Underestimating nearby nature: affective forecasting errors obscure the happy path to sustainability

Modern lifestyles disconnect people from nature, and this may have adverse consequences for the well-being of both humans and the environment. In two experiments, we found that although outdoor walks in nearby nature made participants much happier than indoor walks did, participants made affective forecasting errors, such that they systematically underestimated nature's hedonic benefit. The pleasant moods experienced on outdoor nature walks facilitated a subjective sense of connection with nature, a construct strongly linked with concern for the environment and environmentally sustainable behavior. To the extent that affective forecasts determine choices, our findings suggest that people fail to maximize their time in nearby nature and thus miss opportunities to increase their happiness and relatedness to nature. Our findings suggest a happy path to sustainability, whereby contact with nature fosters individual happiness and environmentally responsible behavior.     

Hedonic value of intentional action provides reinforcement for voluntary generation but not voluntary inhibition of action

Intentional inhibition refers to stopping oneself from performing an action at the last moment, a vital component of self-control. It has been suggested that intentional inhibition is associated with negative hedonic value, perhaps due to the frustration of cancelling an intended action. Here we investigate hedonic implications of the free choice to act or inhibit. Participants gave aesthetic ratings of arbitrary visual stimuli that immediately followed voluntary decisions to act or to inhibit action. We found that participants for whom decisions to act produced a strong positive hedonic value for the immediately following visual stimulus made more choices to act than those with weaker hedonic value for action. This finding is consistent with reinforcement learning of action decisions. However, participants who experienced inhibition as generating more positive hedonic value did not choose to inhibit more than other participants. Thus, voluntary inhibition of action did not act as reinforcement for future inhibitory behaviour. Our finding that inhibition of action lacks motivational capacity may explain why self-control is both difficult and limited.     

Predicting a changing taste: Do people know what they will like?

A distinction is made between decision utility, experienced utility, and predicted utility and an experiment is reported addressing people's ability to forecast experienced utility. Subjects in two experiments made predictions of their future liking for stimuli to which they were then exposed daily for one week. The stimuli were ice cream in a pilot study, plain yogurt in the main study, and short musical pieces in both studies. Decreased liking was the modal prediction, even when the true outcome was increased liking, or reduced dislike. There was substantial stability of tastes, but there were also substantial individual differences in the size and even the sign of changes in liking with repeated exposure. There was little or no correlation between the predictions of hedonic change that individuals made and the changes they actually experienced.     

Selective deficit of motor imagery as tapped by a left-right decision of visually presented hands

This paper presents the case of MT, a patient suffering from apraxia with left-hemisphere damage who showed a selective deficit in mentally rotating images of hands whereas he was still able to mentally rotate other visual stimuli. The deficit was particularly evident when MT was asked to decide which hand (left or right) was represented in a picture. suggested that in order to carry out this task, participants would mentally rotate a representation of their own body part until it aligns with the stimulus and it does appear that MT's ability to mentally simulate movements is impaired. In contrast, he was able to mentally rotate other forms of bi- and three-dimensional stimuli. Our findings are also consistent with proposal that there are at least two ways in which objects can be mentally rotated, one that recruits processes devoted to motor preparation (e.g., hands), and another that does not.     

Mere repeated exposure and experimental stress as determiners of stimulus evaluations

From Berlyne's theorizing concerning the determinants of hedonic value of a stimulus it was hypothesized that importance of evaluative judgments and frequency of exposure would interact in determining the favorability of affective ratings. This prediction was confirmed by the data. Increasing the importance of the rating task decreased the favorability of the ratings of low-frequency stimuli but enhanced the ratings of high-frequency stimuli.The experiments reported here were conducted at the Laboratorium voor Experimentele Sociale Psychologie at Leuven. This article is based on the author's doctoral dissertation, which was supervised by J. M. Nuttin, Jr. I would also like to thank J. M. Nuttin, Jr., E. Van Avermaet, and J. Hatcher for their helpful comments on a previous draft.     

