Three versions of the additive theories of behavioral contrast

The additive theories of behavioral contrast state that contrast will occur only when two types of responses interact during multiple schedules. Three more specific versions of the theories may be defined according to how they distinguish these two types of responses. A strong version physically distinguishes them. A second version distinguishes them according to the theoretical processes which control them. A weak version distinguishes them on the basis of the environmental relations which control them. Only the weak version of the theories is currently testable. The weak theory should be tested by establishing each of the two environmental relations independently and then combining them to assess their effect on behavior. Because this test is not usually performed, many of the results which have been taken to support or contradict the additive theories are actually ambiguous.     

Children's strategy use in computational estimation.

This study reports an investigation of ten-year-old children's strategy use in computational estimation (i.e., give an approximate answer like 400 to an arithmetic problem like 224 + 213). Children used four strategies: rounding with decomposition, rounding without decomposition, truncation, and compensation. Strategies appeared to differ in frequency and effectiveness. Finally, children chose strategies in an adaptive way so as to obtain fast and accurate performance. Implications of these findings for understanding children's computational estimation performance and strategies in numerical cognition in general are discussed.     

A forced-choice adaptive procedure for measuring auditory thresholds in children

A modification of the two-down/one-up tracking procedure was used to estimate thresholds of audibility in 46 children (ages 3 to 6 years) and 10 adults. A two-alternative forced-choice version (26 children, 5 adults) of this method was successful in estimating thresholds of audibility in 5-year-olds, but not in 3- and 4-year-olds. A single-interval version of the procedure was successful in estimating thresholds of audibility for all the children. Measures from the children of between- and within-subjects variability, psychometric functions, and response bias all indicate that the procedure enables one to estimate thresholds that are in close agreement with those obtained from adults and with results of other investigators.     

Retention of time information in forced-choice duration discrimination

We explore the effect on performance in a forced-choice duration-discrimination task of varying the interstimulus interval (ISI) from 0 to 2 sec. The durations were brief empty intervals (115–285 msec) bounded by very brief auditory pulses. Performance improved as the ISI increased from 0 to 1/2 sec, but a further increase in ISI up to 2 sec resulted in little further change in performance. The “time information” derived from a brief interval bounded by auditory pulses does not appear to be susceptible to the very short-term perceptual memory loss inferred in other auditory discriminations.     

A table of d' for M-alternative odd-man-out forced-choice procedures.

There is a class of multiple-alternative forced-choice psychophysical procedures in which the subject is required to identify which one of a number of stimuli differs from the remaining stimuli, without having to consider the direction or sign of the difference. A table giving values of the discrimination index d' as a function of the proportion of correct responses in such odd-man-out procedures was generated by numerical simulation. The table covers experiments with 3 to 32 alternative stimuli.     

Three versions of the Interpersonal Adjective Scales and their fit to the circumplex model

The Interpersonal Adjective Scales (IAS) is a well-supported instrument that is designed to map interpersonal traits onto the interpersonal circumplex. However, three versions of the IAS exist and these vary with respect to the degree to which they included item definitions (i.e., glossary added at the end, definitions attached to each item, and no definitions). The focus of this study was on comparing the structural similarity of each version. Each of the versions was given to different samples (N = 920) of college students. Results of multidimensional scaling (MDS) and randomized tests of order relations demonstrated that all versions were well and equally described by the circular model. There were no structural differences in the different IAS versions and thus each can be used with this population.     

Observation: Three reasons to avoid having half of the trials be congruent in a four-alternative forced-choice experiment on sequential modulation

Sequential modulation is the finding that the sizes of several selective-attention phenomena--namely, the Simon, flanker, and Stroop effects--are larger following congruent trials than following incongruent trials. In order to rule out relatively uninteresting explanations of sequential modulation that are based on a variety of stimulus- and response-repetition confounds, a four-alternative forced choice task must be used, such that all trials with any kind of repetition can be omitted from the analysis. When a four-alternative task is used, the question arises as to whether to have the proportions of congruent and incongruent trials be set by chance (and, therefore, be 25% congruent and 75% incongruent) or to raise the proportion of congruent trials to 50%, so that it matches the proportion of incongruent trials. In this observation, it is argued that raising the proportion of congruent trials to 50% should not be done. For theoretical, practical, and empirical reasons, having half of the trials be congruent in a four-alternative task aimed at providing unambiguous evidence of sequential modulation should be avoided.     

