Aesthetic consciousness of site-specific art

The aim of this article is to examine Edmund Husserl's theory of aesthetic consciousness and the possibility to apply it to site-specific art. The central focus will be on the idea of the limited synthetic unity of the aesthetic object that is introduced by Husserl in order to differentiate positional and aesthetic attitude towards the object. I claim that strongly site-specific art, which is a work of art about a place and in the place, challenges the view that the synthetic unity of the aesthetic object is limited. Moreover, following Husserl's theory, it becomes questionable whether strongly site-specific art is art at all. I try to answer these objections by explaining how the artist prescribes the appearances and boundaries of a strongly site-specific object of art, thereby satisfying the demand for the limited- ness of the synthetic unity of the aesthetic object.     

Iki and Contingency: A Reconstruction of Shūzō Kuki’s Early Aesthetic theory

Iki is the key word of Shūzō Kuki’s The Structure of Iki, and it became one of the most widely recognized Japanese aesthetic categories mainly due to this work. However, in The Problems of Contingency, which is Kuki’s most important philosophical work, there is no discussion of iki again, and consequently, most commentators of Kuki fail to see the correlation between his theories of iki and contingency. This article, by contrast, intends to provide a new interpretation of iki in the light of Kuki’s theory of contingency. The specific thesis of this paper is that aesthetic phenomena categorized as subject to the principles of iki are positively evaluated in Japanese culture just because the consciousness of iki is just one form of the consciousness of contingency, in which the awareness of alternatives to the actual situation could produce considerable spiritual entertainment for aesthetic subjects.     

Aesthetic Adjectives: Experimental Semantics and Context‐Sensitivity

One aim of this essay is to contribute to understanding aesthetic communication—the process by which agents aim to convey thoughts and transmit knowledge about aesthetic matters to others. Our focus will be on the use of aesthetic adjectives in aesthetic communication. Although theorists working on the semantics of adjectives have developed sophisticated theories about gradable adjectives, they have tended to avoid studying aesthetic adjectives—the class of adjectives that play a central role in expressing aesthetic evaluations (e.g., ‘beautiful’, ‘ugly’, ‘elegant’). And despite the wealth of attention paid to aesthetic adjectives by philosophical aestheticians, they have paid little attention to contemporary linguistic theories of adjectives. We take our work to be a first step in remedying these lacunae. In this paper, we present four experiments that examine one aspect of how aesthetic adjectives ordinarily function: the context‐sensitivity of their application standards. Our results present a prima facie empirical challenge to a common distinction between relative and absolute gradable adjectives because aesthetic adjectives are found to behave differently from both. Our results thus also constitute a prima facie vindication of some philosophical aestheticians’ contention that aesthetic adjectives constitute a particularly interesting segment of natural language, even if the boundaries of this segment might turn out to be different from what they had in mind.     

Transparent and Opaque Performance Personas

Jeanette Bicknell has argued that a singer's public persona is relevant to the aesthetic evaluation of that singer's public performances of popular song. Here, I distinguish varieties of personas: those which are transparent (such as when a singer performs more or less as that singer) and those which are opaque (such as when a singer performs more or less as a fictional character). I also distinguish between performance personas and song personas. After introducing and elucidating these distinctions, I discuss ways in which they further inform aesthetic evaluation of such performances.     

Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise

We seem less likely to endorse moral expertise than reasoning expertise or aesthetic expertise. This seems puzzling given that moral norms are intuitively taken to be at least more objective than aesthetic norms. One possible diagnosis of the asymmetry is that moral judgments require autonomy of judgement in away that other judgments do not. However, the author points out that aesthetic judgments that have been ‘borrowed’ by aesthetic experts generate the same autonomy worry as moral judgments which are borrowed by moral experts. The author then explores various approaches to accepting the testimony of moral experts and concludes that the asymmetry may best be explained by (1) the conditions for moral expertise being more difficult to satisfy than those of aesthetic expertise and (2) the intuitive greater seriousness of accepting the moral judgments of others, since moral norms are generally viewed as more binding than aesthetic norms.     

