The Trio of Time: On Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Time

Human Studies - The transition from “natural” sensation to “phenomenological” perception is revealed since the dynamic temporality within perception is elaborated by...     

Urbewußtsein und Unbewußtsein in Husserls Zeitverständnis

Ohne ZusammenfassungDie vorliegende Arbeit wurde auf The first international Meeting for Husserl Studies in Japan (Shizuoka University, November 23–24, 2002) vorgetragen. Zum Zweck der Veröffentlichung wurden einigeÄnderungen vorgenommen. Für die wertvollen Anregungen in der Korrespondenz und Diskussion bedanke ich mich herzlich bei Ichiro Yamaguchi, Nam-In Lee, Anthony Steinbock, Tetsuya Sakakibara und Elmar Holenstein!     

The Fate of Phenomenology in Deconstruction: Derrida and Husserl∗

This paper begins by presenting Lawlor's Derrida and Husserl: The Basic Problems of Philosophy, an account of how deconstruction emerges as Derrida discusses Husserl's phenomenology (I.). It then determines the genre of Lawlor's intellectual history. Lawlor writes a continuist narrative history of ideas and concepts (II.). In the subsequent main section the paper uses Lawlor's material to take a position in the debate between Husserl and Derrida (III.). This is done in three parts. The first part reconstructs Derrida's version of Husserlian time consciousness (III. 1). The second part proposes an alternative and revisionist reading of Husserl's theory of internal temporality. On this reading Husserl is a process theoretician of consciousness (III. 2). The third part juxtaposes Husserl and Derrida's critical views (III. 3), arguing that Husserl's fluxive theory of time consciousness does not suffer from the problems Derrida finds in his Husserl. The final section (IV.) points to relativizing consequences for deconstruction and identifies programmatic consequences for phenomenology.     

The Anticipation of the Present: Phenomenology of déjà vu

This paper analyses the déjà-vu experience in order to deepen the understanding of the complex nature of time-consciousness from a phenomenological point of view. The paper is divided into two sections: the first section focuses on Bergson’s research on déjà vu in order to assess the validity of his position; the second section describes a specific form of déjà-vu experience from a phenomenological perspective. This investigation will question the widespread assumption according to which déjà vu should be conceived as a disturbance of the memory of the past. On the contrary, the author shows that the disturbance primarily pertains to the dimension of the future. In order to understand this phenomenon, it is necessary to focus on the coherent deformation of the immediate expectation of the imminent future.     

The Editing Density of Moving Images Influences Viewers’ Time Perception: The Mediating Role of Eye Movements

The present study examined whether cinematographic editing density affects viewers’ perception of time. As a second aim, based on embodied models that conceive time perception as strictly connected to the movement, we tested the hypothesis that the editing density of moving images also affects viewers’ eye movements and that these later mediate the effect of editing density on viewers’ temporal judgments. Seventy participants watched nine video clips edited by manipulating the number of cuts (slow- and fast-paced editing against a master shot, unedited condition). For each editing density, multiple video clips were created, representing three different kinds of routine actions. The participants’ eye movements were recorded while watching the video, and the participants were asked to report duration judgments and subjective passage of time judgments after watching each clip. The results showed that participants subjectively perceived that time flew more while watching fast-paced edited videos than slow-paced or unedited videos; by contrast, concerning duration judgments, participants overestimated the duration of fast-paced videos compared to the master-shot videos. Both the slow- and the fast-paced editing generated shorter fixations than the master shot, and the fast-paced editing led to shorter fixations than the slow-paced editing. Finally, compared to the unedited condition, editing led to an overestimation of durations through increased eye mobility. These findings suggest that the editing density of moving images by increasing the number of cuts effectively altered viewers’ experience of time and add further evidence to prior research showing that performed eye movement is associated with temporal judgments.     