Subjective well-being,social buffering and hedonic editing in the quotidian

A previous study on the relationship between subjective well-being (SWB) and hedonic editing—the process of mentally integrating or segregating different events during decision-making—showed that happy individuals preferred the social-buffering strategy more than less happy individuals. The present study examined the relationship between SWB, social-buffering and hedonic outcomes in daily life. In Study 1, we used web-based diaries to measure the frequency with which individuals utilised social and non-social buffers as well as daily levels of happiness. Consistent with the previous finding, happy individuals utilised social buffers more frequently than less happy individuals. Interestingly, the utilisation of social buffers had a positive effect on daily happiness among all participants, regardless of individuals’ levels of SWB. In Study 2, we found that although the use of social buffers yielded similar effects across groups on online evaluations of events, happy individuals showed a positive bias in global evaluations of past events. This finding suggests that how one construes and remembers the outcomes of social buffering may shape the different hedonic editing preferences among happy and less happy individuals.     

Anticipatory pleasure predicts motivation for reward in major depression

Anhedonia, the lack of interest or pleasure in response to hedonic stimuli or experiences, is a cardinal symptom of depression. This deficit in hedonic processing has been posited to influence depressed individuals' motivation to engage in potentially rewarding experiences. Accumulating evidence indicates that hedonic processing is not a unitary construct but rather consists of an anticipatory and a consummatory phase. We examined how these components of hedonic processing influence motivation to obtain reward in participants diagnosed with major depression and in never-disordered controls. Thirty-eight currently depressed and 30 never-disordered control participants rated their liking of humorous and nonhumorous cartoons and then made a series of choices between viewing a cartoon from either group. Each choice was associated with a specified amount of effort participants would have to exert before viewing the chosen cartoon. Although depressed and control participants did not differ in their consummatory liking of the rewards, levels of reward liking predicted motivation to expend effort for the rewards only in the control participants; in the depressed participants, liking and motivation were dissociated. In the depressed group, levels of anticipatory anhedonia predicted motivation to exert effort for the rewards. These findings support the formulation that anhedonia is not a unitary construct and suggest that, for depressed individuals, deficits in motivation for reward are driven primarily by low anticipatory pleasure and not by decreased consummatory liking.     

Reactions to uncertainty: A comparison of three motivational theories

This study attempted to explicate some of the variables underlying preference, pleasure, and reward. In order to accomplish this, Jones's (1966, 1969) information drive theory, Berlyne's (1967, 1971, 1973, 1978) optimal arousal potential theory, Helson's (1964, 1966, 1971, 1973) adaptation-level theory, and McClelland and Clark's (1953) discrepancy hypothesis were experimentally contrasted. Subjects (316) rated the hedonic tone, perceived uncertainty, arousing properties, and interest value of two series of visual stimuli of specified uncertainty. Regression analyses revealed that immediately prior experience with stimuli varying in uncertainty affected rating of perceived uncertainty and arousing properties but had no major effects on ratings of hedonic tone and interest value. The results did not support Jones's and McClelland and Clark's models. Berlyne's model seemed to account for the affective hedonic tone and interest results, while Helson's model best explained the nonaffective perceived uncertainty and arousal data. It was concluded that nonaffective variables are affected by short-term experience with uncertainty while affective variables are not. Speculations concerning the phenomenon of interest value were then offered.Jewish Child Care AssociationThis article is based on a dissertation submitted to the New School for Social Research in partial fulfillment of the Ph.D. requirements. I would like to thank Drs. Nathan Brody and Nathan Kogan for their help in conducting this experiment and preparing this article.     

Gambling for Gatorade: risk-sensitive decision making for fluid rewards in humans

Determining how both humans and animals make decisions in risky situations is a central problem in economics, experimental psychology, behavioral economics, and neurobiology. Typically, humans are risk seeking for gains and risk averse for losses, while animals may display a variety of preferences under risk depending on, amongst other factors, internal state. Such differences in behavior may reflect major cognitive and cultural differences or they may reflect differences in the way risk sensitivity is probed in humans and animals. Notably, in most studies humans make one or a few choices amongst hypothetical or real monetary options, while animals make dozens of repeated choices amongst options offering primary rewards like food or drink. To address this issue, we probed risk-sensitive decision making in human participants using a paradigm modeled on animal studies, in which rewards were either small squirts of Gatorade or small amounts of real money. Possible outcomes and their probabilities were not made explicit in either case. We found that individual patterns of decision making were strikingly similar for both juice and for money, both in overall risk preferences and in trial-to-trial effects of reward outcome on choice. Comparison with decisions made by monkeys for juice in a similar task revealed highly similar gambling styles. These results unite known patterns of risk-sensitive decision making in human and nonhuman primates and suggest that factors such as the way a decision is framed or internal state may underlie observed variation in risk preferences between and within species.     