Commentary on Corradi et al.’s (2019) new conception of aesthetic sensitivity: Is the ability conception dead?

Corradi et al. (British Journal of Psychology, 2019) argue that their new conception of visual aesthetic sensitivity (as responsiveness to aesthetic features in one’s preferences) presents several advantages in comparison with the current ability view of aesthetic sensitivity, usually defined as the ability to judge aesthetic stimuli in accordance with standards (The Journal of Psychology, 1964, 57 and 49). Although the measure they propose is interesting and presents advances to the field, we point to important issues. Notably, the authors conveniently base their comparison between the two conceptions on psychometric double standards, discard a century of research on aesthetic sensitivity by focusing on Eysenck’s speculations, and disguise an extension of already existing aesthetic preference tests (e.g., The Journal of Psychology, 1952, 33 and 199; Empirical Studies of the Arts, 2005, 23 and 165) as a redefinition of aesthetic sensitivity. We conclude that both aesthetic preference and aesthetic sensitivity research are legitimate objects of study, that the authors present interesting ideas to further the study of aesthetic preferences, but that their approach is not new and that its proposed renaming only adds confusion to the field.     

McAllister's aesthetics in science: A critical notice

In Beauty and Revolution in Science, James McAllister argues that a sophisticated rationalist image of science can accommodate two prominent features of actual scientific practice, namely, appeals to “aesthetic” criteria in theory choice, and the occurrence of scientific “revolutions”. The aesthetic criteria to which scientists appeal are, he maintains, inductively grounded in the empirical record of competing theories, and scientific revolutions involve changes in aestheic criteria bu continuity in empirical criteria of theory choice. I raise difficulties for McAllister's account concerning: (a) the nature and scope of “aesthetic” criteria in science; (b) the rationality of appeals to aestheic criteria in science; (c) the rationality of scientific revolutions.     

Aesthetic Concepts,Perceptual Learning,and Linguistic Enculturation: Considerations from Wittgenstein,Language, and Music

Aesthetic non-cognitivists deny that aesthetic statements express genuinely aesthetic beliefs and instead hold that they work primarily to express something non-cognitive, such as attitudes of approval or disapproval, or desire. Non-cognitivists deny that aesthetic statements express aesthetic beliefs because they deny that there are aesthetic features in the world for aesthetic beliefs to represent. Their assumption, shared by scientists and theorists of mind alike, was that language-users possess cognitive mechanisms with which to objectively grasp abstract rules fixed independently of human responses, and that cognizers are thereby capable of grasping rules for the correct application of aesthetic concepts without relying on evaluation or enculturation. However, in this article I use Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations to argue that psychological theories grounded upon this so-called objective model of rule-following fail to adequately account for concept acquisition and mastery. I argue that this is because linguistic enculturation, and the perceptual learning that’s often involved, influences and enables the mastery of aesthetic concepts. I argue that part of what’s involved in speaking aesthetically is to belong to a cultural practice of making sense of things aesthetically, and that it’s within a socio-linguistic community, and that community’s practices, that such aesthetic sense can be made intelligible.     

On Liking Aesthetic Value

According to tradition, aesthetic value is non-contingently connected to a certain feeling of liking or pleasure. Is that true? Two answers are on offer in the field of aesthetics today: 1. The Hedonist answers: Yes, aesthetic value is non-contingently connected to pleasure insofar as this value is constituted and explained by the power of its possessors to please (under standard conditions). 2. The Non-Affectivist answers: No. At best, pleasure is contingently related to aesthetic value. The aim of this paper is to point to a blind spot in the dialectic between these two standard positions by defending a third neglected answer to the question above, the answer of the Value-Meriting-Pleasure [VMP] advocate. According to this answer, a certain kind of (cognitive and responsive) pleasure is connected to aesthetic value non-contingently, but also non-hedonically. VMP is the view that objects of aesthetic value are non-contingently related to pleasure insofar as they merit a certain kind of pleasure. But, pace the hedonist, those objects are valuable (those that are to be engaged with etc.) neither on account of their capacity to give pleasure nor on account of the hedonic value of the attitude they merit.     

