Reflection and Disagreement

How should you take into account the opinions of an advisor? When you completely defer to the advisor's judgment (the manner in which she responds to her evidence), then you should treat the advisor as a guru. Roughly, that means you should believe what you expect she would believe, if supplied with your extra evidence. When the advisor is your own future self, the resulting principle amounts to a version of the Reflection Principle—a version amended to handle cases of information loss. When you count an advisor as an epistemic peer, you should give her conclusions the same weight as your own. Denying that view—call it the “equal weight view”—leads to absurdity: the absurdity that you could reasonably come to believe yourself to be an epistemic superior to an advisor simply by noting cases of disagreement with her, and taking it that she made most of the mistakes. Accepting the view seems to lead to another absurdity: that one should suspend judgment about everything that one's smart and well‐informed friends disagree on, which means suspending judgment about almost everything interesting. But despite appearances, the equal weight view does not have this absurd consequence. Furthermore, the view can be generalized to handle cases involving not just epistemic peers, but also epistemic superiors and inferiors.     

For God's sake,what do those women want?

“Of course, you were just trying to make sure she was being 'realistic' in her choice—this was what she really wanted to do—but she got the message.“     

MULTIPLE FRACTURES IN TIME: REFLECTIONS ON A CAR CRASH

This essay offers a story of a traumatic event experienced by the author on September 6, 1999. Presented here in autoethnographic and multivoiced form, the author narrates a fraction of time in her life that has left her forever changed: a near-death car crash. She uses literary mode in the crash story and recollected dialogue in the rescue story. In the effort to engage readers into the particulars of such a horrific experience, she seeks to connect with trauma survivors and perhaps offer illumination for those who (for their own reasons) seek further understanding in what will, hopefully for them, never be a first-order experience.     

The pearl of great price

“The Pearl of Great Price” is a short story that explores the ways faith can go wrong. The central character, Janet, a single mom in a dead end job, is drawn into a multi-level marketing scheme, Benevite, by an unscrupulous salesman. She is encouraged to believe in herself and her dream and to give everything she has to it. She is fed the standard clichés to the effect that you can achieve whatever you want if you try hard enough. In the end her faith in her dream leads to the loss of her relationship with her child and other losses. Her pursuit exhibits many of the standard features of faith, belief, desire, resilience, tenacity, passion, and yet she does not save herself. The story is not meant as an indictment of faith in general, but as an acknowledgement of the fact that faith can be a vice and an exploration of when this might be so.     

At one with our actions,but at two with our bodies

Jennifer Hornsby's account of human action frees us from the temptation to think of the person who acts as ‘doing’ the events that are her actions, and thereby removes much of the allure of ‘agent causation’. But her account is spoiled by the claim that physical actions are ‘tryings’ that cause bodily movements. It would be better to think of physical actions and bodily movements as identical; but Hornsby refuses to do this, seemingly because she thinks that to do so would be to endorse the so–called ‘standard causal story’. But Hornsby misses a possibility here, for we can insist on this identity claim without endorsing the standard story if we embrace an account which parallels the disjunctive account in the philosophy of perception. This will leave us with a picture of physical action that saves the insights of Hornsby's account without succumbing to its distortions.     

All Life Is a Circle: Poetry and the Search for My Native American Roots

In this personal essay, which includes five poems, the author uses poetry as a vehicle to recover, connect with, and explore her Native American ancestry. Her mother, who was one-quarter Wampanoag, was raised from age seven by a couple who taught her that Native American ancestry was something to hide. The poems are interwoven with the account of the author's struggle to retrieve a family story that has been intentionally suppressed. In the first poem, the author's connection to her Native American roots is reflected purely through her interest in and reverence for the earth and its creatures, but throughout the article, the connection becomes a progressively more specific bond with a particular ancestor and his tribe. As the author draws closer to identifying her Wampanoag great-grandfather through genealogical research and reaching out to Wampanoag tribes in Massachusetts, she also draws closer to his spirit, and she writes the final poem, “Wampanoag Clambake,” in his voice.     