On the interpretation of below-chance responding in forced-choice tests

Two-alternative, forced-choice tests are commonly used to assess cooperation in examinations of neurocognitive functioning. Most commercially available tests do not primarily depend on comparing the total correct responses to the number expected by guessing. Nevertheless, the tests afford an opportunity to make stronger judgments about the cooperation of test-takers when the test score is lower than the range of scores expected for guessing. Unfortunately, many researchers and clinicians make serious errors in communicating what is "guessing" and what is "worse than guessing" (or malingering). This article describes proper methods of evaluating total correct responses on a forced-choice test.     

A comparison of method-of-adjustment and forced-choice procedures in frequency discrimination

Reported estimates of the frequency difference limen (DL) for tones show considerable variability. To determine the extent that the differences are dependent on psychophysical method, three estimates of the DL at 1,000 Hz were obtained from the same subjects for each of three psychophysical procedures. The three estimates were: (1) the standard deviation of final settings in a methbd of adjustment, (2) the average of several reversals in an adaptive two-interval forced-choice procedure, and (3) the 76%-correct point in a two-interval forced-choice procedure using constant stimuli. The two forced-choice procedures yielded very similar DLs. The adjustment procedure yielded significantly smaller estimates. Possible reasons for the different values produced by adjustment procedures and the nature of the underlying decision process are discussed.     

The mentalistic basis of core social cognition: experiments in preverbal infants and a computational model

Evaluating individuals based on their pro‐ and anti‐social behaviors is fundamental to successful human interaction. Recent research suggests that even preverbal infants engage in social evaluation; however, it remains an open question whether infants’ judgments are driven uniquely by an analysis of the mental states that motivate others’ helpful and unhelpful actions, or whether non‐mentalistic inferences are at play. Here we present evidence from 10‐month‐olds, motivated and supported by a Bayesian computational model, for mentalistic social evaluation in the first year of life.A video abstract of this article can be viewed at http://youtu.be/rD_Ry5oqCYE     

Preschoolers’ use of feedback for flexible behavior: Insights from a computational model

This study addressed preschoolers’ cognitive flexibility in an inductive task requiring response feedback processing to infer relevant task goals. A total of 63 4- to 6-year-olds were tested on a perceptual matching task in which they needed to switch attention among three colors. A computational model was designed to track down how responses to positive and negative feedback changed as children progressed through the task. The results showed that children’s differential response to positive and negative feedback developed with age. In addition, age differences in feedback responding increased as the task unfolded. These findings are interpreted as reflecting an increase in flexibility with age in terms of growing efficiency in feedback processing.     

An evaluation of forced-choice and true-false item formats in personality assessment

The reliabilities and validities of true-false and forced-choice formats in personality assessment were compared. Subjects from college residential units were assigned randomly to groups receiving the Personality Research Form (PRF) in either forced-choice or standard true-false form. Reliabilities were substantially higher for the true-false form. Peer rating validities for each format were in a comparable range, but correlations with self-ratings were higher for the true-false form. Results do not support the contention that a forced-choice format is consistently more valid than a standard format. Subjects well acquainted with ratees manifested more highly differentiated judgments, showed consistently higher validity, but were more prone to show a bias to attribute more salient traits, like dominance and exhibition, to ratees.     

Small-sample characterization of stochastic approximation staircases in forced-choice adaptive threshold estimation

Despite the widespread use of up-down staircases in adaptive threshold estimation, their efficiency and usability in forced-choice experiments has been recently debated. In this study, simulation techniques were used to determine the small-sample convergence properties of stochastic approximation (SA) staircases as a function of several experimental parameters. We found that satisfying some general requirements (use of the accelerated SA algorithm, clear suprathreshold initial stimulus intensity, large initial step size) the convergence was accurate independently of the spread of the underlying psychometric function. SA staircases were also reliable for targeting percent-correct levels far from the midpoint of the psychometric function and performed better than classical up-down staircases with fixed step size. These results prompt the utilization of SA staircases in practical forced-choice estimation of sensory thresholds.     

Revisiting the role of recollection in item versus forced-choice recognition memory

Many memory theorists have assumed that forced-choice recognition tests can rely more on familiarity, whereas item (yes-no) tests must rely more on recollection. In actuality, several studies have found no differences in the contributions of recollection and familiarity underlying the two different test formats. Using word frequency to manipulate stimulus characteristics, the present study demonstrated that the contributions of recollection to item versus forced-choice tests is variable. Low word frequency resulted in significantly more recollection in an item test than did a forced-choice procedure, but high word frequency produced the opposite result. These results clearly constrain any uniform claim about the degree to which recollection supports responding in item versus forced-choice tests.