Awe or horror: differentiating two emotional responses to schema incongruence

ABSTRACT

Experiences that contradict one's core concepts (e.g. of the world, people, the self) elicit intense emotions. Such schema incongruence can elicit awe, wherein experiences that are too vast to understand with existing cognitive schemata cause one to feel that schemata should be updated [i.e. a “need for cognitive accommodation” (NFA); Keltner & Haidt, 2003. Approaching awe, a moral, spiritual, and aesthetic emotion. Cognition and Emotion, 17(3), 297–314]. However, other emotional responses to schema incongruence, such as horror, have not been investigated. The current studies compared awe and horror to investigate if they are distinct emotional responses to schema incongruence. Study 1 observed significant differences between awe and horror in cognitive appraisals (e.g. certainty, legitimacy), indicating several areas of dissimilarity. Study 2 found evidence that awe and horror are both responses to schema incongruence, as schema incongruence and NFA were salient in awe and horror, but not a contrast emotion. However, awe and horror were elicited by different types of schema incongruence: awe by spiritual vastness, horror by extremity. Awe-eliciting experiences also appeared to be easier to assimilate than horrifying experiences, as NFA and uncertainty were significantly lower in awe than in horror. Differences in the functions of horror and awe are also discussed.     

法律运行道德追问的两重向度

将法律运行的道德追问规定为两重向度 ,既有其学理的依据 ,又是历史给予的启示和破解现实难题的需要。对立法的道德追问不仅要考察法之形式正义和实质正义 ,而且要审视法与社会主导道德以及与广大民众心理和情感相契合的状况。对司法的道德追问则不仅要关注司法是否公正以及司法工作者是否具有良好的职业道德素质 ,而且应特别关注当下我国社会全面转型时期司法之“应然”。     

Pre- versus postdecisional deliberation and goal commitment: The positive effects of defensiveness

Building on Gollwitzer's (1990) mindset theory of action phases, it is proposed that the effects of assigned balanced deliberation on subsequent goal commitment are moderated by people's pre- versus postdecisional status. A balanced deliberation and impartial assessment of pros and cons is expected to reduce goal commitment in predecisional individuals, whereas a distortion of the assigned balanced deliberation and a partial focus on the pros of goal pursuit should defend and strengthen goal commitment in postdecisional individuals. Indeed, in Study 1, assigned deliberation on the pros and cons of pursuing a focal goal promoted stronger reported goal commitment in participants who had decided to pursue this goal, but reduced goal commitment for people who had not yet made such a decision. In Study 2, the same pattern of results emerged when goal commitment was indicated by planning to act on the goal. Study 3 replicated findings using a different decision status manipulation and goal persistence as a measure of commitment. Finally, results of Study 4 suggested that the increase in commitment produced by defensive postdecisional deliberation is consequential as it was found to drive real-life behavior by promoting goal-directed action. Moreover, Study 2: deliberation effects on subsequent planning activity, Study 3: deliberation effects on goal persistence, Study 4: deliberation effects on real-life behavior explored the underlying process and provided evidence that it is the partial focus on the pros of goal pursuit, meant to defend existing goal commitment, that drives postdecisional deliberation's strengthening effects on goal commitment. Implications for mindset theory, goal commitment theory, and decision making are discussed.     

宽以待己，严于律人：道德伪善的双加工机制研究

道德伪善是指个体对同一道德违规行为进行评判时,对自己宽松而对他人严苛的现象。双加工理论认为道德伪善是个体对自身道德违规行为有意识辩护以维护道德自我形象的结果。为此,本研究通过两个行为实验考察直觉思维和分析思维对道德伪善的影响。结果发现,分析性思维可易化道德伪善,直觉性思维无此作用。实验果支持道德伪善的双加工机制模型,道德自利性行为并非自动化的反应,需要认知努力和分析推理的参与。     

Examining congruence between partners' perceived infertility-related stress and its relationship to marital adjustment and depression in infertile couples

