Observation Versus Experiment: An Adequate Framework for Analysing Scientific Experimentation?

Observation and experiment as categories for analysing scientific practice have a long pedigree in writings on science. There has, however, been little attempt to delineate observation and experiment with respect to analysing scientific practice; in particular, scientific experimentation, in a systematic manner. Someone who has presented a systematic account of observation and experiment as categories for analysing scientific experimentation is Ian Hacking. In this paper, I present a detailed analysis of Hacking’s observation versus experiment account. Using a range of cases from various fields of scientific enquiry, I argue that the observation versus experiment account is not an adequate framework for delineating scientific experimentation in a systematic manner.     

Localism vs. Individualism for the Scientific Realism Debate

Abstract

Localism is the view that the unit of evaluation in the scientific realism debate is a single scientific discipline, sub-discipline, or claim, whereas individualism is the view that the unit of evaluation is a single scientific theory. Localism is compatible, while individualism is not, with a local pessimistic induction and a local selective induction. Asay presents several arguments to support localism and undercut globalism, according to which the unit of evaluation is the set of all scientific disciplines. I argue that some of his arguments clash with localism as well as with globalism and support individualism, and that individualism goes hand in hand, while localism does not, with the basic rule of how to evaluate an argument.     

一种基于多阶认知诊断模型测评科学素养的方法

科学素养是指作为一名有反思意识的公民所具有的解决科学问题和运用科学理念的能力。为实现在认知诊断中对科学素养的测评, 本文基于PISA 2015科学素养测评框架首次提出科学素养包含的三阶潜在结构, 使用新提出的多阶认知诊断模型对PISA 2015科学测评数据进行分析, 并通过模拟研究探究新模型的心理测量学性能。结果表明：(1)新模型能够较好地分析包含三阶潜在结构的科学素养; (2)科学知识对科学素养的影响最大, 科学背景次之, 科学能力的影响最小; (3)全贝叶斯MCMC算法能够为新模型提供较精准的参数估计。     

The debate over drug testing in the workplace: A novel opportunity for public scientific education

In several respects, American evidence law has an anti-scientific bias. A number of the admissibility and legal sufficiency rules in American evidence law reflect this bias. The assumption underlying the bias is that the typical citizen–-the potential juror–-is incapable of critically evaluating technical evidence. The results of national educational tests demonstrate that scientific illiteracy is widespread in the United States. However, the current controversy over drug testing presents forensic scientists with a unique opportunity to educate the average citizen about some of the rudiments of scientific proof. In the course of the debate, the scientific community can help familiarize the American public with such concepts as the limited nature of scientific findings, experimentation as the means of scientific validation, and the importance of proper test protocol. Perhaps more than any other scientific controversy, the debate over drug testing is of intense personal interest to the average citizen. This article pleads with the participants in the drug testing debate to capitalize on that interest and conduct their debate at a high level to aid the citizenry to develop a broader understanding of scientific evidence.     

Development and Validation of the Scientific Reasoning Scale

Scientific findings and innovations play an important role in a range of decisions faced by nonscientists, yet little is known about the skills that nonscientists need in order to read and evaluate scientific evidence. Drawing on research in public understanding of science, cognitive developmental psychology, and behavioral decision research, we develop an individual difference measure of scientific reasoning skills, defined as the skills needed to evaluate scientific findings in terms of the factors that determine their quality. We present the results of three studies assessing its psychometric validity. Our results indicate that the Scientific Reasoning Scale (SRS) is internally consistent and distinct from extant measures of scientific literacy. Participants with higher SRS scores are more likely to have beliefs consistent with the scientific consensus on potentially contentious issues, above and beyond education, political and religious beliefs, and scores on two widely used measures of scientific literacy. Participants with higher SRS scores also had better performance on a task requiring them to analyze scientific information. Our results suggest that the SRS provides a theoretically informed contribution to decoding lay responses to scientific results and controversies. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Semantic Challenges to Scientific Realism

This paper is concerned with connections between scientific and metaphysical realism. It is not difficult to show that scientific realism, as expounded by Psillos (1999) clearly qualifies as a kind of metaphysical realism in the sense of Putnam (1980). The statement of scientific realism therefore must not only deal with underdetermination and the dynamics of scientific theories but also answer the semantic challenges to metaphysical realism. As will be argued, the common core of these challenges is the proposition that a (metaphysical) realist semantics leads to semantic agnosticism in the sense that we are unable to grasp the proper meanings and referents of our linguistic expressions. Having established this, I will focus more specifically on the question of whether scientific realism—in its state-of-the-art account—has the resources to make reference to scientific concepts intelligible such that the semantic challenges can be answered.     

