Do Not Revise Ockham's Razor Without Necessity

Ockham's razor asks that we not multiply entities beyond necessity. The razor is a powerful methodological tool, enabling us to articulate reasons for preferring one theory to another. There are those, however, who would modify the razor. Schaffer (2010: 313—our italics), for one, tells us that, ‘I think the proper rendering of Ockham's razor should be ‘Do not multiply fundamental entities without necessity’’. Our aim, here, is to challenge such re‐workings of Ockham's razor.     

We Do Not Count by Identity

It is widely assumed in psychology, philosophy, and linguistics that we count by identity. For example, to count the dogs by identity, we correlate each dog that isn't identical to the rest with a natural number, starting with one and assigning each successive dog the successive natural number. When we run out of distinct dogs, we've yielded a correct count. I argue that this model of counting is incorrect. We do not count by identity.     

What Was Not Discussed: Reply to Comments

Here I respond to comments and questions raised in commentary papers (Castro and Lafuente, Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 42, 2007; Charles, Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 42, 2007; Woodward and Hetley, Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 42, 2007) and address three issues not discussed on my previous paper: (1) the historiography used in the history of Japanese psychology, (2) the first generation of Japanese women psychologists to flesh out the history of psychology in Japan, and (3) how applied psychology and psychical research existed in the early phase of psychology in Japan. Consequently, this paper, together with the previous one, provides a broader picture of the development of psychology in Japan.

What is a Thing?

“Thing” in the titular question of this paper should be construed as having the utmost generality. In the relevant sense, a thing just is an entity, an existent, a being. The present task is to say what a thing of any category is. This task is the primary one of any comprehensive and systematic metaphysics. Indeed, an answer provides the means for resolving perennial disputes concerning the integrity of the structure in reality—whether some of the relations among things are necessary merely given those relata themselves—and the intricacy of this structure—whether some things are more or less fundamental than others. After considering some reasons for thinking the generality of the titular question makes it unanswerable, the paper propounds the methodology, original inquiry, required to answer it. The key to this methodology is adopting a singular perspective; confronting the world as merely the impetus to inquiry, one can attain an account of what a thing must be. Radical ontology is a systematic metaphysics—broadly Aristotelian, essentialist, and nonhierarchical—that develops the consequences of this account. With it, it is possible to move past stalemate in metaphysics by revealing the grounds of a principled choice between seemingly incommensurable worldviews.     

What Justification Could Not Be

I begin by asking the meta-epistemological question, 'What is justification?', analogous to the meta-ethical question, 'What is rightness?' I introduce the possibility of non-cognitivist, naturalist, non-naturalist, and eliminativist answers in meta-epistemology,corresponding to those in meta-ethics. I devote special attention to the naturalistic hypothesis that epistemic justification is identical to probability, showing its antecedent plausibility. I argue that despite this plausibility, justification cannot be identical with probability, under the standard interpretation of the probability calculus, for the simple reason that justification can increase indefinitely but probability cannot. I then propose an alternative model for prima facie justification, based on an analogy with Ross's account of prima facie obligation, arguing that this model illuminates the differences between justification and probability and, given the plausible assumption of epistemic pluralism, explains them as well.     

Advances in Behaviorism: It's Not What It Used to Be

Behaviorism has changed over the past half century and its modern form is not familiar to many educators and other applied professionals. Put briefly, behaviorism has changed from the molecular and absolutist form of years past, when basic researchers, therapists and educators sought to modify isolated target behaviors. Modern behaviorism is relativistic and molar and the articles included in this issue are meant to illustrate this changed emphasis. The first article shows how the matching law has redefined the old law of effect and how that affects application. The second shows how relational frames provide a behavioral treatment of cognitive variables that dispels the stereotyped view of behavior modification. The third treats molar classes of behaviors as traits, and individual behaviors as states, applying that distinction to aspects of the relative frequencies of behaviors of children at home and at school. Finally, the last article shows specifically how behavioral methods have been (and are) applied to the behavior of autistic children, in a program that has been extremely successful over the past few years.     

Sincerely Asserting What You Do Not Believe

I offer examples showing that, pace G. E. Moore, it is possible to assert ‘Q and I don't believe that Q’ sincerely, truly, and without any absurdity. The examples also refute the following principles: (a) justification to assert p entails justification to assert that one believes p (Gareth Evans); (b) the sincerity condition on assertion is that one believes what one says (John Searle); and (c) to assert (to someone) something that one believes to be false is to lie (Don Fallis).     

