Higher-order theories of consciousness and what-it-is-like-ness

Ambitious higher-order theories of consciousness aim to account for conscious states when these are understood in terms of what-it-is-like-ness. This paper considers two arguments concerning this aim, and concludes that ambitious theories fail. The misrepresentation argument against HO theories aims to show that the possibility of radical misrepresentation—there being a HO state about a state the subject is not in—leads to a contradiction. In contrast, the awareness argument aims to bolster HO theories by showing that subjects are aware of all their conscious states. Both arguments hinge on how we understand two related notions which are ubiquitous in discussions of consciousness: those of what-it-is-like-ness and there being something it is like for a subject to be in a mental state. This paper examines how HO theorists must understand the two crucial notions if they are to reject the misrepresentation argument but assert the awareness argument. It shows that HO theorists can and do adopt an understanding—the HO reading—which seems to give them what they want. But adopting the HO reading changes the two arguments. On this reading, the awareness argument tells us nothing about those states there is something it is like to be in, and so offers no support to ambitious HO theories. And to respond to the misrepresentation understood according to the HO reading is to simply ignore the argument presented, and so to give no response at all. As things stand, we should deny that HO theories can account for what-it-is-like-ness.     

Why are attitude–behaviour inconsistencies uncomfortable? Using motivational theories to explore individual differences in dissonance arousal and motivation to compensate

Using cognitive dissonance theories and self-determination theory, we explored the role of individual differences in global and contextual motivational orientations on dissonance arousal processes following spontaneous attitude–behaviour inconsistencies (ABIs). Study 1 (N = 382) showed that individual differences in global motivation relate to the frequency of ABIs and dissonance arousal across important life domains. Studies 2 (N = 282) and 3 (N = 202) showed that individual differences in contextual motivation toward the environment predict the relative frequency of ABIs and the quantity and quality of proximal motivation to compensate for ABIs in that context. Autonomous motivation was associated with a tendency to compensate for ABIs to both reduce dissonance and restore self-integrity. Controlled motivation disposed individuals to reduce dissonance to protect ego-invested self-structures, and to be indifferent to non self-threatening ABIs. Amotivation left people indifferent to ABIs. Individual differences in motivational orientations could explain why ABIs are uncomfortable and motivate people to compensate differently when they face ABIs.     

How does frustration make you feel? A motivational analysis in exercise context

Not all exercisers experience the same psychological benefits. The understanding of motivational processes and their relation with emotional consequences of exercise should be considered in the context of the exercisers motivation. This was a cross-sectional study of 153 gym users (M?=?36.21 years, SD?=?8.44; 44.9% men, 55.1% women; M years exercise?=?8). Weekly attendance averaged 4.3 (SD?=?2.6) sessions per week; reported exertion intensity was 5.6 (SD?=?2.1) (scale: 0–11). The basic psychological needs (BPNs) posited by self-determination theory, motivational regulation, and emotional response to physical activity, were measured. Possible mediators of BPN-emotion relationships were analyzed. BPN satisfaction was associated with a positive emotional response to exercise which was partially mediated by the effect of autonomous regulation on positive activation and psychological well-being. Mediation models indicated that the negative effects of BPN frustration were counteracted by autonomous regulation. Exercise professionals should be able to create psychologically supportive contexts and identify behaviors associated with need frustration so as to enhance emotional responses to exercise.     

Avoiding the Conflation of Moral and Intellectual Virtues

One of the most pressing challenges facing virtue theorists is the conflation problem. This problem concerns the difficulty of explaining the distinction between different types of virtue, such as the distinction between moral virtues and intellectual virtues. Julia Driver has argued that only an outcomes-based understanding of virtue can provide an adequate solution to the conflation problem. In this paper, I argue against Driver’s outcomes-based account, and propose an alternative motivations-based solution. According to this proposal, intellectual virtues can be identified by the shared motivation for cognitive contact with reality, while moral virtues are identified by appeal to the characteristic motivations of kindness and justice. I defend the proposal by demonstrating that it produces plausible verdicts concerning the virtue status of candidate moral and intellectual virtues.     

