Sick? Or slow? On the origins of intelligence as a psychological object

This paper examines the first moments of the emergence of “psychometrics” as a discipline, using a history of the Binet–Simon test (precursor to the Stanford–Binet) to engage the question of how intelligence became a “psychological object.” To begin to answer this, we used a previously-unexamined set of French texts to highlight the negotiations and collaborations that led Alfred Binet (1857–1911) to identify “mental testing” as a research area worth pursuing. This included a long-standing rivalry with Désiré-Magloire Bourneville (1840–1909), who argued for decades that psychiatrists ought to be the professional arbiters of which children would be removed from the standard curriculum and referred to special education classes in asylums. In contrast, Binet sought to keep children in schools and conceived of a way for psychologists to do this. Supported by the Société libre de l'étude psychologique de l'enfant [Free society for the psychological study of the child], and by a number of collaborators and friends, he thus undertook to create a “metric” scale of intelligence—and the associated testing apparatus—to legitimize the role of psychologists in a to-that-point psychiatric domain: identifying and treating “the abnormal”. The result was a change in the earlier law requiring all healthy French children to attend school, between the ages of 6 and 13, to recognize instead that otherwise normal children sometimes need special help: they are “slow” (arriéré), but not “sick.” This conceptualization of intelligence was then carried forward, through the test's influence on Lewis Terman (1877–1956) and Lightner Witmer (1867–1956), to shape virtually all subsequent thinking about intelligence testing and its role in society.     

Understanding of and reasoning about object–object relationships in long-tailed macaques?

Diagnostic reasoning, defined as the ability to infer unobserved causes based on the observation of their effects, is a central cognitive competency of humans. Yet, little is known about diagnostic reasoning in non-human primates, and what we know is largely restricted to the Great Apes. To track the evolutionary history of these skills within primates, we investigated long-tailed macaques’ understanding of the significance of inclinations of covers of hidden food as diagnostic indicators for the presence of an object located underneath. Subjects were confronted with choices between different objects that might cover food items. Based on their physical characteristics, the shape and orientation of the covers did or did not reveal the location of a hidden reward. For instance, hiding the reward under a solid board led to its inclination, whereas a hollow cup remained unaltered. Thus, the type of cover and the occurrence or absence of a change in their appearance could potentially be used to reason diagnostically about the location of the reward. In several experiments, the macaques were confronted with a varying number of covers and their performance was dependent on the level of complexity and on the type of change of the covers’ orientation. The macaques could use a board’s inclination to detect the reward, but failed to do so if the lack of inclination was indicative of an alternative hiding place. We suggest that the monkeys’ performance is based on a rudimentary understanding of causality, but find no good evidence for sophisticated diagnostic reasoning in this particular domain.     

Implicit Personality Theory: Myth or fact? An illustration of how empirical research can miss

The present paper examines some problems in the current literature on Implicit Personality Theory (IPT) with specific reference to the controversial publications by Mirels (1976) and Jackson, Chan, and Stricker (1979). Their disputes address the question of whether individuals' estimates of trait co-occurrence accurately reflect actual (empirical) trait co-occurrence in personality ratings. The cogency of the disputes is undermined, however, by both studies' deficiences at the levels of theory, measurement, and statistical analysis. For instance, the indices used for representing estimated and empirical trait co-occurrence are neither adequately justified nor commensurate. For future personality attribution research, we discuss both the theoretical distinction between two (comparative and absolute) judgment formats frequently involved in data gathering and the empirical distinction between sophisticated and unsophisticated research strategies involved in data analysis. Finally, it was concluded that due to the residual effect of the empiricism of the 1950s and 1960s, and a lack of logical coherence between cognitive psychology, psychometric theories, and statistical data manipulations, IPT is still at an early stage of development. Future investigators should therefore develop a rigorous program with the sophistication of so-called “nomological operationalization” for a systematic investigation of IPT.     

Systematic empirical research versus clinical case studies: a valid antagonism?