Using logic programming for theory representation and scientific inference

The aim of this paper is to show that logic programming is a powerful tool for representing scientific theories and for scientific inference. In a logic program it is possible to encode the qualitative and quantitative components of a theory in first order predicate logic, which is a highly expressive formal language. A theory program can then be handed to an algorithm that reasons about the theory. We discuss the advantages of logic programming with regard to building formal theories and present a novel software package for scientific inference: Theory Toolbox. Theory Toolbox can derive any conclusions that are entailed by a theory, explain why a certain conclusion follows from a theory, and evaluate a theory with regard to its internal coherence and generalizability. Because logic is, or should be, a cornerstone of scientific practice, we believe that our paper can make an important contribution to scientific psychology.     

Science as a Matter of Honour: How Accused Scientists Deal with Scientific Fraud in Japan

Practices related to research misconduct seem to have been multiplied in recent years. Many cases of scientific fraud have been exposed publicly, and journals and academic institutions have deployed different measures worldwide in this regard. However, the influence of specific social and cultural environments on scientific fraud may vary from society to society. This article analyzes how scientists in Japan deal with accusations of scientific fraud. For such a purpose, a series of scientific fraud cases that took place in Japan has been reconstructed through diverse sources. Thus, by analyzing those cases, the social basis of scientific fraud and the most relevant aspects of Japanese cultural values and traditions, as well as the concept of honour which is deeply involved in the way Japanese scientists react when they are accused of and publicly exposed in scientific fraud situations is examined.     

How the growth of science ends theory change

This paper outlines a defense of scientific realism against the pessimistic meta-induction which appeals to the phenomenon of the exponential growth of science. Here, scientific realism is defined as the view that our current successful scientific theories are mostly approximately true, and pessimistic meta-induction is the argument that projects the occurrence of past refutations of successful theories to the present concluding that many or most current successful scientific theories are false. The defense starts with the observation that at least 80% of all scientific work ever done has been done since 1950, proceeds with the claim that practically all of our most successful theories were entirely stable during that period of time, and concludes that the projection of refutations of successful theories to the present is unsound. In addition to this defense, the paper offers a framework through which scientific realism can be compared with two types of anti-realism. The framework is also of help to examine the relationships between these three positions and the three main arguments offered respectively in their support (No-miracle argument, pessimistic meta-induction, underdetermination).     

Scientific Misconduct: Three Forms that Directly Harm Others as the Modus Operandi of Mill’s Tyranny of the Prevailing Opinion

Scientific misconduct is usually assumed to be self-serving. This paper, however, proposes to distinguish between two types of scientific misconduct: ‘type one scientific misconduct’ is self-serving and leads to falsely positive conclusions about one’s own work, while ‘type two scientific misconduct’ is other-harming and leads to falsely negative conclusions about someone else’s work. The focus is then on the latter type, and three known issues are identified as specific forms of such scientific misconduct: biased quality assessment, smear, and officially condoning scientific misconduct. These concern the improper ways how challenges of the prevailing opinion are thwarted in the modern world. The central issue is pseudoskepticism: uttering negative conclusions about someone else’s work that are downright false. It is argued that this may be an emotional response, rather than a calculated strategic action. Recommendations for educative and punitive measures are given to prevent and to deal with these three forms of scientific misconduct.     

中英青少年科学创造力发展的比较

将中学生科学创造力测验施测于英国6所中学的1190名青少年及中国2所中学的1087名青少年的研究,得出如下结论：第一,青少年的科学创造力存在显著的年龄差异。随着年龄的增大,青少年的科学创造力呈持续上升趋势,但在14岁时要下降;11-13岁、14-16岁是青少年的科学创造力迅速发展的关键时期;第二,青少年的科学创造力存在性别差异。英国女生的科学创造力比男生强,差异显著;中国男生的科学创造力比女生强,差异不显著;第三,中英青少年的科学创造力存在显著的差异。在创造性的问题解决能力方面,中国青少年明显高于英国青少年,但中国青少年在其它方面的科学创造力及总成绩则明显低于英国青少年;第四,中国青少年的科学创造力存在显著的学校类型差异。重点中学学生的科学创造力显著高于普通中学学生的科学创造力。     

Expert Trespassing Testimony and the Ethics of Science Communication

Scientific expert testimony is crucial to public deliberation, but it is associated with many pitfalls. This article identifies one—namely, expert trespassing testimony—which may be characterized, crudely, as the phenomenon of experts testifying outside their domain of expertise. My agenda is to provide a more precise characterization of this phenomenon and consider its ramifications for the role of science in society. I argue that expert trespassing testimony is both epistemically problematic and morally problematic. Specifically, I will argue that scientific experts are subject to a particular obligation. Roughly, this is the obligation to qualify their assertions when speaking outside their domain of scientific expertise in certain contexts. Thus, I argue that scientists who possess expert knowledge are confronted with hard questions about when and how to testify and, therefore, that being a scientific expert comes with great responsibility. Consequently, I provide a concrete “expert guideline” according to which scientific experts, in certain contexts, face an obligation to qualify their assertions when speaking outside their domain of expertise. Furthermore, I consider a number of the conditions in which the guideline is waived or overridden. On this basis, I consider the broader aspects of the roles of scientific experts in a society with a high division of cognitive labor that calls for trust in scientific expert testimony.     