The redundancy problem: From knowledge-infallibilism to knowledge-minimalism

Among the epistemological ideas commonly associated with the Descartes of the Meditations, at any rate, is a knowledge-infallibilism. Such an idea was seemingly a vital element in Descartes’s search for truth within that investigative setting: only a true belief gained infallibly (as we would now describe it) could be knowledge, as the Meditations conceived of this. Contemporary epistemologists are less likely than Descartes was to advocate our ever seeking knowledge-infallibility, if only because most are doubtful as to its ever being available. Still, they would agree—in a seemingly Cartesian spirit—that if infallible knowledge was available then it would be a stronger link to truth than fallible knowledge ever manages to be. But this paper argues that infallible knowledge lacks that supposed advantage over fallible knowledge. Indeed, we will see why we should move even further away from the epistemological model at the heart of the Meditations: we should adopt knowledge-minimalism, by conceiving of a belief’s being true as always sufficient for its being knowledge—this, for any belief.     

Reasoning defeasibly about probabilities

In concrete applications of probability, statistical investigation gives us knowledge of some probabilities, but we generally want to know many others that are not directly revealed by our data. For instance, we may know prob(P/Q) (the probability of P given Q) and prob(P/R), but what we really want is prob(P/Q&;R), and we may not have the data required to assess that directly. The probability calculus is of no help here. Given prob(P/Q) and prob(P/R), it is consistent with the probability calculus for prob(P/Q&;R) to have any value between 0 and 1. Is there any way to make a reasonable estimate of the value of prob(P/Q&;R)? A related problem occurs when probability practitioners adopt undefended assumptions of statistical independence simply on the basis of not seeing any connection between two propositions. This is common practice, but its justification has eluded probability theorists, and researchers are typically apologetic about making such assumptions. Is there any way to defend the practice? This paper shows that on a certain conception of probability—nomic probability—there are principles of “probable probabilities” that license inferences of the above sort. These are principles telling us that although certain inferences from probabilities to probabilities are not deductively valid, nevertheless the second-order probability of their yielding correct results is 1. This makes it defeasibly reasonable to make the inferences. Thus I argue that it is defeasibly reasonable to assume statistical independence when we have no information to the contrary. And I show that there is a function Y(r, s, a) such that if prob(P/Q) = r, prob(P/R) = s, and prob(P/U) = a (where U is our background knowledge) then it is defeasibly reasonable to expect that prob(P/Q&;R) = Y(r, s, a). Numerous other defeasible inferences are licensed by similar principles of probable probabilities. This has the potential to greatly enhance the usefulness of probabilities in practical application.     

The links between self-determined motivations and behavioral automaticity in a variety of real-life behaviors

The different motivations postulated by the Self-Determination Theory have proved to be meaningful to predict the level of engagement in a wide variety of life domains. The present research examines the relation between the different forms of self-determined motivation and behavioral automaticity of 12 behaviors associated with different life domains. Following 1743 measurements of self-determination (using a short version of the situational motivational scale, SIMS8), behavioral automaticity (using the self-reported behavioral automaticity index, SRBAI), and behavioral frequency (self-reported number of executions in a unit of time) for 12 various common behaviors collected on 315 young adults (M_age = 20.60?±?2.87 years) through an online survey, the results of crossed linear mixed models indicated that self-determined motivations are more associated with behavioral automaticity than non-self-determined motivations (intrinsic motivation: β?=?0.13, p?<?.001, identified extrinsic motivation: β?=?0.13, p?<?.001; external extrinsic motivation : β?=?0.08, p?<?.001; amotivation: β?=?0.02, p?=?.433). Furthermore, self-determination played a moderating role between the repetition of behaviors and behavioral automaticity (β?=?0.06, p?<?.002) suggesting that self-determination facilitated automatization, as high level of behavioral automaticity was achieved with less frequent behaviors when behaviors were performed for highly self-determined (β?=?0.41, p?<?.001) than weakly self-determined reasons (β?=?0.29, p?<?.001). The applications of these findings for learning and habit formation are discussed.     

