At Arm’s Length? Applied Social Science and its Sponsors

The article deals with trust in applied social science research in the light of applied researchers’ increased dependence on project funding. Taking Norway as a case study it shows how the societal organization of research funding has implications for scientific freedom and ultimately for the confidence we have in research. The article gives an account of various ways the sponsors can influence on applied social science research and discusses the legitimacy of different limitations on scientific freedom. The article concludes with proposals for how the challenges to scientific freedom posed by the research funding framework can be addressed structurally, as well as on the level of the research community.     

A Discussion on Governmental Research Grants

Governmental research grants are financially supported by taxpayers to meet financial requirements of research, particularly research that is unlikely to be supported by private funds. Researchers reward donors by producing knowledge. Publishing research results in an academic journal reflects achievement by researchers; however, receiving a grant award does not. The latter only provides the researcher with the capacity to perform his/her research. Applicants may receive more financial support than they actually need because there is no strict audit on the amount of money requested by each research proposal. There are fewer opportunities to apply for a governmental grant than there are for publishing an academic article, and the application process for governmental grants is not flexible. Some potentially innovative research may be impeded by the intense competition among scientific researchers applying for financial support. Researchers face stiffer competition at this stage than at the stage of publishing results. This paper suggests that scientific foundations can improve their efficiency by giving funding preference to economic proposals. Methods for estimating the efficiency of grants are proposed. The practice followed by the Small Grants for Exploratory Research programme of the National Science Foundation validates my analysis and recommendations.     

Ethical issues at the university-industry interface: A way forward?

This paper forms an introduction to this issue, the contents of which arose directly or indirectly from a conference in May 2001 on Corruption of scientific integrity? — The commercialisation of academic science. The introduction, in recent decades, of business culture and values into universities and research institutions is incompatible with the openness which scientific and all academic pursuit traditionally require. It has given rise to a web of problems over intellectual property and conflict of interest which has even led to corporate sponsors’ suppressing unfavourable results of clinical trials, to the detriment of patients’ health. Although there are those who see the norms of science developing to recognise the importance of instrumental science aiming at specific goals and of knowledge judged by its value in a context of application, none justifies the covert manipulation of results by vested interest.Public awareness of these problems is growing and creating a climate of opinion where they may be addressed. We suggest a way forward by the introduction of nationally and internationally-accepted guidelines for industrial collaboration which contain proper protections of the core purposes of universities and of the independence of their research. Some codes suggested for this purpose are discussed. We note that some universities are moving to adopt such codes of conduct, but argue the need for strong support from the government through its funding bodies.     

The nature of co-authorship: a note on recognition sharing and scientific argumentation

Co-authorship of papers is very common in most areas of science, and it has increased as the complexity of research has strengthened the need for scientific collaboration. But the fact that papers have more than an author tends to complicate the attribution of merit to individual scientists. I argue that collaboration does not necessarily entail co-authorship, but that in many cases the latter is an option that individual authors might not choose, at least in principle: each author might publish in a separate way her own contribution to the collaborative project in which she has taken part, or papers could explicitly state what the contribution of each individual author has been. I ask, hence, why it is that scientists prefer to ‘pool’ their contributions instead of keeping them separate, if what they pursue in their professional careers (besides epistemic goals) is individual recognition. My answer is based on the view of the scientific paper as a piece of argumentation, following an inferentialist approach to scientific knowledge. A few empirical predictions from the model presented here are suggested in the conclusions.     

Whose social values? Evaluating Canada’s ‘death of evidence’ controversy

With twentieth- and twenty-first-century philosophy of science’s unfolding acceptance of the nature of scientific inquiry being value-laden, the persistent worry has been that there are no means for legitimate negotiation of the social or non-epistemic values that enter into science. The rejection of the value-free ideal in science has thereby been coupled with the spectres of indiscriminate relativism and bias in scientific inquiry. I challenge this view in the context of recently expressed concerns regarding Canada's death of evidence controversy. The worry, raised by Stathis Psillos, is that as constructivist accounts of science demoted the previously secure status of evidence for drawing justified conclusions in science, we were left with no rational delineation between the right and wrong values for science. The implication for the death of evidence controversy is that we may have no rational grounds for claiming that the Canadian Government is wrong to interfere with scientific enterprise. But he does offer another avenue for reaching the conclusion that the wrong social values are directing the current stifling of some sectors of Canadian science. Psillos draws from standpoint epistemologies to devise a salient defence of ‘valuing evidence’ as a universalizable social value. That is, government bodies ought to enable scientific research via adequate funding as well as political non-interference. In this paper, I counter that (i) non-epistemic values can be rationally evaluated and that (ii) standpoint epistemology’s universalizable standpoint provides an inadequate framework for negotiating social values in science. Regarding (i), I draw from the evidence-based medicine debate in philosophy of medicine and from feminist empiricist investigations into the science–values relationship in order to make the argument for empirically driven value arbitration. If social values can be rationally chosen in the context of justification, then we can have grounds for charging the Canadian leadership with being ‘at war with science’. (ii) I further argue that my recommended empiricist methodology is preferable to Psillos’s search for universalizable perspectives for negotiating social values in science because the latter method permits little more than the trivial conclusion that evidence is valuable to science.     