Case vignette: cybertherapy

Dr. Neuro Transmitter, a psychotherapist in Paramus, New Jersey, provides services through an online, real-time consultation service known as CyberShrink, Inc., of Dallas, Texas. He is paid by the hour for his consultation services to subscribers who are billed by credit card through CyberShrink. One afternoon he logs on and is connected via private "chat channel" to a new subscriber to the service. She is Ann Hedonia of Simi Valley, California. Ten minutes into the session, Dr Transmitter recognizes that Ms. Hedonia is seriously depressed with suicidal ideation and is feeling on the edge of her ability to cope. He gently suggests that perhaps she ought to think about hospitalization near her home. Ms. Hedonia replies, "Even you don't care about me! That's it. I'm going to do it!" and disconnects. Discussion questions: Is offering psychotherapy services online ethical? What are Dr. Transmitter's obligations in general and at this particular moment to Ms. Hedonia? Suppose Ms. Hedonia has a complaint about Dr. Transmitter. From whom can she seek a remedy? Which state's laws apply regarding professional practice, confidentiality, or licensing qualifications? Must Dr. Transmitter be licensed in any state to offer this service?     

Mapping Moral Motivation

In this paper we defend a version of moral internalism and a cognitivist account of motivation against recent criticisms. The internalist thesis we espouse claims that, if an agent believes she has reason to A, then she is motivated to A. Discussion of counter-examples has been clouded by the absence of a clear account of the nature of motivation. While we can only begin to provide such an account in this paper, we do enough to show that our version of internalism can be defended against putative counter-examples. All theories of motivation which take what motivates to be a psychological state run foul of the following plausible constraint: the reason why you ought to do an action and the reason why you do it can be the same. In our view, however, while what motivates is a reason (which is a fact) the state of being motivated is a cognitive stage, viz. the belief that one has reason to act. In cases where the agent's relevant beliefs are false, then she has no reason to act, but nontheless her action can be explained in other ways.     

SUBJECTIVITY, JUDGMENT, AND THE BASING RELATIONSHIP

Moral and legal judgments sometimes depend on personal traits in this sense: the subject offers good reasons for her judgment, but if she had a different social or ideological background, her judgment would be different. If you would judge the constitutionality of restrictions on abortion differently if you were not a secular liberal, is your judgment really based on the arguments you find convincing, or do you find them so only because you are a secular liberal? I argue that a judgment can be based on the considerations the subject claims as justification even when it depends on personal traits.     

Memoirs of a Mentor: Using Creativity for Counselors in Coping With the Loss of a Mentor

This article was inspired by my (S.S.) own personal loss. My mentor passed away during spring break of my 2nd year postgraduate school after a short battle with systemic lupus. I remember the deep sadness that I felt when it became apparent that she was coming home from the hospital for the last time. No words can describe the emotions; she had helped me through the toughest times in my academic life. How would I ever get the type of mentorship she provided again? She was there when I almost quit as a young student, back when my anger still got the best of me. She talked me down from the edge so many times; I never expected to be on this journey without her.

I dedicate this article to her and mentors like her. Equally, I dedicate this article to mentees who have lost their mentors. I offer my story (in italicized font) in the hopes that it will help others who are dealing with a similar loss. In this article, we attempt to illuminate the true power of mentorship, honor the significance of the relationship between mentor and mentee, and provide a tool useful to anyone who has lost their guide. I share my story in gratitude for my own mentor; I am so thankful that she was a part of my journey and that I can pass on to others the patience she had with me.     

Why Be an Anti‐Individualist?

