Aggressive slides can induce a weapons effect

This experiment aims at testing the relationship between the aggressive meaning of slides and the viewers' behavior. Three sets of slides varying in their perceived aggressive content (revolver, whistle and a box of chocolate milk) were shown to three groups of Ss who had to choose the intensity of electric shocks they wanted to administer to a partner. As expected, viewing a highly aggressive slide increased the aggressive behavior of the Ss who had been insulted. These results broaden the generalizability of the Berkowitz and LePage (1967) original finding, and they cannot be explained by Page and Scheidt's (1971) criticisms.     

Rating scales for hyperactivity: Concurrent validity,reliability, and decisions to label for the Conners and Davids abbreviated scales

Rating scales have become the instrument of choice in labeling and assessing change in behavior of hyperactive children. However, several criticisms have recently have levied against their use. The present investigation examined the concurrent validity, and inter- and intrarater reliability for the Abbreviated Teacer Questionnaire (ATQ, Conners, 1973) and the Rating Scales for Hyperkinesis (Davids, 1971). Sixteen teachers from two special and two regular schools (grades 1-4) rated 211 normal and 49 special children using both scales. High correlations were found suggesting excellent predictability between scales and considerable stability across time and rater. Lower scores on a subsequent rating relative to an initial rating were demonstrated, dependent on time between ratings but independent of (a) teacher expectation of treatment gains, (b) bias produced by rating selected children, and (c) whether children were hyperactive or normal. Use of initial and infrequent rating scores versus subsequent, closely spaced ratings was related to the rater's objective (e.g., diagnosis, treatment, or assessment).     

Ninian Smart and the Phenomenological Approach to Religious Education

This essay reviews and assesses Ninian Smart's contribution to religious education. Attention is given to his account of the nature and purpose of religious education as expressed and developed in a series of works published between the late 1960s and the early 1970s, beginning with The Teacher and Christian Belief (1966) and ending with Schools Council Working Paper 36, Religious Education in the Secondary School (1971), which was produced under his direction. Continuities and tensions in his thought are identified and discussed in the context of recent debates within religious education and the academic study of religion. Smart’s case for non-confessional religious education is considered, as is his support for a phenomenological approach to religious education. Although serious criticisms are raised, it is concluded that his work is of abiding significance and relevance to both British education and beyond.     

A factor structure for the MMPI-A: replication with male delinquents

The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-Adolescent (MMPI-A) Structural Summary was developed as a means of simplifying the interpretation of the 69 scales and subscales of this test instrument by organizing findings around eight primary factor dimensions. The current study examined the scale-level factor structure of the MMPI-A in a large sample of 1,610 male juvenile delinquents to assess the potential usefulness of this factor structure in a delinquency population. In this attempt to replicate the MMPI-A scale-level factor structure identified by Archer, Belevich, and Elkins in the MMPI-A normative sample and by Archer and Krishnamurthy in a clinical sample, a correlation matrix of all MMPI-A scale raw scores was created for a principal factor analysis. Results from the factor analysis produced a seven-factor solution that was largely consistent with the dimensions of the MMPI-A Structural Summary. Results were also reported in terms of the frequency of elevations on Structural Summary dimensions, with particular evidence of the importance of the Immaturity factor in describing this male juvenile delinquent sample.     

The crucial importance of empirical evidence in the development of bereavement theory: reply to Archer (2001).

In his commentary, J. Archer (2001a) argued that G. A. Bonanno and S. Kaltman's (1999) review and integration of the bereavement literature failed to consider evolutionary theory or other approaches to the origins of grief. Archer also argued that Bonanno and Kaltman had merely replaced the traditional grief work perspective with cognitive restructuring, thereby ignoring the processes related to avoidance and distancing from the loss. In this reply, the author first explains that although it was compelling to do so, Bonanno and Kaltman did not emphasize an evolutionary approach to the origins of grief reactions because in their current form these theories lack empirical and theoretical clarity. Second, the author shows that, contrary to Archer's reading, Bonanno and Kaltman's article viewed cognitive restructuring as a mechanism used primarily by extremely grieved persons and only in some cognitive domains. Last, the author shows that Bonanno and Kaltman have championed rather than ignored avoidant or distancing processes.     

Using a Difficulty‐Anchored Rating Scale in Performing Angoff Ratings

While the Angoff (1971) is a commonly used cut score method, critics ( Berk, 1996; Impara & Plake, 1997 ) argue the Angoff places too‐high cognitive demands on raters. In response to criticisms of the Angoff, a number of modifications to the method have been proposed. Some suggested Angoff modifications include using an iterative rating process, presenting judges with normative data about item performance, revising the rating judgment into a Yes/No decision, assigning relative weights to dimensions within a test, and using item response theory in setting cut scores. In this study, subject matter expert raters were provided with a ‘difficulty anchored’ rating scale to use while making Angoff ratings; this scale can be viewed as a variation of the Angoff normative data modification. The rating scale presented test items having known p‐values as anchors, and served as a simple means of providing normative information to guide the Angoff rating process. Results are discussed regarding reliability of the mean Angoff rating (.73) and the correlation of mean Angoff ratings with item difficulty (observed r ranges from .65 to .73).     

