Philosophy,Logic, Science,History

Analytic philosophy is sometimes said to have particularly close connections to logic and to science, and no particularly interesting or close relation to its own history. It is argued here that although the connections to logic and science have been important in the development of analytic philosophy, these connections do not come close to characterizing the nature of analytic philosophy, either as a body of doctrines or as a philosophical method. We will do better to understand analytic philosophy—and its relationship to continental philosophy—if we see it as a historically constructed collection of texts, which define its key problems and concerns. It is true, however, that analytic philosophy has paid little attention to the history of the subject. This is both its strength—since it allows for a distinctive kind of creativity—and its weakness—since ignoring history can encourage a philosophical variety of “normal science.”     

Dissimilarity, Quasimetric, Metric

Dissimilarity is a function that assigns to every pair of stimuli a nonnegative number vanishing if and only if two stimuli are identical, and that satisfies the following two conditions called the intrinsic uniform continuity and the chain property, respectively: it is uniformly continuous with respect to the uniformity it induces, and, given a set of stimulus chains (finite sequences of stimuli), the dissimilarity between their initial and terminal elements converges to zero if the chains’ length (the sum of the dissimilarities between their successive elements) converges to zero. The four properties axiomatizing this notion are shown to be mutually independent. Any conventional, symmetric metric is a dissimilarity function. A quasimetric (satisfying all metric axioms except for symmetry) is a dissimilarity function if and only if it is symmetric in the small. It is proposed to reserve the term metric (not necessarily symmetric) for such quasimetrics. A real-valued binary function satisfies the chain property if and only if whenever its value is sufficiently small it majorates some quasimetric and converges to zero whenever this quasimetric does. The function is a dissimilarity function if, in addition, this quasimetric is a metric with respect to which the function is uniformly continuous.     

Time, trace, memory

Objections to a trace hypothesis for interval timing do not apply to the multiple-time-scale (MTS) theory, which incorporates a dynamic trace tuned by the system history and can easily accommodate interval timing over a 1,000:1 range. The MTS model can also account for Weber's law as well as systematic deviations from it. Contrary to our critics, we contend that patterns of variance in interval timing experiments are not fully described by scalar expectancy theory, and that attempting to understand timing by assigning variance to different elements of a flexible model that lacks inductive support is a flawed strategy, because the attempt may be successful even if the model is wrong. We further argue that biological plausibility is an unreliable guide to the development of behavioral theory, that prediction is not the same as test, that induction should precede deduction, and that a rat is not a clock.     

Autopoiesis,Adaptivity, Teleology,Agency

A proposal for the biological grounding of intrinsic teleology and sense-making through the theory of autopoiesis is critically evaluated. Autopoiesis provides a systemic language for speaking about intrinsic teleology but its original formulation needs to be elaborated further in order to explain sense-making. This is done by introducing adaptivity, a many-layered property that allows organisms to regulate themselves with respect to their conditions of viability. Adaptivity leads to more articulated concepts of behaviour, agency, sense-construction, health, and temporality than those given so far by autopoiesis and enaction. These and other implications for understanding the organismic generation of values are explored.     

Lurking, Distilling, Exceeding, Vibrating

This paper addresses two main questions: (1) What has theory been doing? and (2) What might theory be doing? The first question is addressed historically, and the second question is addressed imaginatively. In between those two topics, I have inserted a brief interval to raise some sticking points pertaining to the question, ??What is properly educational about educational theory???     

Responsibility,Reaction, and Value

Many writers accept the following thesis about responsibility: (R) For one to be responsible for something is for one to be such that it is fitting that one be the object of some reactive attitude with respect to that thing. This thesis bears a striking resemblance to a thesis about value that is also accepted by many writers: (V) For something to be good (or neutral, or bad) is for it to be such that it is fitting that it be the object of some pro-attitude (or indifference, or some contra-attitude). V has been the subject of intense debate in recent years, in part because of its incorporation into what has come to be called the “buck-passing” account of value. In particular, V is open to three challenges: that it is not necessarily the case that whatever is good is the fitting object of a pro-attitude; that it is not necessarily the case that whatever is the fitting object of a pro-attitude is good; and that, even if there is a strict equivalence between what is good and what is the fitting object of a pro-attitude, still the former is not to be analyzed in terms of the latter. The resemblance between V and R has not been previously commented on, but, once it is recognized, it is clear that R is open to challenges that resemble those to which V is vulnerable. This paper explores both the challenges to V and the parallel challenges to R and discusses responses that may be given to these challenges. The interrelation between V and R is then examined, and a general lesson is drawn concerning how to adjudicate disputes about the nature of moral responsibility.     

Traits,states, situations,and uncertainty

The shift of paradigm from psychodynamic therapy to behavior modification has changed the views of assessment and challenged traditional broad trait concepts. Behavioral assessment has used narrow, situation-specific trait tests, state self-report tests given in situations, and behavioral observations and performance ratings. Comparison of these types of measures are reported from a study of fear reactions in three situations. Narrow trait measures are generally more predictive of behavior than broad trait measures. State measures are even more predictive when given just before the performance. But only a sampling of such state measures can be used to define a trait because of the lower reliability of states. It is argued that behavior in situations is only predictable when an adequate number of behavioral samples is used.     