Anti-individualists claim that concepts are individuated with an eye to purely external facts about a subject's environment about which she may be ignorant or mistaken. This paper offers a novel reason for thinking that anti-individualistic concepts are an ineliminable part of commonsense psychology. Our commitment to anti-individualism, I argue, is ultimately grounded in a rational epistemic agent's commitment to refining her own representational practices in the light of new and surprising information about her environment. Since anti-individualism is an implicit part of responsible epistemic practices, we cannot abandon it without compromising our own epistemic agency. The story I tell about the regulation of one's own representational practices yields a new account of the identity conditions for anti-individualistic concepts.     

Abracadabra Tongue: Poetry Magic

The author has known that poetry is magic since she was a child. However when she sat down to write about it she went blank, confronted by the taboo against magic in our rationalistic culture. In the way of Jungian magic she is helped by dream figures. The Muslim Solomon takes her on a flying carpet journey which reveals the magic of poetic influence: how Hafiz influenced Goethe influenced Lorca influenced her, which is how Persian mysticism found its way into her poetry. She tells the story of her development as a poet, how she learned fermentation magic—the difficult and often painful process required by poetic vision and revision in which grapes must be crushed, favorite phrases and metaphors must be ruthlessly smashed. The Queen of Sheba, another dream figure, shows up to tell her version of the story of her relationship with Solomon. She reveals the dark, fierce, and lusty lineage of her “old black magic” and how it has made its way into the author's poetry.     

Debating brain drain: Three objections that complicate the picture

In my contribution to this brain drain debate sparked by Brock and Blake’s book, Debating Brain Drain, I respond only to Brock’s position, and raise three objections which I suggest complicate the picture that she sketches. First, I take issue with the way in which she frames the moral question, namely by limiting her focus to what home countries may legitimately do to address the problems associated with the brain drain. I argue that the way in which she frames the question has important ideological consequences, because she does not adequately account for the larger context, in particular, by leaving out the moral obligations of the host countries who are the main beneficiaries of the brain drain. My second objection is rooted in the distinction between technical knowledge and practical knowledge found in the work of Habermas – an important distinction which gets obscured in Brock’s analysis in precisely the kind of ideological ways that Habermas was concerned about. She namely attempts to solve what are mainly practical (political) problems through purely instrumental, technical means. Several distortions accompany this fundamental confusion. My third point of critique has to do with the problem that an ethics of care (an ethics of responsibility and obligation) encounters within a liberal paradigm strongly shaped by an ethics of rights. Drawing on the work of Kroeger-Mappes, I argue that Brock arbitrarily singles out a group of people and holds them to an ethics of care which is strictly supererogatory within her own liberal paradigm.     

A body with chronic fatigue syndrome as a battleground for the fight to separate from the mother

I describe the therapy of a 20-year-old woman who believed that her difficulties in concentrating and remembering were caused by her 'ME' (Myalgic encephalomyelitis, Chronic fatigue syndrome, or CFS). She had been fathered by a man who never left his own wife. Work with her dreams revealed a within-body drama in which she was locked in an unspeakable fight to the death with her mother. Her symptoms improved after parallels between a dream and an accident showed her own self-destructive hand in her story. Another dream, reflecting her first 'incestuous' affair, showed her search for her original father-self as someone separate from mother, and a later affair provided a between-body drama, helping her to own the arrogant and abject traits she had before seen only as her mother's. I show how we worked in the area of Winnicott's first 'primitive agony' as experienced by a somatizing patient, stuck in a too-close destructive relationship with her mother-body. I discuss how analytical work can be done with the primitive affects and conflicts against which the ME symptoms may be defending.     

‘That Old‐time Religion’: Aimee Semple McPherson and perceptions of Pentecostalism, 1918–26

The story is told of Aimee Semple McPherson, a star female evangelist in the USA in the 1920s. Theologically and in her own understanding of doctrine she resisted denominational or classical Pentecostalism and asserted her own view, stemming from Azusa Street, that the message of Spirit baptism belonged to the church at large.     