Marking the Perception–Cognition Boundary: The Criterion of Stimulus-Dependence

Philosophy, scientific psychology, and common sense all distinguish perception from cognition. While there is little agreement about how the perception–cognition boundary ought to be drawn, one prominent idea is that perceptual states are dependent on a stimulus, or are stimulus-dependent, in a way that cognitive states are not. This paper seeks to develop this idea in a way that can accommodate two apparent counterexamples: hallucinations, which are prima facie perceptual yet stimulus-independent; and demonstrative thoughts, which are prima facie cognitive yet stimulus-dependent. The payoff is not only a specific proposal for marking the perception–cognition boundary, but also a deeper understanding of the natures of hallucination and demonstrative thought.     

The Role of Marriage in Hegel’s Phenomenology

In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel discusses marriage in his analysis of the first shape of Spirit, Ethical Life. Since it is analyzed in terms of a particular shape of spirit and set in Ancient Greece, it is difficult to understand both its use in the Phenomenology as well as what claims, if any, he is making about the institution of marriage as such. I aim to show that in this text, marriage functions as a fundamental context in which self-knowing occurs.     

Depth as Nemesis: Merleau-Ponty’s Concept of Depth in Phenomenology of Perception,Art and Politics

Human Studies - The concept of depth is central to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and informed not only his philosophy of perception but also his thinking about psychology, art and politics....     

Perception—Action Coupling during Bimanual Coordination: The Role of Visual Perception in the Coalition of Constraints That Govern Bimanual Action

Constraints pertaining to interlimb coordination have been studied extensively in the past decades. In this debate, F. Mechsner (2004) has taken a provocative position by putting primary emphasis on perceptual principles that mediate coordinative stability. Whereas the present authors agree that the role of perceptual principles is of critical importance during coordination, they take issue with Mechsner's extreme position and with the evidence forwarded to support a purely perceptual-cognitive approach to bimanual coordination. More specifically, the authors emphasize that current knowledge about brain function argues against a dualism between perception and action, criticize the presented evidence that posture manipulations during coordination provide decisive evidence against motoric and muscular constraints, and report on potential pitfalls associated with the use of visual transformation procedures to support complex coordination patterns.     

The Phenomenon of Ego-Splitting in Husserl’s Phenomenology of Pure Phantasy

Husserl’s phenomenology of imagination embraces a cluster of different theories and approaches regarding the multi-faced phenomenon of imaginative experience. In this paper I consider one aspect that seems to be crucial to the understanding of a particular form of imagination that Husserl names pure phantasy. I argue that the phenomenon of Ego-splitting discloses the best way to elucidate the peculiarity of pure phantasy with respect to other forms of representative acts (such as remembering) and to any simple form of act modification (such as neutrality modification). First, I unravel the phenomenological distinctions which, respectively, oppose phantasy to perception, on the one hand, and phantasy to other forms of the so-called “intuitive re-presentations”. Second, I introduce the difference between presentative and representative acts, arguing that this cannot help us to single out the defining feature of phantasy experiences. The third section draws again an important distinction between pure phantasy and neutrality modification, which allows me to finally determine an internal trait of phantasy experiences, which Husserl refers to as the “Ego-splitting” (Ichspaltung). In this way, I hope to contribute to a refined characterization of Husserl’s phenomenology of imagination.     

The Retentional and the Repressed: Does Freud's Concept of the Unconscious Threaten Husserlian Phenomenology?

This paper investigates the claims made by both Freudian psychoanalysic thought and Husserlian phenomenology about the unconscious. First, it is shown how Husserl incorporates a complex notion of the unconscious in his analysis of passive synthesis. With his notion of an unintentional reservoir of past retentions, Husserl articulates an unconscious zone that must be activated from consciousness in order to “come to life.” Second, it is explained how Husserl still does not account for the Freudian unconscious. Freud's unconscious could be called, in phenomenological terms, a repressed retentional zone that differs from both near and far retention. Finally, an analysis is offered for the significance of this psychoanalytic argument for phenomenology. Does phenomenology provide a complete account of the psychical life of the subject without the Freudian unconscious? Does phenomenology suggest, as is often done, that Freud's “discovery” of the unconscious is a fantastical invention? Or, does the Freudian unconscious represent a true stumbling block for phenomenology?     