Research Misconduct in the Age of Open Science: The Case of STAP Stem Cells

In early 2014, Dr Haruko Obokata and her co-authors caused a global media storm by publishing two scientific papers in Nature on stem cells. The papers proposed a surprisingly simple new method called stimulus-triggered acquisition of pluripotency (STAP) to generate pluripotent stem cells for research purposes in a fast and inexpensive way. To the dismay of many, both papers were retracted within six months of their release due to data fabrication and falsification. The rise and fall of the STAP research illustrates the impacts of open science practices of quality control and validation on new scientific claims. In the STAP case, collective action generated through two online forums—the Knoepfler Lab Stem Cell Blog and PubPeer—exposed not only data manipulation in the two papers but also the irreproducibility of the purported new cellular reprogramming method. The case brings to the fore the tentative possibilities as well as potential pitfalls of ‘accelerated virtual witnessing’ through crowdsourced post-publication peer reviews that value accessibility and inclusiveness. Indeed, it calls for empirically grounded discussion on the ongoing reconfiguration of the shared system of values and norms or the moral economy of science.     

Introduction: Engaging with Nanotechnologies – Engaging Differently?

The idea of conducting upstream public engagement over emerging technologies has been gaining popularity in Europe and North America, with nanotechnologies seen as a test case for this. For many of its advocates, upstream engagement is about a re-conceptualisation of the science–society relationship in which a variety of ‘publics’ are brought together with stakeholders and scientists early in the Research and Development process to co-develop technological trajectories. However, the concept, aims and processes of upstream engagement remain ill-defined, are often misunderstood, and have undergone little critical analysis. This special issue of NanoEthics, entitled ‘Engaging with Nanotechnologies–Engaging Differently?’ takes a multi-nation, multi-case approach to explore this idea, drawing on work represented by four articles from the US and Europe, from ethnographic work in the nanotechnology lab through to analysis of a Citizens’ Jury and other attempts to move public debate ‘upstream’. An overall message from the papers is that without adequate critique ‘upstream engagement’ might end up re-producing out-dated forms of science communication or being rejected as a failed concept before it has even matured.     

Peer review and innovation

Two important aspects of the relationship between peer review and innovation includes the acceptance of articles for publication in journals and the assessment of applications for grants for the funding of research work. While there are well-known examples of the rejection by journals of first choice of many papers that have radically changed the way we think about the world outside ourselves, such papers do get published eventually, however tortuous the process required. With grant applications the situation differs in that the refusal of a grant necessarily curtails the possible research that may be attempted. Here there are many reasons for conservatism and reservation as to the ability of a grant allocation process based on peer review to deliver truly innovative investigations. Other methods are needed; although such methods need not be applied across the board, they should constitute the methods whereby some 10–20% of the grant monies are assigned. The nomination of prizes for specific accomplishments is one way of achieving innovation although this presumes that investigators or institution already have available the money necessary to effect the innovations; otherwise it is a question of the selection and funding of particular individuals or institutions and requiring them to solve particular problems that are set in the broadest of terms.     

Discrepancies between scientific theory and practice in relation to physiological hypotheses

We give anecdotal accounts from our own experience of scientific theories which have been generally accepted as the ‘ruling opinion’ long after sufficient evidence has been collected for their disproof. This has led us to the opinion that the normal scientific process, of working hypothesis followed by experimental test aimed at disproof, is being replaced by the ‘ruling opinion’ followed by experiment aimed at confirmation. The apparently widespread adoption of this procedure may be postulated to arise in part from the need for workers entering a new field of study to obtain grants and to get their results published.     

Rhetorical Strategies for Scientific Authority: A Boundary-Work Analysis of ‘Climategate’

The term ‘Climategate’ refers to the episode in November 2009 when emails between climate scientists were stolen and published online. The content of this private correspondence prompted criticism from diverse commentators who cast doubts on the methods, claims, and members of the climate science community. In response, individual scientists and scientific institutions published statements responding to the allegations of scientific fraud. Gieryn's concept of ‘boundary-work’ can be used to analyse the rhetoric of scientists in situations where their legitimacy is disputed. More specifically, boundary-work can be used to analyse the responses of scientists in terms of: how they represent the attributes of science, what types of boundary-work they undertake (e.g. expulsion, expansion, and protection), and the professional interests that come into play. A boundary-work analysis of the commentaries published in the aftermath of Climategate reveals that scientists characterised climate science as consensual, asocial, and open. Scientists depicted climate science as consensual with the purpose of expelling dissenters and protecting areas of climate science from criticism. Scientists also described knowledge about climate as being ideally produced apart from society so that they could preserve their autonomy and exclude individuals who are accused of being ‘politically biased’. Scientists characterised climate science as necessarily open as the means to justify both existing and additional public funding for science and to avoid external corrective interventions against scientific opacity. Scientists and their critics alike interpreted the stolen emails as embarrassing deviations from the alleged social demands of a consensual, objective, and accessible science.     

