Undoing trauma: contemporary neuroscience. A Jungian clinical perspective

This paper uses insights from contemporary neuroscience and attachment theory to explore the profound dissociative defences associated with trauma. I discuss the effects of trauma on the emotional, intellectual and imaginative life of the individual and on the development of the self. Based on work with three patients with very different experiences of trauma, the paper offers clinical illustration of 'right brain to right brain' Jungian analysis. I argue that through repeated transference and countertransference experiences dissociative defences may be undone and change brought about.     

The dreaming mind-brain: a Jungian perspective

In this paper I discuss the nature and role of dream and the dreaming process in Jungian clinical practice in the light of neuroscience. Insights from contemporary neuroscience support rather than contest Jung's view that emotional truth, not censorship or disguise, underpins the dreaming process. I use clinical material to illustrate how work with dreams within the total interactive experience of the analytic dyad enables the development of the emotional scaffolding necessary for the development of 'mind'. Large scale evidence-based research reveals that dreaming is caused by brain activity during sleep that is both biochemically and regionally different from that of waking states. Recent imaging studies confirm that dreams are the mind's vehicle for the processing of emotional states of being, particularly the fear, anxiety, anger or elation that often figure prominently. Dream sleep is understood as also being the guardian of memory, playing a part in forgetting, encoding and affective organization of memory. In the clinical section of the paper I let a series of dreams speak for themselves, revealing the emotionally salient concerns of the dreamer, weaving past and present, transference and reality together in a way that demonstrates the healthy attempt of the brain-mind to come to terms with difficult emotional experience from the past. The dreams become dreamable as part of the meaning-making process of analysis.     

'To Paint the Portrait of a Bird': analytic work from the perspective of a 'developmental' Jungian

Jungians who are trained in the so-called 'Developmental School' straddle the two worlds of psychoanalysis and classical Jungian thinking. This is not always an easy position in which to be, but if the tensions can be held it is potentially a rich and creative way of working. In this paper I attempt to explore this position using the poem, 'To Paint the Portrait of a Bird' by Jacques Prévert as a metaphor for the analytic endeavour. From this perspective I hope to illustrate the importance of being able on the one hand to hold and maintain a clear frame for the careful and detailed exploration of the transference within which the more malign aspects of the psyche might be expressed, and, on the other, to allow the alchemical process of mutual transformation that lies outside the conscious understanding of the analytic couple.     

Emotional Attention: Uncovering the Mechanisms of Affective Biases in Perception

ABSTRACT— The emotional significance of sensory events may influence attention in a reflexive manner, but these effects vary across paradigms and participants. Recent research indicates that specific circuits in the brain may serve to amplify neural responses to emotional stimuli, a modulation similar to attentional effects usually driven by endogenous goals. However, this modulation involves distinct sources in emotional systems such as the amygdala, and may thus operate partly independent of top-down control by attentional systems in frontoparietal cortices. It remains to be clarified to what degree these emotional effects are influenced by specific perceptual and emotional dimensions, automaticity and attentional resources, task goals or expectations, and individual personality traits.     

Doing cognitive neuroscience: a third way

The “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches have been thought to exhaust the possibilities for doing cognitive neuroscience. We argue that neither approach is likely to succeed in providing a theory that enables us to understand how cognition is achieved in biological creatures like ourselves. We consider a promising third way of doing cognitive neuroscience, what might be called the “neural dynamic systems” approach, that construes cognitive neuroscience as an autonomous explanatory endeavor, aiming to characterize in its own terms the states and processes responsible for brain-based cognition. We sketch the basic motivation for the approach, describe a particular version of the approach, so-called ‘Dynamic Causal Modeling’ (DCM), and consider a concrete example of DCM. This third way, we argue, has the potential to avoid the problems that afflict the other two approaches.     

Naming our concerns about neuroscience: a review of Bennett and Hacker's philosophical foundations of neuroscience

Bennett and Hacker use conceptual analysis to appraise the theoretical language of modern cognitive neuroscientists, and conclude that neuroscientific theory is largely dualistic despite the fact that neuroscientists equate mind with the operations of the brain. The central error of cognitive neuroscientists is to commit the mereological fallacy, the tendency to ascribe to the brain psychological concepts that only make sense when ascribed to whole animals. The authors review how the mereological fallacy is committed in theories of memory, perception, thinking, imagery, belief, consciousness, and other psychological processes studied by neuroscientists, and the consequences that fallacious reasoning have for our understanding of how the brain participates in cognition and behavior. Several behavior-analytic concepts may themselves be nonsense based on thorough conceptual analyses in which the criteria for sense and nonsense are found in the ways the concepts are used in ordinary language. Nevertheless, the authors' nondualistic approach and their consistent focus on behavioral criteria for the application of psychological concepts make Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience an important contribution to cognitive neuroscience.     