This paper considers the issue of systematic empirical research versus clinical case studies raised by Hoffman (2009). A rebuttal of Hoffman's arguments is offered, followed by an argument that each method addresses itself to different questions and that posing them in opposition is not fruitful. Finally, criteria and requirements of the case study method are proposed that, if met, would enhance its evidential value.     

Is Implicit Personality Theory illusory? Armchair criticism versus replicated empirical research

The Tzeng and Tzeng (1982) criticisms of the assumptions underlying the Jackson, Chan, and Stricker (1979) study of Implicit Personality Theory fail to take account of the relevant empirical data. For example, the key contention of Tzeng and Tzeng–that the measures of judged and empirical trait-co-occurrence used by Jackson et al. were not comparable–is contradicted by replicated findings which establish that the two are substantially and consistently related, results for which Tzeng and Tzeng offer no alternative explanation. In short, Tzeng and Tzeng have not demonstrated that their criticisms have any real substance. Hence, none of the Jackson et al. results and conclusions, including those questioning the conditional probability index as a measure of empirical co-occurrence and those supporting the validity of Implicit Personality Theory, are affected or changed.     

Is color an intrinsic property of object representation?

The role of color in object representation was examined by using a variation of the Stroop paradigm in which observers named the displayed colors of objects or words. In experiment 1, colors of color-diagnostic objects were manipulated to be either typical or atypical of the object (eg a yellow banana versus a purple banana). A Stroop-like effect was obtained, with faster color-naming times for the typical as compared to the atypical condition. In experiment 2, naming colors on words specifying these same color-diagnostic objects reversed this pattern, with the typical condition producing longer response times than the atypical condition. In experiment 3, a blocked condition design that used the same words and colors as experiment 2 produced the standard Stroop-like facilitation for the typical condition. These results indicate that color is an intrinsic property of an object's representation at multiple levels. In experiment 4, we examined the specific level(s) at which color-shape associations arise by following the tasks used in experiments 1 and 2 with a lexical-decision task in which some items were conceptually related to items shown during color naming (eg banana/monkey). Priming for these associates was observed following color naming of words, but not pictures, providing further evidence that the color-shape associations responsible for the differing effects obtained in experiments 1 and 2 are due to the automatic activation of color-shape associations at different levels of representation.     

But is there harmony? questions about “empirical” personal construct research

Abstract

Empirical Constructivism in Europe: The Personal Construct Approach Verlag, Germany: Psychosozial, 1996, pp. 287 Edited by Joern Scheer and Ana Catina.     

Scientific associations in the German research system—Results of an empirical study

Within contemporary science, scientific associations have been found to fulfill at least four functions: a communicative function that furthers scientific communication within a discipline or subdiscipline; a profesional function that supports individual careers and represents the collective interests of the members within a discipline; a transfer function that provides a meeting place for scientists and societal users of research results; and a promotion function that advises research institutes and political institutions in science policy decisions. This empirical study investigates German scientific associations and shows how and to what degree they fulfill these functions. The results of the study indicate that the communicative and the transfer functions dominate. Uwe Schimank is currently a research fellow at the Max-Planck-Institut fur Gesellschaftsforschung in Cologne. He received his doctorate in sociology at the University of Bielefeld. He is presently working on an analysis of the development of extra-university state-financed research institutes in the German research system.     

Nine-month-olds’ shared visual attention as a function of gesture and object location

Two factors hypothesized to affect shared visual attention in 9-month-olds were investigated in two experiments. In Experiment 1, we examined the effects of different attention-directing actions (looking, looking and pointing, and looking, pointing and verbalizing) on 9-month-olds’ engagement in shared visual attention. In Experiment 1 we also varied target object locations (i.e., in front, behind, or peripheral to the infant) to test whether 9-month-olds can follow an adult’s gesture past a nearby object to a more distal target. Infants followed more elaborate parental gestures to targets within their visual field. They also ignored nearby objects to follow adults’ attention to a peripheral target, but not to targets behind them. In Experiment 2, we rotated the parent 90° from the infant’s midline to equate the size of the parents’ head turns to targets within as well as outside the infants’ visual field. This manipulation significantly increased infants’ looking to target objects behind them, however, the frequency of such looks did not exceed chance. The results of these two experiments are consistent with perceptual and social experience accounts of shared visual attention.     

