The empirical case for role-governed categories

Most theories of categorization posit feature-based representations. Markman and Stilwell (2001) argued that many natural categories name roles in relational systems and therefore they are role-governed categories. There is little extant empirical evidence to support the existence of role-governed categories. Three experiments examine predictions for ways that role-governed categories should differ from feature-based categories. Experiment 1 shows that our knowledge of role-governed categories, in contrast to feature-based categories, is largely about properties extrinsic to category members. Experiment 2 shows that role-governed categories have more prominent ideals than feature-based categories. Experiment 3 demonstrates that novel role-governed categories are licensed by the instantiation of novel relational structures. We then discuss broader implications for the study of categories and concepts.     

The use of perceptual features in categorization by orangutans (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Pongo abelli</Emphasis>)

The extent to which categorization of natural classes in animals reflects a generalization based on perceptual similarity versus an abstract conceptual representation remains unclear. Here, two experiments were conducted to identify the perceptual features used by orangutans when categorizing pictures. In Experiment 1, subjects were trained and tested for transfer on a concrete discrimination (gorillas or orangutans vs. other primates). Analysis of performance on both positive and negative exemplars revealed that performance was best on photos with faces, particularly close-ups. Moreover, error trials did not seem to reflect instances of mistaken identity, but rather, exemplars that may have been distracting for other reasons, such as novel coloration or morphology. In Experiment 2, photos were modified to test the effects of various features. Color modifications caused the biggest decrease in performance, and eye modifications also affected performance deleteriously. Therefore, two perceptual features, namely eye regions and color, played a key role in subjects' ability to categorize. However, performance based on an underlying concept cannot be ruled out, because both of these features are highly relevant in terms of defining category membership. Although a subset of features was identified as playing a key role in categorization, these features differed depending on whether feature-use was studied indirectly, as in Experiment 1, or directly, as in Experiment 2.     

The origins of concepts

Certain of our concepts are innate, but many others are learned. Despite the plausibility of this claim, some have argued that the very idea of concept learning is incoherent. I present a conception of learning that sidesteps the arguments against the possibility of concept learning, and sketch several mechanisms that result in the generation of new primitive concepts. Given the rational considerations that motivate their deployment, I argue that these deserve to be called learning mechanisms. I conclude by replying to the objections that these mechanisms cannot produce genuinely new content and cannot be part of genuinely cognitive explanations.

The structure of choice

An unsolved fundamental problem in decision science concerns the extent to which the nature of the perceived relationships among items in a set of alternatives influences how they are chosen. More specifically, given a choice set with n items, how does human choice behavior differ as a function of the perceived relationships between the items of the set? In what follows, we study this problem empirically and theoretically from the standpoint of the dimensional structure of the choice set. In particular, we use generalized invariance structure theory (GIST; Vigo, 2013, 2014) to propose an inverse relationship between the degree of concept learning difficulty of a choice set (as determined by its degree of invariance or internal coherence) and choice response times on its members. To our knowledge, this is the first model that precisely unifies these two fundamental constructs. On average, the model, without free parameters, accounts for nearly 90% of the variance in the data from our two response-time experiments.     

Using phenomenal concepts to explain away the intuition of contingency

Humans can think about their conscious experiences using a special class of “phenomenal” concepts. Psychophysical identity statements formulated using phenomenal concepts appear to be contingent. Kripke argued that this intuited contingency could not be explained away, in contrast to ordinary theoretical identities where it can. If the contingency is real, property dualism follows. Physicalists have attempted to answer this challenge by pointing to special features of phenomenal concepts that explain the intuition of contingency. However no physicalist account of their distinguishing features has proven to be satisfactory. Leading accounts rely on there being a phenomenological difference between tokening a physical-functional concept and tokening a phenomenal concept. This paper shows that existing psychological data undermine that claim. The paper goes on to suggest that the recalcitrance of the intuition of contingency may instead by explained by the limited means people typically have for applying their phenomenal concepts. Ways of testing that suggestion empirically are proposed.     

The paradox of the universal triangle: Concepts,language, and prototypes

For over 300 years, the humble triangle has served as the paradigmatic example of the problem of abstraction. How can we have the idea of a general triangle even though every experience with triangles is with specific ones? Classical cognitive science seemed to provide an answer in symbolic representation. With its easily enumerated necessary and sufficient conditions, the triangle would appear to be an ideal candidate for being represented in a symbolic form. I show that it is not. Across a variety of tasks—drawing, speeded recognition, unspeeded visual judgments, and inference—representations of triangles appear to be graded and context dependent. I show that using the category name “triangle” activates a more prototypical representation than using an arguably coextensive cue, “three-sided polygon”. For example, when asked to draw “triangles” people draw more typical triangles than when asked to draw “three-sided polygons”. Altogether, the results support the view that (even formal) concepts have a graded and flexible structure, which takes on a more prototypical and stable form when activated by category labels.     

