Are Envy,Anger, and Resentment Moral Emotions?

Abstract

The moral status of emotions has recently become the focus of various philosophical investigations. Certain emotions that have traditionally been considered as negative, such as envy, jealousy, pleasure-in-others'-misfortune, and pride, have been defended. Some traditionally “negative” emotions have even been declared to be moral emotions.

In this brief paper, I suggest two basic criteria according to which an emotion might be considered moral, and I then examine whether envy, anger, and resentment are moral emotions.     

Responsibility and Self-Defense: Can We Have It All?

The role of responsibility in our common-sense morality of self-defense is complex. According to common-sense morality, one can sometimes use substantial, even deadly, force against people who are only minimally responsible for posing a threat to us. The role of responsibility in self-defense is thus limited. However, responsibility is still sometimes relevant. It sometime affects how much force you can use against a threatener: less if they are less responsible and more if they are more responsible. Is there a well-motivated theory that can explain both why the role of responsibility is limited and why it is sometimes relevant? It is hard to see what theory could unify these disparate elements of our common-sense morality, and if one cannot be found then we may simply have to revise some of our pre-theoretic beliefs. But it would be an important advantage of a theory if it could justify those beliefs. I will argue that there is a theory of this kind: surprisingly, the familiar rights theory of self-defense, defended by Judith Thomson, can do so if it is suitably supplemented. Along the way I will survey some alternative theories of self-defense and show why they are not up to the task.     

What Triggers Anger in Everyday Life? Links to the Intensity,Control, and Regulation of These Emotions,and Personality Traits

Why do people experience anger? Most of our knowledge on anger‐triggering events is based on the study of reactions at a single time point in a person's life. Little research has examined how people experience anger in their daily life over time. In this study, we conducted a comprehensive examination of the situational determinants of anger over the course of 3 weeks. Using daily diary methodology, people (N = 173; 2,342 anger episodes) reported their most intense daily anger and, with an open‐ended format, described the trigger. Participants also answered questions on anger intensity, control, and regulatory strategies, along with baseline personality trait measures. Using an iterative coding system, five anger trigger categories emerged: other people, psychological and physical distress, intrapersonal demands, environment, and diffuse/undifferentiated/unknown. Compared with other triggers, when anger was provoked by other people or when the source was unknown, there was a stronger positive association with anger intensity and lack of control. Personality traits (i.e., anger, mindfulness, psychological need satisfaction, the Big Five) showed few links to the experience and regulation of daily anger. Although aversive events often spur anger, the correlates and consequences of anger differ depending on the source of aversion; personality traits offer minimal value in predicting anger in daily life.     

Freedom is Not Free?: Posthumanist,Ecological Reflections on Christian Freedom and Responsibility

Philosophers aligned with a kind of posthumanism emphasize the modern, modern human's freedom and ethics are founded on a break from all ties to animality and materiality. Highlighting the posthumanist work of Jacques Derrida, Donna Haraway, and Karen Barad, this article aligns key insights of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's work, such as his pervasive concept of “sociality,” with the call for a more ecologically embedded humanity. The resulting reconstruction of Christian freedom is profoundly Christological and sacramental: freedom‐for the other comes in, with, and through—not apart from—both the divine and created other.     

Moral Responsibility and the Moral Community: Is Moral Responsibility Essentially Interpersonal?

Many philosophers endorse the idea that there can be no moral responsibility without a moral community and thus hold that such responsibility is essentially interpersonal. In this paper, various interpretations of this idea are distinguished, and it is argued that no interpretation of it captures a significant truth. The popular view that moral responsibility consists in answerability is discussed and dismissed. The even more popular view that such responsibility consists in susceptibility to the reactive attitudes is also discussed, and it is argued that this view at best supports only an etiolated interpretation of the idea that moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal.     

Compassion, consensus, and conflict: should caregivers' needs influence the ethical dialectic?

There are three important principles to be derived from this case. First, it is essential not to confound the technical problem of assessing pain and suffering with the ethical issue of judgments about pain and suffering. Second, in most cases, the apparent limitations of traditional ethical theory in critical care decisions are precisely that: apparent limitations only. The alternatives, especially intuitionism, are far more troublesome. Finally, the claim of health-care workers to be professionals places legitimate constraints on the extent to which they may be permitted to have their needs and wants influence the ethical dialectic. The achievement and maintenance of "comfortable, compatible relationships" cannot be legitimately construed as a major objective of biomedical ethics--although one would hope it will become a cherished, if serendipitous, byproduct. In short, paraphrasing (and reversing) Archibald MacLeish on poetry: Ethics should not be/but mean.     