Scylla and Charybdis: the purist’s dilemma

This paper explores the view that, on Mumford’s account of the purist, to the degree that the purist adopts an aesthetic perspective, he or she doesn’t watch the sport in question, and to the degree that he or she does watch the sport, there is a loss of aesthetic appreciation. The idea that spectators oscillate between partisanship and purism means that the purist is unable to avoid either the Scylla of not actually watching the sport, or the Charybdis of loss of aesthetic appreciation at any given point. Ultimately there seems to be both a sport-shaped hole and an aesthetic-shaped hole in Mumford’s account of the purist. It is argued that oscillation is incapable of dealing with the problem precisely because it is disjunctive in nature and entails the spectator either watching sport from an aesthetic perspective or from a partisan perspective at any given time. An alternative conception of the aesthetic is considered that offers one way of dissolving the purist’s dilemma.     

Wu-Wei: Lao-zi,Zhuang-zi and the aesthetic judgement

The concept of wu-wei (nonaction) has undergone significant changes from Lao-zi to Zhuang-zi. This paper will argue that, while wu-wei in Lao-zi is a utilitarian principle, wu-wei of Zhuan-zi represents an aesthetic world-view. The aesthetic nature of the Daoist nonaction will be illustrated through Kant's concept of 'purposiveness without purpose'.     

Beauty, A Road To The Truth

In this article I give a naturalistic-cum-formal analysis of therelation between beauty, empirical success, and truth. The analysis is based on the onehand on a hypothetical variant of the so-called `mere-exposure effect' which has been more orless established in experimental psychology regarding exposure-affect relationshipsin general and aesthetic appreciation in particular (Zajonc 1968; Temme 1983; Bornstein 1989;Ye 2000). On the other hand it is based on the formal theory of truthlikeness andtruth approximation as presented in my From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism (2000).The analysis supports the findings of James McAllister in his beautifulBeauty and Revolution in Science (1996), by explaining and justifying them.First, scientists are essentially right in regarding aesthetic criteria useful for empiricalprogress and even for truth approximation, provided they conceive of them as less hard thanempirical criteria. Second, the aesthetic criteria of the time, the `aesthetic canon', maywell be based on `aesthetic induction' regarding nonempirical features of paradigms of successfultheories which scientists have come to appreciate as beautiful. Third, aestheticcriteria can play a crucial, schismatic role in scientific revolutions. Since they may well be wrong, they may, in the hands of aesthetic conservatives, retard empirical progress and hence truth approximation, but this does not happen in the hands of aesthetically flexible, `revolutionary' scientists. We may find totallyopposite things beautiful: a simplemathematical principle as well as a series of unrepeatable complex contingencies. It is a matter of psychology.(Stephen Jay Gould, translated passage from (Kayzer 2000, 30)).     

The malleable bicultural consumer: effects of cultural contexts on aesthetic judgments

• Grounded in the cognitive framework of processing fluency, this study proposes further support for the experiential perspective in aesthetics by positing that aesthetic response to the same object may be malleable, depending on how the symbolic properties of the object interact with different cultural contexts which either facilitate or debilitate the processing experience of the perceiver. The study employed an Internet experiment to test the hypotheses among 105 female Hispanic college‐aged students enrolled at a large midwestern university. The findings revealed that symbolic attributes of products interact with cultural contexts to affect aesthetic judgments of (Hispanic) consumers. Aesthetic judgments were more positive when evaluating culturally symbolic product attributes after exposure to congruent contextual cues that facilitate fluent processing. The study furnishes support for the impact of environment/context on consumer behavior and aesthetic judgment, thus establishing further support for the cognitive framework of conceptual fluency in explaining aesthetic response. The study also contributes to recent literature on “frame‐switching” among bicultural consumers by suggesting that these consumers navigate between competing cultural frames in response to visual primes, with resultant shifts in aesthetic judgments. Important marketing insights emerge from these findings.

Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Aesthetic Testimony: What Can We Learn from Others about Beauty and Art?1

The thesis that aesthetic testimony cannot provide aesthetic justification or knowledge is widely accepted–even by realists about aesthetic properties and values. This Kantian position is mistaken. Some testimony about beauty and artistic value can provide a degree of aesthetic justification and, perhaps, even knowledge. That is, there are cases in which one can be justified in making an aesthetic judgment purely on the basis of someone else's testimony. But widespread aesthetic unreliability creates a problem for much aesthetic testimony. Hence, most testimony about art does not have much epistemic value. The situation is somewhat different with respect to aesthetic testimony about nature, proofs, and theories. And yet he realizes clearly that other people's approval in no way provides him with a valid proof by which to judge beauty; even though others may perhaps see and observe for him, and even though what many have seen the same way may serve him, who believes he saw it differently, as a sufficient basis of proof for a theoretical and hence logical judgment, yet the fact that others have liked something can never serve him as a basis for an aesthetic judgment. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment     

The Effect of Religious Beliefs on the Attitude of Aesthetic Surgery Operation in Islam

This study aims to investigate the relationship between individuals’ attitudes about acceptance of aesthetic surgery (e.g. rhinoplasty, autoplasty, blepharoplasty, and mammaplasty) and some of the worship practices in Islamic religion such as performing prayer, fasting, and going to pilgrimage. Although many people think that aesthetic surgery is inappropriate in Islamic religion, no studies in the literature were found to have investigated this issue. This study collected data through a questionnaire administered to 96 patients who applied to our Plastic Surgery Clinic and underwent various surgical operations and 96 patients who were recommended plastic surgery but rejected to have one; the questionnaire aimed to identify the participants’ frequency of religious worship practices and appropriateness of aesthetic surgery to their beliefs. The participants responded on the frequency of religious worship levels according to the options in the questionnaire. The “Acceptance of Cosmetic Surgery Scale” was utilized in order to identify their attitudes towards aesthetic surgery. Levels of performing prayers, fasting, and going to pilgrimage in the groups that accepted surgery and in the groups that rejected surgery were significantly different (p < 0.001, p = 0.008, p < 0.001). In two different groups, the Acceptance of Aesthetic Surgery Scale scores were significantly different within the prayer groups and fasting groups (p < 0.001, p < 0.001, p = 0.001, p < 0.001). While the group that accepted surgery indicated no significant differences between those who thought about going to pilgrimage and who did not (p = 0.650), there was a significant difference in the group that rejected surgery (p < 0.001). While 14.6% of the participants in the group that accepted surgery considered aesthetic surgery a sin, this proportion was 56.3% in the group that rejected surgery, and this difference was significant (p < 0.001). In both surgery groups, there were differences in the scale scores of those who considered aesthetic surgery a sin and those who did not (p < 0.001, p < 0.001). There was a significant relationship between worship practices, one of the biggest indicators of the level of belief in Islamic religion, and aesthetic surgery attitudes. However, despite the fact that belief levels affect the decision of having an operation in plastic surgery, in case of serious health problems, the decision of having an operation becomes more important religious beliefs.

     

Narrative Representation and Phenomenological Knowledge

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that narrative representations can provide knowledge in virtue of their narrativity, regardless of their truth value. I set out the question in section 1, distinguishing narrative cognitivism from aesthetic cognitivism and narrative representations from non-narrative representations. Sections 2 and 3 argue that exemplary narratives can provide lucid phenomenological knowledge, which appears to meet both the epistemic and narrativity criteria for the narrative cognitivist thesis. In section 4, I turn to non-narrative representation, focusing on lyric poetry as presenting a disjunctive objection: either lucid phenomenological knowledge can be reduced to identification and fails to meet the epistemic criterion, or lucid phenomenological knowledge is provided in virtue of aesthetic properties and fails to meet the narrativity criterion. I address both of these problems in sections 5 and 6, and I close with a tentative suggestion as to how my argument for narrative cognitivism could be employed as an argument for aesthetic cognitivism.     