Evidence,explanation and enhanced indispensability

In this paper I shall adopt a possible reading of the notions of ‘explanatory indispensability’ and ‘genuine mathematical explanation in science’ on which the Enhanced Indispensability Argument (EIA) proposed by Alan Baker is based. Furthermore, I shall propose two examples of mathematical explanation in science and I shall show that, whether the EIA-partisans accept the reading I suggest, they are easily caught in a dilemma. To escape this dilemma they need to adopt some account of explanation and offer a plausible answer to the following ‘question of evidence’: What is a genuine mathematical explanation in empirical science and on what basis do we consider it as such? Finally, I shall suggest how a possible answer to the question of evidence might be given through a specific account of mathematical explanation in science. Nevertheless, the price of adopting this standpoint is that the genuineness of mathematical explanations of scientific facts turns out to be dependent on pragmatic constraints and therefore cannot be plugged in EIA and used to establish existential claims about mathematical objects.     

Are you afraid of the dark? Notes on the psychology of belief in histories of science and the occult

Abstract

The popular view of the inherent conflict between science and the occult has been rendered obsolete by recent advances in the history of science. Yet, these historiographical revisions have gone unnoticed in the public understanding of science and public education at large. Particularly, reconstructions of the formation of modern psychology and its links to psychical research can show that the standard view of the latter as motivated by metaphysical bias fails to stand up to scrutiny. After highlighting certain basic methodological maxims shared by psychotherapists and historians, I will try to counterbalance simplistic claims of a ‘need to believe’ as a precondition of scientific open-mindedness regarding the occurrence of parapsychological phenomena by discussing instances revealing a presumably widespread ‘will to disbelieve’ in the occult. I shall argue that generalized psychological explanations are only helpful in our understanding of history if we apply them in a symmetrical manner.     

Population Thinking in Epistemic Evolution: Bridging Cultural Evolution and the Philosophy of Science

Researchers in cultural evolutionary theory (CET) have recently proposed the foundation of a new field of research in cultural evolution named ‘epistemic evolution’. Drawing on evolutionary epistemology’s early studies, this programme aims to study science as an evolutionary cultural process. The paper discusses the way CET’s study of science can contribute to the philosophical debate and, vice versa, how the philosophy of science can benefit from the adoption of a cultural evolutionary perspective. Here, I argue that CET’s main contribution to an evolutionary model of scientific growth comes from the application of ‘population thinking’ to science. Populationism offers a ‘variation based’ understanding of scientists’ epistemic and socio-epistemic criteria that is able to better accommodate the variegated preferences that intervene in scientific epistemic decisions. A discussion of the so called theory choice context is offered as an example of the way a populationist approach can shed new light on the operation of scientists’ epistemic choices.

     

Re-enchanting Realism in Debate with Kyle Stanford

In this article, against the background of a notion of ‘assembled’ truth, the evolutionary progressiveness of a theory is suggested as novel and promising explanation for the success of science. A new version of realism in science, referred to as ‘naturalised realism’ is outlined. Naturalised realism is ‘fallibilist’ in the unique sense that it captures and mimics the self-corrective core of scientific knowledge and its progress. It is argued that naturalised realism disarms Kyle Stanford’s anti-realist ‘new induction’ threats by showing that ‘explanationism’ and his ‘epistemic instrumentalism’ are just two positions among many on a constantly evolving continuum of options between instrumentalism and full-blown realism. In particular it is demonstrated that not only can naturalised realism redefine the terms of realist debate in such a way that no talk of miracles need enter the debate, but it also promises interesting defenses against inductive- and under-determination-based anti-realist arguments.     

Reality in science

One way in which to address the intriguing relations between science and reality is to work via the models (mathematical structures) of formal scientific theories which are interpretations under which these theories turn out to be true. The so-called ‘statement approach’ to scientific theories—characteristic for instance of Nagel, Carnap, and Hempel—depicts theories in terms of ‘symbolic languages’ and some set of ‘correspondence rules’ or ‘definition principles’. The defenders of the oppositionist non-statement approach advocate an analysis where the language in which the theory is formulated plays a much smaller role. They hold that foundational problems in the various sciences can in general be better addressed by focusing on the models these sciences employ than by reformulating the products of these sciences in some appropriate language. My model-theoretic realist account of science lies decidedly within the non-statement context, although I retain the notion of a theory as a deductively closed set of sentences (expressed in some appropriate language). In this paper I shall focus—against the background of a model-theoretic account of science—on the approach to the reality-science dichotomy offered by Nancy Cartwright and briefly comment on a few aspects of Roy Bhaskar's transcendental realism. I shall, in conclusion, show how a model-theoretic approach such as mine can combine the best of these two approaches.     

