Knowledge of spatial relations: A preliminary investigation

The mechanism underlying our knowledge of spatial relationships was investigated. In the first experiment subjects were asked to examine an array of circles, located in different positions on a background; after removal of the array, they answered questions about the spatial relations between the circles. The array was constructed so that the number of circles and the number of relations between circles could be independently varied. The results showed that the number of correct answers decreased as the number of circles increased, but was unaffected by the number of relations between circles. This suggests that subjects learn the positions of the circles, from which relations between circles can be computed, rather than learning the relations directly. Evidence from the second experiment, using a similar experimental paradigm, suggests that the positions of the circles are learned by organizing them into higher-order units or groups.     

Opening the cuebox: The information children and young adults generate and rely on when making inferences from memory

We used a cue‐generation and a cue‐selection paradigm to investigate the cues children (9‐ to 12‐year‐olds) and young adults (17‐year‐olds) generate and select for a range of inferences from memory. We found that children generated more cues than young adults, who, when asked why they did not generate some particular cues, responded that they did not consider them relevant for the task at hand. On average, the cues generated by children were more perceptual but as informative as the cues generated by young adults. When asked to select the most informative of two cues, both children and young adults tended to choose a hidden (i.e., not perceptual) cue. Our results suggest a developmental change in the cuebox (i.e., the set of cues used to make inferences from memory): New cues are added to the cuebox as more cues are learned, and some old, perceptual cues, although informative, are replaced with hidden cues, which, by both children and young adults, are generally assumed to be more informative than perceptual cues.     

Knowledge of spatial relations: Varying the precision with which locations must be specified

In previous studies, subjects have been asked whether one named town is north (say) of another. The results have shown that as the distance between the towns increases, reaction times decrease. Explanations have focused on a subject's disposition to derive an answer by using less precise information about location when the towns are far apart. In the present experiments, subjects who had memorized a map of Europe were asked whether an imaginary line connecting two named towns passes through a named country. The country was either large or small in area, and the distance between the towns was either long or short. It was expected that in the large country condition less precise information would be used when the distance was long than when it was short, as inferred in previous experiments. Accordingly, reaction times decreased as the distance increased. In the small country condition it was supposed that some degree of precision would be required to determine that the line ran through the country, regardless of the distance between the towns. Therefore, it was expected that the size of the country would limit the degree to which a decrease in precision could occur with an increase in distance. Consistent with this expectation, distance and size of country interacted, such that when the country was small an increase in distance did not cause a decrease in reaction time. Similar results were found in a second experiment.     

Knowledge of spatial relations: The determination of the relationship “nearest to”

After memorising the names and positions of a set of familiar towns, subjects were given the name of one of the towns followed by the name of a target town. The subjects' task was to state whether the given town was the nearest town in the memory set to the target. In three experiments analyses of reaction times suggested that subjects generate their responses by determining the distance from the given town to the target and comparing it with the distances of other towns to the target. The use of other methods, for example locating the nearest town on a mental map by scanning outward from the target and comparing it with the given town seem inconsistent with the data.     

The influence of information redundancy on probabilistic inferences

Information redundancy affects the accuracy of inference strategies. A simulation study illustrates that under high-information redundancy simple heuristics that rely on only the most important information are as accurate as strategies that integrate all available information, whereas under low redundancy integrating information becomes advantageous. Assuming that people exercise adaptive strategy selection, it is predicted that their inferences will more often be captured by simple heuristics that focus on part of the available information insituations ofhigh-information redundancy, especially when information search is costly. This prediction is confirmed in two experiments. The participants' task was to repeatedly infer which of two alternatives, described by several cues, had a higher criterion value. In the first experiment, simple heuristics predicted the inference process better under high-information redundancy than under low-information redundancy. In the second experiment, this result could be generalized to an inference situation in which participants had no prior opportunity to learn about the strategies' accuracies through outcome feedback. The results demonstrate that people are able to respond adaptively to different decision environments under various learning opportunities.     

Knowledge acquisition and information searching strategies in diagnostic decision making.

The effect of three learning procedures on diagnostic information searching strategies was investigated. Undergraduate students acquired an artificial knowledge domain through either a Taxonomic-, Inductive-, or Case-oriented knowledge acquisition procedure. The use of the competing-hypotheses heuristic as a practical strategy to guide decision making in the face of uncertainty, was compared among the three learning conditions and between each condition and a non-learning control group using the method developed by Kern and Doherty (1982) and Wolf et al. (1985). The small instruction intervention had an effect on the diagnostic nature of subjects' information-searching strategies. Subjects in the Inductive-learning condition exhibited a stronger tendency to seek diagnostically worthless information than the other learning conditions. The outcomes are considered relevant to the nature of expertise in decision making, and to the effect of instruction methodologies on the knowledge representations available to diagnostic classification and decision-making processes.     

