Does the autistic child have a metarepresentational deficit?

This study examines the claim that autistic children lack a “theory of mind” because of an inability to metarepresent. We argue that if autistic children have a “metarepresentational” deficit in Leslie's (1987, 1988) sense of the term, then they should have difficulty not only with mental representations such as false beliefs, but also with external representations such as photographs. Autistic children's understanding of photographic representations was tested using Zaitchik's (1990) task. This task is modelled on the false belief task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985: Wimmer & Perner, 1983) but involves “false” photographs where a photographic representation does not conform with the current state of the real world. Like Zaitchik (1990) we found that normal 3 and 4-year-olds found this task as difficult as the false belief task. In sharp contrast, however, the autistic children in our study passed the photograph task but failed the false belief task. As both tasks require the ability to decouple, this evidence challenges the view that autistic children lack “metarepresentational” ability in Leslie's sense. However, the results leave open the question of whether autistic children have a metarepresentational ability in the different sense of the term intended by Pylyshyn (1978), that is, representing the relationship between a representation and what it represents.     

The Meaning of Meaning-Fallibilism

Much discussion of meaning by philosophers over the last 300 years has been predicated on a Cartesian first-person authority (i.e. “infallibilism”) with respect to what one’s terms mean. However this has problems making sense of the way the meanings of scientific terms develop, an increase in scientific knowledge over and above scientists’ ability to quantify over new entities. Although a recent conspicuous embrace of rigid designation has broken up traditional meaning-infallibilism to some extent, this new dimension to the meaning of terms such as “water” is yet to receive a principled epistemological undergirding (beyond the deliverances of “intuition” with respect to certain somewhat unusual possible worlds). Charles Peirce’s distinctive, naturalistic philosophy of language is mined to provide a more thoroughly fallibilist, and thus more realist, approach to meaning, with the requisite epistemology. Both his pragmatism and his triadic account of representation, it is argued, produce an original approach to meaning, analysing it in processual rather than objectual terms, and opening a distinction between “meaning for us”, the meaning a term has at any given time for any given community and “meaning simpliciter”. the way use of a given term develops over time (often due to a posteriori input from the world which is unable to be anticipated in advance). This account provocatively undermines a certain distinction between “semantics” and “ontology” which is often taken for granted in discussions of realism.     

Is Mere True Belief Knowledge?

Crispin Sartwell ingeniously defends the provocative thesis that mere true belief suffices for knowledge. In doing so, he challenges one of the most deeply entrenched epistemological tenets, namely that knowledge must be more than mere true belief. Particularly interesting is the way he defends his thesis by appealing to considerations adduced by such prominent epistemologists as William Alston, Laurence BonJour, Alvin Goldman and Paul Moser, each of whom denies that knowledge is merely true belief. In this paper, I argue that the case Sartwell presents for his thesis fails. However, by examining why it fails, we may derive at least four important epistemological lessons: (1) being justified does not entail being able to give a justification; (2) we should distinguish between epistemic justification conceived of as intrinsically conducive to truth and conceived of as extrinsically conducive to truth; (3) we should distinguish between epistemic justification conceived of as an essential criterion of knowledge and conceived of as an accidental criterion of knowledge; and (4) epistemologists need to specify how the telos of inquiry involves more than the acquisition of (merely) true beliefs.Socrates: Then tell me: what definition can we give with the least risk of contradicting ourselves?Theaetetus: The one we tried before, Socrates. I have nothing else to suggest.Socrates: What was that?Theaetetus: That true belief is knowledge. Surely there can at least be no mistake in believing what is true and the consequences are always satisfactory.Theaetetus 200d–e     

Disentangling the course of epistemic development: parsing knowledge by epistemic content

Over the past three decades, research into the developmental course by means of which persons come to an increasingly mature conception of the knowing process has yielded an highly defracted picture. Despite some concert of opinion about the general bill of particulars, what remains deeply problematic is the increasingly radical disagreement that has arisen regarding the ages at which major milestones in the course of epistemic development are said to be reached. As a way of making some sense of these competing claims, it is argued that the emerging insight that knowledge is ineluctably shaped by those doing the knowing (i.e., that there is an unavoidable “world-to-mind direction of fit” (J.R. Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983) between things in the world and the manner of their understanding) does not arrive in a single piece. Instead, as the data presented here help to illustrate, an appreciation of the constructed character of knowledge more commonly arrives piecemeal and at different ontogenetic moments, the times of which are governed by the place that different objects of knowledge occupy along an envisioned continuum of diverse epistemic contents. On this account, not all “facts of the matter” are ordinarily seen to occupy the same epistemic footing. Rather, some so-called facts are commonly understood to be of an “institutional” sort, where “representational” diversity is early expected and widely tolerated. By contrast, other objects of knowledge are imagined to be more like “brute” facts that, on some less mature readings, fully escape the clutches of subjective opinion. Viewed against the backcloth of this proposed continuum, a developmental sequence hypothesized according to which growing persons first come to view “institutional” facts as humanly constructed before subsequently coming to a similar view about presumptively “brute” facts. To test this hypothesis, 242 young persons were administered a paper and pencil measure of epistemic reasoning (the EDQ). Results strongly support the hypothesis that respondents understood the interpretive nature of beliefs about “institutional” facts at an earlier age than so-called “brute” facts.     