Conflict in contemporary clinical work: a self psychological perspective

The authors review the history of controversy regarding conflict versus deficit. They suggest that conflict, when conceptualized within the theory of self psychology, may arise in one of two ways, either: (1) along with deficit when caregivers are unable to provide developmentally needed selfobject functions, and, at the same time, these needed caregivers are also feared; these conflicts are unconscious and potentially pathogenic. Or: (2) conflicts may appear secondary to deficit. Such conflicts also require the analysis of selfobject transferences that have arisen on the basis of the underlying deficit. A clinical example demonstrates that deficit related to the oedipal phase may give rise to oedipal-selfobject transferences, requiring their working through for a successful termination.     

The relevance of attachment theory to a contemporary Jungian view of the internal world: internal working models, implicit memory and internal objects

In this paper I examine the various meanings of the term 'internal object' and the differences between various theoretical models for the formation of internal objects. I suggest that the idea in attachment theory of 'internal working models' emphasizes the internal world as one consisting of unconscious internalized patterns of emotional relationships. The term 'internal object' lacks this clarity and the different meanings it carries within differing theoretical frameworks are a source of confusion. I describe the role implicit memory plays in the formation of 'internal working model's and suggest that these offer us an alternative explanation for unconscious fantasy and for object relationships to that of instinctual drives. This model is then brought to bear on contemporary Jungian concepts of the internal world, with a suggestion that, seen in this light, Jung's formulation of the concept of the complex has many features in common with the 'internal working model' of attachment theory.     

The symbol in the body: the un-doing of a dissociation through Embodied Active Imagination in Jungian analysis

Jung understood dissociation as a natural state of the psyche, capable of turning defensive through development. Based on this premise, and its conception on the equivalence between psyche and matter, the present work describes the un-doing of a dissociation expressed through a chronic enterocolitis disorder. When the symbol remains closer to the body and its most instinctive manifestations, we need to descend to that level in order to let the vertical axis connection be gradually restored through the therapeutic relationship – the horizontal axis. In other words, this un-doing requires that patient and analyst follow the unconscious path proposed by symbolic expressions that gradually emerge through the patient’s body and active imagination. Movement is our most primitive and fundamental experience. Many authors (Stern, Panksepp, Gallese) have agreed that, in addition to being first in terms of development, movement continues to have primacy over any other experience throughout life. This means that emotions, bodily concepts and, later, speech, evolve from a somatic basis. In the light of such neuroscientific findings, Jung’s vision of the correspondence of psyche and matter will be revisited in order to portray how the analytic bond provides a context for the re-establishment of the linking/creative function of the archetype, and allows the restoring of the ego-Self axis connection by including non-verbal approaches, such as body-based active imagination, also known as Authentic Movement. Authentic Movement is an amplification of Jung’s active imagination method that enables a dialogue between the ego and the diverse configurations of the unconscious. When such dialogue is grounded in the body, there is an easier access to the affective dimension stored in implicit memory. That which was relived through the body can gradually be remembered, and affects hitherto rejected, find other symbolic ways of being expressed and contained in the analytic vas.     

Dissociating automatic associations: Comparing two implicit measurements of race bias

Weak correspondence across different implicit bias tasks may arise from the contribution of unique forms of automatic and controlled processes to response behavior. Here, we examined the correspondence between estimates of automatic and controlled processing derived from two sequential priming tasks with identical structure and timing designed to separately measure stereotypic (Weapons Identification Task; WIT) and evaluative (Affective Priming Task; APT) associations. Across two studies using predominantly White samples, three consistent patterns emerged in the data: (a) stereotypic bias was stronger for Black targets, whereas evaluative bias was stronger for White targets; (b) overall response accuracy bias correlated modestly across the two tasks; and (c) multinomial processing tree estimates of controlled processing corresponded much more strongly than estimates of automatic processing. These findings support models positing distinct learning and memory systems for different forms of race bias, and suggest that these differing forms contribute to estimates of automatic associations.     