Language,Ontology, and Metaphysics

Thomas Hofweber's Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics is ambitious, thought‐provoking, and a good read. It expands upon a project he's developed in several previous papers—a project that seamlessly weaves together both metaphysics and metametaphysics. The book is as much about methodology as it is about the substantive conclusions he draws about what there is. As a consequence, it is a long book that covers a lot of ground. Since I cannot do justice to all of it, I hope my fellow symposiasts will take up parts of the book that I neglect. There is a lot of good stuff in there.     

Goodness, Values, Reasons

Contemporary value theory has been characterized by a renewed interest in the analysis of concepts like “good” or “valuable”, the most prominent pattern of analysis in recent years being the socalled buck-passing or fitting-attitude analysis which reduces goodness to a matter of having properties that provide reasons for pro-attitudes. Here I argue that such analyses are best understood as metaphysical rather than linguistic and that while the buck-passing analysis has some virtues, it still fails to provide a suitably wide-ranging pattern of analysis for conceptualizing evaluative properties. Instead, a better alternative can be found in a metaphysical version of the Geachean view that goodness is always attributive and never predicative, namely that goodness is always a matter of relative placement in certain kinds of comparison classes. It is then suggested that the good and the valuable need to be separated from each other and that the latter is a species of the former.     

Witnessing, wonder, and hope

This article is based on a keynote address I gave in South Africa at the Eighth International Conference of The South African Association of Marital and Family Therapy. The phenomenon of witnessing is explored in a number of contexts, and a distinction is made between witnessing with and without awareness, and from an empowered or a disempowered position. I propose that the African philosophy of ubuntu--the emphasis of which is on the self in community, in contrast to the Western emphasis on the individual--may be a better fit for my view of hope, which, I propose, is not just a feeling but, rather, something people do.     

Time, tense, truth

A theory of time is a theory of the nature of temporal reality, and temporal reality determines the truth-value of temporal sentences. Therefore it is reasonable to ask how a theory of time can account for the way the truth of temporal sentences is determined. This poses certain challenges for both the A theory and the B theory of time. In this paper, I outline an account of temporal sentences. The key feature of the account is that the primary bearers of truth-values are not utterances, but sentences evaluated with respect to a time. I argue that unlike other views, the present proposal can meet the challenges faced both by the A and the B theory.     

Thinking,Acting, Considering

According to a familiar (alleged) requirement on practical reason, one must believe a proposition if one is to take it for granted in reasoning about what to do. This paper explores a related requirement, not on thinking but on acting—that one must accept a goal if one is to count as acting for its sake. This is the acceptance requirement. Although it is endorsed by writers as diverse as Christine Korsgaard, Donald Davidson, and Talbot Brewer, I argue that it is vulnerable to counterexamples, in which agents act in light of ends that they do not accept but are still merely considering. For instance, a young professional may keep a job option open not because she definitely wants or intends to take it, but just because she is considering taking it. I try to show (1) that such examples are not easily resisted; (2) that they present challenges specifically for Brewer, Davidson, and especially Korsgaard; and (3) that the examples also raise fresh, non-partisan questions in action theory. What is considering, exactly? How could it fall short of acceptance while still guiding behaviour? How can we act for an end before thinking it through?     

Supervision-competence, confidence, accountability

The need for a shared understanding of the tasks and purposes of supervision for the emerging professions of counselling and psychotherapy is presented Progress to date is reviewed, including a brief account of the initiatives taken by the British Association for Counselling. Taking one definition of the supervision task, its implications are explored and contrasted to other possible definitions. It is suggested that working with trainee counsellors calls for some agreed skills which may not be within the accustomed repertoire of all 'schools of counselling', and a plea is made for group supervision which actively engages all participants. The implications of the ideas in the article for supervisor development and counsellor training are examined.     

Harmful dysfunction, disorder, disease, illness, and evolution.

Can psychiatric disorders be conceptualized as "harmful dysfunctions" (J. C. Wakefield, 1992a, 1992b, 1999; S. O. Lilienfeld & L. Marino, 1995)? Wakefield's (1992a) central concept of disorder as "harmful dysfunction" is discussed by placing it in the context of a complementary discussion of disease, illness, the sick role, and evolution (D. F. Klein, 1978). S. O. Lilienfeld and L. Marino (1995) contended that proper biological function cannot be determined. This argument obscures the key significance of involuntary impairment of evolved functions. The claim that the Roschian concept has no counterpart in reality is incorrect and does not support the conclusion that dysfunctions are irreducibly evaluative and therefore arbitrary. J. C. Wakefield's (1999) views in this area are supplemented. The role of monothetic and polythetic categorization, extremal terms, and the concept of normality in nosology is considered. This analysis refutes the implication that deviance and illness are equivalent. The resolution of this debate is practically relevant to emphasizing areas of research investment, such as therapeutics.     