Programmers, Professors, and Parasites: Credit and Co-Authorship in Computer Science

This article presents an in-depth analysis of past and present publishing practices in academic computer science to suggest the establishment of a more consistent publishing standard. Historical precedent for academic publishing in computer science is established through the study of anecdotes as well as statistics collected from databases of published computer science papers. After examining these facts alongside information about analogous publishing situations and standards in other scientific fields, the article concludes with a list of basic principles that should be adopted in any computer science publishing standard. These principles would contribute to the reliability and scientific nature of academic publications in computer science and would allow for more straightforward discourse in future publications.     

The Role of Picture Books in Children's Spiritual Development and Meaning Making [1]

This paper sets out to explore how spiritual development might be addressed through the use of picture books in the primary classroom. The working definition for what is meant by ‘spiritual development’ is drawn from a variety of sources but is principally informed by the National Curriculum Council (NCC) and Ofsted discussion papers and the work of John Hull. Thus the work centres on the aspects of spirituality that are developed through experiencing relationships with other human beings and the world in which we live. The paper draws upon original classroom based research carried out with a group of 8 year old children in an inner city school. The children's group discussions centre around the picture book ‘Dogger’ by Shirley Hughes. The paper explores how the children are able to make and negotiate meaning as they address ‘spiritual’ issues.     

Textbooks and introductions to Western Esotericism

This article reviews the presently available supply of textbooks and introductions to the new academic field of study known as ‘Western esotericism’. By analogy with computer software, the author refers to the early ‘religionist’ phase of research in this domain as ‘Western esotericism 1.0’. He argues that Antoine Faivre's small French textbook L’ésotérisme (1992) marked the beginning of a more satisfactory upgrade that might be referred to as ‘Western esotericism 2.0’ and remains dominant in teaching and research today. A critical review of textbooks and introductions representative of this second phase of academic professionalisation reveals a number of structural problems and weaknesses (‘bugs and design faults’) that need to be corrected in order for the field to complete its adolescence and reach academic maturity. To accommodate the needs and new perspectives of the upcoming generation of scholars in this field, it is therefore time for an upgrade to ‘Western esotericism 3.0’.     

Midstream Modulation in Biotechnology Industry: Redefining What is ‘Part of the Job’ of Researchers in Industry

In response to an increasing amount of policy papers stressing the need for integrating social and ethical aspects in Research and Development (R&D) practices, science studies scholars have conducted integrative research and experiments with science and innovation actors. One widely employed integration method is Midstream Modulation (MM), in which an ‘embedded humanist’ interacts in regular meetings with researchers to engage them with the social and ethical aspects of their work. While the possibility of using MM to enhance critical reflection has been demonstrated in academic settings, few attempts have been made to examine its appropriateness in industry. This paper describes the outcomes of a case study aiming to find out firstly whether MM can effectively be deployed to encourage and facilitate researchers to actively include social and ethical aspects in their daily R&D practice, and secondly to what extent the integration activities could form an integral part of the engaged industrial researchers’ professional activities. Our data show that after MM, researchers display increased reflexive awareness on the social and ethical aspects of their work and acknowledge the relevance and utility of such aspects on their daily practice. Also, all participants considered actively reflecting on social and ethical aspects to be part of their work. Future research on the role of MM in industrial settings could focus on how to embed social and ethical integration as a regular part of innovation practice. We suggest that one possibility would be through aligning social and ethical aspects with innovation Key Performance Indicators.     

Conceptual clarity in international collaborations: A point of departure for policy-relevant research on discrimination

A workshop was conducted as part of the International Metropolis Conference held in Vienna, Austria in September 2003. The Metropolis Project is meant to facilitate research in the area of migration that can optimally inform policy. In this context, a workshop was conducted with the objective of discussing how policy-relevant research on discrimination could be conducted internationally. Four broad areas were addressed: ‘key stakeholder’ involvement, obtaining ethical and other forms of approval, international, national and local funding opportunities, and qualitative and quantitative methodology and questionnaire development. Viewpoints represented included those of non-governmental organizations, researchers, health professionals, and policy-makers/implementers. Countries represented in the discussions included Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Key conceptual differences included how best to define discrimination, societal acknowledgement of discrimination, the meaning of ‘race’, ‘racism’, ‘national’, and ‘migrant’, and perceptions of national identity.