Because studies examining the emotional impact of infertility-related stress generally focus on individuals, there has been little research examining how relationship and individual variables are linked. The purpose of this study was to explore the impact of congruence (e.g., agreement) between partner's perceived infertility-related stress and its effects on depression and marital adjustment in infertile men and women. Couples referred for infertility treatments at a University-affiliated teaching hospital completed the Fertility Problem Inventory (FPI), the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), and the Dyadic Adjustment Scale (DAS) 3 months prior to their first treatment cycle. Study findings show that men and women in couples who perceived equal levels of social infertility stress reported higher levels of marital adjustment when compared to men and women in couples who perceived the stress differently. In addition, women in couples who felt a similar need for parenthood reported significantly higher levels of marital satisfaction when compared to women in couples where the males reported a greater need for parenthood. While couple incongruence was unrelated to depression in males, incongruence over relationship concerns and the need for parenthood was related to female depression. These findings provide initial support for the theory that high levels of agreement between partners related to the stresses they experience help them successfully manage the impact of these stressful life events. Possibilities for future research examining the construct of couple congruence are discussed.     

道德之一元论与多元论：缘起、内涵与论争

一元论与多元论之争是道德心理学领域近些年最为活跃的理论交锋之一。道德一元论认为所有外在的道德现象与内在的道德结构都可以用一种因素来解释。道德多元论则认为道德不能只用单一因素来解释,而是存在多个不同质的道德维度,且具有文化敏感性。对应道德理论和道德基础理论是这场争议的典型代表。双方就伤害的解释力、道德失声现象、模块化道德与洁净维度独立性等方面展开论争。未来研究应从三个具体方面进一步探索道德之一元论与多元论难题,进而保持道德心理学领域的理论活力。     

Developing an understanding of the literature relating to the moral development of people with intellectual disabilities

Recent reviews of moral development theory (Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey, 2007) demonstrate that revisionist theoretical perspectives have cross cultural validity, but moral development in relation to people with intellectual disabilities (IDs) has not been considered within this literature. A structured review of the published literature relating to children, adolescents and adults with IDs, and moral development was carried out. Twenty studies meeting the inclusion criteria were found. The review indicated that people with IDs may not progress through the developmental stages of moral reasoning as quickly as typically developing peers, or reach the more advanced stages. This difference from non-disabled peers tends to disappear if groups are matched on some measure of cognitive ability. However, the studies are fraught with methodological problems and there is a need for further research, given the theoretical developments within the area of moral development, including the evidence of a relationship between moral development and anti-social behaviour amongst typically developing children and adolescents.     

A re-investigating of the religious orientation-moral reasoning relationship: a relational developmental systems perspective

This study re-investigates the relationship between religious orientation and Kohlberg’s moral reasoning among students at a midwestern (USA) university. Multiple regression analyses revealed that quest-oriented religiosity was significantly positively related to principled moral reasoning, as consistently found in previous studies, while intrinsic religious orientation showed no relation to principled moral reasoning. We discuss our findings through a lens of relational developmental systems theory, suggesting that a more integrative measure is needed to better understand the complex relationship between religious orientation and moral reasoning.     

Epistemology shmepistemology: moral error theory and epistemic expressivism

Some philosophers object to moral error theory by arguing that there a parity between moral and epistemic normativity. They maintain that moral and epistemic error theory stand or fall together, that epistemic error theory falls, and that moral error theory thus falls too. This paper offers a response to this objection on behalf of moral error theorists. I defend the view that moral and epistemic error theory do not stand or fall together by arguing that moral error theory can be sustained alongside epistemic expressivism. This unusual combination of theories can be underpinned by differences in the foundational norms that guide moral and epistemic inquiry. I conclude that the problem of epistemic normativity fails to show that it is compulsory for us to reject moral error theory.     

Doing Ethics or Changing for the Better?

In this paper, classical pragmatism is used as a method, not as a substantial ethical theory, to develop “moral pragmatics.” Moral pragmatics offers a constructive approach for making progress where traditional ethical theories converge, and it innovates ethical deliberation. Assuming widespread agreement that real moral problems need practical solutions, the paper addresses two related problems: the missing link between ethical theories and moral practice, and the question of who is in charge of finding such solutions. It argues that “conscience” can create a link between ethical knowledge and moral practice, and that this partly discharges “the ethicist” from the task of solving problems that are not really, or not only, hers. Two specific methodological innovations are suggested that go beyond admonitions to render ethics sensitive to context. Instead, a reevaluation of “casuistry” and a sensitivity for “finding the right words” give an idea of how to achieve this goal.     

