Relationality and Commitment: Ethics and Ontology in Heidegger's Aristotle

This article discusses the tension between social relationality and self-relationality central to Heidegger's ontology of Dasein and the possible ways of reconciling this tension. Arguing that this is a tension between communicability and existential commitments, the article poses the question: How are existential commitments responsive to communication? After problematizing the quasi-Kantian and communitarian ways of settling the tension, the article uses Heidegger's early reading of Aristotle to develop a third hermeneutic model of ethical relationality according to which existential commitments are shareable in communication, since ethos – the existential posture towards the good – arises out of pathos that exposes Dasein to coexistence. The account of ethical relationality found in Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle thus takes the world to be a shared and dynamic ontological condition and emphasize that the world constitutes selfhood in a way that is constantly at stake in ethical communication.     

Heidegger's Reception of Kierkegaard: The Existential Philosophy of Death

After briefly drawing attention to two key strains in the history of philosophy's dealings with death, the Platonic and the Epicurean, I describe a more recent philosophical alternative to viewing death in terms of this ancient dichotomy. This is the alternative championed by the likes of Søren Kierkegaard, the father of existentialism, and Martin Heidegger, whose work on death tends to overshadow Kierkegaard's despite the undeniable influence exerted on him by the nineteenth century Dane. By exploring this influence, a deep connection between them on the topic of death becomes apparent. Although both of these thinkers arise from the Platonic/Christian tradition, I discuss how they handle Epicurean insights about death in their work, and thereby prescribe a peculiar way of living with death that falls somewhere in between the Platonic and the Epicurean strains. This way of approaching life through death, in which Kierkegaard and Heidegger show signs of reaction to (and in some cases, influence from) both strains, is what I call the ‘existential philosophy of death’.     

Death and Deliberation: Overcoming the Decisionism Critique of Heidegger's Practical Philosophy

This paper defends Heidegger's account of resolute self-choice against the ubiquitous Decisionism Critique [DC]. According to DC, Heidegger's discussion of resoluteness commits him to an indefensible position in which resolute Dasein is said to choose who it will be without recourse to any reasons or evaluative standards. In response, I argue that DC is based on a misunderstanding of some of the key arguments ofBeing and Time. I then offer an alternative portrait of Heidegger's account of resolute self-choice and argue that such choice will involve both 1) the consideration of factical claims as reasons that count in favor of a particular way of life and 2) the evaluation of these reasons in light of at least three deliberative standards. Thus, I argue that DC is misguided and needs to be replaced by an interpretation rooted in a more complete understanding of Heidegger's project.     

自本体与对本体:中西哲学的诠释学基础

中西哲学的根本性差异是自本体思维与对本体思维的差异。所谓自本体的思维,是认为认知对象与认知主体无法分开,强调本体的自我呈现。而对本体思维则首先将存在视之为客观实有,然后去探究这客观实有的真实。自本体思维与对本体思维都是人的二重性存在的客观反映。对于对本体方式来说,它重视对人的工具理性式的生存状态的探究,而自本体则关心人作为价值理性的生存状态的探究。由于人的工具性层面与价值性层面不仅相互补充与依存,而且会相互涵摄,因此,未来哲学的发展,要求我们同时采取自本体思维与对本体思维的方式;而所谓中西哲学的融会与贯通,是指它们在各自保持自身的诠释学传统的基础上,同时理解与吸收对方的诠释学立场与传统。     

序《卦序与解卦理路》

<周易>古经有两个难解之谜:一个是<周易>古经的卦序(今本卦序)是怎么排列出来的,它要表达什么思想?另一个是<周易>古经卦爻辞是如何编纂出来的,六十四卦卦爻辞究竟在讲些什么?可以说,这两个问题最少困扰了人们两千余年,因为至少从汉代起人们对这两个问题就已不甚了了.     

Historicism and Critique in Herder's Another Philosophy of History: Some Hermeneutic Reflections

In Another Philosophy of History, J.G. Herder claims that his aim is not to compare and judge different cultures, but merely to describe and explain how each came into being and thus to adopt the standpoint of an impartial observer. I argue, however, that there is a tension between Herder's understanding of his own project—his stated doctrine of historicism and cultural relativism—and the way in which it is actually put into practice. That is, despite Herder's stated aims, he is nevertheless unable to avoid justifying premodern forms of life and making context‐transcending evaluative judgments in the process of trying to understand cultures on their own terms and holding them up as exemplars vis à vis the Enlightenment. This tension presents the challenge of accounting for it in the most charitable and illuminating way. I argue that this goal can be achieved by appealing to the resources of the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans‐Georg Gadamer, which enables us to disclose two enabling conditions for Herder's project of which he was not explicitly aware, viz., the internal connection between understanding and justification and the enabling character of prejudice as the condition for the possibility of understanding as such.     

