Intuition, reason, and metacognition

Dual Process Theories (DPT) of reasoning posit that judgments are mediated by both fast, automatic processes and more deliberate, analytic ones. A critical, but unanswered question concerns the issue of monitoring and control: When do reasoners rely on the first, intuitive output and when do they engage more effortful thinking? We hypothesised that initial, intuitive answers are accompanied by a metacognitive experience, called the Feeling of Rightness (FOR), which can signal when additional analysis is needed. In separate experiments, reasoners completed one of four tasks: conditional reasoning (N = 60), a three-term variant of conditional reasoning (N = 48), problems used to measure base rate neglect (N = 128), or a syllogistic reasoning task (N = 64). For each task, participants were instructed to provide an initial, intuitive response to the problem along with an assessment of the rightness of that answer (FOR). They were then allowed as much time as needed to reconsider their initial answer and provide a final answer. In each experiment, we observed a robust relationship between the FOR and two measures of analytic thinking: low FOR was associated with longer rethinking times and an increased probability of answer change. In turn, FOR judgments were consistently predicted by the fluency with which the initial answer was produced, providing a link to the wider literature on metamemory. These data support a model in which a metacognitive judgment about a first, initial model determines the extent of analytic engagement.     

Intuition,intelligence, data compression

The main goal of my paper is to argue that data compression is a necessary condition for intelligence. One key motivation for this proposal stems from a paradox about intuition and intelligence. For the purposes of this paper, it will be useful to consider playing board games—such as chess and Go—as a paradigm of problem solving and cognition, and computer programs as a model of human cognition. I first describe the basic components of computer programs that play board games, namely value functions and search functions. I then argue that value functions both play the same role as intuition in humans and work in essentially the same way. However, as will become apparent, using an ordinary value function is just a simpler and less accurate form of relying on a database or lookup table. This raises our paradox, since reliance on intuition is usually considered to manifest intelligence, whereas usage of a lookup table is not. I therefore introduce another condition for intelligence that is related to data compression. This proposal allows that even reliance on a perfectly accurate lookup table can be nonintelligent, while retaining the claim that reliance on intuition can be highly intelligent. My account is not just theoretically plausible, but it also captures a crucial empirical constraint. This is because all systems with limited resources that solve complex problems—and hence, all cognitive systems—need to compress data.

     

Elijah Levita: a Jewish Hebraist

Elijah Levita’s (c. 1469–1558) study of Hebrew was part of the longtime Jewish occupation with the language of Scripture. Yet much of Levita’s scholarship was at odds with prior Jewish approaches to Biblical language and the transmission of the Biblical text. In his many works, Levita provides a critical account of the development of Hebrew, Aramaic, and the masoretic scribal traditions. This article examines the relationship between Levita’s critical approach to the Bible and the Christian context within which he worked. With the rise of Christian Hebraism, an increasingly sophisticated and sustained discourse on Hebrew developed outside of Jewish circles. This created an alternative setting within which Levita could produce scholarship that challenged prior Jewish notions of language and the Bible. The viability of Levita’s scholarship was no longer contingent on Jewish reception alone, allowing him to express critical ideas without fear of internal censure and without assuming the hermeneutical posture typical of pre-modern Jewish scholarly expression. This article has benefited from conversations with advisors at Columbia University and with colleagues at the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley. In particular, I would like to thank Wim Smit (z”l) and Jennifer Greenfield for shaping my studies of early-modern European intellectual life and my colleague Naomi Seidman for helping me to better tell the story. Thanks to Kenneth Stow, Arthur Lesley, and unnamed third and fourth readers of this essay for their helpful suggestions.     

Intuition

At least since the Enlightenment Western thought has been dominated by a skeptical attitude towards intuition, although it is vital for mental and creative functions. In contrast, in recent times, a re-evaluation has emerged. Intuition is now considered by many to be of significant assistance not only in everyday life but also in making complex decisions in business, people management and psychotherapy. This article describes different dimensions of intuition ranging from unconscious intelligence in everyday life through intuitive processes with their connection to the collective unconscious up to its spiritual dimension. The question of how intuition works is extensively discussed. A distinction is made between intuitive work, resonance phenomena and gut feelings. The author concludes that it is not a question as to whether we want to use intuition as a source of knowledge for ourselves but if we recognize and appreciate that we do it constantly.     

Arithmetic,Mathematical Intuition,and Evidence

Abstract

This paper provides examples in arithmetic of the account of rational intuition and evidence developed in my book After Gödel: Platonism and Rationalism in Mathematics and Logic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). The paper supplements the book but can be read independently of it. It starts with some simple examples of problem-solving in arithmetic practice and proceeds to general phenomenological conditions that make such problem-solving possible. In proceeding from elementary ‘authentic’ parts of arithmetic to axiomatic formal arithmetic, the paper exhibits some elements of the genetic analysis of arithmetic knowledge that is called for in Husserl’s philosophy. This issues in an elaboration on a number of Gödel’s remarks about the meaning of his incompleteness theorems for the notion of evidence in mathematics.     