Moral Error Theory, Entailment and Presupposition

According to moral error theory, moral discourse is error-ridden. Establishing error theory requires establishing two claims. These are that moral discourse carries a non-negotiable commitment to there being a moral reality and that there is no such reality. This paper concerns the first and so-called non-negotiable commitment claim. It starts by identifying the two existing argumentative strategies for settling that claim. The standard strategy is to argue for a relation of conceptual entailment between the moral statements that comprise moral discourse and the statement that there is a moral reality. The non-standard strategy is to argue for a presupposition relation instead. Error theorists have so far failed to consider a third strategy, which uses a general entailment relation that doesn’t require intricate relations between concepts. The paper argues that both entailment claims struggle to meet a new explanatory challenge and that since the presupposition option doesn’t we have prima facie reason to prefer it over the entailment options. The paper then argues that suitably amending the entailment claims enables them to meet this challenge. With all three options back on the table the paper closes by arguing that error theorists should consider developing the currently unrecognised, non-conceptual entailment claim.     

Virtue Ethics, Theory, and Warrant

Are there good grounds for thinking that the moral values of action are to be derived from those of character? This ‘virtue ethical’ claim is sometimes thought of as a kind of normative ethical theory; sometimes as form of opposition to any such theory. However, the best case to be made for it supports neither of these claims. Rather, it leads us to a distinctive view in moral epistemology: the view that my warrant for a particular moral judgement derives from my warrant for believing that I am a good moral judge. This view seems to confront a regress-problem. For the belief that I am a good moral judge is itself a particular moral judgement. So it seems that, on this view, I need to derive my warrant for believing that I am a good moral judge from my warrant for believing that I am a good judge of moral judges; and so on. I show how this worry can be met, and trace the implications of the resulting view for warranted moral judgement.     

Improving Epistemological Beliefs and Moral Judgment Through an STS-Based Science Ethics Education Program

This study develops a Science–Technology–Society (STS)-based science ethics education program for high school students majoring in or planning to major in science and engineering. Our education program includes the fields of philosophy, history, sociology and ethics of science and technology, and other STS-related theories. We expected our STS-based science ethics education program to promote students’ epistemological beliefs and moral judgment development. These psychological constructs are needed to properly solve complicated moral and social dilemmas in the fields of science and engineering. We applied this program to a group of Korean high school science students gifted in science and engineering. To measure the effects of this program, we used an essay-based qualitative measurement. The results indicate that there was significant development in both epistemological beliefs and moral judgment. In closing, we briefly discuss the need to develop epistemological beliefs and moral judgment using an STS-based science ethics education program.     

道德概念净脏隐喻映射的偏向性

基于概念隐喻理论探讨道德概念净脏隐喻映射的偏向性。实验一考察洁净和肮脏启动对中性刺激道德判断的影响,实验二考察道德和不道德启动对中性刺激净脏判断的影响。结果发现:(1)洁净和肮脏启动下被试对中性刺激的道德判断差异不显著;(2)道德词和不道德词启动下被试对中性刺激的净脏判断差异显著,相比不道德词启动,道德词启动下被试更倾向于对中性刺激作洁净判断。研究结果说明,道德概念净脏隐喻映射存在偏向性,从道德概念目标域到净脏始源域的隐喻映射力量更强。     

CONSEQUENTIALISM AND RATIONAL CHOICE: LESSONS FROM THE ALLAIS PARADOX

Abstract: This paper investigates the relation between consequentialism, as conceived of in moral theory, and standard expected utility theory. I argue that there is a close connection between the two. I show furthermore that consequentialism is not neutral with regard to the values of the agent. Consequentialism, as well as standard expected utility theory, is incompatible with the recognition of considerations that depend on what could have been the case, such as regret and disappointment. I conclude that consequentialism should be rejected as a principle of rational choice and that there are reasons to doubt its plausibility in the realm of moral theory. Moreover, this is a reason to doubt whether standard expected utility theory is a plausible theory of rational choice.     