Structure Disclosed. Replete Moments and Aesthetic Experience in Reading Novels

ABSTRACT

Despite the huge interest in different philosophical questions surrounding literature, particularly analytic philosophers have had relatively little to say about literature’s specifically aesthetic character. Peter Kivy has developed this antiaesthetic tendency furthest, ultimately denying that the reading of prose literature has any deep aesthetic content. Building on Alan Goldman’s and John Dewey’s work on aesthetic experience, I argue that a key literary feature of novels I single out – what I term a replete moment – has the potential to trigger in readers significant aesthetic experiences. Along with revealing aesthetic aspects in reading that Kivy’s position does not cover, my account shows that contemplation of the overall structure of the novel is not the sole, more substantial form aesthetic experience can take in the case of reading, as Kivy’s formalistic literary aesthetics assumes. This conclusion is argued to be significant also for the general philosophical discussion on aesthetic experience. An analysis of a key passage in John Irving’s A Prayer for Owen Meany is an important part of the view of literary aesthetic experience put forth.     

Visual aesthetics in store environment and its moderating role on consumer intention

• The paper goal is to answer the following questions: What are the factors of centrality of visual aesthetic design (CVSA) in store environment? What factor explains better the construct? Is there a relationship between CVSA and consumers' intentions, such as loyalty, satisfaction, minutes, item, and $ spent inside store? What is the moderating role of store visual aesthetic design on consumer intentions? The research design was a 2 × 2 design, between subjects, which we manipulated store arousal (high vs. low) and CVSA (high vs. low) in two studies. The findings supported the theory that there are three CVSA dimensions; that there is a positive relationship between CVSA and consumer satisfaction, loyalty, items bought, minutes visiting the store, and $ spent; and that high (vs. low) CVSA consumers were more discriminating in their intentions, when the environment had a high arousal. The original value is to support the notion that consumers also evaluate, beyond products, visual aesthetic components in retail and that it plays a moderating role on consumer intention.

Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Free Harmony of the Faculties and the Primacy of Imagination in Kant's Aesthetic Judgment

This essay argues that, contrary to the prevailing view according to which reflection in Kant's aesthetic judgment is interpreted as ‘the logical actus of the understanding’, we should pay closer attention to Kant's own formulation of aesthetic reflection as ‘an action of the power of imagination’. Put differently, I contend in this essay that the rule that governs and orders the manifold in aesthetic judgment is imagination's own achievement, the achievement of the productive synthesis of the ‘fictive power’ (Dichtungsvermögen), entirely independent of the understanding. While this view does not entail that the faculty of the understanding is not necessary in aesthetic reflection, a stronger emphasis on the role of imagination in aesthetic reflection allows us to realize that its schematizing and interpretive activity, while consistent with, goes well beyond the discursive demands of the understanding insofar as it intimates the supersensible ground of freedom that manifests itself as ‘the feeling of life’. Therefore, I show in this essay that the imagination's unique interpretive power has a special role in completing Kant's critical system by facilitating the connection of the sensible to the supersensible, which further helps us appreciate imagination's practical as opposed to merely cognitive significance.     

Aesthetic freedom and democratic ethical life: A Hegelian account of the relationship between aesthetics and democratic politics

This paper presents a novel Hegelian view of the relationship between aesthetics and democratic politics. My account avoids the drawbacks associated with approaches, such as Rancière's, that reconceive all of the political in aesthetic terms or, like Rockhill's, reduce the aesthetic to art. Instead, I maintain that the aesthetic is best understood as a distinct recognition relationship of individual freedom. My argument proceeds by highlighting shortcomings of Honneth's account of democratic Sittlichkeit and then addressing these impasses by integrating aesthetic freedom into the picture. The first two steps of my argument concern the fact that the form of life outlined by Honneth aspires to be a form of free life, yet his account of democratic Sittlichkeit gives rise to two dimensions of unfreedom. The first problem of unfreedom pertains to the scope of freedom. The relationships of freedom incorporated into Honneth's account fail to turn given social roles into the subject matter of a sufficiently unrestricted practice of freedom. The second problem of freedom concerns conformism. In a final step, I complete my argument that Honneth's account is unsatisfactory and incomplete by showing that aesthetic freedom is socially valid and thus ought to form part of our accounts of democratic ethical life.