神经营养因子发现的启示

本文对神经营养因子的发现,生理作用及意义进行了回顾研究,综合自然辨证法的基本原理得出在科学研究中的两点启示：一在科学研究中要牢记事物是普遍联系的;二是科学研究中要勇于接受新观点。     

Effectiveness of research guidelines in prevention of scientific misconduct

In response to a series of allegations of scientific misconduct in the 1980’s, a number of scientific societies, national agencies, and academic institutions, including Harvard Medical School, devised guidelines to increase awareness of optimal scientific practices and to attempt to prevent as many episodes of misconduct as possible. The chief argument for adopting guidelines is to promote good science. There is no evidence that well-crafted guidelines have had any detrimental effect on creativity since they focus on design of research studies, documentation of research findings, assignment of credit through authorship, data management and supervision of trainees, not on the origin and evolution of ideas. This paper addresses a spectrum of causes of scientific misconduct or unacceptable scientific behavior and couples these with estimates of the potential for prevention if guidelines for scientific investigation are adopted. The conclusion is that clear and understandable guidelines should help to reduce the chance that flawed research will escape from our institutions. However, they cannot be relied upon alone to prevent all instances of scientific misconduct and should be regarded rather as one means of bolstering the integrity of the entire scientific enterprise.     

The morality of scientific openness

The ideal of scientific openness — i.e. the idea that scientific information should be freely accessible to interested parties — is strongly supported throughout the scientific community. At the same time, however, this ideal does not appear to be absolute in the everyday practice of science. In order to get the credit for new scientific advances, scientists often keep information to themselves. Also, it is common practice to withhold information obtained in commissioned research when the scientist has agreed with his or her employer to do so. The secrecy may be intended for ever, as in the military area, but also temporarily until a patent application has been made. The paper explores to what extent such secrecy is undesirable, as seems to be suggested by the ideal of scientific openness. Should this ideal be interpreted as having certain exceptions which make the above-mentioned practices acceptable? Are there, on closer inspection, good arguments for the ideal of scientific openness, and for officially upholding it? Possible versions of the ideal of scientific openness are explored and the issue is found to be rather complex, allowing for wide variations depending on the acting parties, beneficiaries, types of information and moral requirements involved. We conclude that the arguments usually given in favour of this ideal are weaker than what seems to be generally believed, and that, on closer inspection, they leave plenty of room for exceptions to it. These exceptions only partly cover the actual practice of withholding scientific information, and there may still be good reason to advocate, teach and enforce the ideal of scientific openness within the scientific community.     

Husserl on Scientific Method and Conceptual Change: A Realist Appraisal

Husserl claimed that all theoretical scientific concepts originate in and are valid in reference to 'life-world' experience and that scientific traditions preserve the sense and validity of such concepts through unitary and cumulative change. Each of these claims will, in turn, be sympathetically laid out and assessed in comparison with more standard characterizations of scientific method and conceptual change as well as the history of physics, concerning particularly the challenge they may pose for scientific realism. The Husserlian phenomenological framework is accepted here without defense, and hence the present project is limited to the task of asking what can and cannot be accommodated within that framework on its own terms. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The unity of science

The paper addresses the question of how the unity of science can adequately be characterized. A mere classification of scientific fields and disciplines does not express the unity of science unless it is supplemented with a perspective that establishes a systematic coherence among the different branches of science. Four ideas of this kind are discussed. Namely, the unity of scientific language, of scientific laws, of scientific method and of science as a practical‐operational enterprise. Whereas reference to the unity of scientific language and of scientific laws does not provide a viable basis for the unity of science, the methodological and practical unity might. The unity of science can be characterized by the way in which methodological criteria enter into the assessment or evaluation of theories, and, moreover, by a transdisciplin‐ary approach to problems. Accordingly, the unity of science is not expressed by theoretical uniformity but by the unity of scientific practice.     

Pluralism, scientific knowledge, and the fallacy of overriding values

The paper examines one implication of pluralism, the view that all values are conditional and none are overriding. This implication is that since scientific knowledge is one of the conditional values, there are circumstances in which the pursuit of even the most basic scientific knowledge is legitimately curtailed. These circumstances occur when the pursuit of scientific knowledge conflicts with moral and political values which, in that context, are more important than it. The argument focuses on the case for and against space exploration in search of intelligent extraterrestrial life. The widely held supposition that search for pure scientific knowledge cannot be reasonably curtailed is identified as the fallacy of overriding values.     

A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding

Achieving understanding of nature is one of the aims of science. In this paper we offer an analysis of the nature of scientific understanding that accords with actual scientific practice and accommodates the historical diversity of conceptions of understanding. Its core idea is a general criterion for the intelligibility of scientific theories that is essentially contextual: which theories conform to this criterion depends on contextual factors, and can change in the course of time. Our analysis provides a general account of how understanding is provided by scientific explanations of diverse types. In this way, it reconciles conflicting views of explanatory understanding, such as the causal-mechanical and the unificationist conceptions.