Defending (a modified version of) the Zygote Argument

Think of the last thing someone did to you to seriously harm or offend you. And now imagine, so far as you can, becoming fully aware of the fact that his or her action was the causally inevitable result of a plan set into motion before he or she was ever even born, a plan that had no chance of failing. Should you continue to regard him or her as being morally responsible—blameworthy, in this case—for what he or she did? Many have thought that, intuitively, you should not. Recently, Alfred Mele has employed this line of thought to mount what many have taken to be a powerful argument for incompatibilism: the “Zygote Argument”. However, in interesting new papers, John Martin Fischer and Stephen Kearns have each independently argued that the Zygote Argument fails. As I see it, the criticisms of Fischer and Kearns reveal some important questions about how the argument is meant to be—or how it would best be—understood. Once we make a slight (but important) modification to the argument, however, I think we will be able to see that the criticisms of Fischer and Kearns do not detract from its substantial force.     

Living in with Normal Families

Connie Hansen participated in my project, “Methodology for Studying Family Interaction,” in the mid 1960s. One of the purposes of that project was to compare several groups of families, including “normals.” Connie suggested that it might provide a rich source of data if she were to “live in” with a few of the “normal” families and observe them day to day on their own territory. (A year or so before, Dr. Jules Henry had given a talk to the MRI staff about living-in with “schizogenic” families, and I believe that Connie had discussed her idea with him.) Connie was an experienced family therapist — she was one of Virginia Satir's first students — and a most perceptive observer. She lived with three “normal” families for a week each during 1966–67; she was excited by the wealth of material and exhausted by the experience. She tried to develop a group of central themes from her data and gave me a preliminary draft of a paper in 1969. It clearly contained a number of important observations about the complexities and subtleties of family systems and some beginning attempts at conceptualization. She struggled for years to clarify and elaborate on her material. Several times she sent me portions and fragments of new drafts, each with additional insights, but she was never satisfied with her efforts. It seems a fitting tribute to Connie — she died early in 1979 — to attempt to put together her various drafts. We wanted to publish this very important material in a readable form and yet still preserve the immediateness, enthusiasm, and vividness of her observations. I hope, that if she were to read it, she would not be overly critical of this final draft. JULES RISKIN, M.D. It is a special privilege for me to participate in this posthumous publication of Connie Hansen's unique contribution to the further knowledge of family interaction. She died before the material could be published. I feel particular gratitude to the young woman who entered my first training program in 1961 at the Mental Research Institute. This was a time when such training seemed “far out” and was regarded as “probably only a fad.” She was willing to face the risks inherent to her professional standing by choosing to do this training. It was this same courage together with her imagination and curiosity and her willingness to document her experience without judging it that resulted in the article now being published. Farewell, Connie, and thank you for your presence in my life. VIRGINIA M.SATIR     

Casper or 'the cabinet of horrors'

This paper is an account of a four-times-a-week analysis with a very deprived, feral-like child. The author, who has come to understand feral children as very deprived children, turns to an historical account written in 1826 by Anselm von Feuerbach, the jurist who was asked to make enquiries into the identity of a savage and mysterious boy, Kaspar Hauser. The author describes how she has made use of the observations and thoughts of Anselm von Feurbach in her attempts to process her own thoughts and reflections around the unfolding clinical material and how the exploration of the differences and similarities between Casper and Kaspar Hauser helped her to gradually grasp the psychological essence of the patient. The question of an appropriate reading of the clinical material for theoretical purposes remains open.     

A Look Beyond the Mirror—What He Saw and I Didn't: Reply to Commentary

Altman's commentary challenged this author on both a personal and a theoretical level. On a personal level, she was encouraged to explore her knowing at one moment but not knowing at another, her own self-interest in the position of beneficiary. Thus, the mechanism of disavowal that underpins liberal racism was revisited in a more clinically oriented manner.

On a theoretical level, Altman's response invited a more refined exploration of liberal racism as it differs from blatant racism. It also facilitated a more nuanced application of Lacanian and Kleinian theory to this matter.