Popper and Synthetic judgements A Priori

Summary  Popper uses the “Humean challenge” as a justification for his falsificationism. It is claimed that in his basic argument he confuses two different doubts: (a) the Humean doubt (Popper’s problem of induction), and (b) the “Popperean” doubt whether – presupposing that there are laws of nature – the laws we accept are in fact valid. Popper’s alleged solution of the problem of induction does not solve the problem in a straightforward way (as Levison and Salmon have remarked before). But if Popper’s solution of the Humean challenge is re-interpreted as being close to Kant’s it makes sense. Even though Popper explicitly rejects Kant’s synthetic judgements a priori, it is claimed here that this is so because he misinterprets Kant’s argument. If he had understood Kant correctly he should have been a modern “Kantianer”!     

Social epistemology and the aim(s) of education

In Knowledge in a Social World (1999) Alvin Goldman has defended a ‘veritistic’ or truth-oriented, monistic account of the aim of education. In particular, he argued that the inculcation of true belief constitutes the ultimate goal of education, with other educational activities having only instrumental value insofar as they aid in this goal. In contrast, Harvey Siegel has defended a pluralistic alternative, on which the critical capacity for sustaining rational belief represents an independent, non-instrumental epistemic end of education. I argue that while some of Siegel's objections represent challenges to the sufficiency of Goldman's veritistic model, his alternative account fails to recognise the necessity of truth as an educational goal. This therefore commits Siegel to an unsatisfying pluralism regarding the ideal aim of education. Crucially, this disagreement hinges on two very different ways of understanding the nature of rationality: as instrumental or as epistemic. On Goldman's instrumentalist view, rationality merely involves the ordering of one's means to the end of true belief. However, Kelly (2003) has raised significant counterexamples against the instrumentalist view, and I adapt these to the case of the epistemic ends of education. I thus defend a non-pluralistic account of the ultimate end of education as involving knowledge in the ‘strong’ sense. This, I argue, overcomes the objections raised against Goldman and Siegel's accounts, and better accords with the notion of an ideal characterisation of the aim of education.     

Children's understanding of interpretation

The prevailing view in the study of children's developing theories of mind is that the 4-year-old's newfound understanding of false belief is the single developmental milestone marking entry into an adult “folk psychology.” We argue instead that there are at least two such watershed events. Children first develop a “copy theory” that equates the mind with a recording device capable of producing either faithful or flawed representations of reality and according to which mental states are determined entirely by the flow of information into the mind. Only later, in the early school years, do children come to appreciate, as do adults, that the mind itself can contribute to the content of mental states. This later-arriving “Interpretive Theory of Mind” allows an appreciation of the capacity for constructively interpreting and misinterpreting reality. The main finding from the six studies reported here is that children who otherwise demonstrate a clear understanding that beliefs can be false (and so deserve to be credited with a theory of mind), can nevertheless fail to appreciate even the most basic aspects of interpretation: that despite exposure to precisely the same information, two persons can still end up holding sharply different opinions about what is the self-same reality. What these studies reveal is that an interpretive theory of mind is different from, and later arriving than, an appreciation of the possibility of false belief, and contrary to competing claims, this interpretive theory actually makes its first appearance during, but not before, the early school years.     

The value problem and the nature of knowledge

Jason Baehr has argued that the intuition that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief is neither sufficiently general nor sufficiently formal to motivate the value problem in epistemology. What he calls the “guiding intuition” is not completely general: our intuition does not reveal that knowledge is always more valuable than true belief; and not strictly formal: the intuition is not merely the abstract claim that knowledge is more valuable than true belief. If he is right, the value problem (as we know it) is not a real problem. I will argue in this paper that he is wrong about the generality claim: knowledge is always more valuable than true belief; and yet he is right about the formality claim—there is more to the intuition than just the abstract claim that knowledge is more valuable than true belief. What this amounts to, I will argue, is that there is still a value problem but that the guiding intuition can tell us how to solve it.     

Unsafe Knowledge

Ernest Sosa has argued that if someone knows that p, then his belief that p is “safe”. and Timothy Williamson has agreed. In this paper I argue that safety, as defined by Sosa, is not a necessary condition on knowledge – that we can have unsafe knowledge. I present Sosa’s definition of safety and a counterexample to it as a necessary condition on knowledge. I also argue that Sosa’s most recent refinements to the notion of safety don’t help him to avoid the counterexample. I consider three replies on behalf of the defender of safety, and find them all wanting. Finally, I offer a tentative diagnosis of my counterexample.     