Can the Simultaneous Experience of Opposing Emotions Really Occur?

Various investigators have proposed that people may feel simultaneous positive and negative affect. However, experimental evidence from tests of a recent theory about the intensity of emotion (J. W. Brehm, 1999) suggests that even when they are invited by the experimental design, positive and negative emotions do not occur at the same time. When people have been instigated to feel a particular emotion, such as happiness, and then are given a reason (e.g., sad news) for not feeling happy, they report continued happiness but no increase in sadness unless the reason for feeling sad is very great, in which case sadness replaces happiness. The present paper briefly reviews the underlying theory and evidence, and discusses implications.

Endogenous Ketamine-Like Compounds and the NDE: If So, So What?

This commentary on Karl Jansen's ketamine model for the near-death experience expands upon and raises additional questions about several issues and hypotheses: self-experimentation as a source of data; ketamine's similarities to and differences from classical hallucinogens; the need for quantification of unusual subjective states; clinical research and toxicological implications of this model; drugs as gateways to religious states; and evolutionary versus religious significance of naturally occurring compounds released in the near-death state. I suggest future research that could help explicate several of these areas.Formerly Associate Professor of Psychiatry at the University of New Mexico School of Medicine     

IRB and Research Regulatory Delays Within the Military Health System: Do They Really Matter? And If So,Why and for Whom?

Institutional review board (IRB) delays may hinder the successful completion of federally funded research in the U.S. military. When this happens, time-sensitive, mission-relevant questions go unanswered. Research participants face unnecessary burdens and risks if delays squeeze recruitment timelines, resulting in inadequate sample sizes for definitive analyses. More broadly, military members are exposed to untested or undertested interventions, implemented by well-intentioned leaders who bypass the research process altogether. To illustrate, we offer two case examples. We posit that IRB delays often appear in the service of managing institutional risk, rather than protecting research participants. Regulators may see more risk associated with moving quickly than risk related to delay, choosing to err on the side of bureaucracy. The authors of this article, all of whom are military-funded researchers, government stakeholders, and/or human subject protection experts, offer feasible recommendations to improve the IRB system and, ultimately, research within military, veteran, and civilian populations.     

Measuring the quality of life: Why,how and what?

In this paper three questions concerning quality of life in medicine and health care are analysed and discussed: the motives for measuring the quality of life, the methods used in assessing it, and the definition of the concept. The purposes of the study are to find an ethically acceptable motive for measuring the quality of life; to identify the methodological advantages and disadvantages of the most prevalent current methods of measurement; and to present an approach towards measuring and defining the quality of life which evades the difficulties encountered and discussed. The analysis comprises measurements both in the clinical situation concerning individual patients and in research concerning whole populations. Three motives are found for evaluating the quality of human life: allocation of scarce medical resources, facilitating clinical decision making, and assisting patients towards autonomous decision making. It is argued that the third alternative is the only one which does not evoke ethical problems. As for the methods of evaluation, several prevalent alternatives are presented, ranging from scales of physical performance to more subtle psychological questionnaires. Clinical questionnaires are found to fail to provide a scientific foundation for universally measuring the quality of life. Finally, the question of definition is tackled. The classical distinction between need-based and want-based theories of human happiness is presented and discussed. The view is introduced and defended that neither of these approaches can be universally preferred to the other. The difficulty with the need approach is that it denies the subjective aspects of human life; whereas the problem of the want approach is that it tends to ignore some of the objective realities of the human existence. In conclusion, it is argued that the choice of methods as well as definitions should be left to the competent patients themselves — who are entitled, if they so wish, to surrender the judgement to the medical personnel. Technical factors as well as the requirements of respect for autonomy and informed consent support this conclusion.     

Emotions and appraisals: can you have one without the other?

In his commentary on M. Siemer and R. Reisenzein (2007), B. Parkinson (2007) raised a number of important questions concerning the process of emotion inference and the scope of appraisal theories. Siemer and Reisenzein first examine the alternative explanations of their findings proposed by Parkinson and then look at the alternative "situated" view of emotions proposed by him. The main conclusion is that the issues raised by Parkinson can be dealt with by (suitable extensions of) appraisal theory.     

Can Children with Autism Recover? If So, How?