Rational skepticism: A scientific review of Witts' (2018) criticisms of the PEAK relational training system

Witts' (2018) review of the peer-reviewed research on the PEAK-Direct Training Module (Dixon, 2014) yielded a divergent conclusion from that of previous reviews (Reed & Luiselli, 2016; Dixon, Belisle, McKeel et al., 2017). Witts advocates for skepticism of this research due to methodological shortcomings, hyperclaiming of results, and inappropriate statistical testing procedures. We identified 30 criticisms in Witts' review, respond to each, and argue that all but 2 (7%) contain untrue assumptions (7, 23%), are not novel (5, 17%), are logically invalid (7, 23%), or are more appropriately framed as criticisms of applied behavior analytic research more generally (9, 30%). The two criticisms that support Witts' purpose in writing his review are minor and not fatal. We discuss all of Witts' criticisms both specifically and broadly to illustrate that most of his suggestions about applied behavior analytic research may actually serve to hinder progress in a discipline moving toward larger-scale research.     

Sporting Integrity,Coherence, and Being True to the Spirit of a Game

Abstract

The term ‘sporting integrity’ is widely used in the normative assessment of sports. The term, however, suffers from a lack of conceptual precision. Alfred Archer’s ‘coherence-view’ of sporting integrity goes a long way to help clarify what ‘sporting integrity’ actually means and the specific institutional and individual obligations that it generates. Archer argues that ‘sporting integrity’ essentially means that the constraints athletes face ‘cohere’, in the sense of applying consistent inefficiencies between athletic competitors. For example, those who use performance enhancing drugs (PEDs) are less constrained than those who do not use PEDs, and thus PED use undermines sporting integrity. This paper presents the argument that over and above competitive coherence, sporting integrity means living up to the ‘spirit’ or ‘ethos’ of a game. The implications of this view are that a sport could have ‘coherent’ competitive constraints and still lack sporting integrity; additionally, a sport could have ‘incoherent’ competitive constraints and still demonstrate sporting integrity. These implications are drawn out relative to the three specific cases that Archer uses to illustrate his coherence view; namely, PED use in professional cycling, ‘tanking’ in Olympic badminton, and the prospect of allowing the Rangers Football Club entrance into the Scottish Premier League without playing through and first winning/qualifying in the lesser leagues.     

In defence of iconic memory

According to a model of visual information-processing which originated with Sperling (1960), and which currently enjoys wide acceptance, the contents of brief alphanumeric displays are initially held in a high-capacity fast-decay visual-information store (“iconic memory”). Some of these items are subsequently transferred to a more durable form of storage; the remaining non-transferred items are lost. Observers can select which items are to be transferred on the basis of physical characteristics of the items (such as colour, location, size, shape or brightness).

This model has recently been attacked by Holding (1970, 1971, 1972, 1973), sometimes by claiming that iconic memory does not exist, and at other times by claiming that transfer from iconic memory cannot be selectively controlled by the observer. We argue in this paper that Holding's criticisms are incorrect, and that, even if they were correct, the experiment we report would not be open to objections he has raised concerning previous studies of iconic memory. Despite this, evidence fully supporting the orthodox model was obtained, and we therefore conclude that this model remains tenable.     

Morgan on deductive explanation: A rejoinder

This paper is mainly a response to Charles Morgan's criticisms (this journal, pp. 511–25) of the author's model of the (formal aspects of) explanation. It is claimed in the paper that with two modifications and some additional specifications the model withstands Morgan's criticisms.     

Complex genetic causation of human disease: Critiques of and rationales for heritability and path analysis

This paper examines some criticisms that have been made of two standard genetic methodologies: heritability and path analysis. I conclude that the criticisms should be taken seriously, concerning both the accuracy of heritability measures and their significance. In light of the fact that such studies remain prominent in the literature, I consider what possible rationale they can retain consistent with these criticisms. In particular, I consider (1) a role in the identification of high-risk individuals and (2) a heuristic role in the planning of research strategy.     

What the Problem with Russell Isn't

Mark Nelson thinks that Bertrand Russell's well-known criticisms of St. Thomas Aquinas turn on Russell's acceptance of a highly implausible epistemic principle (DAM), and that my previous objection to this claim depends upon the attribution to Russell of an even more implausible Insincerity Objection. While I agree that Russell's criticisms do not turn on the Insincerity Objection, I argue that my previous rejection of the attribution of (DAM) to Russell is well-justified: there is a plausible reading of Russell that requires neither (DAM) nor the Insincerity Objection.     

A FAILED RECONCILIATION: FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON STERBA'S PROJECT

Although I do not find any of Sterba's responses to my recent criticisms of his work How to Make People Just convincing, I shall not attempt to answer them point by point since this would be a boring, scholastic exercise at best.1 Rather, I shall expand upon what I believe continue to be the three major problems with Sterba's theory and explain why his recent responses to my criticisms (and the criticisms of others) along these lines are not adequate.     

