Center-of-inattention: Position biases in decision-making

This paper examines centrality of physical position as a cue that leads to systematic biases in people’s decisions to retain or eliminate a participant from a group. Termed the “center-stage” effect, we argue that people use their belief that “important people sit in the middle” as a schematic cue that they substitute for individuating performance information for individuals who occupy central positions when the goal is to eliminate all but one of the group members. This leads to the errors of those in center-positions being overlooked: or making them the “centers-of-inattention.” Study 1 examines people’s lay beliefs regarding positions using two stylized placement tasks (a group interview and classroom seating scenarios). These suggest that people believe that more attention is paid to those in the center than those on the extremes. Study 2 tests the center-stage effect using observational data from a real television show, The Weakest Link. Results show that players assigned at random to central positions are more likely to win the game than those in extreme positions. Study 3, a laboratory experiment manipulating attention paid to the game shows that observers overlook the errors of players in the center to a greater extent than the errors of players in extreme positions. Study 4 replicates the game in the laboratory with direct process measures to show that players playing the game make the same error. Study 5 shows that in a stylized group interview setting, participants who believe that “important people sit in the middle” find the performance of candidates in the extreme position easier to recall than the performance of those in the central position, and are more likely to choose them. Study 6 shows that the “center-stage” effects are weaker when the end-game rule allows for two (vs one) contestants to be retained. Overall results converge to show that the use of the “center-stage” heuristic substitutes for the effortful processing of individuating information, leading to a biased (favorable) assessment of people in the center. Implications for decision-making are discussed.     

Up or Down? How Culture and Color Affect Judgments

In the Mainland China stock market, an upmarket is represented by the color red, whereas a downmarket is represented by the color green. Elsewhere, including the Chinese Hong Kong stock market, the color representations are the opposite. Three studies were conducted to examine the red‐up–green‐down effect for Mainland Chinese as well as the green‐up–red‐down effect for Hong Kong people. Study 1 showed that Mainland Chinese tended to predict greater economic growth (study 1a) and higher growth in consumption trends (study 1b) when the experimental materials were presented in red than in green, whereas Hong Kong participants exhibited the opposite tendencies. Study 2 found that Mainland Chinese implicitly associated red and green with up and down, respectively; Hong Kong people, however, implicitly associated green and red with up and down, respectively. Study 3 further indicated that Mainland Chinese were more likely to predict good outcomes when scenarios were presented in red, whereas Hong Kong participants were more likely to predict good outcomes when scenarios were presented in green. These findings suggest that culturally specific environment cues could influence human prediction and judgment. Implications for judgment generally are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

System‐justifying behaviors: When feeling dependent on a system triggers gender stereotype‐consistent academic performance

Based on system‐justification theory, we hypothesized that men and women would perform in accordance with gender stereotypes mainly when justification of the system is necessary. In this research, system‐justification motivation was triggered using a system‐dependency manipulation. Study 1 shows that when feeling highly (vs. less) dependent on the system, people endorsed system‐justifying beliefs more. In Study 2, men performed better in math than in verbal domains, while women showed the reverse pattern, but only when they felt highly dependent on the system. Similar results were obtained on performance self‐evaluation. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Semantic Coherence and Inconsistency in Estimating Conditional Probabilities

Two studies examined semantic coherence and internal inconsistency fallacies in conditional probability estimation. Problems reflected five distinct relationships between two sets: identical sets, mutually exclusive sets, subsets, overlapping sets, and independent sets (a special case of overlapping sets). Participants estimated P(A), P(B), P(A|B), and P(B|A). Inconsistency occurs when this constellation of estimates does not conform to Bayes' theorem. Semantic coherence occurs when this constellation of estimates is consistent with the depicted relationship among sets. Fuzzy‐trace theory predicts that people have difficulty with overlapping sets and subsets because they require class‐inclusion reasoning. On these problems, people are vulnerable to denominator neglect, the tendency to ignore relevant denominators, making the gist more difficult to discern. Independent sets are simplified by the gist understanding that P(A) provides no information about P(B), and thus, P(A|B) = P(A). The gist for identical sets is that P(A|B) = 1.0, and the gist of mutually exclusive sets is that P(A|B) = 0. In Study 1, identical, mutually exclusive, and independent sets yielded superior performance (in internal inconsistency and semantic coherence) than subsets and overlapping sets. For subsets and overlapping sets, interventions clarifying appropriate denominators generally improved semantic coherence and inconsistency, including teaching people to use Euler diagrams, 2 × 2 tables, or relative frequencies. In Study 2, with problems about breast cancer and BRCA mutations, there was a strong correlation between inconsistency in conditional probability estimation and conjunction fallacies of joint probability estimation, suggesting that similar fallacious reasoning processes produce these errors. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Role of the Face and Body in Unfamiliar Person Identification