The Ontic and the Ontological in Heidegger's Philosophy of Technology: Response to Thomson

Iain Thomson's critique is persuasive on several points but not on the major issue, the relation of the ontological to the ontic in Heidegger's philosophy of technology. This reply attempts to show that these two dimensions of Heidegger's theory are closely related, at least in the technological domain, and not separate, as Thomson affirms. It is argued that Heidegger's evaluations of particular technologies, the flaws of which Thomson concedes, proceed from a flawed ontological conception.     

The Mania of Existence: Klein,Winnicott, and Heidegger's Concept of Inauthenticity

This paper offers a new interpretation of Heidegger's concept of inauthenticity (Uneigentlichkeit) in Being and Time. It breaks from the “conformity interpretation” of inauthenticity, according to which the anonymity of the inauthentic person is due to her conformity to das Man. Rather, it argues that the anonymity of the inauthentic person is due to “existential mania” – a state in which a person denies her death and anxiety, understands her abilities to be limitless, and is perpetually active. It shows how this existential mania – and the anonymity to which it gives rise – is analogous to the mania described by the object relations psychoanalyst Melanie Klein. Finally, drawing on D. W. Winnicott's discussion of mania, it shows how both the inauthentic person's conformity to das Man, and her existential mania, give rise to anonymity.     

Being a Therapist: Contributions of Heidegger's Philosophy and the Buddha's Teachings to Psychotherapy

Is there a place for Heidegger's philosophy and the Buddha's teachings (dhamma) in contemporary psychotherapy? The simple answer is yes. This article explores how the ideas of Being-in-the-world, Openness, Being-With, anticipatory care, letting be and letting go, cultivating a meditative attitude and a beginner's mind—promoted in Heidegger's philosophy, daseinsanalysis, and the Buddha's teachings—inform my approach to therapy and ground my Being as a therapist, and how this embodiment has been received by clients. Some important parallels and differences between Heideggerian and Buddhist ideas and practices are also discussed. Heidegger's philosophy, the Buddha's teachings, and daseinsanalysis provide therapists with important foundations for understanding their roles as cojourneyers with their clients, and embracing this attitude in therapy can make therapy truly a healing, rather than a curing, process.     

On Heidegger's Root and Branch Reformulation of the Meaning of Transcendental Philosophy

Over the past decades there has been increasing interest in the idea that Heidegger was a “transcendental philosopher” during the late 1920s. Furthermore, a consensus has started to emerge around the idea that Heidegger must be thought of as a transcendental thinker during this time. For the most part this means to first experience how Heidegger's work inherits this term from Kant or Husserl so that one can then experience how Heidegger creatively adapts this inheritance. The aim of this paper is to show that such an approach is unhelpful. The aim of this paper is instead to show that transcendental philosophy bears a wholly renewed meaning in Heidegger's fundamental ontology and that this meaning must be understood in an intrinsic connection with the fundamental-ontological problem of transcendence. Articulating this connection will show how Heidegger makes transcendental philosophy properly phenomenological.     

Post-Cartesian Psychoanalysis and the Sociocultural Turn: From Cultural Contexts to Hermeneutic Understanding

This article addresses the tension between the defining impact of culture on human experience and the role of the person as agent. Focusing on the sociocultural turn in psychoanalysis, it examines the evolution of the notions of culture and the person, first in the culturalist psychoanalysis of Harry Stack Sullivan and Erich Fromm, and then in the hermeneutic turn of recent psychoanalysis. The article maintains that persons are inescapably shaped by the culture in which they live. At the same time, the manner in which individual psychology is organized and experienced within culture points to the role of agency as an emergent human potential. The article suggests that culture and personal agency are mutually reinforcing and that psychoanalysis must account for both. It develops a hermeneutic perspective as an alternative to postmodernism and concludes by outlining a post-Cartesian approach in psychoanalysis that addresses culture and the person in a non-dualistic fashion.