Although Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) are generally assumed to be lifelong, we review evidence that between 3% and 25% of children reportedly lose their ASD diagnosis and enter the normal range of cognitive, adaptive and social skills. Predictors of recovery include relatively high intelligence, receptive language, verbal and motor imitation, and motor development, but not overall symptom severity. Earlier age of diagnosis and treatment, and a diagnosis of Pervasive Developmental Disorder-Not Otherwise Specified are also favorable signs. The presence of seizures, mental retardation and genetic syndromes are unfavorable signs, whereas head growth does not predict outcome. Controlled studies that report the most recovery came about after the use of behavioral techniques. Residual vulnerabilities affect higher-order communication and attention. Tics, depression and phobias are frequent residual co-morbidities after recovery. Possible mechanisms of recovery include: normalizing input by forcing attention outward or enriching the environment; promoting the reinforcement value of social stimuli; preventing interfering behaviors; mass practice of weak skills; reducing stress and stabilizing arousal. Improving nutrition and sleep quality is non-specifically beneficial.     

Children’s Gender–Emotion Stereotypes in the Relationship of Anger to Sadness and Fear

Children’s perceptions of the emotional reactions of same- and different-sex characters in stories containing ambiguous and unambiguous emotional contexts were examined. According to the Parallel-Constraint-Satisfaction Theory (Kunda and Thagard. Psychological Review, 103, 284–308, 1996), stereotypes are more likely to be utilized in ambiguous contexts, defined here as those likely to elicit multiple emotional responses. Seventy suburban U.S. preschoolers were read vignettes describing boys or girls in ambiguous or unambiguous emotion-inducing events and reported how the vignette characters were feeling. Results suggest that the perceptions of participants were more likely to reflect gender–emotion stereotypes (e.g. perceiving males as angry and females as sad) in ambiguous contexts than in unambiguous contexts. Results are discussed in terms of children’s emerging understanding of gender–emotion stereotypes.     

Would You Mind, If We Record This? Perceptions on Regulation and Responsibility among Indian Nanoscientists

Looking at our knowledge of the risks associated with nanotechnology, one wonders to what degree should its products and applications be regulated? Do we need any governing body to regulate nanotechnology research and development? Do individuals have a right to know to make informed decisions through labelling mechanism? The question of regulation and responsibility in the interaction between science, technology and society is one of the most pressing issues. Risks and regulations regarding nanoscience and nanotechnology are mostly debated amongst policy-makers and not amongst the nanoscientists, who actually produce the new science. Thus, the paper makes an attempt to contribute significantly to an increased body of knowledge regarding how scientists think and talk about science. Little has been documented about perceptions of nanotechnology regulation and responsibility in developing countries. Given the importance of perceptions in the genetically-modified foods debate, the way nanotechnology is perceived holds serious repercussions for the framing of its ethical, legal and social implications. Through a field-survey that records the opinions of leading Indian nanoscientists, the paper examines scientists' perceptions about nanotech-regulation. Such discussion is imperative to address technological risks and uncertainties. The paper further explores whether scientists have different views on what responsibility amounts to and under what conditions one is responsible. Though the study has considered Indian nanoscientists due to access issues, the research questions raised and addressed in this study are universal in nature.     

All in the mind's eye? Anger rumination and reappraisal

Research on rumination has demonstrated that compared with distraction, rumination intensifies and prolongs negative emotion. However, rumination and distraction differ both in what one thinks about and how one thinks about it. Do the negative outcomes of rumination result from how people think about negative events or simply that they think about them at all? To address this question, participants in 2 studies recalled a recent anger-provoking event and then thought about it in 1 of 2 ways: by ruminating or by reappraising. The authors examined the impact of these strategies on subsequent ratings of anger experience (Study 1) as well as on perseverative thinking and physiological responding over time (Study 2). Relative to reappraisal, rumination led to greater anger experience, more cognitive perseveration, and greater sympathetic nervous system activation. These findings provide compelling new evidence that how one thinks about an emotional event can shape the emotional response one has.     

Gender,Risk, and Religiousness: Can Power Control Provide the Theory?

Collett and Lizardo (2009) offer a model of gender differences that revisits and expands earlier research, in particular nascent ideas used by Miller and Hoffmann (1995) that were borrowed, in part, from a power-control theory of delinquency and crime. However, I am skeptical of their attempt to apply power-control theory as a general explanation of gender differences in religiousness. In this response piece, I first set the context by describing how Alan Miller and I initially approached our risk and religion work. I then point out where I think the research stream went awry and why recent studies of risk preferences and religion have failed to provide convincing evidence one way or the other. Finally, I offer an appraisal of Collett and Lizardo's work, with particular attention to why adopting power-control theory should be viewed with caution. I conclude with suggestions for future research on gender and religiousness.