On what there is: Representation and history

Premise: our representational system has had a relatively invariant core throughout human history (cf. Sellars's manifest image). Major theses: (i) When philosophical argument establishes the existence of an entity, that entity is a representing, not a represented. (ii) Most of the documents in the history of philosophy are on a par (as dialogical resources) with current philosophical literature for establishing or controverting such existence claims. (iii) The use of mathematics (initially the mathematized neo-Platonism of classical mechanics) allowed modern physical science to break with the perennial system of representation; in consequence, a portion of the representings of modern physical scientists do not belong to the historically invariant core. This limits the dialogical resources of physical science and the applicability of arguments from perennial philosophy to science. It also explains the relative irrelevance of pre-17th century science to contemporary physical scientists in contrast to the relevance of pre-17th century philosophy to contemporary philosophers. It also supports thesis (iv), that logic (broadly conceived) in central to all serious philosophical enterprises, since logic is the central tool for exhibiting and criticizing the rationale(s) of our representational system(s). Support for these theses will be found in the paper.     

说造就人的好话

言语是人一生当中用来表达自己的情感和心思意念的工具。在人际关系中,人们是和睦相处,还是冷眼相对,往往与他们说的话紧密关联,因为有其人必有其言。同样,在我们基督徒的信仰生活中,上帝特别看重我们所说的话,因为我们所说的话能反映出我们内心的景况。在圣经当中记载了许多关于言语的教训,上帝将这么多有关言语的教导摆在我     

Ontic terms and metaontology,or: on what there actually is

Terms such as ‘exist’, ‘actual’, etc., (hereafter, “ontic terms”) are recognized as having uses that are not ontologically committing, in addition to the usual commissive uses. (Consider, e.g., the Platonic and the neutral readings of ‘There is an even prime’.) In this paper, I identify five different noncommissive uses for ontic terms, and (by a kind of via negativa) attempt to define the commissive use, focusing on ‘actual’ as my example. The problem, however, is that the resulting definiens for the commissive ‘actual’ is itself equivocal between a commissive and a noncommissive reading. I thus consider other proposals for defining the commissive use, including two proposals from David Lewis. However, each proposal is found to be equivocal in the same way—and eventually I argue that it is impossible to define an ontic term unequivocally. Even so, this is not meant to overshadow that we can understand an ontic term as univocally commissive, in certain conversational contexts. I close by illustrating the import of these observations for the Hirsch–Sider debate in metaontology.     

Object detection and basic-level categorization: Sometimes you know it is there before you know what it is

A tight temporal coupling between object detection (is an object there?) and object categorization (what kind of object is it?) has recently been reported (Grill-Spector &; Kanwisher, 2005), suggesting that image segmentation into different objects and categorization of those objects at the basic level may be the very same mechanism. In the present work, we decoupled the time course of detection and categorization through two task manipulations. First, inverted objects were categorized significantly less accurately than upright objects across a range of image presentation durations, but no significant effect on object detection was observed. Second, systematically degrading stimuli affected categorization significantly more than object detection. The time course of object detection and object categorization can be selectively manipulated. They are not intrinsically linked. As soon as you know an object is there, you do not necessarily know what it is.     

Recalling what was where when seeing nothing there

So-called “looks-at-nothing” have previously been used to show that recalling what also elicits the recall of where this was. Here, we present evidence from an eye-tracking study which shows that disrupting looks to “there” does not disrupt recalling what was there, nor do (anticipatory) looks to “there” facilitate recalling what was there. Therefore, our results suggest that recalling where does not recall what.     

On what is bound in figures and grounds

All else being equal, regions providing a quick, good match to object memories are likely to be seen as shaped figures rather than as shapeless grounds. Good matches to object memories occur only if the parts are properly bound spatially. If object memories are accessed in the course of perceptual organization even for regions ultimately seen as shapeless grounds, then binding of parts cannot require attention to figures. Novel silhouette primes were shown immediately before real or novel line drawings. The silhouette contours of half of the primes preceding real line drawings sketched a known shape on the outside, which nevertheless appeared to be a shapeless ground. At short prime-line drawing SOAs, observers took longer to categorize real line drawings following these experimental primes than control primes, suggesting that parts are properly bound spatially for regions perceived to be shapeless grounds, and further that object memories matching grounds are inhibited.     

On what it is to be in a quandary

A number of serious problems are raised against Crispin Wright’s quandary conception of vagueness. Two alternative conceptions of the quandary view are proposed instead. The first conception retains Wright’s thesis that, for all one knows, a verdict concerning a borderline case constitutes knowledge. However a further problem is seen to beset this conception. The second conception, in response to this further problem, does not enjoin the thesis that, for all one knows, a verdict concerning a borderline case constitutes knowledge. The result is a much simpler and more plausible version of the quandary view.     