Choice‐making,Expectations, and Treatment Positivity: How and When Choosing Shapes Aversive Experiences

Every day we use products and treatments with unknown but expected effects, such as using medication to manage pain. In many cases, we have a choice over which products or treatments to use; however, in other cases, people choose for us or choices are unavailable. Does choosing (versus not choosing) have implications for how a product or treatment is experienced? The current experiments examined the role of choice‐making in facilitating so‐called expectation assimilation effects—or situations in which a person's experiences (e.g., discomfort and pain) are evaluated in a manner consistent with their expectations. In Experiment 1, participants were initially exposed to a baseline set of aversive stimuli (i.e., sounds). Next, some participants were given expectations for two “treatments” (i.e., changes in screen display) that could ostensibly reduce discomfort. Critically, participants were either given a choice or not about which of the two treatments they preferred. Participants in a control condition were not provided with treatment expectations. Results revealed that discomfort experiences assimilated to expectations only when participants were provided with choice. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and provided evidence against the idea that demand characteristics and choice‐making unrelated to the core task (i.e., choices without associated expectations) could account for the results. Further, Experiment 2 showed that choosing reduced discomfort because of increased positivity about the treatment. Results are discussed in the context of extant research on choice‐making and expectation effects. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The relationship between mental toughness and affect intensity

Mentally tough athletes are conceptualized as being able to function effectively in stressful situations and recent research has found small to moderate correlations between mental toughness and coping. Despite this no research has thus far examined the possibility that mentally tough athletes experience less intense emotions. This paper tested the relationship between mental toughness and affect intensity to determine whether mentally tough athletes generally experienced more or less intense emotions. A sample of 112 sport performers (55 men and 57 women) aged between 18 and 51 years (M = 29.3, s = 10.3) acted as participants, and ranged from recreational to national level in a variety of sports. Mental toughness and affect intensity were found to be unrelated. This is an important finding because it suggests participants with high or low levels of mental toughness do not characteristically experience more or less intense emotions. Thus there is no evidence to suggest the ability of mentally tough athletes to remain relatively unaffected by pressure or adversity is due to lower levels of affect intensity. More research is required to understand how mentally tough athletes (in comparison to less tough athletes) maintain control and high levels of performance in stressful circumstances.     

产品类型对购物冲量效应的调节作用分析

基于享乐品-实用品有关研究及购物冲量效应, 考察产品类型对购物冲量效应的调节作用及其内在机制。实验一通过现场研究验证购买实用品提高后续购买概率, 购买享乐品降低其概率; 实验二为实验室实验, 再次验证该调节作用, 并验证内在原因：购买享乐品更可能激发内疚感、花钱的痛苦甚至负面自我形象和高层次目标, 导致理由性思维占主导, 前次购买引发的应用思维定式受到削弱。相比于实用品, 购买享乐品引发购物冲量效应的可能性更低。     

Identifying expectations about the strength of causal relationships

When we try to identify causal relationships, how strong do we expect that relationship to be? Bayesian models of causal induction rely on assumptions regarding people’s a priori beliefs about causal systems, with recent research focusing on people’s expectations about the strength of causes. These expectations are expressed in terms of prior probability distributions. While proposals about the form of such prior distributions have been made previously, many different distributions are possible, making it difficult to test such proposals exhaustively. In Experiment 1 we used iterated learning—a method in which participants make inferences about data generated based on their own responses in previous trials—to estimate participants’ prior beliefs about the strengths of causes. This method produced estimated prior distributions that were quite different from those previously proposed in the literature. Experiment 2 collected a large set of human judgments on the strength of causal relationships to be used as a benchmark for evaluating different models, using stimuli that cover a wider and more systematic set of contingencies than previous research. Using these judgments, we evaluated the predictions of various Bayesian models. The Bayesian model with priors estimated via iterated learning compared favorably against the others. Experiment 3 estimated participants’ prior beliefs concerning different causal systems, revealing key similarities in their expectations across diverse scenarios.     

