论金岳霖逻辑思想的展开方式

金岳霖是现代逻辑在中国得以研究并传播的奠基者,他将现代逻辑方法引入中国哲学体系的反思与重建之中,开辟了一条创新性的学术发展路径。从金岳霖逻辑思想的展开方式看,无论是关于逻辑与哲学、逻辑与自然科学、逻辑与社会生活之间关系的阐述,还是承载逻辑教育使命的现代逻辑知识体系的呈现,都表现出其逻辑思想具有鲜明的融通性、开放性和创新性特征,这也使得充满现代逻辑意识的中国逻辑学研究成为世界逻辑思想体系的重要组成部分,凸显其当代价值。     

没有知识和信念的认识论

本文是欣迪卡生前最后一部论文集《苏格拉底认识论》的第一篇文章。欣迪卡认为,我们不应该孤立地探讨知识和信念这些认知概念,而应该把它们放到人的行动和决策的语境中去探讨。在这种探讨中,至关重要的概念不是知识和信念,而是信息。我们不应该把研究重点放在知识的定义和证成,而应该放到知识的发现和获取,即把知识作为探究过程的结果。由此,他提出了基于问答逻辑的询问探究模型,试图由此去建立认知逻辑和认识论,其中知识和信念都不具有关键地位。     

早期分析哲学中的信念逻辑

弗雷格的涵义/意谓理论为信念句子的句法和语义分析提供了一个框架。一个信念句子由专名、动词"相信"和从句组成。根据弗雷格的从句理论,从句有间接意谓,即它的思想。按弗雷格的分析,可以建立信念逻辑的形式语言和语义。这种语义是混合式的,引入涵义、个体和真值三类本体。还可以建立一个弗雷格式的信念逻辑系统。它是不需要可能世界语义学的信念逻辑。罗素先后提出处理信念语境中同一替换律失效问题的摹状词理论、信念关系论和逻辑原子主义。但罗素没有对信念句子的句法和语义作出明确的分析。     

建构第一人称信念逻辑的一致性难题

研究信念逻辑的有趣之处在于：可以在没有清楚的存在与等同条件下,建立一套元目的形式理论。现有的合理且可能为真的形式系统皆因为著名的“知识拥有者的悖论（Knower’s Paradox）”而导致不一致。这篇论文将建构一套第一人称信念的形式系统。用来建构系统的信念将来自内在观点,因此信念的拥有者将不在讨论的范围中。此外,本篇论文将论证信念的背景将扮演语意、知识论及语用的角色。本篇论文建构的系统将是标准初阶逻辑的有限延展,并将使用到引述。本系统所使用的公理及规则相对较弱,且因为太弱而不足够,因此导致了系统的不一致。本论文欲藉此论证：可被定义的信念集合将不可能被找到。在现有的信念理论及所有的第一人称信念理论中,有限且可被定义的信念集合皆为不一致的原因在于并未涵盖我们真实拥有的信念。     

论逻辑后承概念

塔尔斯基在其1933年的论文中基于自己开创的语义学定义了形式化语言中真这个概念。然后,他在发表于1936年的本文中,在真这个概念的定义的基础上,第一次为后承概念提出了一个实质恰当的定义,即“句子X从类K的句子逻辑地得出当且仅当K这个类的每个模型也是句子X的模型”,使得逻辑后承这个现代逻辑核心概念的定义成为标准定义。但是,这个定义也遗留了一个更为根本的问题,即逻辑词项和非逻辑词项的划分标准问题,后者将由塔尔斯基本人在1966年给出了一个划分标准,从而开辟了一个方兴未衰的逻辑哲学研究方向。     

认知逻辑研究述评

认知逻辑的英文表述是epistemic logic,而episteme的意思就是知识的意思.因此从字面上来理解,认知逻辑就是有关知识的逻辑.然而,现在我们看到的认知逻辑已经从知识扩充到了信念,甚至涉及到更多的认识论概念,换一种宽泛的说法就是形式认知(formal epistemology).这一点充分体现在对认知逻辑的定义或描述上.     