Reasoning counterfactually: making inferences about things that didn't happen

The authors investigated the relationship between reasoners' understanding of subjunctive conditionals (e.g., if p had happened, then q would have happened) and the inferences they were prepared to endorse. Reasoners who made a counterfactual interpretation of subjunctive statements (i.e., they judged the statement to imply that p and q did not happen) endorsed different inferences than those who did not. Those who made a counterfactual interpretation were more likely to (a) judge the situation in which p and q occurred to be inconsistent with the conditional statement and (b) make negative inferences such as modus tollens (i.e., approximately q therefore approximately p). These findings occurred with familiar and unfamiliar content, affirmative and negative conditionals, and conditional and biconditional relations.     

The role of logical and nonlogical factors in making inferences about category membership

Three postulates are proposed concerning the manner in which persons infer the validity of propositions that do not necessarily follow logically from the information available. These postulates assume that subjects first attempt to identify the propositions that are most and least likely to follow from the information given. They then use their beliefs in these propositions as anchors, relative to which the validity of other propositions is evaluated on the basis of both logical and nonlogical criteria. Two experiments are reported in which these postulates are used successfully to diagnose the logical and nonlogical factors that underlie inferences based upon both single statements and sets of syllogistically related propositions. The implications of the proposed postulates for existing formulations of social inference and cognitive organization are discussed.     

The use of recognition information and additional cues in inferences from memory

Goldstein and Gigerenzer's (2002) "Recognition Heuristic" (RH) was tested for its empirical validity in an experimental paradigm with induced recognition of objects. RH claims that upon inferring which of two objects (e.g., cities) scores higher on a criterion (e.g., city size), a recognized object will be chosen over an unrecognized one, if the recognition is a valid predictor of the criterion without considering additional object information. Trying to avoid potential shortcomings of former studies, we (a) used the city population task, (b) provided additional cue information only for recognized cities, and (c) had participants draw inferences from memory. Participants learned city names and additional information about some cities. They also learned that recognition and the additional information were valid predictors of the criterion "city size". In a subsequent decision phase, the additional information about the cities in memory strongly affected the inferences, suggesting that recognition information is clearly integrated into judgments, but by no means in a non-compensatory fashion that would dominate every other cue.     

The organisation of spatial and temporal relations in memory

Episodic memories are comprised of details of “where” and “when”; spatial and temporal relations, respectively. However, evidence from behavioural, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging studies has provided mixed interpretations about how memories for spatial and temporal relations are organised—they may be hierarchical, fully interactive, or independent. In the current study, we examined the interaction of memory for spatial and temporal relations. Using explicit reports and eye-tracking, we assessed younger and older adults’ memory for spatial and temporal relations of objects that were presented singly across time in unique spatial locations. Explicit change detection of spatial relations was affected by a change in temporal relations, but explicit change detection of temporal relations was not affected by a change in spatial relations. Younger and older adults showed eye movement evidence of incidental memory for temporal relations, but only younger adults showed eye movement evidence of incidental memory for spatial relations. Together, these findings point towards a hierarchical organisation of relational memory. The implications of these findings are discussed in the context of the neural mechanisms that may support such a hierarchical organisation of memory.     

Visual attention and the apprehension of spatial relations: The case of depth

Several studies have shown that targets defined on the basis of the spatial relations between objects yield highly inefficient visual search performance (e.g., Logan, 1994; Palmer, 1994), suggesting that the apprehension of spatial relations may require the selective allocation of attention within the scene. In the present study, we tested the hypothesis that depth relations might be different in this regard and might support efficient visual search. This hypothesis was based, in part, on the fact that many perceptual organization processes that are believed to occur early and in parallel, such as figure-ground segregation and perceptual completion, seem to depend on the assignment of depth relations. Despite this, however, using increasingly salient cues to depth (Experiments 2–4) and including a separate test of the sufficiency of the most salient depth cue used (Experiment 5), no evidence was found to indicate that search for a target defined by depth relations is any different than search for a target defined by other types of spatial relations, with regard to efficiency of search. These findings are discussed within the context of the larger literature on early processing of three-dimensional characteristics of visual scenes.     

The representation of spatial information in memory

Following memorisation of the spatial arrangement of an array of circles, subjects were asked to recall the circles in a type of free-recall task designed to determine the structure of the memorised information. Their performance showed that the circles tended to be recalled in an order that corresponded with a top-to-bottom ordering of circles on the array. In a second experiment the input order of the circles was varied by presenting them successively. The results indicated that input order influenced recall order. The implications for hypotheses about the structure and manipulation of stored spatial information were discussed.     

Distortions in judged spatial relations

In three experiments, we explore distortions in subjects' judgments of relative geographical relations. People make large systematic errors in judging the geographical relations between two locations that are in different geographical or political units. There is a strong tendency to distort the judged relation to conform with the relation of the superordinate political unit. To account for this result, we present a model in which spatial information is stored hierarchically. Spatial relations between any two locations are stored explicitly only if those locations are within the same superordinate unit. Spatial relations not stored are inferred by combining the relations from between and within superordinate units.     

