The natural appearance of unnatural incline speed

In three experiments, college students provided judgments about a marble's speed along a nonlinear incline. Each experiment revealed widespread support for the slope-speed belief, a mistaken belief holding that an object's speed at any point depends on the slope at that point. In truth, an object's incline speed varies with its elevation. In Experiment 1, participants relied solely on a diagram. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants observed computer animations depicting the descent of a marble at speeds conforming to either the slope-speed belief or Newtonian theory, and they rated the slope-speed version as more "natural" than the correct version. The task in Experiment 1 gauged participants' consciously available knowledge, but the perceptual realism of the slope-speed animations suggests that the slope-speed belief is also held outside awareness. By contrast, virtually all previously identified false beliefs about motion appear unnatural once animated.     

Cost of transport at preferred walking speeds are minimized while walking on moderately steep incline surfaces

Research has shown that preferred walking speed results in a minimization of the cost of transport on flat surfaces. However, it has also been shown that over non-smooth surfaces other variables, such as stability, are necessary for task completion increasing the cost of transport. The purpose of this research was to investigate the effect of incline walking on the cost of transport, assessing the effect of raising the center of mass as a potential variable affecting preferred walking speed, such that the cost of transport is no longer minimized. 12 healthy, college-aged male participants completed walking trials on a treadmill at inclines of 0%, 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20% at three different continuous speeds (1mph, 2mph and 3mph) and a preferred walking speed for 4–5 min. Cost of transport was calculated using the oxygen consumption collected during the last minute of each stage. Up to 20% incline, the cost of transport was lowest on each incline for the preferred walking speed trials. On inclines greater than 20%, many participants were unable to complete the task with respiratory exchange ratios less than 1.0. We conclude that inclines up to 20% do not induce an alternative challenge affecting the established relationship that humans prefer to walk at speeds that minimize the cost of transport despite the increased need to raise the center of mass.     

Seeing mountains in mole hills: geographical-slant perception

When observers face directly toward the incline of a hill, their awareness of the slant of the hill is greatly overestimated, but motoric estimates are much more accurate. The present study examined whether similar results would be found when observers were allowed to view the side of a hill. Observers viewed the cross-sections of hills in real (Experiment 1) and virtual (Experiment 2) environments and estimated the inclines with verbal estimates, by adjusting the cross-section of a disk, and by adjusting a board with their unseen hand to match the inclines. We found that the results for cross-section viewing replicated those found when observers directly face the incline. Even though the angles of hills are directly evident when viewed from the side, slant perceptions are still grossly overestimated.     

The relationship between anomalistic belief,misperception of chance and the base rate fallacy

Abstract

A poor understanding of probability may lead people to misinterpret every day coincidences and form anomalistic (e.g., paranormal) beliefs. We investigated the relationship between anomalistic belief (including type of belief) and misperception of chance and the base rate fallacy across both anomalistic and control (i.e., neutral) contexts. Greater anomalistic belief was associated with poorer performance for both types of items; however there were no significant interactions between belief and context. For misperception of chance items, only experiential (vs. theoretical) anomalistic beliefs predicted more errors. In contrast, overall anomalistic belief was positively related to the base rate fallacy but no specific subtype of anomalistic belief was a significant predictor. The results indicate misperception of chance may lead people to interpret coincidental events as having an anomalistic cause, and a poor understanding of base rates may make people more prone to forming anomalistic beliefs.     

Misperception of Chance,Conjunction, Belief in the Paranormal and Reality Testing: A Reappraisal

The present study examined the degree to which specific probabilistic biases (misperception of chance and conjunction fallacy) were associated with belief in the paranormal and proneness to reality testing (RT) deficits. Participants completed measures assessing probabilistic reasoning, belief in the paranormal and RT. Perception of randomness predicted the level of paranormal belief and proneness to RT deficits. These results provide support for the notion that paranormal believers demonstrate greater misrepresentation of chance. With regard to conjunction, a framing effect occurred. Problems presented in a paranormal context correlated negatively with the level of paranormal belief and proneness to RT deficits. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

QALYs—A Threat to our Quality of Life?

ABSTRACT QALY calcuations are currently being considered in the UK as a way of showing how the National Health Service (NHS) can do the most good with its resources. After providing a brief summary of how QALY calculations work and the most common arguments for and against using them to set NHS priorities, I suggest that they are an inadequate measure of the good done by the NHS because they refer only to its effects on what will be defined as the 'patient community'. The benefit of the NHS to the wider community is best regarded as a public good—everyone benefits from the general belief that the NHS is there to provide care for those who fall into a state of medical need. QALY ideology threatens this belief because it gives efficiency a higher priority than caring in response to need. It is a fallacy that a QALY maximising health service will be a greater good to society, because this sort of quest for efficiency threatens the caring basis of the Welfare State as such.     

