Families of Adolescent Drug Abusers Are “Rigid”: Are These Families Either “Disengaged” or “Enmeshed,” or Both?

The FACES instrument, based on Olson's Circumplex Model of family functioning, was administered to 96 adolescent drug-abuse clients and their parents. The majority of these families categorized themselves as "disengaged" (rather than "enmeshed") on the cohesion dimension, and as "rigid" (rather than "chaotic") on the adaptability dimension. These findings were unexpected as they were substantially different from published findings on families with other types of problems. Family therapists, utilizing Olson's Clinical Rating Scale for the Circumplex Model, characterized significantly more of these same families as "enmeshed," rather than "disengaged." Possible explanations for the difference between the therapists' perceptions and the families' self-perceptions are discussed.     

What's in a Name? The Effects of the Labels “Fat” Versus “Overweight” on Weight Bias1

This research examined the effects of the labels “fat” vs. “overweight” in the expression of weight bias, with the prediction that the label “fat” biases individuals to respond more negatively than does the label “overweight.” In Study 1, participants' attitudes toward people labeled as fat were less favorable than were their attitudes toward people labeled as overweight. In Studies 2 and 3, although participants chose similar‐sized figures to depict fat and overweight targets, weight stereotypes and weight attitudes were more negative toward people labeled as fat than those labeled as overweight. In addition, the endorsement of weight stereotypes mediated the biasing effect of the “fat” label on weight prejudice. Implications of this work for prejudice researchers and for public attitudes are discussed.     

“Statistical,” “Practical,” and “Clinical”: How Many Kinds of Significance Do Counselors Need to Consider?

The present article reviews and distinguishes 3 related but different types of significance: “statistical,” “practical,” and “clinical.” A framework for conceptualizing the many “practical” effect size indices is described. Several effect size indices that counseling researchers can use, or that counselors reading the literature may encounter, are summarized. A way of estimating “corrected” intervention effects is proposed. It is suggested that readers should expect authors to report indices of “practical” or “clinical” significance, or both, within their research reports; and it is noted that indeed some journals now require such reports.     

On “knowing your partner”: Dangerous illusions in the age of AIDS?

We identified two characteristics of the impression formation process that may cause people to underestimate the riskiness of potential sexual partners. In Study 1, participants were quite confident that they could determine whether someone was lying to them about risk-related behavior when, in reality, they could not. Particularly troubling was a “truth bias” that resulted in relatively high rates of truth detection, but poor lie detection. In Study 2, increased familiarity with a target person (who actually was HIV+) caused participants to lower their estimates of the target's riskiness, despite the fact that we explicitly warned them that the target might be HIV+. We suggest that such processes may foster the illusion of knowing one's partner when one does not.     

Can People Identify “Deceptive” or “Misleading” Items that Tend to Produce Mostly Wrong Answers?

In many domains, two‐alternative forced‐choice questions produce more correct responses than wrong responses across participants. However, some items, dubbed “deceptive” or “misleading”, produce mostly wrong answers. These items yield poor calibration and poor resolution because the dominant, erroneous response tends to be endorsed with great confidence, even greater than that of the correct response. In addition, for deceptive items, group discussion amplifies rather than mitigates error while enhancing confidence in the erroneous response. Can participants identify deceptive items when they are warned about their existence? It is argued that people's ability to discriminate between deceptive and non‐deceptive items is poor when the erroneous responses are based on the same process assumed to underlie correct responses. Indeed, participants failed to discriminate between deceptive and non‐deceptive perceptual items when they were warned that some of the items (Experiment 1) or exactly half of the items (Experiment 2) were deceptive. A similar failure was observed for general‐knowledge questions (Experiment 3) except when participants were informed about the correct answer (Experiment 4). Possibly, for these tasks, people cannot escape the dangers lurking in deceptive items. In contrast, the results suggest that participants can identify deceptive problems for which the wrong answer stems from reliance on a fast, intuitive process that differs from the analytic mode that is likely to yield correct answers (Experiment 5). The practical and theoretical implications of the results were discussed. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What Are the “True” Statistics of the Environment?

A widespread assumption in the contemporary discussion of probabilistic models of cognition, often attributed to the Bayesian program, is that inference is optimal when the observer's priors match the true priors in the world—the actual “statistics of the environment.” But in fact the idea of a “true” prior plays no role in traditional Bayesian philosophy, which regards probability as a quantification of belief, not an objective characteristic of the world. In this paper I discuss the significance of the traditional Bayesian epistemic view of probability and its mismatch with the more objectivist assumptions about probability that are widely held in contemporary cognitive science. I then introduce a novel mathematical framework, the observer lattice, that aims to clarify this issue while avoiding philosophically tendentious assumptions. The mathematical argument shows that even if we assume that “ground truth” probabilities actually do exist, there is no objective way to tell what they are. Different observers, conditioning on different information, will inevitably have different probability estimates, and there is no general procedure to determine which one is right. The argument sheds light on the use of probabilistic models in cognitive science, and in particular on what exactly it means for the mind to be “tuned” to its environment.     

Is love a “basic” emotion?

