Autonomy and Conjugal Love: A Reply to Golash

In my response to Golash I distinguish between two steps in my original argument. The first relates to the special value of conjugal (two-person) love relationships. I defend this step against criticisms, arguing that the two-person relationship provides a form of recognition that is of special importance to us and cannot be found in other sorts of relationship. The two-person relationship is one that, at least as private individuals, we have special reason to pursue. The second step concerns the claim that the special value of such relationships tends to promote the autonomy of those who have them. It is this second step that is important for the argument that a liberal state – one, at any rate, that takes itself to be in the business of safeguarding the pre-conditions of autonomy – could have reason to favour marriage or some form of civic partnership over other forms of intimate adult tie. However, I admit that Golash puts forward plausible – if anecdotal – arguments against this second step. I therefore agree that I need to be more tentative about this step than I was in the original paper.     

Marriage, Autonomy, and the State: Reply to Christopher Bennett

Christopher Bennett has argued that state support of conjugal relationships can be founded on the unique contribution such relationships make to the autonomy of their participants by providing them with various forms of recognition and support unavailable elsewhere. I argue that, in part because a long history of interaction between two people who need each other’s validation tends to produce less meaningful responses over time, long-term conjugal relationships are unlikely to provide autonomy-enhancing support to their participants. To the extent that intimate relationships can provide a unique form of reciprocal support, Bennett fails to show that couples have an advantage over multiple-partner arrangements in doing so.     

Feminism and Women's Autonomy: the Challenge of Female Genital Cutting

Feminist studies of female genital cutting (FGC) provide ample evidence that many women exercise effective agency with respect to this practice, both as accommodators and as resisters. The influence of culture on autonomy is ambiguous: women who resist cultural mandates for FGC do not necessarily enjoy greater autonomy than do those women who accommodate the practice, yet it is clear that some social contexts are more conducive to autonomy than others. In this paper, I explore the implications for autonomy theory of these understandings of the relation between culture, FGC, and women's agency. I review the range of worldwide FGC practices – including "corrective" surgery for "ambiguous genitalia" in Western cultures as well as the various initiation rites observed in some African and Asian cultures – and the diverse cultural rationales for different forms of FGC. I argue that neither latitudinarian, value-neutral accounts of autonomy nor restrictive, value-saturated accounts adequately explain women's agentic position with respect to FGC. I then analyze a number of educational programs that have enhanced women's autonomy, especially by strengthening their introspection, empathy, and imagination. Such programs, which engage women's autonomy skills without exposing them to autonomy-disabling cultural alienation, promote autonomy-within-culture. This understanding of autonomy as socially situated, however, entails neither endorsement of FGC nor resignation to its persistence.     

The Misguided Marriage of Responsibility and Autonomy

Much of the literature devoted to the topics of agent autonomy and agent responsibility suggests strong conceptual overlaps between the two, although few explore these overlaps explicitly. Beliefs of this sort are commonplace, but they mistakenly conflate the global state of being autonomous with the local condition of acting autonomously or exhibiting autonomy in respect to some act or decision. Because the latter, local phenomenon of autonomy seems closely tied to the condition of being responsible for an act, we tend to think of the former, global phenomenon as a condition of responsibility as well. But one can act autonomously, or manifest autonomy with respect to some occurrent state, without satisfying the conditions for autonomous agency. Autonomous agency and responsible agency are logically distinct in part due to the varient conceptions of rationality each calls for. Both agent responsibility and holding a person responsible imply a fairly ``thick' form of rationality, where rationality embodies a normative component and is a matter of satisfying criteria that are objective in the sense that they are independent of what a person happens to want or to value. But autonomous agency calls for a quite different, ``thin' conception of instrumental rationality.     

A Compassionate Autonomy Alternative to Speciesism

Many people in the animal welfare communityhave argued that the use of nonhuman animals inmedical research is necessarily based onspeciesism, an unjustified prejudice based onspecies membership. As such it is morally akinto racism and sexism. This is misguided. Thecombined capacities for autonomy and sentiencewith the obligations derived from relationssupport a morally justifiable rationale forusing some nonhuman animals in order to limitthe risk of harm to humans. There may be a fewcases where it is morally better to use a neversentient human than a sentient animal, butthese cases are few and would not fulfill thecurrent need for research subjects. The use ofnonautonomous animals instead of humans inrisky research can be based on solid moralground. It is not necessarily speciesism.     

The Porosity of Autonomy: Social and Biological Constitution of the Patient in Biomedicine

The nature and role of the patient in biomedicine comprise issues central to bioethical inquiry. Given its developmental history grounded firmly in a backlash against 20th-century cases of egregious human subjects abuse, contemporary medical bioethics has come to rely on a fundamental assumption: the unit of care (and the unit of value) is the autonomous self-directing patient. In this article we examine first the structure of the feminist social critique of autonomy. Then we show that a parallel argument can be made against relational autonomy as well, demonstrating how this second concept of autonomy fails to take sufficiently into account an array of biological determinants, particularly those from microbial biology. Finally, in light of this biological critique, we question whether or to what extent any relevant and meaningful view of autonomy can be recovered in the contemporary landscape of bioethics.     

