Social comparison as a predictor of changes in burnout among nurses

Abstract

This study addressed the question whether the affect evoked by social comparisons and individual differences in social comparison orientation (SCO) may predict the development of burnout over a period of one year. The participants were 93 nurses (25 males and 68 females) who filled out a questionnaire twice, with an interval of about one year. Comparisons with others performing better than oneself (upward comparisons) were reported to occur more often, to evoke more positive affect, and to invoke less negative affect than comparisons with others performing worse than oneself (downward comparisons). Those who responded at Time 1 (T1) with more positive affect to upward comparison and with less negative affect to downward comparisons, showed a decrease in burnout at Time 2 (T2). In addition, those who responded with relatively more negative affect to upward comparisons at T1, showed an increase in burnout at T2, but only when they were high in SCO. It is concluded that in this population upward comparisons were more prevalent than, and evoked more favorable responses than, downward comparisons. The most important conclusion is that the affect evoked by social comparisons may predict future changes in burnout.     

The philosopher and the Fly Bottle

Wittgenstein said that what he does in philosophy is ‘to show the fly out of the fly bottle’ (Philosophical Investigations¶309). He is, himself, both the fly, his alter-ego, and the philosopher who turns the fly around. This is a transformation in his vision of and perspective on those matters which tempted him, through the questions it posed for him, into the bottle, there to be trapped – trapped into a form of scepticism, realism, or one of its many reductionist satellites, for instance. The transformation which releases him into the open takes philosophical work which unearths unspoken assumptions and subjects them to criticism. As for the movement into and out of the bottle, this is the philosophical journey in the course of which the philosopher comes to a new understanding of the matters he questioned in a way that led him into the bottle. To come to such a better understanding, therefore, the philosopher has to have the courage of his temptations and not be afraid to give up what he holds on to. What he learns in coming out of the bottle belongs to the work that frees him from the compelling pictures that held him captive within the space of opposed theories held together by common assumptions. It cannot be acquired or conveyed independently of such work. It is in this sense that philosophy is a struggle with difficulties which each philosopher has to face and work through himself. The difficulties are not in him, but they are his– they are difficulties for him. He has to work on them. That is why, while he can learn from others, he cannot borrow from them, build on or go on from what they have established. In the first section of the paper I put on some flesh on this. But what I provide is still a thumb-nail sketch. The question ‘what is philosophy?’ is itself a philosophical question, like any other, and can only be ‘answered’ like them. It is only that with which we are familiar – in our mastery of the language we speak or in our experience of life –that can raise philosophical questions for us. Thus contrast ‘what is knowledge?’, ‘what is thinking?’ with ‘what is cancer?’, ‘what is osmosis?’. The question ‘what is philosophy?’ similarly can only be asked by a philosopher, someone who has asked and struggled with its questions. Otherwise it is a request for information to which the full answer is: you have to study philosophy if you really want to find out. It follows that what I say about the way philosophical questions are to be answered applies equally to the question about the nature of philosophy. Hence I can do no other than provide a thumb-nail sketch for those who have themselves struggled with philosophical questions. As for what I provide in the following three sections, they are no more than illustrations of a way of working on those sample questions – questions on which hopefully the reader will have thought himself. I am able to offer such illustrations only because I have myself been caught up by these questions and have worked on them and discussed them more fully elsewhere (see Bibliography).     

Fichte's Voluntarism

Abstract: In recent work Stephen Darwall has attacked what he calls J. G. Fichte's ‘voluntarist’ thesis, the idea—on Darwall's reading—that I am bound by obligations of respect to another person by virtue of my choice to interact with him. Darwall argues that voluntary choice is incompatible with the normative force behind the concept of a person, which demands my respect non‐voluntarily. He in turn defends a ‘presuppositional’ thesis which claims that I am bound by obligations of respect simply by recognizing the other as a person. In this paper I argue Darwall has misidentified the voluntary element in Fichte's account (sections 4–5). This requires me first to explain what Fichte's voluntarism really consists in (sections 1–3), and I suggest an apparent ambiguity in Fichte's position is responsible for Darwall's misreading. Clarifying this ambiguity, however, exposes some limitations to Darwall's thesis, and I end by discussing what those limitations are and what we can learn from them (sections 6–8).     