Neuroscience,mind and meaning: an attempt at synthesis in a Relational Affective Hypothesis

This paper sets out a falsifiable Relational Affective Hypothesis, describing a neurological and relational pathway, through which affect and sensations arising from the interior of the body are translated, in a relational context, into language and a capacity for symbolisation. It describes the role of psychodynamic defences in narcissistic disorder, which can result in collapse in the function of this pathway. The hypothesis arose from clinical psychodynamic work with patients with severe and complex narcissistic disorders. They are characterised as severe, because they are at high risk of completed suicide and so are commonly treated in locked units, and complex because of their anorexic and bulimic eating patterns, tendency towards somatisation and the co-occurrence of autistic difficulties. A more or less profound failure of symbolisation is a feature common to these presentations. This interdisciplinary thinking offers a perspective on brain and psychological development, taking into account the complex interplay between genetic, environmental, relational and dynamic influences. It can be tested empirically and has implications for psychoanalytic thinking, psychiatry and neuroscience.     

Mourning and psychosis: a psychoanalytic perspective

The author attempts to develop some of the basic models and concepts relating to mourning processes in psychotic patients on the assumption that situations of loss and mourning are key moments for psychoanalysis, psychotherapy, and therapeutic approaches in general. Secondly, he reminds us that 'mourning processes in psychotics' are not always 'psychotic mourning processes', that is to say, that they do not necessarily occur within, or give rise to, a psychotic clinical picture. These ideas are illustrated by a number of sessions and vignettes concerning two psychotic patients in psychotherapeutic and psychoanalytic treatment. In theoretical terms, it seems vitally important in this context to combine a relationship-based approach within a framework of special psychoanalytic psychopathology with an updated view of processes of mourning and affective loss. A fundamental requirement at clinical level is to determine the role to be played by psychoanalytically based treatments in combined, integrated or global therapies when working with psychotic patients. For this purpose, the paper ends by outlining a set of principles and objectives for such treatments.     

知识经验与顿悟：来自认知神经科学的证据

知识经验对于顿悟问题解决是一把双刃剑,强势知识会阻碍顿悟问题解决,弱势知识才是顿悟问题解决的关键。强势知识引导的组块效应、约束效应和固着效应等心理定势现象,“帮助”问题解决者以惯用方案来理解、思考和解决问题。之所以会这样,可能是因为大脑内存在一套具有优先级差的层级加工系统,赋予惯用方案的优先级最高。不过,惯用方案不仅不能够解决顿悟问题,而且还会通过注意竞争和注意失灵方式来阻碍新异方案的探索和执行,所以,问题解决者往往都会进入思维僵局。僵局的打破和顿悟的实现,需要抑制住强势知识及其相关的惯用方案、激活弱势知识和新异方案,这违反了大脑的认知加工惯性,是很难以自发发生的。但是,可以通过激活扩散来增强弱势知识的激活水平,或者是拓宽注意范围、提高注意灵活性来增加弱势知识激活的可能性,从而促进顿悟问题解决。     

外显与内隐刻板印象的分布式表征及其激活过程——基于认知神经科学视角的探索

刻板印象是人们有关群体的行为特征与特质属性信念化的认识, 它多以语义图式形式存储于长时记忆中。依据激活过程中意识参与程度的不同, 刻板印象具有内隐和外显两种表现型。不同于双加工理论“自动激活+认知控制”的研究视角, 本项目计划从内隐/外显记忆的多重记忆系统模型出发, 试图检验内隐与外显刻板印象在表征机制和激活过程上的差异。现有的多重记忆系统模型虽能解释内隐和外显刻板印象在记忆存储与提取上的机制差别, 但却无法阐释二者语义表征带有的心理理论特性以及二者的认知控制过程。有鉴于此, 本项目拟吸收“镜像系统−心理化系统”模型和双加工理论各自在特质与信念加工以及刻板印象认知控制上的理论优势, 深入探索内隐和外显刻板印象的分布式表征机制。借助ERP技术的时间过程优势和fMRI技术的脑区动态因果建模优势, 研究结果将最终揭示刻板印象分布式语义表征的动态加工机制。     

Murray Sidman and Patient H. M.: The role of behavior analysis in the emergence of collaborative modern neuroscience

The intersection of the lives of 2 essential individuals in science, behavior analyst Murray Sidman (1923-2019), and Henry G. Molaison also known as Patient H.M. (1926-2008), warrants examination as it highlights the role of behavior analysis and other disciplines in the emergence of modern neuroscience and a collaborative approach to science. This paper describes the historical context and content of two publications by Sidman in which Molaison served as a research participant. The goal of the present paper is to emphasize this little-known facet of Sidman's rich career and to highlight the pioneering role of behavior analysis, and particularly the work of Murray Sidman, in the emergence of collaborative modern neuroscience.     