The effects of feature-label-order and their implications for symbolic learning

Symbols enable people to organize and communicate about the world. However, the ways in which symbolic knowledge is learned and then represented in the mind are poorly understood. We present a formal analysis of symbolic learning-in particular, word learning-in terms of prediction and cue competition, and we consider two possible ways in which symbols might be learned: by learning to predict a label from the features of objects and events in the world, and by learning to predict features from a label. This analysis predicts significant differences in symbolic learning depending on the sequencing of objects and labels. We report a computational simulation and two human experiments that confirm these differences, revealing the existence of Feature-Label-Ordering effects in learning. Discrimination learning is facilitated when objects predict labels, but not when labels predict objects. Our results and analysis suggest that the semantic categories people use to understand and communicate about the world can only be learned if labels are predicted from objects. We discuss the implications of this for our understanding of the nature of language and symbolic thought, and in particular, for theories of reference.     

类别表征与策略的脑科学研究及对思维教学的启示

脑科学研究表明,分类中对物体的知觉表征激活颞下叶皮层和颞中区等区域;语义表征激活前额皮层等。语义加工和知觉表征相互作用的脑机制表现为额区与视觉区域间信息的传递、提取。分类策略主要有规则策略和相似性策略两种。规则策略激活额区等广泛区域;相似性策略与视觉区域相关,包含着对个别样例的记忆过程。基于以上研究结果,本文从学习材料的表征和对材料进行表征时的策略两个方面为思维教学提出了一些建议。     

Do Americans Have a Preference for Rule‐Based Classification?

Six experiments investigated variables predicted to influence subjects’ tendency to classify items by a single property (rule‐based responding) instead of overall similarity, following the paradigm of Norenzayan et al. ( 2002 , Cognitive Science), who found that European Americans tended to give more “logical” rule‐based responses. However, in five experiments with Mechanical Turk subjects and undergraduates at an American university, we found a consistent preference for similarity‐based responding. A sixth experiment with Korean undergraduates revealed an effect of instructions, also reported by Norenzayan et al., in which classification instructions led to majority rule‐based responding but similarity instructions led to overall similarity grouping. Our American subjects showed no such difference and used similarity more overall. We conclude that Americans do not have a preference for rule responding in classification and discuss the differences between tasks that reliably show strong rule or unidimensional preferences (category construction and category learning) in contrast to this classification paradigm.     

Moving hands, moving entities

In this study we investigated with a priming paradigm whether uni and bimanual actions presented as primes differently affected language processing. Animals’ (self-moving entities) and plants’ (not self-moving entities) names were used as targets. As prime we used grasping hands, presented both as static images and videos. The results showed an interference effect with unimanual action primes (both static and moving) with plants’ names. No modulation of responses for animals’ names was found. We argue that in the present task plants elicit information on unimanual grasping actions they support, while the lack of effect for animals could be due to them being better characterized as active agents.     

Categories and causality: the neglected direction

The standard approach guiding research on the relationship between categories and causality views categories as reflecting causal relations in the world. We provide evidence that the opposite direction also holds: categories that have been acquired in previous learning contexts may influence subsequent causal learning. In three experiments we show that identical causal learning input yields different attributions of causal capacity depending on the pre-existing categories to which the learning exemplars are assigned. There is a strong tendency to continue to use old conceptual schemes rather than switch to new ones even when the old categories are not optimal for predicting the new effect, and when they were motivated by goals that differed from the present context of causal discovery. However, we also found that the use of prior categories is dependent on the match between categories and causal effect. Whenever the category labels suggest natural kinds which can be plausibly related to the causal effects, transfer was observed. When the categories were arbitrary, or could not be plausibly related to the causal effect learners abandoned the categories, and used different categories to predict the causal effect.     

Instance memorization and category influence: Challenging the evidence for multiple systems in category learning

A class of dual-system theories of categorization assumes a categorization system based on actively formed prototypes in addition to a separate instance memory system. It has been suggested that, because they have used poorly differentiated category structures (such as the influential “5-4” structure), studies supporting the alternative exemplar theory reveal little about the properties of the categorization system. Dual-system theories assume that the instance memory system only influences categorization behaviour via similarity to single isolated instances, without generalization across instances. However, we present the results of two experiments employing the 5-4 structure to argue against this. Experiment 1 contrasted learning in the standard 5-4 structure with learning in an even more poorly differentiated 5-4 structure. In Experiment 2, participants memorized the 5-4 structure based on a five minute simultaneous presentation of all nine category instances. Both experiments revealed category influences as reflected by differences in instance learnability and generalization, at variance with the dual-system prediction. These results have implications for the exemplars versus prototypes debate and the nature of human categorization mechanisms.     

A developmental examination of the conceptual structure of animal, artifact, and human social categories across two cultural contexts

Previous research indicates that the ontological status that adults attribute to categories varies systematically by domain. For example, adults view distinctions between different animal species as natural and objective, but view distinctions between different kinds of furniture as more conventionalized and subjective. The present work (N = 435; ages 5-18) examined the effects of domain, age, and cultural context on beliefs about the naturalness vs. conventionality of categories. Results demonstrate that young children, like adults, view animal categories as natural kinds, but artifact categories as more conventionalized. For human social categories (gender and race), beliefs about naturalness and conventionality were predicted by interactions between cultural context and age. Implications for the origins of social categories and theories of conceptual development will be discussed.     