Aristotle's De Anima: On Why the Soul is Not a Set of Capacities

Although it is common for interpreters of Aristotle's De Anima to treat the soul as a specially related set of powers of capacities, I argue against this view on the grounds that the plausible options for reconciling the claim that the soul is a set of powers with Aristotle's repeated claim that the soul is an actuality cannot be unsuccessful. Moreover, I argue that there are good reasons to be wary of attributing to Aristotle the view that the soul is a set of powers because this claim conflicts with several of his metaphysical commitments, most importantly his claims about form and substance. I argue that although there are passages in the De Anima in which Aristotle discusses the soul in terms of its powers or capacities, these discussions do not establish that the soul is a set of capacities.     

论医学哲学是什么和不是什么

弄清医学哲学是什么和不是什么,是医学哲学学科建设的基本问题。医学哲学理论构架的逻辑起点是生命健康,基本结构是医学哲学的本体论、认识论、方法论、价值论和发展观以及一系列医学范畴。“哲学理论 医学实例”不是医学哲学。医学哲学具备超验的思维方式、反思的学术精神、创新的学术风格、开放的学术视野,而临床经验总结、紧跟时局的宣传、时髦热闹的效果,从者众多的场面不是医学哲学。     

What is Working,What is Not,and What We Need to Know: a Meta-Analytic Review of Business Ethics Instruction

Requirements for business ethics education and organizational ethics trainings mark an important step in encouraging ethical behavior among business students and professionals. However, the lack of specificity in these guidelines as to how, what, and where business ethics should be taught has led to stark differences in approaches and content. The present effort uses meta-analytic procedures to examine the effectiveness of current approaches across organizational ethics trainings and business school courses. to provide practical suggestions for business ethics interventions and research. Thus, the primary questions driving this research are as follows: (1) what course characteristics moderate the effectiveness of ethics instruction?, and (2) have ethics education and training efforts improved? Findings suggest that professional, focused, and workshop-based training programs are especially effective for improving business ethics. However, results also reveal considerable problems with many of the criteria used to evaluate the effectiveness of business ethics interventions. Practical suggestions for course design and evaluation in business ethics efforts are discussed along with future research needs.     

Long Working Hours and Well-being: What We Know,What We Do Not Know,and What We Need to Know

Despite a widespread belief in both the academic and public policy literatures that working long hours is deleterious to health and well-being, our critical review of this large and complex literature fails to support a robust direct causal effect of work hours on either physical or mental well-being outcomes. Large-scale epidemiological studies, many of which are prospective and include objective health outcome measures, support a statistically significant association between long work hours and coronary heart disease and depression, but the effect sizes are very small. Moreover, there is an absence of true longitudinal studies that assess the consistency of working long hours over time and its relationship to well-being. Our review suggests that the effects of working long hours are nuanced in that they may vary considerably for different working populations based on gender, age, working conditions, and other factors. Primary and meta-analytic studies suggest that such moderator effects are plausible, yet rigorous testing of these remains to be done. We conclude with suggestions for specific moderator effects that seem worth investigating in future research.     

On Not Seeing What You Do Not Want to See: Meloen, van der Linden and de Witte on Authoritarianism

Meloen, van der Linden, and de Witte (1996) were puzzled by their finding that their various scales of authoritarian attitudes all correlated at similar low levels with approval for a racist political party. They also reported that the "Directiveness" behavior inventory correlated not at all with political variables. If the validity characteristics of the various scales used are taken into account, however, the implications of their results are clear: The alleged scales of authoritarian attitudes were simply functioning as alternative scales of conservatism and people who preferred leftist political parties were just as likely to be authoritarian as those who preferred racist political parties.     

Some Varieties of Particularism

Analytic particularism claims that judgments of moral wrongness are about particular acts rather than general principles. Metaphysical particularism claims that what makes true moral judgments true is not general principles but nonmoral properties of particular acts. Epistemological particularism claims that studying particular acts apart from general principles can justify beliefs in moral judgments. Methodological particularism claims that we will do better morally in everyday life if we look carefully at each particular decision as it arises and give up the search for a complete moral theory. This paper raises problems for each of these versions of particularism.     

A Return to Musical Idealism

In disputes about the ontology of music, musical idealism—that is, the view that musical compositions are ideas—has proven to be rather unpopular. We argue that, once we have a better grip on the ontology of ideas, we can formulate a version of musical idealism that is not only defensible, but plausible and attractive. We conclude that compositions are a particular kind of idea: they are completed ideas for musical manifestation.     

回到道德现象本身——康德道德形而上学的论证方法初探

在康德理性的道德形而上学的建构过程中,两种论证方法即分析法和综合法起到了重要的作用。他首先用分析法从普通人的相互混杂的道德认识中逐步分离出纯粹的道德现象和原则,力图给真正的道德哲学奠基。随后他又用综合法来论证道德律的实在性并使它在经验世界中能得到现实的应用,以说明纯粹的道德原则并非人的主观臆造。两种方法相互依赖,相辅相成,共同支撑起道德形而上学的大厦。