Practical reasons to believe,epistemic reasons to act,and the baffled action theorist

I argue that unless belief is voluntary in a very strict sense – that is, unless credence is simply under our direct control – there can be no practical reasons to believe. I defend this view against recent work by Susanna Rinard. I then argue that for very similar reasons, barring the truth of strict doxastic voluntarism, there cannot be epistemic reasons to act, only purely practical reasons possessed by those whose goal is attaining knowledge or justified belief.     

Emotional Schemas and Self-Help: Homework Compliance and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder

Many patients will either refuse to enter treatment or will drop out of treatment where exposure and response prevention (ERP) are employed. Patients may have a number of “good reasons” for noncompliance with ERP. For example, they may view their intrusions as conveying responsibility, reflecting higher threat, as personally relevant, and as requiring perfect and certain solutions. Inducing anxiety, from this perspective, only exacerbates the “problem.” Moreover, patients may employ beliefs about emotion and anxiety that conflict with exposure—such as the belief that anxiety should always be avoided or decreased because it is assumed to rise indefinitely and cause psychological harm. Homework or between-session self-help necessarily involves exposure with increased anxiety and discomfort. In the current case study, both meta-cognitive and meta-emotional conceptualization and strategies were employed in the treatment of a previously treatment-resistant case of OCD, and homework compliance was improved through the use of an emotional schema approach.     

A consistency-based framework for merging knowledge bases

We present a framework for expressing various merging operators for belief sets. This framework generalises our earlier work on consistency-based belief revision and contraction. Two primary merging operators are identified: in the first approach, belief sources are consistently combined so that the result of merging knowledge bases K₁,…,K_n is a maximal consistent (if possible) set of formulas comprising the joint knowledge of the knowledge bases. This approach then accords with one's intuitions as to what a “merge” operator should do. The second approach is more akin to a generalised belief revision operator. Knowledge bases K₁,…,K_n are “projected” onto another (in the simplest case the knowledge base where only tautologies are known). Properties of these operators are investigated, primarily by comparing their properties with postulates that have been identified previously in the literature. Notably, the approach is independent of syntax, in that merging knowledge bases K₁,…,K_n is independent of how each K_i is expressed. As well, we investigate the role of entailment-based and consistency-based integrity constraints, the interrelationships between these approaches and belief revision, and the expression of further merging operators.     

Why we don’t deserve credit for everything we know

A view of knowledge—what I call the Deserving Credit View of Knowledge(DCVK)—found in much of the recent epistemological literature, particularly among so-called virtue epistemologists, centres around the thesis that knowledge is something for which a subject deserves credit. Indeed, this is said to be the central difference between those true beliefs that qualify as knowledge and those that are true merely by luck—the former, unlike the latter, are achievements of the subject and are thereby creditable to her. Moreover, it is often further noted that deserving credit is what explains the additional value that knowledge has over merely lucky true belief. In this paper, I argue that the general conception of knowledge found in the DCVK is fundamentally incorrect. In particular, I show that deserving credit cannot be what distinguishes knowledge from merely lucky true belief since knowledge is not something for which a subject always deserves credit.     

The personality assessment system: A radical hypothesis

Two stories are presented. The first story is about a clinical practitioner developing an assessment method beginning with a connection of test “signs” with behavior, and proceeding to a system that could mystify observers. The second story is about the application of scientific methods to explain how the system could work. Together the stories are an example of practice informing science, and science informing practice. The basic hypothesis used is that much of what we call personality is “caused” by differential aptitudes as modified by long-term learning. It is also assumed that people would prefer to use those aptitudes they feel are their better ones and avoid those in which they feel weaker.     

Reproducing gender in counseling and psychotherapy: Understanding the problem and changing the practice

In this article I argue that the concept of gender is misunderstood by the majority of psychologists. Increasingly the term “gender” is mindlessly replacing the term “sex,” obfuscating decades of theory and research that elucidated gender as a complex social-psychological variable rather than a bifurcated individual-difference variable tied to biological sex. As a consequence, gender is largely ignored as an “active” variable in counseling research and practice. Current theory and research on gender as they apply to counseling and psychotherapy are first described. Then ways in which gender processes are often reproduced in counseling and psychotherapy and factors contributing to this practice are illuminated. Finally, areas particularly vulnerable to reproducing gender are described and some examples provided of the reproducing, and the disrupting, of gender processes in counseling.     