The Impact of Social Comparisons After Failure: The Moderating Effects of Perceived Control

It was proposed that the impact of upward and downward social comparisons on affect and behavior following failure is moderated by perceived control. Subjects who failed an initial test were led to believe that it was either possible or impossible to improve performance on a second test and were exposed to information indicating that others either had done better or had done worse on the first test. As predicted, those who believed that they had little control over their subsequent outcomes and who were exposed to upward comparisons reported greater depressive and hostile affect and persisted less on the second task relative to other subjects. In addition, subjects who had low perceived control showed more interest in additional comparison information when they believed that others had done worse than when they believed that others had done better. Those who believed that they had high control did not show this preference. Findings suggest that upward comparison is debilitating only when accompanied by low perceived control. Further, exposure to downward comparison information may prevent some of the negative effects that have previously been associated with low personal control.     

In search of the true group animal: the effects of affiliation orientation and social comparison orientation upon group satisfaction

A study among 653 undergraduate students examined the effects upon group satisfaction of social comparison orientation (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999) and affiliation orientation, i.e. the preference for doing things together and in groups versus a preference for doing things alone. Affiliation orientation correlated positively with extraversion and agreeableness, and social comparison orientation correlated negatively with emotional stability and openness to experience. A multi‐level analysis showed that individual level variance in group satisfaction was explained by an interaction effect of affiliation orientation and social comparison orientation: a high level of affiliation orientation was associated with high group satisfaction of individual group members, but only among those low in social comparison orientation. Among those high in social comparison orientation, a high level of affiliation orientation was even associated, though not very strongly, with low group satisfaction. These effects were upheld when simultaneously controlling for all ‘Big Five’ personality dimensions. It was concluded that the typical ‘group animal’ is someone who has a strong preference for affiliation, combined with a low tendency to compare him‐ or herself with others. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Having less,giving less: The effects of unfavorable social comparisons of affluence on people’s willingness to act for the benefit of others

Previous research has found a negative relationship between individual differences in personal relative deprivation (PRD; i.e., resentment stemming from the belief that one is worse off than similar others) and prosociality. Whether PRD causes reductions in people's willingness to act for the benefit of others, however, is yet to be established. Across six studies, we experimentally examined whether experiences of PRD via unfavorable (vs. favorable or lateral) social comparisons of affluence reduced prosociality toward known others and strangers. We found that making hypothetical (Study 1) or real (Study 2) unfavorable social comparisons of affluence in workplace contexts reduced participants’ organizational citizenship behavioral intentions. Furthermore, adverse social comparisons of affluence reduced generosity toward the targets of those comparisons during a Dictator Game (Studies 3 to 6). Across studies, we also measured participants’ subjective and objective socioeconomic status and found, contrary to previous theory and research, no consistent relationship between status and prosociality and no modulation of this relationship by either local or macro-level inequality. These results suggest that local, specific interpersonal comparisons of affluence play a more dominant role in people's willingness to act for the benefit of a comparison target than do their subjective or objective class rank or the prevailing income inequality of the state in which they reside.     

Control of movement patterns in animals

As a more junior Fellow of the same college in Cambridge as Sir Frederic Bartlett, I am especially glad of this opportunity to join with members of the Experimental Psychology Society in honouring him. It would be superfluous for me to speak here of Sir Frederic's academic achievements: so many of our members are engaged in research on problems which sprung from his pioneering work, and his influence on the development of psychology as a science certainly needs no elaboration by me. But I would like to make one personal remark. I suppose all younger men feel that there are just a very few members of the preceding generation who have achieved a stature which will always be beyond the reach of any of their own contemporaries. Sir Frederic has always been one of those for me. I am speaking here not only of his academic achievements, but of his kindness as a man; and I would like to tell him how much I valued his willingness to share some of the benefits of his experience when I was blundering about on the borders of his subject.     

Expressive Individualism,the Cult of the Artist as Genius,and Milton's Lucifer

I propose an ‘intellectual genealogy’ of the widespread contemporary lifestyle called ‘expressive individualism’, tracing it back first to the cult of the artist as genius, which flourished during the 19^th century, but which has been democratized and universalized in our time. I then trace it back one step further, somewhat surprisingly, to the altered depiction of Lucifer John Milton gives in his poem Paradise Lost. Milton's Lucifer rejects not only Jesus as the highest creature, he rejects the Father as father; he announces ‘I know none before me; I am self‐begot.’ To the extent that we embrace the ethic of ‘expressive individualism’, therefore, we are implicitly committed to Milton's Lucifer as an archetype for human fulfilment, which I suggest, however, is a toxic model.     

Social and Temporal Comparisons Made by Individuals Living With HIV Disease: Relationships to Adherence Behavior1

When faced with the uncertainty of serious illness, individuals cope by comparing themselves to other people (social comparisons) and to other times in their lives (temporal comparisons). Participants were 44 individuals being treated for HIV who completed questionnaires measuring comparisons, adherence, and self‐efficacy; 34 also completed qualitative interviews that were coded for comparisons. High levels of comparison to worse‐off others, worse‐off past selves, and better‐off future selves were prevalent. Comparisons to worse‐off others resulting in positive affect were associated with greater medication adherence; comparisons to better‐off others resulting in negative affect were related to worse adherence. Self‐efficacy to adhere mediated the relationship between comparison and adherence. Individuals who are uncertain about treatment outcomes may engage in social comparison to gain specific knowledge about adherence.     

