. In Experiment 2, they displayed a larger sunk cost effect than strong-handers. Experiments 3 and 4 extended the sunk cost finding into a different domain and explored how mixed- and strong-handers react to additional information designed to increase the comparative advantage of terminating, rather than continuing, a failed project. Overall, we found that mixed-handers were more likely to show inertia effects because of an increased aversion to losses. The results of Experiment 4 suggest that, when provided with additional information that made it clear that continuing a project would be a greater loss than terminating it, mixed-handers no longer showed a larger sunk cost effect than strong-handers, highlighting the importance of carefully considering exactly how sunk cost scenarios are worded and providing additional information on how mixed- and strong-handers differ in belief updating.     

Inaction Inertia in the Stock Market1

Based on the inaction inertia effect, it was hypothesized that investors who missed an opportunity to leave a “bear market” will be less likely to sell the stock at a later opportunity when facing a grave loss. Participants in a stock‐market computer game were given an opportunity to sell their stock for a moderate gain. Having missed this initial opportunity and now facing a grave loss, these participants were less likely to sell their stock compared to participants whose potential loss was not as grave, or compared to participants facing the same magnitude of loss who had no previous opportunity to leave the market. Analysis of the time spent by participants on reading relevant information concerning the stock market suggests that this tendency toward continued inaction was not the result of careful deliberation over market trends. The results are discussed in terms of counterfac‐tual thinking and anticipated regret.     

Group norms and excessive absenteeism: The role of peer referent others

Drawing from social identity and social influence theory, we propose that the absence-related norms of an individual’s work-based referent others will have a significant effect on the likelihood of excessive absence behavior. We then develop and test a model of the social mechanisms potentially underlying the relationship between referent absence norms and the likelihood of excessive absence behavior. Our findings indicate that referent group norms significantly explain excessive absence behavior, even when taking into account the absence norms associated with the formal organizational units within which these referent groups are often nested. They also indicate that permissive referent group norms are likely to have a greater impact on the probability of target excessive absence when the target has a more conformist disposition. Finally, post-hoc findings suggest that the more negative targets’ perceptions of the consequences of absenteeism, the more attenuated the impact of permissive group norms on excessive absence behavior.     

Coping with non‐purchase: Managing the stress of inaction regret

This research presents a framework based on coping theory to explain the different ways of managing the stress of regret for inaction. We theorize that primary appraisals of goal-relevance and secondary appraisals of reversibility affect how consumers cope with the stress of inaction regret resulting in different behavioral outcomes. Prior research has focused on two outcomes of regret for inaction—inaction inertia and dissonance reduction—that result in the decreased intent to avail of a similar future opportunity. This research proposes that these are not inevitable outcomes, but rather coping responses. Further, if the forgone opportunity is appraised to be goal-relevant and reversible, consumers engage in active coping that results in increased behavioral intent.     

To do or not to do: desirability and consistency mediate judgements of regret.

In 4 studies, the authors demonstrated that when errors associated with action were inconsistent with decision nakers' orientation, they were undesirable and produced more regret than did errors associated with inaction. Conversely, when errors associated with action were consistent with decision makers' orientation. they were desirable and produced less regret than did errors associated with inaction. Desirability and consistency mediated this relationship, independent of mutability. These results were obtained when judgments and decisions to act or not act were made in close temporal proximity to one another as well as when participants reflected on their past decisions. The authors provide an analysis of when counterfactuals would and would not be expected to mediate judgments of normality and regret.