Myth,Memory and Misrecognition in Sellars' ``Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind'

Philosophical Studies -     

Names,identity, and predication

It is commonly accepted, after Frege, that identity statements like “Tully is Cicero” differ from statements like “Tully is Tully”. For the former, unlike the latter, are informative. One way to deal with the information problem is to postulate that the terms ‘Tully’ and ‘Cicero’ come equipped with different informative (or cognitive) values. Another approach is to claim that statements like these are of the subject/predicate form. As such, they should be analyzed along the way we treat “Tully walks”. Since proper names can appear in predicative position we could go as far as to dismiss the sign of identity altogether, some told us. I will try to discuss the advantages and/or disadvantages of this approach and investigate whether Frege’s view that the ‘is’ of identity must be distinguished from the ‘is’ of predication (copula) can be reconciled with the fact that names can appear in predicative position.     

The role of local and global properties in comparison of analogical visual scenes

Love, Rouder, and Wisniewski (1999) obtained interesting results showing that, in a same/different task on abstract visual scenes, subjects were able to process global properties quickly, even before local properties were identified. Our aim in this work is to explore more fully the complex relationships that exist between local processing and global processing. In our first experiment, we tested the robustness and generality of these global and local effects by using another, very different kind of local element. We showed that the global effects remain strong even when the local elements are neither conventional nor easily discriminable. In the second experiment, we showed that there exists an intermediate level of similarity between purely local and purely global similarity. Furthermore, we found that even when a stronger form of local dissimilarity is manipulated (through the introduction of different local elements), global effects were still observed. We conclude with a discussion of the respective roles of global and local properties in light of our findings.     

The educational theorists, the teachers, and their history of education

The following contribution expands the current discussion on the status and function of the history of education at the methodological, or epistemological, level by introducing the perspective of a history of educational knowledge. This opens up a theoretical option for educational historiography that avoids the identification of history of education with history of a discipline, or the institutionalized knowledge of education and teaching. As a consequence, some history of education topoi – as the history of a discipline – can be called into question and practiced historically rather than educationally or morally.     

The educational theorists, the teachers, and their history of education

The following contribution expands the current discussion on the status and function of the history of education at the methodological, or epistemological, level by introducing the perspective of a history of educational knowledge. This opens up a theoretical option for educational historiography that avoids the identification of history of education with history of a discipline, or the institutionalized knowledge of education and teaching. As a consequence, some history of education topoi – as the history of a discipline – can be called into question and practiced historically rather than educationally or morally.     

康德、黑尔与普遍主义

康德和黑尔都是伦理学的杰出代表人物,尽管一个是规范伦理学家,一个是元伦理学家,但是双方都把目光聚集在道德的形式主义研究上,并且着力于普遍主义的落脚点.两者在理论上存在诸多不同,却依然可以发现两者在理论上的先行后继的关系.     

Phenomenology,idealism, and the legacy of Kant

Martin Heidegger closes his Winter Semester 1927–28 lectures by claiming that Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, read through the lens of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, confirmed the accuracy of his philosophical path culminating in Being and Time. A notable interpretation of Heidegger’s debt to Kant, advanced by William Blattner, presents Heidegger as a temporal idealist. I argue that attention to Husserl’s adaptation of Kant’s critical philosophy shows that both Husserl and Heidegger are realists. I make my case by tracing a unified philosophical problematic through three puzzling passages: the Schematism chapter of the first Critique, Husserl’s thought experiment of the destruction of the world in Ideas, and the passage in Being and Time that motivates Blattner’s idealist reading. Husserl and Heidegger give accounts, derived from Kant, of how the consciousness of time makes it possible for objects to be perceived as enduring unities, as well as ‘genealogies of logic’ that show how a priori knowledge, including ontology, is possible. These accounts are idealistic only in the sense that they concern the ideal or essential features of intentionality in virtue of which it puts us in touch with things as they are independently of the contributions of any mind of any type.     

Kant,teleology, and evolution

This essay examines Kant's idea of organic teleology. The first two sections are devoted to Kant's analysis and justification of teleological conceptions in biology. Both the idea of teleology and Kant's anti-reductionism are derived from basic elements of his critical treatment of the human intellect. The third section discusses the limitations Kant places on accounts of origins in the life world. It is argued that the limitations Kant places on accounts of the origins of species do not follow from his idea of teleology. The final section briefly outlines the fate of the Kantian formulation of teleology in the nineteenth century.     

Reid, Kant and the Philosophy of Mind

I suggest a possible rehabilitation of Reid's philosophy of mind by a constructive use of Kant's criticisms of the common sense tradition. Kant offers two criticisms, explicitly claiming that common sense philosophy is ill directed methodologically, and implicitly rejecting Reid's view that there is direct epistemological access by introspection to the ontology of mind. Putting the two views together reveals a tension between epistemology and ontology, but the problem which Kant finds in Reid also infects his own system, as his weaker ontological claims are undermined to such an extent by the necessary reintroduction of self-consciousness that the justification he seeks for reason fails to be reached epistemologically. Plausible solutions to these parallel tensions imply that both Reid and Kant have a pre-systematic concept of mind, and may lead to the conclusion that Reid's method is more economical in the elaboration of an ontology for the philosophy of mind.     

Kant,wittgenstein and the limits of logic

This paper has two purposes. (1) To justify the claim that there is an important distinction underlying the saying/showing distinction of the Tractatus; the distinction which Kant characterises as that between historical and rational knowledge. (2) To argue that it is because the Tractatus accepts Frege/Russell logic as a complete representation of all thought according to laws, that what is shown cannot be recognised as knowledge. This is done by interpolating Frege's logical innovations between the views of Kant and Wittgenstein on logic and mathematics.