The effect of thematic content on the ‘Wason selection task’

This paper concerns the differential effects of use of ‘thematic’, rather than abstract (symbolic), content on the ‘Wason selection task’. An effect of thematic content has been reported several times, originally by Wason & Shapiro (1971), but Manktelow & Evans (1979) report five experiments that failed to obtain an effect and argue against the validity of the content effect in general. However, it is pointed out that four of their experiments use a novel content and that there are previous reports of non-effective content in the literature. It is concluded that a particular type of thematic content cannot be treated as a ‘random sample’ of thematic content in general, and that their argument thus rests upon their failure to produce an effect of the specific (’towns and transport’) content used by Wason and Shapiro. This produces an essentially empirical controversy which is settled in two ways. First, Manktelow and Evans’s criticisms of two previous replications are shown to be misleading. Second, an experiment is reported that exactly copies the Wason and Shapiro design and produces a significant effect of content. It is concluded that the Manktelow and Evans result most probably was due to a Type 2 error. Finally, a hypothesis is developed to account for both the effect of certain types of content and the lack of effect of others, including that used in Manktelow and Evans’s first four experiments.     

CONDEMNATION OF A SCIENTIFIC ARTICLE: A CHRONOLOGY AND REFUTATION OF THE ATTACKS AND A DISCUSSION OF THREATS TO THE INTEGRITY OF SCIENCE

On July 12, 1999, our meta-analysis on child sexual abuse published in Psychological Bulletin, one of the American Psychological Association's (APA) premiere journals, was condemned by the U.S. Congress (H. Con. Res. 107). The condemnation followed months of attacks on the article, the APA, and us by various social conservatives and psychoanalytically-oriented clinicians. The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) was asked by the APA to independently review our article. After considering criticisms of it and the article itself, AAAS declined, but commented that it was the criticisms, not our methods or analyses, that troubled them because these criticisms misrepresented what we wrote. The current article chronicles this whole affair. First, we provide background, explaining why an article such as ours was needed. Then we accurately summarize the article, given that it has been so widely misrepresented. Next we present a chronology of the events leading up to and following the condemnation. We then present and refute all the major criticisms of the article, which have included both methodological and conceptual attacks. Next we discuss the threat to science that these events portend. We conclude by discussing the need to separate moral judgments from scientific research, the conflation of which formed the basis for the distortions and condemnation.     

Lateral asymmetries in electrodermal responses to nonattended stimuli: a reply to Walker and Ceci

Walker and Ceci (1983) pose a number of interesting and potentially important criticisms and alternative explanations regarding the laterality finding and hypothesis of Dawson and Schell (1982). The present evaluation finds each of the criticisms and alternative explanations to be inadequate. We then distinguish between two alternative interpretations of the Dawson and Schell hypothesis, one based on inherent functional properties of the two hemispheres and the other based on the notion that each hemisphere is a partially independent pool of processing resources. Walker and Ceci's fundamental objection seems to apply only to the first interpretation.     

Whether, when, and why Skinner published on biological participation in behavior

This paper brings some data to bear on the criticisms, claims, and arguments that Skinner (a) denied or dismissed biological participation in behavior, (b) addressed it only late in his career or more often later than earlier, or (c) addressed it only because of the overwhelming evidence for it or the criticisms that he had overlooked it. For this, we coded Skinner's every primary-source publication for three content categories (i.e., genetics, physiology, and evolution) and for the extent to which he addressed them (i.e., in publication titles, substantively, or in passing). Our findings are that Skinner addressed biological participation in over a third of his publications throughout his career, albeit more often later than earlier. The latter, however, is accounted for by an increase in his base rate of publication and in general conditions and specific events in his career, psychology, and science. The discussion addresses our research methods; the reasons for and refutations of the criticisms, claims, and arguments; and their sources.     

MMPI scale development methodology reconsidered

Levitt's (1978) critique of my earlier suggestions regarding MMPI scale development methodology (Clopton, 1978b) correctly noted that scales have been developed by a variety of methods in addition to empirical scale construction, but two of Levitt's other criticisms were mistaken. After Levitt's criticisms are considered, some additional suggestions are provided regarding the empirical development of new MMPI scales.     

Dispelling a few false-positives: A reply to MacGregor and McNamee on doping

McGregor and MacNamee recently, in this journal, offered several criticisms of an earlier article in which I attempted to refute a number of arguments for the claim that doping in sports is morally wrong. Their criticisms are numerous, but focus on four domains. First, they sketch a view on which the risk profiles of different sports may make doping permissible in some and impermissible in others. Second, they suggest that my criticisms of safety-based arguments assume that doping opponents are bent on harm elimination, rather than harm management. Finally, they offer two methodological criticisms, the first pertaining to my use of analogical arguments, and the second pertaining to the general difficulties of making revisionist arguments in ethics. I defend my criticisms of safety-based arguments by showing that these do not rest on the assumptions McGregor and MacNamee attribute to me and by noting that their own view about the variable relevance of safety considerations is underdeveloped. As for their methodological arguments, I endeavor to show that these are misplaced, in that they either rest on misinterpretations of my earlier article or on an excessively high standard for ethical argumentation.