Er?ffnungsansprache

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

What is Theological Interpretation? The Example of Robert W. Jenson

Theological interpretation is an approach to reading generated by a theological understanding of the biblical text, of the community that reads it theologically, and of the practice of reading. This essay argues this point on the basis of the work of one representative theological interpreter, Robert W. Jenson. In addition, it entertains John Barton's objection that theological interpretation amounts to eisegesis. The article concludes that theological exegesis does not necessarily involve reading one's views into the text, but rather that it results in putting the text to a different end.     

Intersubjektivit?t und psychoanalytische Identit?t

The psychoanalytic identity is the result of identification with a psychoanalytic introject. It protects against the fears to which everyone who is attempting to illuminate the unconscious is exposed. In this paper the substantive issues of identity are discussed as a psychoanalyst who is a support for the work by providing concepts for the understanding of the unconscious. Using the example of the intersubjective wend in psychoanalysis it will be examined how these contents have changed under the influence of intersubjectivity. The notion that psychological development also occurs in psychoanalysis in unmistakable interpersonal contexts implies removing the restraints imposed by commitment to the technical rules and normative expectations. The intersubjective view of psychoanalysis therefore demands from the psychoanalyst an identity which is fundamentally different from that of the classical psychoanalyst. Processing the associated fears places the psychoanalytic identity at a more mature stage.     

Old is old is old?

We examined potential differences between two matched subgroups of elderly men: young-old (65-74 years of age; n = 53) and old-old (75 years of age and older; n = 56). Subjects were fairly healthy men from community agencies, who were interviewed and tested on a number of characteristics involving personality, mood, attitudes, and behaviors. Although t tests and correlations indicated some differences between the groups, the overall findings underlined their similarity on the vast majority of variables scrutinized. The crucial base for enhancing understanding in gerontology should not only focus on the age-advancing senescent person but on the whole individual.     

What is spiritual? What is spiritual suffering?

The author offers definitions for "spiritual" and for "spiritual suffering," suggesting that human spiritual needs include Love, Faith, Hope, Virtue, and Beauty. Spiritual suffering is experienced when these needs are unfulfilled. Spiritual care involves assisting in the fulfillment of these needs. He considers the constant movement between spiritual needs and fulfillments, encouraging use of fluid (not static) assessment methods using "spiritual spectra." As a model, this outline of basic spiritual needs may serve as the foundation for many current spiritual assessment tools.     

Where is here? When is now?1

With a Kleinian perspective influenced by Betty Joseph, the author describes the distinctive ‘here and now’ of a psychoanalysis as the place and the time of the patient’s inner subjective world as it emerges in the work of patient and analyst. This psychoanalytic ‘here’ and ‘now’ is examined with clinical material from the analysis of Mr X; first, with an account of the way his analysis begins and then through a detailed session five years later.The author identifies Mr X’s problems with place and time, and how these change over the course of the analysis. He moves from sequestered dyadic relationships towards an Oedipal and family space, and from disconnection and timelessness to acquiring a sense of duration, of being in the present with a past and a future – all of which, the paper aims to show, has implications for technique.     

What is Testimony?

C.A.J. Coady, in his book Testimony: A Philosophical Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), offers conditions on an assertion that p to count as testimony. He claims that the assertion that p must be by a competent speaker directed to an audience in need of evidence and it must be evidence that p . I offer examples to show that Coady's conditions are too strong. Testimony need not be evidence; the speaker need not be competent; and, the statement need not be relevant or directed to someone in need of evidence. I give alternative conditions. Coady was led into the stronger conditions by investigating testimony as it occurs in legal contexts, where special steps are taken to ensure that testimony provides the jury or the judge with evidence by a competent speaker that is relevant to the disputed question of the guilt or innocence of the defendant.     

What is Antiphilosophy?

In certain philosophical quarters, a new metaphilosophical position is being discussed—antiphilosophy. Such a position seems to maintain that there is no distinction between philosophy and sophistry, reason and rhetoric, arguing and emoting. This paper examines antiphilosophy. Specifically, it aims to address three interrelated questions: Is antiphilosophy a possible metaphilosophical position? If it is, what characterizes it? And what ramifications would it have? The paper argues that antiphilosophy is possible and is best construed as an attempt to reconstruct philosophical discourse on noncognitive lines. Explicitly, “to assert” and the belief propositional attitude is replaced by “to convince” and a pro‐attitude desire to rhetorically talk someone into something. The paper examines one possible form such a position could take as well as various ramifications of it.     

What is hope?

According to the standard account, to hope for an outcome is to desire it and to believe that its realization is possible, though not inevitable. This account, however, faces certain difficulties: It cannot explain how people can display differing strengths in hope; it cannot distinguish hope from despair; and it cannot explain substantial hopes. This paper proposes an account of hope that can meet these deficiencies. Briefly, it argues that in addition to possessing the relevant belief–desire structure as allowed in the standard account, a hopeful person must also be able to see a way in which the desired outcome can come about and to see such a way to the outcome as a genuine possibility.     

What is Said?

It is sometimes argued that certain sentences of natural language fail to express truth conditional contents. Standard examples include e.g. Tipper is ready and Steel is strong enough. In this paper, we provide a novel analysis of truth conditional meaning (what is said) using the notion of a question under discussion. This account (i) explains why these types of sentences are not, in fact, semantically underdetermined (yet seem truth conditionally incomplete), (ii) provides a principled analysis of the process by which natural language sentences (in general) can come to have enriched meanings in context, and (iii) shows why various alternative views, e.g. so‐called Radical Contextualism, Moderate Contextualism, and Semantic Minimalism, are partially right in their respective analyses of the problem, but also all ultimately wrong. Our analysis achieves this result using a standard truth conditional and compositional semantics and without making any assumptions about enriched logical forms, i.e. logical forms containing phonologically null expressions.