Being proven wrong elicits learning in children – but only in those with higher executive function skills

This study investigated whether prompting children to generate predictions about an outcome facilitates activation of prior knowledge and improves belief revision. 51 children aged 9–12 were tested on two experimental tasks in which generating a prediction was compared to closely matched control conditions, as well as on a test of executive functions (EF). In Experiment 1, we showed that children exhibited a pupillary surprise response to events that they had predicted incorrectly, hypothesized to reflect the transient release of noradrenaline in response to cognitive conflict. However, children's surprise response was not associated with better belief revision, in contrast to a previous study involving adults. Experiment 2 revealed that, while generating predictions helped children activate their prior knowledge, only those with better inhibitory control skills learned from incorrectly predicted outcomes. Together, these results suggest that good inhibitory control skills are needed for learning through cognitive conflict. Thus, generating predictions benefits learning – but only among children with sufficient EF capacities to harness surprise for revising their beliefs.     

个体证券投资者自我效能感对赌徒谬误的影响

赌徒谬误指当某一独立随机事件发生后,人们倾向认为这一结果再次出现的概率降低。如果一连串的随机事件呈现出一定的趋势,人们倾向于认为随机事件将呈现系统性反转。证券市场中的赌徒谬误指在股票上涨（下跌）序列中做出股价将要下跌（上涨）的判断。本研究探讨股票市场特征（趋势长度及方向）及投资者的人格特征（自我效能感）对赌徒谬误的影响。以83名股票投资者为对象,采用多层线性模型进行分析,结果发现：趋势长度主效应显著,短线情境下赌徒谬误频次更高;趋势方向主效应显著,下跌情境下赌徒谬误频次更高;二者交互作用显著,在短线下跌情境下,赌徒谬误频次更高;投资者的自我效能感对股票趋势长度具有调节作用,高自我效能的投资者在短线情境下更容易出现赌徒谬误。     

Psychics,aliens, or experience? Using the Anomalistic Belief Scale to examine the relationship between type of belief and probabilistic reasoning

A growing body of research has shown people who hold anomalistic (e.g., paranormal) beliefs may differ from nonbelievers in their propensity to make probabilistic reasoning errors. The current study explored the relationship between these beliefs and performance through the development of a new measure of anomalistic belief, called the Anomalistic Belief Scale (ABS). One key feature of the ABS is that it includes a balance of both experiential and theoretical belief items. Another aim of the study was to use the ABS to investigate the relationship between belief and probabilistic reasoning errors on conjunction fallacy tasks. As expected, results showed there was a relationship between anomalistic belief and propensity to commit the conjunction fallacy. Importantly, regression analyses on the factors that make up the ABS showed that the relationship between anomalistic belief and probabilistic reasoning occurred only for beliefs about having experienced anomalistic phenomena, and not for theoretical anomalistic beliefs.     

Intuitive physics: the straight-down belief and its origin

This study examines the nature and origin of a common misconception about moving objects. We first show through the use of pencil-and-paper problems that many people erroneously believe that an object that is carried by another moving object (e.g., a ball carried by a walking person) will, if dropped, fall to the ground in a straight vertical line. (In fact, such an object will fall forward in a parabolic arc.) We then demonstrate that this "straight-down belief" turns up not only on pencil-and-paper problems but also on a problem presented in a concrete, dynamic fashion (Experiment 1) and in a situation in which a subject drops a ball while walking (Experiment 2). We next consider the origin of the straight-down belief and propose that the belief may stem from a perceptual illusion. Specifically, we suggest that objects dropped from a moving carrier may be perceived as falling straight down or even backward, when in fact they move forward as they fall. Experiment 3, in which subjects view computer-generated displays simulating situations in which a carried object is dropped, and Experiment 4, in which subjects view a videotape of a walking person dropping an object, provide data consistent with this "seeing is believing" hypothesis.     