Journal reprints as dissemination of psychological research: courtesy, obligation, or obsolescence?

The proliferation of journals and the escalation of journal prices have made it difficult for psychologists, especially those in rural areas without access to comprehensive libraries, to obtain journal articles. A traditional source of otherwise unavailable papers is to request a reprint directly from the author. Although previous researchers found this method to be 60%-80% successful, there have been major changes in journal operations and alternative media since this research was conducted. In the present study, reprints were requested from 473 corresponding authors from 10 American Psychological Association journals. The compliance rate was 84% and reprints took, on average, 32 days to arrive. There was no difference in the rate or in the speed of response due to the requestor's status as an academic or applied psychologist. Although functional, the traditional reprint request method was slow, uncertain, and costly. It is suggested that a demand still exists for reprints, but that electronic reprints should replace the traditional paper format. Key words: reprints, scientific communication     

Is object recognition automatic?

A new paradigm is proposed that involves a simple judgment on an object’s perceptual feature that is independent of object identity. Subjects were required to categorize as vertical or horizontal the main axis of elongation of an object picture. Both fake and real-world objects were presented, and a graphical manipulation was applied to their shapes so that the canonical elongation of the real-world objects was incongruent with the elongation of their shapes after the manipulation. The results showed an influence of the identity of the objects on the perceptual task in the form of a cost in judging the elongation of the incongruent real-world objects. The results are taken as evidence for automatic activation of objects’ stored representations. A “horse-race” model of the influence of these representations on the perceptual task is proposed in the final section of the article.     

What drives the organization of object knowledge in the brain?

Various forms of category-specificity have been described at both the cognitive and neural levels, inviting the inference that different semantic domains are processed by distinct, dedicated mechanisms. In this paper, we argue for an extension of a domain-specific interpretation to these phenomena that is based on network-level analyses of functional coupling among brain regions. On this view, domain-specificity in one region of the brain emerges because of innate connectivity with a network of regions that also process information about that domain. Recent findings are reviewed that converge with this framework, and a new direction is outlined for understanding the neural principles that shape the organization of conceptual knowledge.     

Countertransference: Our new royal road to the unconscious?

In this paper I am tracing the history of countertransference and how it has informed the current debate about self‐disclosure as a pivotal instrument of analytic work. Now that the analyst's “subjective factor”; has been understood as a central influence on the analysand and as a vital source of information about the analysand's intrapsychic life, I argue that certain currents in the relational school of psychoanalysis confuse the analyst's subjectivity with his personality. While becoming more “real”; with a patient may enliven a stale analytic dialogue, it ought not be confused with, or take the place of, an analysis of unconscious desires and phantasies. I claim that a two‐person psychology can exist only within a tripartite structure in which the analyst does not lose sight of his complex function of being the carrier, observer, and conveyor of the unconscious currents holding both participants in check.     

Does scene context always facilitate retrieval of visual object representations?

An object-to-scene binding hypothesis maintains that visual object representations are stored as part of a larger scene representation or scene context, and that scene context facilitates retrieval of object representations (see, e.g., Hollingworth, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 32, 58-69, 2006). Support for this hypothesis comes from data using an intentional memory task. In the present study, we examined whether scene context always facilitates retrieval of visual object representations. In two experiments, we investigated whether the scene context facilitates retrieval of object representations, using a new paradigm in which a memory task is appended to a repeated-flicker change detection task. Results indicated that in normal scene viewing, in which many simultaneous objects appear, scene context facilitation of the retrieval of object representations-henceforth termed object-to-scene binding-occurred only when the observer was required to retain much information for a task (i.e., an intentional memory task).