Affect,Moral Intuition,and Risk

The natural way to deal with moral issues involving risk is to rely on our intuitive feelings. “How bad is it? Well, how bad does it feel?” We can also rely on reason to determine right and wrong but, as Jonathan Haidt has demonstrated, intuition comes first and dominates our responses unless we make an effort to critique and, if necessary, override it. We argue that our intuitive feelings are insensitive to large losses of life and thus mislead us in the face of natural disasters or human disasters associated with poverty, disease, and violence. Our intuitions seduce us into calmly turning away from these catastrophes, when we should be driven by outrage or sorrow to act. We propose ways to overcome this insensitivity through new forms of education and communication coupled with reliance on moral deliberation aimed at designing laws and institutions that compel attention to such problems.     

Intuition, Affect, and Peculiar Beliefs

Research with college students has found that intuitive thinking (e.g., using hunches to ascribe meaning to experiences) and positive affect interactively predict ideas of reference and odd/magical beliefs. We investigated whether these results would generalize to a diverse community sample of adults that included individuals with elevated levels of peculiar perceptions and beliefs. We measured positive and negative affect and intuitive thinking through questionnaires, and peculiar beliefs (i.e., ideas of reference and odd/magical beliefs) through structured clinical interviews. We found that peculiar beliefs were associated with intuitive thinking and negative affect, but not positive affect. Furthermore, in no instance did the interaction of affect and intuitive thinking predict peculiar beliefs. These results suggest that there are important differences in the factors that contribute to peculiar beliefs between college students and clinically meaningful samples.     

Intuition, cognitive style, and hemispheric processing

200 undergraduate volunteers were administered Westcott's Test of Intuitive Ability, Witkin's Group Embedded Figures Test, Paivio's Revised Individual Differences Questionnaire, and visual and aural dominance measures using a three-field tachistoscope and dichotic listening device, respectively. Field dependence was consistently related to poorer intuitive performance. No sex-related differences were found on intuition, embedded figures, Paivio's questionnaire, or dominance scores although the amount of intuition explained by cognitive style and dominance differed by hand and gender. Visual-verbal style was not associated with dominance while the relation of field dependence-independence and dominance was inconsistent. Neither dominance nor visual-verbal style was consistently related to intuition although complicated associations were indicated by hand and sex, suggesting differences in cognitive organization.     

Intuition as an Influence on Creative Problem-Solving: The Effects of Intuition,Positive Affect,and Training

Intuition may be a critical component of creative thought. To test this hypothesis, a measure of individual differences in intuition was developed. After completing this measure, 320 undergraduates were asked to work on a domain-relevant creative problem-solving task under conditions where positive and neutral affect were induced and they were exposed to 1 of 3 different types of training. It was found that intuitive people produced more creative problem solutions, but that positive affect and training offset the advantage intuitive people showed in creative problem-solving. The implications of these findings for understanding the nature of intuition, and its role in creative problem-solving, are discussed.     

Putnam's Intuition

Multiple realizability has recently attractedrenewed attention, for example Bickle, 1998;Bechtel and Mundale, 1999; Bechtel and McCauley,1999; Heil, 1999; and Sober, 1999. Many of thesewriters revisit the topic of multiplerealizability in order to show that someversion of a mind-brain identity theory isviable. Although there is much of value inthese recent explorations, they do not addressthe underlying intuitions that have vexedphilosophers of mind since Hilary Putnamintroduced the concern (1967). I argue that thestandard way of construing multiplerealizability is a much stronger claim thanthat of Putnam's intuition alone. I distinguishfour interpretations of the multiplerealizability intuition. Some commonformulations of multiple realizability arealmost certainly true, while others are not atall plausible. I argue that the plausible formsof multiple realizability do not impugn theprospects for a mind-brain Identity Theory.     

Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics

This paper defends a moderate intuitionism by extending a version of that view previously put forward and responding to some significant objections to it that have been posed in recent years. The notion of intuition is clarified, and various kinds of intuition are distinguished and interconnected. These include doxastic intuitions and intuitive seemings. The concept of inference is also clarified. In that light, the possibility of non-inferential intuitive justification is explained in relation to both singular moral judgments, which intuitionists do not take to be self-evident, and basic moral principles, which they typically do take to be self-evident in a sense explicated in the paper. This explanation is accomplished in part by drawing some analogies between moral and perceptual judgments in the light of a developmental conception of knowledge. The final section of the paper presents a partial account of rational disagreement and indicates how the kind of intuitionist view defended can allow for rational disagreement between apparent epistemic peers.

Function, Intuition and Ends in Aristotle's Ethics

This essay attempts to show why deliberation is not of ends for Aristotle, not only because deliberation is concerned with means, but because ends are grasped by wish. Such wishing, I argue, is a form of rational intuition that is non-discursive and analogous to seeing and therefore not at all like the discursive thought involved in deliberation. Such a reading also helps shed light on the nature of contemplation and therefore on happiness in Aristotle.     

Misconceptions About Intuition

This article outlines advances in intuition research and draws attention to several misconceptions, based on conflicting assumptions about the intuition construct and the intuiting process. In particular, it focuses on the distinction between process and outcome, the role of consciousness and affect, the research focus on decision making or problem solving, and the differential use of intuition in technical and creative settings. It calls for a comprehensive intuition model that would refute some of the misconceptions and proposes three types of intuition: intuitive expertise, intuitive creation, and intuitive foresight.