The role of speed and incline in the spontaneous choice of technique in classical roller-skiing

Cross-country skiers change technique depending on terrain (incline) and effort (work rate; speed at a particular incline or resistance). The literature is not unequivocal about the influence of incline or speed on the choice of technique, i.e., which of these act as a ‘control parameter’. Identifying task related control parameters for spontaneous technique shifts assists elucidating which mechanisms are active for triggering technique transitions. The aim of this study was to investigate whether speed or incline acted as such control parameter for technique shifts during classic style roller skiing. In this study, we kept the exercise intensity constant while changing two potential control parameters (speed and incline). Thus, any effect of work rate was excluded.Eight male competitive cross-country skiers performed roller skiing on a treadmill while incline was altered from 3 to 11% and back to 3% each minute by 1% and speed changed accordingly to obtain a constant work rate. This protocol was performed at three submaximal work rates (170, 200, and 230 W) to obtain various combinations of speed and incline.The athletes were free to choose their technique (double poling, double poling with kick and diagonal stride), which was identified using continuous phase analysis on the motion of the skis. Physiological response (heart rate, oxygen uptake) was recorded continuously.The incline seemed to affect choice of technique shift more than speed: the ANOVA for repeated measures on all work rates showed no significant effect of incline (p > 0.2) and an effect for speed (p < 0.001). No effect of protocol order (increasing versus decreasing incline) was found for transitions. The physiological response was lowest for conditions of steep incline-low speed and was affected by protocol order. Cycle rate was affected by incline only in the double poling technique.Possible mechanisms related to the triggering of technique transitions are discussed.     

The test taker's fallacy: How students guess answers on multiple‐choice tests

Many students and applicants take multiple‐choice tests to demonstrate their competence and achievement. When they are unsure, they guess the most likely answer to maximize their score. Despite the impact of guessing on test reliability and individual performance, studies have not examined how patterns of answer sequences in multiple‐choice tests affect guessing. This research presents the test taker's fallacy, which refers to an individual's tendency to expect a different answer to appear for the next question given a run of the same answer choices. The test taker's fallacy exhibits negative recency, similar to the gambler's fallacy. However, extending the sequential judgment literature, the test taker's fallacy shows that negative recency arises even when sequences may or may not be randomly generated. In three studies, including a survey and experiments, the test taker's fallacy is robustly observed. The test taker's fallacy is consistent with the operation of the representativeness heuristic. This research explains what and how test takers guess given a streak of answers and extends judgment under uncertainty to the test‐taking context.     

Misperception of Chance,Conjunction, Framing Effects and Belief in the Paranormal: A Further Evaluation

Studies exploring relationships between belief in the paranormal and vulnerability to cognitive bias suggest that believers are liable to misperception of chance and conjunction fallacy. Research investigating misperception of chance has produced consistent findings, whilst work on conjunction fallacy is less compelling. Evidence indicates also that framing biases within a paranormal context can increase believers' susceptibility. The present study, using confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modelling, examined the contribution of each bias to belief in the paranormal and assessed the merits of previous research. Alongside, the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale, participants completed standard and paranormal framed perception of randomness and conjunction problems. Perception of randomness was more strongly associated with belief in the paranormal than conjunction fallacy. Inherent methodological issues limited the usefulness of framing manipulations; presenting problems within a paranormal context weakened their predictive power.Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Another look at sex stereotypes and social judgments: an analysis of the social perceiver's use of subjective probabilities

Locksley, Borgida, Brekke, and Hepburn (1980) assert that subjects fall prey to the base-rate fallacy when they make stereotype-related trait judgments. They found that subjects ignored their stereotypes when trait judgments were made in the presence of trait-related behavioral information. The present article reexamines those findings with respect to two issues: (a) the use of a normative criterion in comparison with subjects' judgments and (b) the level of analysis (group vs. individual) of subjects' judgments. We conducted a replication of the Locksley et al. (1980) Study 2, and the results were examined with respect to these two issues. We found no support for the base-rate fallacy. When a Bayesian normative criterion was constructed for each subject based on the subject's own stereotype judgments and was compared with assertiveness judgments made in the presence of individuating information, there was no evidence that subjects ignored or underused their stereotypes as the base-rate fallacy predicts.     

Effects of delay on color priming for natural objects

Using a standard study-test procedure, color priming was examined through effects of color transformation, from correctly colored to incorrectly colored and vice versa, for natural objects with pre-existing color-shape associations, e.g., yellow banana. More specifically these effects were examined at study-test delays of 0, 24, and 48 hr. When deciding whether an object was correctly colored, color transformation eliminated priming. Furthermore, there was evidence that for objects that were not transformed, priming was stronger for correctly as compared with incorrectly colored objects. In addition, the introduction of 24- and 48-hr. delays between the study and the test phase of the task reduced the effects of color transformation on priming. These findings are discussed in terms of the representations that mediate implicit memory performance.     