Truth-ratios,process, task,and knowledge

In this paper, I delineate two major problems facing reliabilist approaches in epistemology. I argue that Alvin Goodman's (1986) position fails to solve either problem. I then suggest an alternative reliabilist approach that ties truth-ratio assessments to particular, well-specified cognitive tasks. I claim that a well-specified cognitive task is an empirical hypothesis about a system that involves the specification of input and output types and nomic correlations (including statistical correlations) that underlie the system's performance. On my approach, one characterizes processes by reference to the system's dispositions across the situations consistent with the task. Characterization is best understood as revealing a strategy or a set of strategies for generating outputs from inputs relying on certain nomic correlations associated with the task.     

Symbiosis,Empathy, Suicidal Behavior,and the Family

ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the theoretical concept of symbiosis, as described by Mahler and her co-workers, and its clinical applications in suicidal situations. Symbiosis is defined as both a developmental phase characterized by a lack of differentiation between self and others and a relationship which is contingent upon the family and social network. A disturbed symbiosis is a major component in a suicide attempt. The destructive aspects of symbiosis are traced together with its relationship to empathy and the efforts to both restore and resolve a symbiotic conflict through suicidal behavior. In family therapy a repetition of older symbiotic relationships is frequently observed. These are repeated from one generation to the next in order to keep the old relationship alive. Finally, the practical implications of the concept of symbiosis for assessment and treatment are discussed.     

Intuition,intelligence, data compression

The main goal of my paper is to argue that data compression is a necessary condition for intelligence. One key motivation for this proposal stems from a paradox about intuition and intelligence. For the purposes of this paper, it will be useful to consider playing board games—such as chess and Go—as a paradigm of problem solving and cognition, and computer programs as a model of human cognition. I first describe the basic components of computer programs that play board games, namely value functions and search functions. I then argue that value functions both play the same role as intuition in humans and work in essentially the same way. However, as will become apparent, using an ordinary value function is just a simpler and less accurate form of relying on a database or lookup table. This raises our paradox, since reliance on intuition is usually considered to manifest intelligence, whereas usage of a lookup table is not. I therefore introduce another condition for intelligence that is related to data compression. This proposal allows that even reliance on a perfectly accurate lookup table can be nonintelligent, while retaining the claim that reliance on intuition can be highly intelligent. My account is not just theoretically plausible, but it also captures a crucial empirical constraint. This is because all systems with limited resources that solve complex problems—and hence, all cognitive systems—need to compress data.

     

Methods,minds, memory,and kinds

ABSTRACT

The acquisition of a skill, or knowledge-how, on the one hand, and the acquisition of a piece of propositional knowledge on the other, appear to be different sorts of epistemic achievements. Does this difference lie in the nature of the knowledge involved, marking a joint between knowledge-how and propositional knowledge? Intellectualists say no: All knowledge is propositional knowledge. Anti-intellectualists say yes: Knowledge-how and propositional knowledge are different in kind. What resources or methods may we legitimately and fruitfully employ to adjudicate this debate? What is (or are) the right way(s) to show the nature of the knowledge knowers know? Here too there is disagreement. I defend the legitimacy of the anti-intellectualist appeal to cognitive neuroscientific findings against a recent claim that anti-intellectualists conflate the scientific categories of procedural and declarative knowledge with the mental kinds of skill (knowledge-how) and propositional knowledge, respectively. I identify two kinds of arguments for this claim and argue that neither succeeds.     

Data, model, conclusion, doing it again

This paper explores the robustness of conclusions from a statistical model against variations in model choice (rather than variations in random sampling and random assignment to treatments, which are the usual variations covered by inferential statistics). After the problem formulation in section 1, section 2 presents an example from Box and Tiao in which variation in parent distribution is modeled for a one sample location problem. An adaptive Bayesian procedure permits to use a weighted mixture of parent distributions rather than choosing just one, such as a normal or a uniform distribution.In section 3 similar considerations are applied to an event history model for the influence of education and gender on age at first marriage, but here the conclusions are hardly influenced by the choice of the duration distribution. In section 4 a brief discussion of model choice in factor analysis and structural equation models is followed by a more elaborate treatment of the choice of integer valued slopes for item response functions in the OPLM model which is an extension of the Rasch model. A modest simulation study suggests that Adaptive Bayesian Modeling with a mixture of sets of slopes works better than fixing one set of postulated slopes.The paper concludes with some remarks on the roles and sources of prior distributions followed by a short epilogue which argues that simultaneous consideration of a class of models for the same data is sometimes superior to exclusively analyzing the data under one specific model chosen from such a class.This article is based on the Presidential Address Ivo W. Molenaar gave on June 20, 1998 at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the Psychometric Society held at the University of Illinois in Champaign, Illinois. Thanks is given to John Wiley & Sons and George C. Tiao for granting permission to reprint three figures from the book George C. Tiao wrote with George E. P. Box titled Bayesian Inference in Statistical Analysis.—EditorThanks are due to Anne Boomsma, Jeffrey Hoogland, Mark Huisman, Tom Snijders, Marijtje Van Duijn, and Norman Verhelst for suggesting improvements and/or assisting with data analyses.