Attributions and other inferences: Processing information about the self versus others

This study focuses on the attributional inferences involved in the comprehension of behaviors and on possible differences between the process of comprehending one's own behaviors and those of another person. Both the content of attributional judgments and the time taken to make the judgments were measured, in a design involving the comprehension of behaviors that were high or low in desirability and distinctiveness and that were understood as the subject's own versus another person's. Results show that the inferential processes in the comprehension of one's own and another's behavior are generally similar. Exceptions are where organized knowledge about the self (a self-schema) is brought into use and where differences in “perspective” between self and other influence processing. Discussion centers on the implications of the results for theories of comprehension and inference, including extensions needed to handle the self/other distinction.     

Implications of the symbol figure representations: information from the direction and spatial location used by Japanese students

Meanings of physical distance, spatial location, and direction of symbolic figure in the Doll Location Test were investigated with 283 normal college students in Japan. They were asked to indicate eight symbolic figures of hypothetical people such as reliable father, unreliable mother on a recording sheet. The physical dyadic distance from the self, spatial location, and direction of symbolic figures were analyzed. Positive persons were placed twice as close as a negative person. Analysis of direction showed that more than 90% of the positive people were represented in either the same direction as or facing self, whereas a negative person was represented either in the opposite or in an unrelated direction from the self. Spatial location of the symbolic figures did not yield evaluative values.     

Attending to multiple sources of information: I. The integration of information in decision making

Information relevant to a decision is often available from several sources, such as different sensory modalities or different spatial locations. Processing or utilization of such information is often selective in that some sources seem to have more influence on a decision or response than others. Many different theoretical mechanisms have been proposed to account for such selective (i.e., attentional) aspects of human information processing. This paper considers theoretical mechanisms which operate to integrate separate sources of information in order to make a binary decision. In particular, these mechanisms are studied in simple visual and auditory detection tasks as well as a Bayesian decision problem. Data from these experiments reject the idea that one integrates the relevant information from several sources prior to making a decision. Rather, one seems to form separate decisions about the information from each source and then integrate these decisions in order to select a response.     

The development of categorical and coordinate spatial relations

Two classes of spatial relations can be distinguished in between and within object representations. Kosslyn [Kosslyn, S. M. (1987). Seeing and imagining in the cerebral hemispheres: A computational approach. Psychological Review, 94, 148–175] suggested that the right hemisphere (RH) is specialized for processing coordinate (metric) spatial information and the left hemisphere (LH) processes categorical (abstract) information more effectively. The present study examined the developmental pattern of spatial relation processing in 6–8-year old, 10–12-year old and adults. Using signal detection analyses we calculated sensitivity and bias scores for all age groups. The results indicated that older children and adults showed a greater response bias than younger children. Also, discrimination sensitivity for spatial relation changes clearly improved with age. For the oldest children (10–12-year old) and adults this improvement was accompanied by a RH specialization. In contrast with Kosslyn's claim, this RH advantage also applied to the processing of categorical spatial information. The results are discussed in terms of a right hemispheric specialization for spatial relation processing which matures with age.     

行为决策中的描述–经验差距:信息加工角度的解释

选项信息获取过程会影响决策,描述–经验差距简称D-E差距,是指个体进行决策时根据概括性描述信息得到的结果与依据序列体验信息的经验得到的结果之间的差异。文章以认知因素在决策范式演进过程中的角色为线索,梳理了D-E差距的提出及最新的研究发现。参考决策认知过程框架从信息加工角度探讨D-E差距影响因素,从整体上解释D-E差距的原因。未来需要从全面对比两种决策范式,改进经验决策研究方法等角度进行深入探讨。     

Knowledge in the information society

The German Council for Research, Technology and Innovation defines the “information society” as a type of society where the acquirement, storage, processing, exchange, diffusion and utilization of knowledge inclusive of their technological possibilities of interactive communication, here become increasingly important. In this notion, knowledge has become the decisive factor for economic growth and technological advance. As a social scientist I transform the term “information society” into processes of automatization of knowledge, which is called its informatization and computerization. It is argued that these processes affect the societal condition of knowledge in that the part of knowledge relating to the contents diminishes while the importance of the technical and/or formal part increases. In contrast to the claim of many social scientists, this trend does not lead to a superficial or shallow type of knowledge. What is changing is the social requirement of professional skills and qualifications. The great looming question about information society then is: Which knowledge do people need to behave competently, effectively and successfully in a world full of computers? The structure of this article is as follows. First I will have a look at the micro‐level of the composition of knowledge, next I will proceed to the historical shift from subject‐specific knowledge to media‐competence and finally I will talk about the meaning of the evolving dominance of—what I will call “media‐competent experts”.