No Time to Waste: Restricting Life‐Span Temporal Horizons Decreases the Sunk‐Cost Fallacy

In three studies, we examined the influence of restricted and expansive temporal horizons on the sunk‐cost fallacy. The sunk‐cost fallacy occurs when prior investments instead of future returns influence decisions about future investments. When making decisions about future investments, rational decision makers base decisions on future consequences, not already‐invested costs that are “sunk” and cannot be recovered. In Study 1, we restricted young adult college students' temporal horizons by instructing them to imagine that they did not have much longer to live; this manipulation decreased the sunk‐cost fallacy. In Study 2, we replicated Study 1 and also found that the consequences of manipulating temporal horizons were most pronounced for prior investments of time and that prior investments of time and money had different implications for the sunk‐cost fallacy, depending on the social or nonsocial decision domain. In Study 3, we manipulated temporal horizons by instructing students to imagine their time as a college student was coming to an end. Results were mostly similar to Study 2 but also suggested that focusing on one's mortality may have unique consequences. Implications of the three studies for understanding age differences in sunk‐cost decisions, interventions to improve sunk‐cost decisions, and the situations in which interventions might be most needed are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Fallacies in probability judgments for conjunctions and disjunctions of everyday events

The conjunction fallacy occurs when people judge a conjunction B‐and‐A as more probable than a constituent B, contrary to probability theory's ‘conjunction rule’ that a conjunction cannot be more probable than either constituent. Many studies have demonstrated this fallacy in people's reasoning about various experimental materials. Gigerenzer objects that from a ‘frequentist’ standpoint probability theory is not valid for these materials, and so failure to follow the conjunction rule is not a fallacy. This paper describes three experiments showing that the conjunction fallacy occurs as consistently for conjunctions where frequentist probability theory is valid (conjunctions of everyday weather events) as for other conjunctions. These experiments also demonstrate a reliable correlation between the occurrence of the conjunction fallacy and the disjunction fallacy (which arises when a disjunction B‐or‐A is judged less probable than a constituent B). This supports a probability theory + random variation account of probabilistic reasoning. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Measures of information processing in rapid automatized naming (RAN) and their relation to reading

The letters, numbers, and objects subtests of the Rapid Automatized Naming Tests (RAN) were given to 50 first- and second-grade students. Student performance on the three RAN subtests were audiotaped and subjected to postacquisition processing to distinguish articulation and interarticulation pause times. This study investigated (1) the relations between the articulation and pause durations associated with the 50 stimuli of each RAN subtest and (2) the relations between the pause and articulation latencies of the three RAN subtests and reading. For both first- and second-grade students, pause and articulation times for RAN letters and objects were not found to be reliably related, in contrast to RAN numbers articulation and pause durations. RAN subtest pause durations were differentially related to reading; however, articulation was rarely related to reading. The RAN letters pause time was the most robust predictor of decoding and reading comprehension, consistently predicting all first- and second-grade measures. Analysis supported the view that reading is predicted by speed of processing associated with letters, not general processing speed.     

Motivated reasoning in the prediction of sports outcomes and the belief in the “hot hand”

The present paper explores the role of motivation to observe a certain outcome in people’s predictions, causal attributions, and beliefs about a streak of binary outcomes (basketball scoring shots). In two studies we found that positive streaks (points scored by the participants’ favourite team) lead participants to predict the streak’s continuation (belief in the hot hand), but negative streaks lead to predictions of its end (gambler’s fallacy). More importantly, these wishful predictions are supported by strategic attributions and beliefs about how and why a streak might unfold. Results suggest that the effect of motivation on predictions is mediated by a serial path via causal attributions to the teams at play and belief in the hot hand.     

Development of naive beliefs about moving objects: The straight-down belief in action

The naive belief that carried objects fall straight down when released has become known as the straight-down belief in the literature of intuitive physics. The present data show that, without formal instruction, many children revise the straight-down belief between 8 and 12 years of age. In Experiment 1, 6-, 8-, and 12-year-old children repeatedly tried to hit a target on the floor or on a table (without feedback) by dropping a ball while moving and judged the optimal release points. Whereas, in their judgments, the majority of the 6- and 8-year-old children exhibited the erroneous straight-down belief, most 12-year-olds gave correct forward answers. In their actions, children who held the straight-down belief dropped the ball significantly later than children who exhibited correct judgmental knowledge. The results of three additional experiments provide converging evidence for the claim that children use their naive beliefs to plan their actions. The data further suggest that the straight-down belief does not directly stem from a perceptual illusion. Age differences concerning the ability to execute action plans as intended are documented and discussed in relation to conceptual development.