Reversal operations after brain damage

The ability to perform reversals—that is, the appreciation of the relationship between original and transformed states of knowledge—is critical to human thought processes. In order to assess whether a number of “special-purpose processors” are responsible for reversal operations, depending on the particular context in which the reversal is couched, or whether a single “core processing mechanism” subserves a critical aspect of reversal operations regardless of the specific context, patients with localized brain damage were asked to solve eight reversal problems. Visual and auditory reversals mediated by linguistic and non-linguistic symbol systems were presented. The findings demonstrate that patients with insult to the anterior portion of the right hemisphere encounter more difficulty performing reversals than patients with right posterior insult, Broca's aphasics, and fluent aphasics. This is regardless of the symbol system mediating the reversal, regardless of the modality of presentation, and regardless of the amount of available processing time. Subjects with insult to the posterior region of the left hemisphere or the right hemisphere also exhibit some difficulty solving reversal problems, although their difficulties appear modality specific. These data lend support to the claim that a core processing mechanism may play a critical role in the performance of reversal operations.     

Generativity and Erikson's “belief in the species”

Generativity is the concern for guiding and promoting the next generation through such creative behavior as parenting, teaching, mentoring, leading, and generating products and outcomes that benefit others. Erikson (1963) has argued that in order to be generative in adulthood, people must have a fundamental “belief in the species” or a faith that human progress is possible and worth working toward. The present study focuses on hope and trust concerning the self and others (Erikson's “belief in the species”). In addition, however, the study examines the relation between generativity and personality traits, in this case, dominance, leadership, self-absorption, and nurturance. A sample of 70 adults was administered (1) a series of self-report questionnaires converging on Erikson's idea of belief in the species, (2) a self-report scale assessing generativity, (3) measures of personality traits, and (4) two open-ended measures of generativity requiring subjects to describe life commitments and creative endeavors. The results provide modest support for Erikson's claim of a link between belief in the species and generativity, with significant positive correlations obtained (1) between self-report generativity and two measures of belief in species and (2) between generativity assessed through life commitments and one measure of belief in the species. In addition, the personality trait of nurturance was positively related to all three generativity measures. Problems and issues in the assessment of generativity are discussed.     

An assessment of the potential utility of “scientific jury selection”: A “thought experiment” approach

The efficacy of “scientific jury selection” (the use of social science methodology to aid the jury selection process) has been a subject of considerable contention. Unfortunately, such issues are difficult to address empirically, especially at the level of jury rather than juror decisions. One means of addressing some of these questions is through the use of “thought experiments” or computer simulations that are based not on intuition or conventional wisdom alone but guided by relevant empirical data. This paper reports the outcomes of simulations that explore jury verdict consequences from the use of scientific jury selection to (a) obtain changes in venue, (b) select jurors, and (c) accomplish both of the preceding. The results indicated that the potential effects of scientific jury selection are strongest when the techniques are successful in bringing about changes of venue or more representative jury panels. Somewhat weaker, albeit still consequential, effects were observed in those instances where scientific jury selection techniques are used to select particular jurors. The psychological and legal implications of these results, and the thought experiment approach in general, are discussed.     

Eliminative and enumerative behaviour in a conceptual task

P. C. Wason's paper “On the Failure to Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task” is criticized on the grounds that the task set is in important respects untypical of problem solving situations in general. It is suggested that few or no subjects are “Eliminators” in Wason's sense and that although many are “Enumerators” in his sense, enumerative behaviour is a function of the situation. An experiment is reported in which it appears that modification to the situation can sharply reduce the incidence of enumerative behaviour and increase the subject's chance of success at an early stage. The frequency with which hypotheses are directly eliminated is shown to be very low in all groups.     

Pragmatic reasoning schemas

We propose that people typically reason about realistic situations using neither content-free syntactic inference rules nor representations of specific experiences. Rather, people reason using knowledge structures that we term pragmatic reasoning schemas, which are generalized sets of rules defined in relation to classes of goals. Three experiments examined the impact of a “permission schema” on deductive reasoning. Experiment 1 demonstrated that by evoking the permission schema it is possible to facilitate performance in Wason's selection paradigm for subjects who have had no experience with the specific content of the problems. Experiment 2 showed that a selection problem worded in terms of an abstract permission elicited better performance than one worded in terms of a concrete but arbitrary situation, providing evidence for an abstract permission schema that is free of domain-specific content. Experiment 3 provided evidence that evocation of a permission schema affects not only tasks requiring procedural knowledge, but also a linguistic rephrasing task requiring declarative knowledge. In particular, statements in the form if p then q were rephrased into the form p only if q with greater frequency for permission than for arbitrary statements, and rephrasings of permission statements produced a pattern of introduction of modals (must, can) totally unlike that observed for arbitrary conditional statements. Other pragmatic schemas, such as “causal” and “evidence” schemas can account for both linguistic and reasoning phenomena that alternative hypotheses fail to explain.