自立、自主、独立特征的语义分析

用22对人格形容词制成的7级评定的语义分析量表对171名被试进行了调查,结果如下：在5对人格形容词上自立与自主的评分有显著差异,在ll对人格形容词上自立与独立的评分有显著差异。最后对自立与自主、独立的关系问题进行了讨论,提出：①自立是与自主、独立不同的人格构念,差异的关键在于自立是一种辩证性的人格特征。这种差异可能主要源于我国的传统文化;②与独立人格、自主人格相比,自立人格才是符合我国构建和谐社会所需的健全人格的重要因素;③我国公众对自主、独立的认识很可能与西方国家的公众不一样。     

家庭功能与社会适应:个人自主的中介作用

采用大学生社会适应量表、自我调控问卷和家庭功能问卷调查了643名大学生社会适应的基本特点及其与家庭功能、个人自主间的关系。结果发现:(1)男生在校园生活适应上得分高于女生;大三学生在人际关系适应、自我适应维度上得分高于大四,大一学生在学习适应维度上得分高于大二、在满意度维度上得分高于大三;(2)除投射调控维度外,个人自主的其余维度与家庭功能及社会适应各维度及总均分间均存在显著相关;(3)分层回归结果表明,除投射调控维度外,个人自主其余各维度和家庭功能的亲密性能显著预测社会适应,且个人自主在家庭功能的亲密性和社会适应间起完全中介作用。     

Autonomy and the Normativity Question: Framing Considerations

Abstract

An initial interest in the question of whether one can autonomously choose to be non-autonomous has developed into the broader question of whether there are any normative commitments that necessarily attend being autonomous. This paper argues that reflection on this issue has been systematically hampered by a failure to realize that the normativity question does not delineate a single line of inquiry, but rather several different such lines; and that these differences depend on how certain key concepts embedded in the question are understood. The paper concludes by noting several lines of future research suggested by the present work.     

Freedom, Preference and Autonomy

Philosophers have advocated different kinds of freedom, but each has value and none should be neglected in a complete theory of freedom and responsibility. There are three kinds of freedom of preference and action that should be distinguished. A person S may fully prefer to do A at every level, and that is one kind of freedom. A person S may autonomously prefer to do A when S has the preference structure concerning doing A because S prefers to have that very preference structure, and that is a second kind of freedom. A person S may prefer to do A when S could have preferred otherwise, and that is a third kind of freedom. These forms of freedom may be combined, but they are valuable and essentially independent. They all involve the metamental ascendence of preference over desire, but it is autonomous preference that makes a person the author of his or her preference. The responsibility a person has for what he or she does out of a preference for doing it depends on the kinds of freedom of preference the person has and must be ranked in terms of them.     

病人临终决策中的自主问题辨析

自主在医学伦理学中是一个重要的概念。在临终决策中,必须对病人自主从主体自主和行为自主两个维度加以区分,并强调缺乏内外部约束的重要性,尽管内部约束对病人自主影响巨大,但它并不会破坏临终决策的行为自主。在回顾两种反对将行为自主作为理解临终决策手段的意见基础上,应当实现行为自主的标准从完全自主向充分自主的转变,充分自主的优势在于它对各种医疗环境和背景条件所表现出的适应性。根据这一标准,诸如临终病人的死亡选择并不需要完全自主,充分自主即可。

     

Multicultural Education as Fostering Individual Autonomy

This article attempts a philosophical defense of an autonomy-based approach to multicultural education. I contend that multicultural education is necessary in order for students to be able to develop personal autonomy. This, in turn, can empower students to effectively formulate their own version of the good life. The development of autonomy need not, as many critics claim, promote atomistic individualism. Rather, contemporary liberal autonomy strives for a balance between the individual and the community. In defending multicultural education, my argument relies on Joseph Raz's notion of autonomy and Will Kymlicka's concept of a context of choice. I conclude that through multicultural education, students can expand their contexts of choice and consequently develop individual autonomy, an essential ingredient of the good life.     

教师的教学自主权与工作满意度的关系:教学自主性的中介作用

以北京、河北、宁夏、广东等地24所中小学923名中小学教师为被试,采取教学自主权量表、教学自主性量表、教师工作满意度量表,探讨了教师的教学自主权、教学自主性与工作满意度之间的关系。研究结果发现:(1)教学自主权与教学自主性均可显著预测教师工作满意度;(2)教学自主性在教学自主权与教师工作满意度之间起着完全中介作用,即教学自主权通过教师的教学自主性,对教师工作满意度有正向预测作用。     

Analytical Buddhism: The Two-Tiered Illusion of Self

In the contemporary debate on the nature of autonomy, it is generally taken for granted that autonomy is to be understood as rule by the self, with the debate centring on how that self is to be identified. Garnett [2013b Garnett, Michael 2013b. The Autonomous Life: A Pure Social View, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91/4. [Google Scholar]] has recently proposed a theory that rejects the dominant understanding of autonomy as rule by the self and views it instead as resistance to rule by others. According to that theory, an autonomous agent is one whose various ‘autonomy traits’ render her sufficiently resistant to subjection to foreign wills. I argue that Garnett has not given us good reason to abandon the understanding of autonomy as rule by the self. His account is plausible only if it is understood to require for autonomy the possession of at least one trait with which the agent can be identified. And the best explanation of the necessity of some such trait(s) is offered, not by Garnett's, but by the dominant understanding of autonomy he rejects.     