Consciousness as a logically consistent and prognostic model of reality

The work demonstrates that brain might reflect the external world causal relationships in the form of a logically consistent and prognostic model of reality, which shows up as consciousness. The paper analyses and solves the problem of statistical ambiguity and provides a formal model of causal relationships as probabilistic maximally specific rules. We suppose that brain makes all possible inferences from causal relationships. We prove that the suggested formal model has a property of an unambiguous inference: from consistent premises we infer a consistent conclusion. It enables a set of all inferences to form a consistent model of the perceived world. Causal relationships may create fixed points of cyclic inter-predictable properties. We consider the “natural” classification introduced by John St. Mill and demonstrate that a variety of fixed points of the objects’ attributes forms a “natural” classification of the external world. Then we consider notions of “natural” categories and causal models of categories, introduced by Eleanor Rosch and Bob Rehder and demonstrate that fixed points of causal relationships between objects attributes, which we perceive, formalize these notions. If the “natural” classification describes the objects of the external world, and “natural” concepts the perception of these objects, then the theory of integrated information, introduced by G. Tononi, describes the information processes of the brain for “natural” concepts formation that reflects the “natural” classification. We argue that integrated information provides high accuracy of the objects identification. A computer-based experiment is provided that illustrates fixed points formation for coded digits.     

Biases towards internal features in infants' reasoning about objects

This paper reports the results of two sets of studies demonstrating 14-month-olds' tendency to associate an object's behavior with internal, rather than external features. In Experiment 1 infants were familiarized to two animated cats that each exhibited a different style of self-generated motion. Infants then saw a novel individual that had an internal feature (stomach color) similar to one cat, but an external feature (hat color) similar to the other. Infants looked reliably longer when the individual's motion was congruent with the hat than when it was congruent with the stomach. Using a converging method involving object choice, Experiment 2 found that infants prioritized the internal feature over the external feature only when the object's behavior was self-generated. In the absence of self-generated behaviors, however, infants did not show a preference towards the internal feature.     

Beyond perceptual symbols: A call for representational pluralism

Recent evidence from cognitive neuroscience suggests that certain cognitive processes employ perceptual representations. Inspired by this evidence, a few researchers have proposed that cognition is inherently perceptual. They have developed an innovative theoretical approach that rests on the notion of perceptual simulation and marshaled several general arguments supporting the centrality of perceptual representations to concepts. In this article, I identify a number of weaknesses in these arguments and defend a multiple semantic code approach that posits both perceptual and non-perceptual representations.     

Does changing the reference frame affect infant categorization of the spatial relation BETWEEN?

Past research has shown that variation in the target objects depicting a given spatial relation disrupts the formation of a category representation for that relation. In the current research, we asked whether changing the orientation of the referent frame depicting the spatial relation would also disrupt the formation of a category representation for that relation. Experiments 1 to 3 provided evidence that 6- and 7-month-olds formed a category representation for BETWEEN when a diamond shape was depicted in different locations between two vertical or horizontal reference bars during familiarization and in a novel location between the same orientation of bars during test. By contrast, in Experiment 4, same-age infants did not form a category representation for BETWEEN when the diamond shape was depicted between two vertical (or horizontal) bars during familiarization and between two horizontal (or vertical) bars during test. Moreover, in Experiment 5, 9- and 10-month-olds did form a category representation for BETWEEN when the orientation of the referent bars depicting the relation changed from familiarization to test. The findings suggest that the formation of category representations for spatial relations by infants is affected by changes to either target (figure) or referent (ground).     

Cognitive templates for religious concepts: cross-cultural evidence for recall of counter-intuitive representations

Presents results of free-recall experiments conducted in France, Gabon and Nepal, to test predictions of a cognitive model of religious concepts. The world over, these concepts include violations of conceptual expectations at the level of domain knowledge (e.g., about 'animal' or 'artifact' or 'person') rather than at the basic level. In five studies we used narratives to test the hypothesis that domain-level violations are recalled better than other conceptual associations. These studies used material constructed in the same way as religious concepts, but not used in religions familiar to the subjects. Experiments 1 and 2 confirmed a distinctiveness effect for such material. Experiment 3 shows that recall also depends on the possibility to generate inferences from violations of domain expectations. Replications in Gabon (Exp. 4) and Nepal (Exp. 5) showed that recall for domain-level violations is better than for violations of basic-level expectations. Overall sensitivity to violations is similar in different cultures and produces similar recall effects, despite differences in commitment to religious belief, in the range of local religious concepts or in their mode of transmission. However, differences between Gabon and Nepal results suggest that familiarity with some types of domain-level violations may paradoxically make other types more salient. These results suggest that recall effects may account for the recurrent features found in religious concepts from different cultures.