This article documents the neglect of love in many contemporary emotion theories, despite its prominence in the lay psychology of emotion. We argue that love should be considered a basic emotion, like anger, sadness, happiness, and fear. We discuss the criteria that various theorists use to distinguish basic from nonbasic emotions, and we marshal arguments and evidence from a variety of sources suggesting that love fits the criteria for basicness. We conclude that a number of controversies over the status of love can be resolved by distinguishing between the momentary surge form of love, a basic emotion having properties similar to joy, sadness, fear, etc., and relational love, a bond that develops between people, associated with states that include not only surge love, but many other emotions such as distress and anxiety. Finally, we suggest that “love” is the broad, everyday name for emotions related to three interrelated behavioral systems discussed by Bowlby (1979): attachment, caregiving, and sex.     

Comments on “selective attention: Perception or response?“ reply

We cannot understand why Treisman and Geffen (1967) think their experiment argues against our theory (Deutsch and Deutsch, 1963). Briefly, Treisman and Geffen ask subjects to repeat and tap to certain words in one message, played to one ear, and only tap to such words when they occur in another message played to the other ear. They find that subjects neglect the words to which they only have to tap. According to our theory, stimuli with a greater weighting of importance inhibit certain outputs (such as storage, motor response) of the structures processing stimuli with a lesser weighting of importance. Now it seems to be clear that Treisman and Geffen have by their instructions (to tap and repeat one set of words and only to tap to another set of words) produced a situation in which one set of stimuli is given a larger weighting of importance than the other. It is therefore not surprising on our theory that the less important set is almost disregarded. It is instructive here to consider Lawson's (1966) very similar experiment. In this experiment the signals to which the subject has to tap do not also have to be repeated if they occur in the message which is being shadowed. (These signals are non-verbal.) Lawson's results are almost the opposite of Treisman and Geffen's, as would be expected from our theory. Treisman and Geffen have some difficulty in explaining the discrepancy. “It seems that analysis of simple physical signals precedes both the selective filter and the analysis of verbal content in the perceptual sequence, that the bottle-neck in attention arises chiefly in speech recognition where of course the information load is usually much higher. To confirm the belief that the verbal content of the secondary message was not being analysed, we find no evidence whatever of interference from secondary target words when these received no tapping response.” (We quote the last sentence as just one example of the fact that Treisman and Geffen have failed to understand our theory. It is one of the major points of this theory to explain why “secondary” messages do not cause interfernce with the “primary” message while they are being analysed.) To return now to the subject of Lawson's experiments, we would suggest that the outcome of such experiments would be the same if instead of signals, words were used in Lawson's paradigm. These words should occur on both channels and should be distinguishable by another speaking voice. The subject should be asked to respond to, but not to repeat such words. To make sure the subject is not simply responding to differences in timbre, pitch, etc., the target words should be interspersed with other words. Treisman and Geffen could not then postulate differences in information load to explain an unfavourable result.     

Does Conventional Implicit Association Test of Shyness Measure “Self‐Shyness” or “Others‐Shyness”?

The Implicit Association Test (IAT) measures implicit associations between attitude targets and attributes. Its structure and procedure facilitate investigation of the strength of associations between one target and attributes relative to that between the other target and the same attributes when two targets are contradictory (e.g., black/white and comfortable/uncomfortable). This structure can cause conceptual complexity about what the IAT measures, particularly when a counter category is not needed. Thus, using the Single‐Target Implicit Association Test (ST‐IAT), which allowed only one target category for pairing with attributes, this paper delineated the association measured in the conventional IAT for shyness: “self‐shy” or “others‐shy.” Seventy‐seven Japanese university students completed the self‐report shyness scale, the conventional IAT, and two ST‐IATs (i.e., self/others as target). Results showed that implicit shyness produced in the conventional IAT significantly and positively correlated with that in the self‐targeted ST‐IAT. Moreover, implicit shyness in the conventional IAT was significantly accounted for by those produced by the ST‐IAT with self as target and those calculated in the ST‐IAT with others as target in opposite directions.     

Do the “Savage Origins” of Tattoos Cast a Prejudicial Shadow on Contemporary Tattooed Individuals?

We investigated whether increases in tattooing rates and designs have eradicated or altered traditional delinquent tattooing stereotypes. We tested the perceived suitability of tattooed and non‐tattooed individuals for 2 different jobs. Affective evaluations mediated judgments of job suitability, with those displaying traditional tattoos being rated as less suitable for employment than those who were not tattooed and those displaying contemporary tattoos. Those with a contemporary tattoo were judged in the same manner as those who were not tattooed (even by observers who neither had a tattoo nor were considering getting one). These results suggest that the savage associations of tattooing continue for some, but suggest that for other tattoo enthusiasts, a new stereotype has emerged reflecting a shift toward respectability.     

“Prematurity stereotype” in a sample of Dutch mothers: Do researchers suffer from a “prejudiced parent stereotype”?

This paper reports a Dutch replication of North American research on the “prematurity stereotype” among mothers. In a rating task, infants labeled as “premature” were given less favorable scores on a number of dimensions. A questionnaire study also showed negative expectations concerning premature infants. Associations with the mothers' number of children and level of education were found. Methodological problems of this type of research are discussed. To a large extent, the effects found can be ascribed to the “demand characteristics” of the experiment and the normal effects of expectations on perception. It is argued that researchers should not automatically label such behavior as “stereotyping”: There must also be evidence of a failure to adapt expectations in the face of conflicting evidence. Recommendations are made concerning future research in this area, and the importance of providing clear and complete information for the public on the effects of prematurity is stressed.