Autonomy,life as an intrinsic value,and the right to die in dignity

This paper examines two models of thinking relating to the issue of the right to die in dignity: one takes into consideration the rights and interests of the individual; the other supposes that human life is inherently valuable. I contend that preference should be given to the first model, and further assert that the second model may be justified in moral terms only as long as it does not resort to paternalism. The view that holds that certain patients are not able to comprehend their own interests in a fully rational manner, and therefore ‘we’ know what is good for these patients better than ‘they’ do, is morally unjustifiable. I proceed by refuting the ‘quality of life’ argument, asserting that each person is entitled to decide for herself when it is worth living and when it is not. In this connection, a caveat will be made regarding the role of the family. The author’s research interests include bioethics, free speech, tolerance and ethics in the media.     

Reply to Catriona Mackenzie

In her excellent critique of my book Self to Self (2006), Catriona Mackenzie highlights three gaps in my view of the self. First, my effort to distinguish among different applications of the concept ‘self’ is not matched by any attempt to explain the interactions among the selves so distinguished. Second, in analyzing practical reasoning as aimed at self-understanding, I speak sometimes of causal-psychological understanding (e.g. in the paper titled ‘The Centered Self’) and sometimes of narrative self-understanding (e.g. in ‘The Self as Narrator’), but I never explain how these two modes of self-understanding are related. Third, I never explain how my account of autonomous agency can be reconciled with my interpretation of Kant's (e.g., in ‘A Brief Introduction to Kantian Ethics’). In this reply to Mackenzie, I agree with her about all three of these gaps, and I offer some (admittedly incomplete) ideas about how they might be filled.     

Autonomy and radical evil: a Kantian challenge to constitutivism

Properly understood, Kant’s moral philosophy is incompatible with constitutivism. According to the constitutivist, being subject to the moral law cannot be a matter of free choice, and failure to comply with it is to be understood as a deficiency in one’s integrity as an intentional agent. I reconstruct Kant’s arguments to the conclusion that immorality, moral evil, consists in choosing to give one’s unity as an intentional agent supremacy over the moral law, and that one’s being subject to the moral law must be one’s own free choice. And I explain how Kant’s doctrine of radical evil, according to which we cannot be subject to the moral law without actually being morally evil, protects this conclusion from entailing the denial of the unconditionally binding character of moral principles, which character constitutivists correctly identify as the central concern of Kant’s – or any – moral philosophy.     

Autonomy deficits as vulnerability for anxiety: evidence from two laboratory-based studies

Background: Autonomous individuals are characterized by self-governance; awareness of and capacity to realize one’s wishes and needs, while being connected with and sensitive towards others. In line with earlier research showing consistent associations between autonomy-connectedness deficits and anxiety, we tested in two studies whether autonomy deficits predict anxious responses to acute stressors.

Methods: In Study 1, participants (N?=?177) viewed an anxiety-inducing film fragment and reported anxiety before and after viewing the clip. In experimental Study 2, participants (N?=?100) were randomly allocated to one of two conditions: giving a short presentation to an audience (impromptu speech task) or watching another person’s presentation (control condition). Anxiety was measured at baseline, after a preparation period and directly after the presentation.

Results: In Study 1, individuals’ anxiety in reaction to watching the movie was positively associated with the autonomy-connectedness component sensitivity to others. In Study 2, individuals’ anxiety in reaction to preparing the presentation was negatively associated with the autonomy-connectedness component self-awareness.

Conclusions: Specific autonomy components may be related to experiencing anxiety in differing situations (i.e., related to others’ distress or presenting one’s personal views). Collectively these results indicate that autonomy-connectedness deficits may form a vulnerability factor for experiencing anxiety.     

Ethics Consultation and Autonomy

Services of ethics consultants are nowadays commonly used in such various spheres of life as engineering, public administration, business, law, health care, journalism, and scientific research. It has however been maintained that use of ethics consultants is incompatible with personal autonomy; in moral matters individuals should be allowed to make their own decisions. The problem this criticism refers to can be conceived of as a conflict between the professional autonomy of ethics experts and the autonomy of the persons they serve. This paper addresses this conflict and maintains that when the nature of both ethics consultation and individual autonomy is properly understood, the professional autonomy of ethics experts is compatible with the autonomy of the persons they assist.     

Counterfactuals, Autonomy and Downward Causation: Reply to Zhong

In recent papers, Lei Zhong argues that the autonomy solution to the causal exclusion problem is unavailable to anyone that endorses the counterfactual model of causation. The linchpin of his argument is that the counterfactual theory entails the downward causation principle, which conflicts with the autonomy solution. In this note I argue that the counterfactual theory does not entail the downward causation principle, so it is possible to advocate for the autonomy solution to the causal exclusion problem from within the counterfactual theory of causation.