Frequent Social Comparisons and Destructive Emotions and Behaviors: The Dark Side of Social Comparisons

Social comparisons may seem to serve several positive functions, including self-enhancement. Frequent social comparisons, however, have a dark side. Two studies examined the relationship between frequent social comparisons and destructive emotions and behaviors. In Study 1, people who said they made frequent social comparisons were more likely to experience envy, guilt, regret, and defensiveness, and to lie, blame others, and to have unmet cravings. In Study 2, police officers who said they made frequent social comparisons were more likely to show ingroup bias and to be less satisfied with their jobs. The dark side of frequent social comparisons was not associated with self-esteem. Results are discussed in terms of the role of individual differences in social comparison processes.     

差距知觉的泛化效应：我和你之间的差距有多大?

当知晓自己和他人的表现,即自己与他人在某方面表现上的差距已经明确时,人们对自我-他人差异的知觉准确吗?本研究发现了差距知觉的泛化效应：人们将自身的绝对表现(自己的表现与零相比的结果)泛化到对自身相对表现(自己与他人相比的结果)的判断上。在7个研究中, 被试(N = 2766)得知自己的绝对表现和相对于他人的表现,并判断自己与他人之间的差距。结果显示,绝对获益时,人们在相对获益时感知到的自我-他人差距大于相对损失时;绝对损失时,人们在相对获益时感知到的自我-他人差距小于相对损失时;当泛化难以进行时,上述效应消失。研究揭示了差距知觉的泛化效应及其联结机制。     

Self-evaluative effects of temporal and social comparison

Social and temporal comparisons are two fundamental information sources for evaluating one’s characteristics and abilities. The current study demonstrates that when social comparison (where people’s performance stood in the overall distribution) and temporal comparison (whether performance improved or deteriorated over time) information are both provided, each independently influences actors’ self-evaluations of task performance and ability. In contrast, yoked observer participants paid virtually no attention to temporal comparison information, preferring to evaluate actors based solely on their status relative to others. Furthermore, when the feedback actors received suggested that they were getting worse, their self-evaluation ratings were approximately equal to that of the observers who had access to the same information. However, when their fortunes improved over time, actors used this temporal information as a basis for evaluating themselves more favorably than observers. We argue that both egocentrism and self-enhancement account for the differences between actors’ and observers’ performance evaluations.     

That in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Martyā</Emphasis> Which is <Emphasis Type="Italic">Amṛta</Emphasis>: a Dialog with Ramchandra Gandhi

This philosophical meditation, which deals with death as question, presence, and even teacher, begins with Ramchandra Gandhi’s (RCG’s) penetrating essay ‘On Meriting Death.’ What does it mean ‘to merit’ death? To provide an answer, I travel through RCG’s corpus, in dialog with contemporary theorists such as Sri Aurobindo, Daya Krishna, and Mukund Lath. RCG implies that the question about ‘meriting’ death, and life, is not and cannot be ‘personal’ or ‘isolated’. For X to die, is for his close and distant samāj a matter of losing him and living without him. Hence meriting death, as also life, is a joint venture which involves deep understanding regarding non-isolation as the heart of the human situation. RCG’s creative thinking, or svarāj in ideas, reaches its peak when he dares to offer an answer of his own to the piercing question kim ā?caryam, ‘what is amazing?’ raised in the Yak?a-pra?na episode of the Mahābhārata. For RCG, the heart of the matter is not the ‘ungraspability’ of one’s unavoidable death, or the perennial search for ‘permanence’ in vain, but our failure to perceive ‘that in the martyā which is am?ta,’ i.e., a sense of solidarity in the face of death, connecting ‘I and Thou,’ which he derives from the icchā m?tyu of his grandfather, the famous Mahatma.     

We can do it: the interplay of construal orientation and social comparisons under threat

The authors investigated how a collective self-construal orientation in combination with positive social comparisons "turns off" the negative effects of stereotype threat. Specifically, Experiment 1 demonstrated that stereotype threat led to increased accessibility of participants' collective self ("we"). Experiment 2 showed that this feeling of "we-ness" in the stereotype threat condition centered on the participants' stereotyped group membership and not on other important social groups (e.g., students). Experiment 3 indicated that in threat situations, when participants' collective self is accessible, positive social comparison information led to improved math test performance and less concern, whereas in nonthreat situations, when the collective self is less accessible, positive comparison information led to worse test performance and more concern. Our final experiment revealed that under stereotype threat, only those comparison targets who are competent in the relevant domain (math), rather than in domains unrelated to math (athletics), enhanced participants' math test performance.     