One Thought Too Few: Where <Emphasis Type="Italic">De Dicto</Emphasis> Moral Motivation is Necessary

De dicto moral motivation is typically characterized by the agent’s conceiving of her goal in thin normative terms such as to do what is right. I argue that lacking an effective de dicto moral motivation (at least in a certain broad sense of this term) would put the agent in a bad position for responding in the morally-best manner (relative to her epistemic state) in a certain type of situations. Two central features of the relevant type of situations are (1) the appropriateness of the agent’s uncertainty concerning her underived moral values, and (2) the practical, moral importance of resolving this uncertainty. I argue that in some situations that are marked by these two features the most virtuous response is deciding to conduct a deep moral inquiry for a de dicto moral purpose. In such situations lacking an effective de dicto moral motivation would amount to a moral shortcoming. I show the implications for Michael Smith’s (1994) argument against Motivational Judgment Externalism and for Brian Weatherson’s (2014) argument against avoiding moral recklessness: both arguments rely on a depreciating view of de dicto moral motivation, and both fail; or so I argue.     

The self-systems: facilitating personal well-being experiences at school

The focus of inquiry pertaining to quality learning and student well-being experiences at school has involved numerous studies, utilizing complex quantitative methodological approaches. In a similar vein, for consideration of research advancement, there has been extensive progress made regarding motivational tenets of effective learning and enriched schooling experiences. We recently developed a model of student learning and school experiences (Phan in Progress in Education, vol 33. Nova Science Publishing, New York, pp 101–121, 2015; Phan and Ngu in Int J Pedag Curric 22(4):1–19, 2015a), detailing a number of personal, cognitive, motivational, and emotional components for validation and implementation. The present study, situated within the self-systems framework, explored the central roles and differential influences of three major components on adaptive outcomes: emotional well-being, daily functioning, and relating to others. Structural equation modelling analyses of 258 year 8 secondary school students produced some notable evidence for potential educational-social practices: (1) the positive influences of self-esteem on daily functioning and motivation towards schooling and learning, (2) the inverse association between self-efficacy and emotional well-being, and (3) the positive influences of relating to others on motivation towards schooling and learning, and liking for school. We also noted, however, some unexpected and inconclusive findings for discussion—for example, the negative influence of daily functioning on motivation towards schooling and learning.     

Subjunctive Conditional Probability

There seem to be two ways of supposing a proposition: supposing “indicatively” that Shakespeare didn’t write Hamlet, it is likely that someone else did; supposing “subjunctively” that Shakespeare hadn’t written Hamlet, it is likely that nobody would have written the play. Let P(B//A) be the probability of B on the subjunctive supposition that A. Is P(B//A) equal to the probability of the corresponding counterfactual, A □→B? I review recent triviality arguments against this hypothesis and argue that they do not succeed. On the other hand, I argue that even if we can equate P(B//A) with P(A □→B), we still need an account of how subjunctive conditional probabilities are related to unconditional probabilities. The triviality arguments reveal that the connection is not as straightforward as one might have hoped.     

The (non-)benefit of choosing: If you get what you want it is not important that you chose it

Self-Determination Theory argues that autonomy plays a major role in intrinsic motivation. Autonomy can be operationalized as choice. Whether positive effects on motivation are caused by the mere act of choosing or by confounding variables is still unclear. In this study (N?=?299, M_age?=?13.1?±?0.6 years), students could work with two polarizing animals. The first group was allowed to choose (choosing & match), two groups were not. In these groups, the teacher allocated the animals to the students resulting in a second group that received the wanted animal (no choosing & match), and a third group that received the unwanted animal (no choosing & no match). Situational motivation and flow experience were assessed. Regarding intrinsic motivation and flow, students in the no choosing & match treatment scored the highest, students of the no choosing & no match group the lowest. In conclusion, matching and not choosing made the difference.     