The case for neuropsychoanalysis: Why a dialogue with neuroscience is necessary but not sufficient for psychoanalysis

Recent advances in the cognitive, affective and social neurosciences have enabled these fields to study aspects of the mind that are central to psychoanalysis. These developments raise a number of possibilities for psychoanalysis. Can it engage the neurosciences in a productive and mutually enriching dialogue without compromising its own integrity and unique perspective? While many analysts welcome interdisciplinary exchanges with the neurosciences, termed neuropsychoanalysis, some have voiced concerns about their potentially deleterious effects on psychoanalytic theory and practice. In this paper we outline the development and aims of neuropsychoanalysis, and consider its reception in psychoanalysis and in the neurosciences. We then discuss some of the concerns raised within psychoanalysis, with particular emphasis on the epistemological foundations of neuropsychoanalysis. While this paper does not attempt to fully address the clinical applications of neuropsychoanalysis, we offer and discuss a brief case illustration in order to demonstrate that neuroscientific research findings can be used to enrich our models of the mind in ways that, in turn, may influence how analysts work with their patients. We will conclude that neuropsychoanalysis is grounded in the history of psychoanalysis, that it is part of the psychoanalytic worldview, and that it is necessary, albeit not sufficient, for the future viability of psychoanalysis.     

Self-reference is a fast-acting automatic mechanism on emotional word processing: evidence from a masked priming affective categorisation task

This study examined the impact of self-referential information at early stages of emotional word processing using an affective masked-priming paradigm in which positive (e.g, espetacular[awesome]) and negative (e.g., horrível[awful]) trait-adjectives were preceded by briefly primes that could be self-related (Eu sou[I am]), other-related (Ela é[She is]), or a control (%%%%%). Trait-adjectives were selected from female norms and only females participants were used to control for sex differences. Results showed that positive words were categorised faster when preceded by self-related primes than by other-related primes, though not control primes. Negative trait-adjectives were not modulated by the type of prime, even though participants were slower when they were preceded by other-related than by control primes. These findings demonstrate that taking the other-perspective entails a cost, and that the amount of priming produced by self-related and control primes was virtually the same, thus suggesting that assuming the self-perspective is a cognitively effortless process.     

A re-investigating of the religious orientation-moral reasoning relationship: a relational developmental systems perspective

This study re-investigates the relationship between religious orientation and Kohlberg’s moral reasoning among students at a midwestern (USA) university. Multiple regression analyses revealed that quest-oriented religiosity was significantly positively related to principled moral reasoning, as consistently found in previous studies, while intrinsic religious orientation showed no relation to principled moral reasoning. We discuss our findings through a lens of relational developmental systems theory, suggesting that a more integrative measure is needed to better understand the complex relationship between religious orientation and moral reasoning.     

The functional‐cognitive framework as a tool for accelerating progress in cognitive neuroscience: On the benefits of bridging rather than reducing levels of analyses

The subject matter of neuroscience research is complex, and synthesising the wealth of data from this research to better understand mental processes is challenging. A useful strategy, therefore, may be to distinguish explicitly between the causal effects of the environment on behaviour (i.e. functional analyses) and the mental processes that mediate these effects (i.e. cognitive analyses). In this article, we describe how the functional‐cognitive (F‐C) framework can accelerate cognitive neuroscience and also advance a functional treatment of brain activity. We first highlight that cognitive neuroscience can particularly benefit from the F‐C approach by providing an alternative to the problematic practice of reducing cognitive constructs to behavioural and/or neural proxies. Next, we outline how functional (behaviour–environment) relations can serve as a bridge between cognitive and neural processes by restoring mental constructs to their original role as heuristic tools. Finally, we give some examples of how both cognitive neuroscience and traditional functional approaches can mutually benefit from the F‐C framework.