Engaging in upward and downward comparisons as a determinant of relative deprivation at work: A longitudinal study

A longitudinal study was conducted among 93 nurses to determine the role of comparing one’s performance with that of one’s colleagues in the increase versus decrease of perceived relative deprivation at work over a period of one year. Relative deprivation at T2 had increased particularly among those high in social comparison orientation (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999) who at T1 (1) more frequently engaged in upward comparisons; (2) more frequently derived positive as well as negative feelings from such comparisons; and (3) more frequently derived negative feelings from downward comparison. Moreover, engaging in downward comparison also led to an increase in perceived relative deprivation at T2. This study is one of the few to find evidence for longitudinal effects of social comparison activity, and the first to find that such effects occur only for those high in social comparison orientation.     

The Hubris Hypothesis: You Can Self-Enhance, But You'd Better Not Show It

We tested whether and why observers dislike individuals who convey self-superiority through blatant social comparison (the hubris hypothesis). Participants read self-superiority claims ("I am better than others"; Experiments 1-7), noncomparative positive claims ("I am good"; Experiments 1-2, 4), self-equality claims ("I am as good as others"; Experiments 3-4, 6), temporally comparative self-superiority claims ("I am better than I used to be"; Experiment 5), other-superiority claims ("S/he is better than others"; Experiment 6), and self-superiority claims accompanied by persistent disclaimers (Experiment 7). They judged the claim and the claimant (Experiments 1-7) and made inferences about the claimant's self-view and view of others (Experiments 4-7) as well as the claimant's probable view of them (Experiment 7). Self-superiority claims elicited unfavorable evaluations relative to all other claims. Evaluation unfavorability was accounted for by the perception that the claimant implied a negative view of others (Experiments 4-6) and particularly of the observer (Experiment 7). Supporting the hubris hypothesis, participants disliked individuals who communicated self-superiority beliefs in an explicitly comparative manner. Self-superiority beliefs may provoke undesirable interpersonal consequences when they are explicitly communicated to others but not when they are disguised as noncomparative positive self-claims or self-improvement claims.     

Evil acts not evil people: their characteristics and contexts

Abstract: The problem of evil has vexed philosophers and theologians for centuries and anthropologists, sociologists, psychoanalysts and analytical psychologists in more recent times. Numerous theories have been proposed but there is still little agreement on such basic questions as the nature of evil, what constitutes and motivates an evil act, and how we resolve conflicts between individuals and groups in which evil acts are being committed. I am proposing that evil should be used as an adjective, and not as a noun. As such it should be employed to qualify acts of persons rather than their character. This change would enable us to eschew foundational explanations of evil and, therefore, to examine evil acts in their contexts and so better discern their nature and motivation. I will contend that evil acts begin when an individual makes, or members of a group make, assertions about the ‘naturalness’ of their own acts and, correspondingly, the ‘unnaturalness’ of the acts of others. I will suggest that this results from the anxiety that ensues when they cannot adequately signify their experience of these acts. When this occurs, those so treated are dispossessed of their ‘personhood’, allowing members of the ‘natural’ group to violate their ‘boundaries' with impunity. These violations can range from the relatively innocuous such as being ignored to the extreme such as genocide. I am asserting that all these acts should be termed evil as they derive from the same semiotic process of ‘naturalizaton’. I will discuss ways of preventing individuals or groups from embarking on the process of ‘naturalization’ and describe the types of contexts that might reduce or eliminate the commission of evil acts by those already engaged in their perpetration. To demonstrate these ideas I will use examples from my personal experience, from analytic theory and from the ‘troubles' in Northern Ireland.     

No pain, no gain: the conditions under which upward comparisons lead to better performance

In 3 studies, the authors explored the relation between threatening upward social comparisons and performance. In an initial study, participants were exposed to comparison targets who either threatened or boosted self-evaluations and then completed a performance task. Participants exposed to the threatening target performed better than those in a control group, whereas those exposed to the nonthreatening target performed worse. In Study 2, self-affirmation prior to comparison with threatening targets eliminated performance improvements. In Study 3, performance improvements were found only when the performance domain was different from the domain of success of the comparison target. These boundary conditions suggest that increases in performance following social comparison arise from individuals' motivations to maintain and repair self-evaluations. Implications for the study of the behavioral consequences of social comparison are discussed.