The Social Language of Time: The Time Perspective–Social Network Connection

Time perspective (TP) is a pivotal cognitive process through which people perceive, interpret, and negotiate their physical and social worlds. This study identifies unique patterns in the quality of social relationships that were associated with different TP dimensions. Low support and high conflict with family characterized past-negative TP. Large networks and high support from family distinguished past positive TP. Large networks with more support and companionship from friends/acquaintances typified present hedonistic TP. Having highly supportive significant others was associated with high future TP. Multidimensional time perspective is an essential cognitive process influencing human social behavior.     

Does Monitoring Performance Eliminate the Ego-depletion Phenomenon and Influence Perception of Time?

This study evaluated whether monitoring performance against an objective measure eliminated ego-depletion and enhanced the accuracy of one's temporal perception. Two independent variables, depletion level and monitoring status, were manipulated in 83 undergraduates (71% female, median age = 21.2 years), who were then measured for persistence on a series of anagram puzzles (first dependant variable) and subjective time perception estimates (second dependant variable). While depleted participants in the nonmonitoring condition exhibited significantly less persistence than those in the performance-monitoring or low-depleted conditions, no differences in time perception scores were detected among the four groups. It appears monitoring behavior against an objective measure is a robust tool to improve self-control ability in depleted individuals; however, this effect is unrelated to perception of time.     

“The Cancer Bond”: Exploring the Formation of Cancer Risk Perception in Families with Lynch Syndrome

This study explores the social context of hereditary cancer risk perception in three families, an African-American family, a Mexican-American family, and a Caucasian family, each with Lynch Syndrome documented by a mismatch repair gene mutation. Communication network assessments measured family communication about cancer experiences and genetic testing information among a total of 26 participants. Participant narratives were evaluated to gain insight into how family cancer experiences and genetic testing information have shaped perceptions of cancer risk. Analysis of communication networks indicated that some families discussed cancer experiences to a greater extent than genetic testing information, and vice-versa. Interviews elucidated that sharing both types of health information led participants to conceptualize linkages among a strong family history of cancer, genetic testing information, and cancer prevention strategies. Understanding how different types of family communication influence the formation of perceived hereditary disease risk may enhance efforts to tailor genetic counseling services for families.     

Early Glimmers of the Now Familiar Ethnomethodological Themes in Garfinkel’s “The Perception of the Other”

Garfinkel??s dissertation, ??The Perception of the Other,?? was completed and defended 15?years prior to the publication of Studies in Ethnomethodology. This essay seeks hints of the familiar ethnomethodological themes (indexicality, reflexivity, accountability) within his thesis. It begins by examining the contributions of earlier social theorists, particularly Talcott Parsons and Alfred Schütz, to Garfinkel??s thought. It then examines the dissertation itself seeking evidence to support the claim that Garfinkel was already moving in the direction of an ??incommensurable, asymmetric, and alternate?? program of sociological inquiry well before the term ??ethnomethodology?? had even been coined.     

The Tailor-Made Analysis: The Analyst’s Adaptation to the Patient and the Question of Time

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis - This paper considers Ferenczi’s views about the need for an adaptation of the analyst to the patient through a flexible management of time during some...     

“The First Man Speaking”: Merleau-Ponty on Expression as the Task of Phenomenology

This article aims to establish an understanding of Merleau-Ponty's view of creative expression, and of its phenomenological function, setting out from the intriguing statement in his essay “Cézanne's Doubt” that the painter (or writer or philosopher) finds himself in the situation of the first human being trying to express herself. Although the importance of primary or creative expression in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is well known, there is no consensus among commentators with respect to how this notion is to be understood, and of its apparently paradoxical relation to experience in his philosophy. On the one hand, Merleau-Ponty seems to presuppose that there is an original meaning pre-given in experience; on the other hand, expression is described as a hazardous enterprise, because the meaning to be expressed does not exist before expression has succeeded. In order to resolve this tension, I explore the significance of the precariousness of creative expression, arguing that it must be related to its other side: the constituted, all too often petrified meaning that we must start out from.