When and why people <Emphasis Type="Italic">don</Emphasis>’<Emphasis Type="Italic">t</Emphasis> accept cheating: self-transcendence values,social responsibility,mastery goals and attitudes towards cheating

Although self-transcendence values have received top rankings as moral values, research has yet to show how they relate to cheating. In two studies, (N = 129) and (N = 122), we analyze the indirect motivational path between self-transcendence values and acceptance of cheating. Both studies were carried out with third-year students in an international management school: Study 1 included 58 male and 65 female students (six missing values), mean age: 22.38 (SD = 1.60). The study 2 sample comprised 46 male and 73 female students, (three missing values), mean age: 22.01 (SD = 1.74). We find that adherence to self-transcendence values positively predicts a social-responsibility driven motivation to study, namely wanting to study to help improve society. This, in turn, predicts the adoption of study-related mastery-approach achievement goals, characterized by a desire to understand course material. These learning-oriented goals negatively predict the acceptance of cheating. Study 2 also reveals that exposing individuals to representations of society characterized by opposing self-enhancement values of power and achievement is sufficient to render non-significant the negative relation between self-transcendence values and acceptance of cheating. The theoretical and practical significance of understanding motivational connections between higher-order life values and context-specific acceptance of dishonest behaviors is discussed.     

Is Explanatoriness a Guide to Confirmation? A Reply to Climenhaga

We (2013, 2014) argued that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant in the following sense: Let H be a hypothesis, O an observation, and E the proposition that H would explain O if H and O were true. Then our claim is that Pr(H | O & E) = Pr(H | O). We defended this screening-off thesis (SOT) by discussing an example concerning smoking and cancer. Climenhaga (Philos Sci, forthcoming) argues that SOT is mistaken because it delivers the wrong verdict about a slightly different smoking-and-cancer case. He also considers a variant of SOT, called “SOT*”, and contends that it too gives the wrong result. We here reply to Climenhaga’s arguments and suggest that SOT provides a criticism of the widely held theory of inference called “inference to the best explanation”.     

Changes Over Time in the Comprehension of <Emphasis Type="Italic">He</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">They</Emphasis> as Epicene Pronouns

An epicene pronoun is a gender-neutral singular pronoun used in sentences when the gender of the subject is unknown or unspecified. In English, he and they are commonly-used epicene pronouns. Until recently, he has been widely accepted as being grammatically correct. However, many have argued that he is sexist because it may bias people to think about males. Two experiments were performed using a lexical decision task in which participants reacted to gendered words (e.g., aunt and uncle) after reading sentences using he, they, or unrelated epicene pronouns. We conducted the experiments 15 years apart in order to explore whether change in pronoun usage and the social significance of pronouns would be associated with different priming effects. Both experiments demonstrated that pronouns influence the processing of gendered nouns. However, in Experiment 1 they facilitated the processing of feminine nouns whereas in Experiment 2, he slowed the processing of feminine nouns. We discuss these results with respect to language change and conclude that they is a more effective epicene.     

Episodic-like memory in zebrafish

Episodic-like memory tests often aid in determining an animal’s ability to recall the what, where, and which (context) of an event. To date, this type of memory has been demonstrated in humans, wild chacma baboons, corvids (Scrub jays), humming birds, mice, rats, Yucatan minipigs, and cuttlefish. The potential for this type of memory in zebrafish remains unexplored even though they are quickly becoming an essential model organism for the study of a variety of human cognitive and mental disorders. Here we explore the episodic-like capabilities of zebrafish (Danio rerio) in a previously established mammalian memory paradigm. We demonstrate that when zebrafish were presented with a familiar object in a familiar context but a novel location within that context, they spend more time in the novel quadrant. Thus, zebrafish display episodic-like memory as they remember what object they saw, where they saw it (quadrant location), and on which occasion (yellow or blue walls) it was presented.     