On the Existence of Duties to the Self (and Their Significance for Moral Philosophy)

Contemporary philosophers generally ignore the topic of duties to the self. I contend that they are mistaken to do so. The question of whether there are such duties, I argue, is of genuine significance when constructing theories of practical reasoning and moral psychology. In this essay, I show that much of the potential importance of duties to the self stems from what has been called the “second‐personal” character of moral duties—the fact that the performance of a duty is “owed to” someone. But this is problematic, as there is reason to doubt whether a person can genuinely owe to herself the performance of an action. Responding to this worry, I show that temporal divisions within an agent's life enable her to relate to herself second‐personally, in the way required by morality. The upshots, I argue, are that we need an intra‐personal theory of justice that specifies the extent of a person's authority over herself, and that we need to rethink our theories of moral emotions in order to specify how an individual ought to respond to attacks on her interests and autonomy that she herself perpetrates.     

Pornography use and marital quality: Testing the moral incongruence hypothesis

Studies often report a negative association between pornography use and marital quality. A number of studies, however, find this negative association to be stronger among religious Americans, suggesting that “moral incongruence” may be a key moderating factor. This theory is tested with panel data from the nationally representative 2006–2012 Portraits of American Life Study (N = 612). Support for the theory is mixed. Any pornography use in 2006 predicts lower marital quality in 2012 regardless of whether the viewer felt pornography use was always immoral. However, among pornography viewers, the negative association between marital quality and viewing frequency is stronger for those who morally oppose pornography. Findings hold regardless of gender. Data limitations and implications for future research are discussed.     

Religion as a resource for positive youth development: religion, social capital, and moral outcomes

Although existing literature demonstrates that developmental benefits are associated with religion for adolescents, little is understood about the dynamics of this relationship. Drawing on social capital theory, this study tested a conceptual model exploring socially embedded religious influences on moral outcomes. A three-dimensional model of social capital demonstrated how social interaction, trust, and shared vision enable social ties associated with religiousness to influence moral behavior. Structural equation modeling was used with data gathered from 735 urban youths to test a proposed model of the effects of religiousness on moral outcomes. Results suggested that religiously active youths report higher levels of social capital resources and that the influence of adolescent religiousness on moral outcomes was mediated through social capital resources. Suggestions for further research and implications for faith-based youth development organizations are considered.     

Normative Objectivity Without Ontological Commitments?

Several non-naturalist philosophers look for ways to maintain the objectivity of morals without making any (robust) ontological commitments. Recently Derek Parfit proposed an account of non-ontologically existing irreducible moral properties. My first aim in this paper is to outline that such an account is doomed to fail. My second aim in this paper is to argue that irreducible moral properties can be integrated with adaptions into an ontological framework such as E.J. Lowe’s four-category ontology. If it can be shown that irreducible moral properties have a proper place in such an ontology, then there is no need to distinguish between an ontological and non-ontological mode of existence, which, in turn helps to eschew the obscurities that this distinction brings in its wake.     

Voters’ Partisan Responses to Politicians’ Immoral Behavior

Politicians’ moral behaviors affect how voters evaluate them. But existing empirical research on the effects of politicians’ violations of moral standards pays little attention to the heterogeneous moral foundations of voters in assessing responses to violations. It also pays little attention to the ways partisan preferences shape responses. We examine voters’ heterogeneous evaluative and emotional responses to presumably immoral behaviors by politicians. We make use of moral foundation theory’s argument that people vary in the extent to which they endorse, value, and use the five universally available moral intuitions: care, fairness, loyalty, authority and sanctity. We report on a 5 × 3 between‐subjects experiment asking a random sample of 2,026 U.S. respondents to respond to politicians’ violations of different moral foundations. We randomly vary which of the five foundations is violated and the partisanship of the actor (Republic/Democrat/Nonpartisan). Results suggest that partisanship rather than moral foundations drives most of U.S. voters’ responses to moral foundations violations by politicians. These foundations seem malleable when partisan actors are involved. While Democrats in this sample show stronger negative emotional response to moral violations than Republicans, partisans of both parties express significantly greater negativity when a politician of the other party violates a moral foundation.