On regulating what is known: A way to social epistemology

This paper lays the groundwork for normative-yet-naturalistic social epistemology. I start by presenting two scenarios for the history of epistemology since Kant, one in which social epistemology is the natural outcome and the other in which it represents a not entirely satisfactory break with classical theories of knowledge. Next I argue that the current trend toward naturalizing epistemology threatens to destroy the distinctiveness of the sociological approach by presuming that it complements standard psychological and historical approaches. I then try to reassert, in Comtean fashion, the epistemologist's credentials in regulating knowledge production. Finally, I consider how social epistemology may have something exciting and relevant to say about contemporary debates in the theory of knowledge.A version of this paper appears as chapter one of Fuller (1988). My warmest thanks goes to Fred Schmitt, who saved me from many unclarities and howlers, as well as provided many probing remarks and criticisms with which I have barely begun to grapple.     

Where there's life,There's hope,and where there is hope,there is...

Using the Hearth Hope Index, we describe the level of hopefulness among hospital patients and compare it to that reported by community persons and family members in a surgical waiting room. We also correlate these results with depression and self-esteem scores. As measured by these selected instruments, the results suggest that the level of hopefulness is not significantly different among the three samples, that it is positively correlated with self-esteem and negatively associated with depression, and that, among the demographic variables, only the respondent's age and frequency of attendance at worship significantly influence hope scores. The results suggest that pastoral caregivers can encourage hopefulness among those under their care by bolstering self-esteem and giving attention to depressive symptoms. They also suggest that those who need the most pastoral support are younger adults with limited education. Pastoral caregivers can use these results, we think, to inform their work in giving pastoral care.     

Beyond logic there is only nonsense

Studies in East European Thought - This paper provides an interpretation of Father Bocheński’s saying “Beyond logic there is only nonsense.” He considered the battle against...     

The explanatory gap is still there

I argue that O'Regan & No?'s (O&N's) theory is in a no better position than any other theory to solve the "hard problem" of consciousness. Getting rid of the explanatory gap by exchanging sensorimotor contingencies for neural representations is an illusion.     

神仙也有不公

人们往往认为,一个人的命运好坏是神灵保佑的结果。其实不是这么一回事。例如在成才事上,有的人不论是自己还是培养子女,都能心想事成。而另外一些人却是处处碰壁。又例如为什么有的人不论是做生意还是办实业,一次次总是亏本。还有,在财产的增殖等多项工作,有的人碰到顺顺当当,也总是心想事成。而另外一些人不论采用何种办法,未能使自己的财产增殖。人们针对这种不同情况,往往怨命运的原因、机遇的原因,甚至埋怨老天不公,神灵不公,很少有人说是运用科学知识当否的原因。我知道这样两个家庭,一家姓王,一家姓郑。王家祖传中医,从小熟识医药知…     

Doing what is humanly possible

The subtle docetism which pervades orthodox discussions of the person and work of Christ can serve to vitiate the hope contained in the New Testament message. A reprise of the themes underlying the Christological controversies and modern discussions of the humanity of Christ demonstrates these contain clear implications for the practice of pastoral counseling.     

The ties that bind what is known to the recall of what is new

Cued recall success varies with what people know and with what they do during an episode. This paper focuses on prior knowledge and disentangles the relative effects of 10 features of words and their relationships on cued recall. Results are reported for correlational and multiple regression analyses of data obtained from free association norms and from 29 experiments. The 10 features were only weakly correlated with each other in the norms and, with notable exceptions, in the experiments. The regression analysis indicated that forward cue-to-target strength explained the most variance, followed by backward target-to-cue strength. Target connectivity and set size explained the next most variance, along with mediated cue-to-target strength. Finally, frequency, concreteness, shared associate strength, and cue set size also contributed significantly to recall. Taken together, indices of prior word knowledge explain 49% of the recall variance. Theoretically driven equations that use free association to predict cued recall were also evaluated. Each equation was designed to condense multiple indices of word interconnectivity into a single predictor.     

Seeing what is not seen

This paper connects ideas from twentieth century Gestalt psychology, experiments in vision science, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception. I propose that when we engage in simple sensorimotor tasks whose successful completion is open, our behavior may be motivated by practical perceptual awareness alone, responding to invariant features of the perceptual field that are invisible to other forms of perceptual awareness. On this view, we see more than we think we see, as evidenced by our skillful bodily behavior.