Depression and Approach Motivation: Differential Relations to Monetary,Social, and Food Reward

Depression is associated with blunted reward functioning. It remains unknown, however, whether depression is linked to diminished motivation to approach reward across categories of reward stimuli, or if depression is differentially related to approach motivation. The current study tested associations between depression and behavioral approach motivation to specific reward stimuli (i.e., money, social, food reward). In a two-visit study, university females (N = 122, M _age = 18.67) completed measures of depression and three behavioral approach motivation tasks (completed across visits). Differential findings emerged across behavioral reward tasks. Specifically, depressive symptoms were associated with decreased motivation to approach monetary and social reward but increased motivation to approach food reward. Results suggest a category-specific conceptualization of depressive symptomatology in relation to behavioral approach motivation, whereby women with elevated symptoms may be less likely to approach certain rewards, but more likely to approach others.     

Reflexology,schizokinesis and autokinesis

A resume of the history and concepts culminating in the work of Pavlov shows that there has been a gradual and slow elaboration toward a science of behavior. The past work has been oriented since the time of Locke increasingly toward the external environment. Pavlov’s theories, however, were directed toward forceswithin the nervous system. Further work from the Pavlovian Laboratories at Johns Hopkins and the V.A. (and elsewhere) indicate that the various physiological systems do not always work harmoniously, but that there is often a split in function (Schizokinesis)—changes occurring over a period of time—which do not seem to be referable to the external environment but to elaborations occurringwithin the organism (Autokinesis). These may tend toward improvement of function or, on the other hand, toward deterioration. The time has come when the progressive changes and the interrelationships of active fociwithin the organism should be considered as well as the reactivity of the individual toward the external environment.     

Perceived Autonomy Support Moderates the Relations between Counseling Self-Efficacy and Flow among Filipino Counselors

Contemporary literature has emphasized the vital role of supervision in the professional growth of counselors and therapists. Even some counselor developmental models argued that improvement in counselor autonomy, motivation, and self-efficacy is highly contingent upon counseling supervision, especially in Western settings. Yet, there is marked scarcity of studies examining the antecedents of flow in non-Western contexts. As such, the central aim of the current study was to assess the moderating effects of perceived autonomy support from supervisors on the relations between counseling self-efficacy (CSE) and state flow among Filipino counselors. A sample of 131 Filipino counselors in Metro Manila participated in the research through answering questionnaires that measured the aforementioned constructs. The findings of correlational analyses have shown that counseling self-efficacy and perceived autonomy support are positively associated with state flow. The results of path analysis revealed a significant moderation effect. This suggests that for Filipino counselors who had greater perceptions that their supervisors provide autonomy in their counseling practice (perceived autonomy support), having lower perceived capabilities in performing counseling duties may lead to higher immersion and enjoyment in counseling activities, while for those who have low perceived autonomy support, having higher levels of counseling self-efficacy will lead to lower flow. Implications of these findings in theory and practice are elucidated.     

Mindless accuracy: on the ubiquity of content in nature

It is widely held in contemporary philosophy of mind that states with underived representational content are ipso facto psychological states. This view—the Content View—underlies a number of interesting philosophical projects, such as the attempt to pick out a psychological level of explanation, to demarcate genuinely psychological from non-psychological states, and to limn the class of states with phenomenal character. The most detailed and influential theories of underived representation in philosophy are the tracking theories developed by Fodor, Dretske, Millikan and others. Tracking theorists initially hoped to ‘naturalize’ underived representation by showing that although it is distinctively psychological it is not irreducibly so, yet they ended up developing theories of representation that by their own lights don’t pick out a distinctively psychological phenomenon at all. Burge (Origins of objectivity, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) sets out to develop a theory of underived representation that does pick out a distinctively psychological phenomenon. His theory promises to vindicate the Content View and the various philosophical projects that depend on it. In this paper I argue that Burge’s theory dementalizes representation for the same reason tracking theories do: These theories hold that representations are states with underived accuracy conditions, yet such states are found in all sorts of mindless systems, like plants.