墨子逻辑的基本概念

本文是作者在＂中国逻辑史研讨会＂（荷兰阿姆斯特丹,2010 年 11 月 24-26日）发言的修改版本。论文首先简要回顾了晚期墨家逻辑的历史和知识语境,主体部分讨论晚期墨家逻辑的基本逻辑概念与当代逻辑中的相关概念的关系,这些概念包括：辩;名、实、合;辞;＂类＂;推理。论文还涉及到其它一些概念,包括先天、充要条件、量化、必然性、时间、空间,无限等等。     

论栾调甫中国逻辑研究范式

栾调甫提出读《墨子》书必有八法,即考版本、正文字、明训诂、离章句、辨真伪、定篇什、辑遗佚、辨异同,此八法为“实证”之一端。栾调甫基于此八法以“虚会”之另一端建构墨家辩学知识体系,内容包括《墨子》的考版本、正文字、明训诂等内容;还有对同时代学者相关研究的批判;又有自己义理分析,如其认为墨子之辩学亦为名学,为中国逻辑代名词,其他诸子无辩学,中国逻辑特征为别同异、明是非。栾调甫的墨子辩学思想包括知识论和理论体系,其中知识论是墨子辩学形成的思想基础,墨子辩学之理论体系包括名的特征、种类,辞的特征、种类,辩说的特征、结构、应用和种类,狂举的定义和种类等,墨子辩学与因明、亚氏三段论之异大于同。不过栾调甫也把《墨子》中的“逻辑”应用视作逻辑理论,并与三段论、三支论式作比较,但栾调甫的中国逻辑研究“虚会实证”范式为我们重建中国逻辑思想体系提供方法论意义。     

认知逻辑的新发展

认知逻辑是研究知识和信念的逻辑。它诞生于 2 0世纪 60年代 ,而从 80年代起 ,在计算机科学、人工智能、博奕论、决策论、经济学和军事学诸多领域需要的推动下 ,取得了突破性进展 ,形成了若干既具有重大理论意义 ,又具有实际应用价值的分支学科。一、欣迪卡型认知逻辑 (或经典认知逻辑 )1962年欣迪卡 (Ｈｉｎｔｉｋｋａ ,Ｊ .)发表了开创性著作《知识和信念这两个概念的逻辑导论》。他引入 4个二元认知算子 ,用以表达 4种基本认知命题形式 ,据此 ,他提出 6项认知条件 ,从而构造了认知逻辑语义学。在欣迪卡工作的基础上 ,一些逻辑学家寻求更…     

逻辑视域下博弈解的知识论分析

解概念的知识论分析,即研究博弈参与者在拥有怎样的信息和信念的条件下,通过策略推理可以获得博弈解,从而为这类博弈解提供合理的认知条件说明,不仅是认知博弈论领域中的焦点问题,也是认知逻辑领域中许多学者关注的热点问题。那么,相对于在认知博弈论领域中偏重于数学模型的建构,对解的认知条件所进行的定量化分析,在当前认知逻辑领域中如何通过定性化来描述主体所拥有的信息和信念以及探析各类博弈解的认知条件,将是本文的主要议题之一。同时,立论于解的知识论研究中是否采用统一的理性标准,本文通过比较分析这两种研究模式的优劣,明晰了认知逻辑视域下博弈解研究的可能发展。     

Children's understanding of teaching: the role of knowledge and belief

The relation between preschoolers’ concept of teaching and theory of mind was explored to determine if there is a developmental change in understanding how teaching depends on knowledge and belief. The study tested whether 3- to 6-year-olds thought the awareness of a knowledge difference is necessary for teaching. The 3- and 4-year-olds understood teaching stories with clear knowledge differences and could correctly use that information to specify the teacher and learner. The 5- and 6-year-olds, who performed well on a standard false belief task, further understood that it was the teacher's belief about the knowledge difference that would actually govern teaching. The conceptual link to teaching suggests that theory of mind is critical for understanding other forms of knowledge acquisition besides perceptual access.     

Coherence Theory of Knowledge: a Gradational Account

A satisfactory theory of knowledge in which the shortcomings of a pure externalist account are avoided and in which the Gettier problem is solved should consist in a combination of externalist and internalist components. The internalist component should guarantee that the epistemic subject has cognitive access to the justifying grounds of her belief. And the externalist component should guarantee that the justification of her belief does not depend on any false statement. Keith Lehrer's coherence theory of knowledge as undefeated justification is an example of such an internalist-externalist analysis of knowledge. But nevertheless, Lehrer's account leads to unintended results. Therefore, it is argued that a satisfactory coherence theory of knowledge must also be based on a gradual notion of systematic coherence.     

Memory belief is weak

Recently there has been extensive debate over whether “belief is weak”, viz, whether the epistemic standard for belief is lower than for assertion or knowledge. While most current studies focus on notions such as “ordinary belief” and “outright belief”, this paper purports to advance this debate by investigating a specific type of belief; memory belief. It is argued that (outright) beliefs formed on the basis of episodic memories are “weak” due to two forms of “entitlement inequality”. My key argument is thus twofold. First, by rejecting the epistemic theory of memory, I argue that one can be entitled to belief but not to knowledge. Second, by scrutinising a recent defence of the belief norm of assertion, it will be demonstrated that belief is weaker than assertion, as long as we expect one to match words with deeds.     