Recognition of Line-Drawing Representations by a Chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes)

The ability of a chimpanzee to recognize individuals portrayed in line drawings was evaluated. A 12-year-old female chimpanzee with extensive prior experience in the use of visual symbols matched the line drawings of chimpanzees, humans, and an orangutan with a specific letter of the alphabet. When a line drawing of a familiar individual was presented on the computer screen, the chimpanzee responded by punching a key with the letter of the alphabet that corresponded to the individual's name. Results indicate that the chimpanzee is able to categorize individuals from novel line-drawing representations.     

Mental cookery: An illustration of fact retrieval from plans

Anyone who is able to cook a certain dish will probably also be able to list its ingredients from memory. Detailed recording of this verbal listing exposes structural regularities. These imply that people can search a representation which is essentially the same as that used in the actual cooking. In effect, the dish can be “mentally cooked” and the necessary ingredients reported when they occur. This ability to mentally simulate plans allows considerable cognitive economy.     

Unconscious manipulation of free choice in humans

Previous research has shown that subliminally presented stimuli accelerate or delay responses afforded by supraliminally presented stimuli. Our experiments extend these findings by showing that unconscious stimuli even affect free choices between responses. Thus, actions that are phenomenally experienced as freely chosen are influenced without the actor becoming aware of the manipulation. However, the unconscious influence is limited to a response bias, as participants chose the primed response only in up to 60% of the trials. LRP data in free choice trials indicate that the prime was not ineffective in trials in which participants chose the non-primed response as then it delayed performance of the incongruently primed response.     

Spontaneous versus Controlled Influences of Stimulus-Based Affect on Choice Behavior

This article identifies two routes through which affect and cognitions arising from a stimulus can influence choices: a “lower order” route, where choices are influenced through automatic affective processes, and a “higher order” route, where choices are influenced through more controlled affective or consequence-related cognitive processes. Across three experiments the extent of deliberation, mental preoccupation, and the nature of exposure to the stimuli were manipulated to identify conditions under which lower order affect, higher order affect, or higher order cognitions impact choices. Respondents chose between two alternatives: one that was associated with more intense positive affect but less favorable cognitions (e.g., chocolate cake), and one that was associated with less intense positive affect but more favorable cognitions (e.g., fruit salad). Findings suggest that when the individual makes the decision quickly and is mentally preoccupied while making the decision, choices are driven by lower order affect. When the individual deliberates on the decision without being mentally preoccupied and the affect-laden option is in full view while the decision is being deliberated upon, choices are driven by higher order affect. In both cases, the affect-laden option (e.g. chocolate cake) is selected. In all other situations, choices are driven by higher order consequence-related cognitions and the alternative that is superior on the cognitive dimension (e.g. fruit salad) is selected. It is suggested that the effects of affective reactions on choice occur through the activation of appetitive (i.e., gratification-seeking) goals.     

The relationship between mental toughness and affect intensity

Mentally tough athletes are conceptualized as being able to function effectively in stressful situations and recent research has found small to moderate correlations between mental toughness and coping. Despite this no research has thus far examined the possibility that mentally tough athletes experience less intense emotions. This paper tested the relationship between mental toughness and affect intensity to determine whether mentally tough athletes generally experienced more or less intense emotions. A sample of 112 sport performers (55 men and 57 women) aged between 18 and 51 years (M = 29.3, s = 10.3) acted as participants, and ranged from recreational to national level in a variety of sports. Mental toughness and affect intensity were found to be unrelated. This is an important finding because it suggests participants with high or low levels of mental toughness do not characteristically experience more or less intense emotions. Thus there is no evidence to suggest the ability of mentally tough athletes to remain relatively unaffected by pressure or adversity is due to lower levels of affect intensity. More research is required to understand how mentally tough athletes (in comparison to less tough athletes) maintain control and high levels of performance in stressful circumstances.