Financing Faith: Religion and Strategic Philanthropy

Over the last century, a new form of strategic philanthropy arose—that of the private foundation. Foundations do not account for a large portion of donations received by religious organizations, but they can deploy important resources at critical moments. Examining data between 1999 and 2003 from the Foundation Center on grants and grant making, we find that a very small number of foundations are dominant actors in religious strategic philanthropy. These organizations introduce isomorphic tendencies within American religion. Federal tax policies and financial scandals precipitated the emergence of more organizational forms—regranting organizations, supporting organizations, and oversight organizations. Factors such as secularization, religious pluralism, and globalization have generated new challenges for private foundations, and in the aggregate, these developments have contributed to a restructuring within the world of religious philanthropy.     

An Orthodox View of Philanthropy and Church Diaconia

According to Orthodox theology, philanthropy refers to the loveof God toward man, which man is called to imitate by lovinghis neighbor as himself. This love consists not just in emotionsbut requires specific acts of philanthropy toward our fellowman in need. The church, in keeping the commandments of Christ,has developed throughout her history a rich philanthropic work.The diaconia of the church has taken many forms, thus respondingto historical change and to the specific human needs at differenttimes. Concentrating on diaconia for those who are in need oflong-term care, this article presents the Orthodox view of thediaconia of the church, as realized through her own philanthropicorganizations as well as through her very specific contributionto the diaconia offered by state sponsored charitable institutions.     

Philanthropy,cosmopolitanism, and the benefits of giving directly

In the face of widespread poverty, Peter Singer argues that the best response is giving money to charitable organizations that give aid to the poor. In response, much criticism has been leveled by cosmopolitan philosophers that philanthropy is unable to effectively combat poverty for many reasons: such funds fall prey to corrupt bureaucrats, the poor will waste the money, or become dependent upon donations rather than providing for themselves. In this paper, I argue that the work of the organization GiveDirectly offers an approach that can overcome the criticisms leveled against philanthropy. GiveDirectly works by providing direct cash transfers to the poor; by adopting such a straightforward method, GiveDirectly provides practical benefits to the poor, and overcomes key philosophical critiques. The poor are empowered to make choices to meet their own needs, and do not become dependent upon donations. While GiveDirectly does not constitute the solution to the problem of global poverty, it does provide an avenue by which philanthropic efforts can make a difference in the battle against poverty, in ways that best respect and promote the autonomy of the poor.     

当代福建佛教慈善组织运行模式剖析

本论文以厦门南普陀寺慈善会、厦门同心慈善会和福建省佛教协会佛教教育基金委员会等三个佛教慈善组织为重点,对它们的慈善活动开展和组织运行机制进行剖析,比较其组织特点和发展优势,并将三者分别归纳为"救济型慈善"、"服务型慈善"和"弘法型慈善"三种类型。以这三个佛教组织进行考察,不仅可以反映出福建佛教慈善的基本状况,而且可以代表不同类型的佛教组织运行机制特点,从而揭示我国佛教慈善组织的发展面貌。     

Good science and good philosophy of science

I argue against the assumption that the influence of non-cognitive values must lead to bad science, opening the way for the thesis that non-cognitive values are compatible with good science. This, in turn, allows us to answer feminist questions, principally, How do gender politics influence science? without (1) having to reject the question a priori because theories of science assume that political values cannot influence good scientific work and (2) having made a case for the influence of gender politics upon a particular bit of scientific work, being put into the ludicrous position of saying that it is bad science after all, even though the relevant community of scientists say it is good. Nevertheless, moral and political neutrality is held to be a norm of good science and a tacit metaphilosophical norm governing good philosophy of science, viz., a good philosophy of science reveals and analyzes the morally and politically neutral production of good science. This metaphilosophical norm insures that the philosophy of science (1) is blind to the influence of non-cognitive values on good science if and when these are present and so (2) acquiesces in the moral or political arrangements supported by the science in question.     

The Philanthropy of the Orthodox Church: A Rumanian Case Study

On the basis of a definition of God as "love", human philanthropyis derived from Divine philanthropy, and therefore extends toall human beings. Because Divine philanthropy is most centrallyexpressed in Christ's incarnation and resurrection, Christ'sidentification with all who suffer presents the strongest motivationfor human philanthropy. After a short review of the RomanianOrthodox Church's development after 1989, the author turns tohis special case study, the Social-Medical Day-Care ChristianCentre for older citizens. He describes the wan in which Church-basedphilanthropy can integrate socialmedical with Christian pastoralcare, and how this work draws the local communities into assuminga shared responsibility.     

Conceptual change in science and in science education

There is substantial evidence that traditional instructional methods have not been successful in helping students to restructure their commonsense conceptions and learn the conceptual structures of scientific theories. This paper argues that the nature of the changes and the kinds of reasoning required in a major conceptual restructuring of a representation of a domain are fundamentally the same in the discovery and in the learning processes. Understanding conceptual change as it occurs in science and in learning science will require the development of a common cognitive model of conceptual change. The historical construction of an inertial representation of motion is examined and the potential instructional implications of the case are explored.The preparation of this paper was supported in part by the Office of Naval Research Grant N00014-85-K-0337 to the Learning Research and Development Center at the University of Pittsburgh. The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the ONR, and no official endorsement should be inferred. I wish to thank Lauren Resnick for her helpful comments and encouragement to pursue this research. I also thank Paul Thagard for introducing me to the technique of concept mapping and Gregory Nowak for his assistance in the preparation of the figures. The paper has benefited from comments by Floris Cohen, Susan Hojnacki, Thomas Kuhn, and Michael Ranney. Any misconceptions are, however, my own.     

The misrepresentation of science by philosophers and teachers of science

In education there is a concern that science teachers misrepresent the nature of science to students. An assumption that is implicit in this concern is that science teachers should be teaching the philosophy of science as it is understood by philosophers. This paper argues that both philosophers and science teachers misrepresent science when they engage in their respective disciplines, and it is evident the two misrepresentations are of different types. In philosophy, the misrepresentation is of a philosophical-epistemological nature where advocates of particular views maintain that advocates of other views misinterpret the nature of science. In education, the misrepresentation is of a cognitive, teaching nature where teachers' practical interpretations are not congruent with philosophers' interpretations of science. The discrepancy that exists between the two misrepresentations is due to the intentions of the two disciplines, and assuming that science teachers should teach a philosophically coherent interpretation of the nature of science is an over-simplification of the problem. The concepts of espoused theories and theories-in-use are used to link the two interpretations of science and provide suggestions for future research that may help clarify misrepresentations of science in science education.