The Frame Problem and Theories of Belief

The frame problem is the problem of how we selectively apply relevant knowledge to particular situations in order to generate practical solutions. Some philosophers have thought that the frame problem can be used to rule out, or argue in favor of, a particular theory of belief states. But this is a mistake. Sentential theories of belief are no better or worse off with respect to the frame problem than are alternative theories of belief, most notably, the “map” theory of belief.     

Safety and Unknowability

Philosophia - In a recent paper Jacob Ross presents two ingenious objections against the safety theory of knowledge: one against the claim that safe true belief is necessary for knowledge, the...     

The Influence of Activation Level on Belief Bias in Relational Reasoning

A novel explanation of belief bias in relational reasoning is presented based on the role of working memory and retrieval in deductive reasoning, and the influence of prior knowledge on this process. It is proposed that belief bias is caused by the believability of a conclusion in working memory which influences its activation level, determining its likelihood of retrieval and therefore its effect on the reasoning process. This theory explores two main influences of belief on the activation levels of these conclusions. First, believable conclusions have higher activation levels and so are more likely to be recalled during the evaluation of reasoning problems than unbelievable conclusions, and therefore, they have a greater influence on the reasoning process. Secondly, prior beliefs about the conclusion have a base level of activation and may be retrieved when logically irrelevant, influencing the evaluation of the problem. The theory of activation and memory is derived from the Atomic Components of Thought‐Rational (ACT‐R) cognitive architecture and so this account is formalized in an ACT‐R cognitive model. Two experiments were conducted to test predictions of this model. Experiment 1 tested strength of belief and Experiment 2 tested the impact of a concurrent working memory load. Both of these manipulations increased the main effect of belief overall and in particular raised belief‐based responding in indeterminately invalid problems. These effects support the idea that the activation level of conclusions formed during reasoning influences belief bias. This theory adds to current explanations of belief bias by providing a detailed specification of the role of working memory and how it is influenced by prior knowledge.     

Perceptual Knowledge Derailed

The tracking theory treats knowledge as counterfactual covariation of belief and truth through a sphere of possibilities. I argue that the tracking theory cannot respect perceptual knowledge, because perceptual belief covaries with truth through a discontinuous scatter of possibilities. Perceptual knowledge is subject to inner derailing: there is an inner hollow of perceptual incompetence through which the differences are too small to track. Perceptual knowledge is subject to outer derailing: there are outlying islands of perceptual competence that extend well past skeptical sinkholes.     

Two problems of easy credit

This paper defends the theory that knowledge is credit-worthy true belief against a family of objections, two instances of which were leveled against it in a recent paper by Jennifer Lackey. Lackey argues that both innate knowledge (if there is any) and testimonial knowledge are too easily come by for it to be plausible that the knower deserves credit for it. If this is correct, then knowledge would appear not to be a matter of credit for true belief. I will attempt to neutralize these objections by drawing a distinction between credit as praiseworthiness and credit as attributability.     

Reliability and the Value of Knowledge*

Reliabilism has come under recent attack for its alleged inability to account for the value we typically ascribe to knowledge. It is charged that a reliably‐produced true belief has no more value than does the true belief alone. I reply to these charges on behalf of reliabilism; not because I think reliabilism is the correct theory of knowledge, but rather because being reliably‐produced does add value of a sort to true beliefs. The added value stems from the fact that a reliably‐held belief is non‐accidental in a particular way. While it is widely acknowledged that accidentally true beliefs cannot count as knowledge, it is rarely questioned why this should be so. An answer to this question emerges from the discussion of the value of reliability; an answer that holds interesting implications for the value and nature of knowledge.     

Knowledge’s Boundary Problem

Where is the justificatory boundary between a true belief’s not being knowledge and its being knowledge? Even if we put to one side the Gettier problem, this remains a fundamental epistemological question, concerning as it does the matter of whether we can provide some significant defence of the usual epistemological assumption that a belief is knowledge only if it is well justified. But can that question be answered non-arbitrarily? BonJour believes that it cannot be – and that epistemology should therefore abandon the concept of knowledge. More optimistically, this paper does attempt to answer that question, by applying – and thereby refining – a non-absolutist theory of knowledge.