Information useful for identifying a person can be found both in the face and body. Previous studies indicate that when an entire person is visible, we rely strongly on the face for identification, even if the body can be useful. We measured the utility of the face versus body for identification, by using images of unfamiliar people that varied in the quality of identity information in the face. Face quality was varied using similarity scores generated by state‐of‐the‐art face recognition algorithms from an international competition. These algorithms estimated the similarity of faces in a large set (>1 000 000) of image pairs that showed ‘people’, including the face and the top half of the body. By using these similarity scores, image pairs were stratified into three groups representing good, moderate, and poor performance for the face recognition algorithm. Participants matched identity in image pairs sampled from the three groups, by using versions of the stimuli edited digitally to show only the face or body. Consistent with the algorithm stratifications, performance with the face declined across the three conditions. The face supported more accurate identification than the body in the good and moderate conditions. In the poor condition, performance from the face and body was comparable. Using data from a previous study, we compared the face‐only and body‐only identity judgments with judgments based on the original image. The original unedited image supported the best overall performance in the good and moderate conditions. Notably, performance in the poor condition was equivalent for the face, body, and original images. The results indicate that in poor viewing conditions, identification decisions from the body may be as accurate as those made from the face or the entire person. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sweets,Sex, or Self‐Esteem? Comparing the Value of Self‐Esteem Boosts With Other Pleasant Rewards

Abstract Many people ascribe great value to self‐esteem, but how much value? Do people value self‐esteem more than other pleasant activities, such as eating sweets and having sex? Two studies of college students ( Study 1 : N=130; Study 2 : N=152) showed that people valued boosts to their self‐esteem more than they valued eating a favorite food and engaging in a favorite sexual activity. Study 2 also showed that people valued self‐esteem more than they valued drinking alcohol, receiving a paycheck, and seeing a best friend. Both studies found that people who highly valued self‐esteem engaged in laboratory tasks to boost their self‐esteem. Finally, personality variables interacted with these value ratings. Entitled people thought they were more deserving of all pleasant rewards, even though they did not like them all that much (both studies), and people who highly value self‐esteem pursued potentially maladaptive self‐image goals, presumably to elevate their self‐esteem ( Study 2 ).     

Strategy Selection in Risky Choice: The Impact of Numeracy,Affect, and Cross‐Cultural Differences

Real‐world decisions often involve options with outcomes that are uncertain and trigger strong affect (e.g., side effects of a drug). Previous work suggests that when choosing among affect‐rich risky prospects, people are rather insensitive to probability information, potentially compromising decision quality. We modeled the strategies of less and more numerate participants in the United States and in Germany when choosing between affect‐rich prospects and between monetarily equivalent affect‐poor prospects. Using large probabilistic national samples (n = 1047 from the United States and Germany), Study 1 showed that compared with more numerate participants, less numerate participants chose the normatively better option (i.e., the one with the higher expected value) less often, guessed more often, and relied more on a simple risk‐minimizing strategy. U.S. participants—although less numerate—selected the normatively better option more frequently and were more consistent across affect‐rich and affect‐poor problems than the German participants. Using a targeted quota sample (n = 118 from Germany), Study 2 indicated that although both more and less numerate participants paid less attention to probability information in affect‐rich than in affect‐poor problems, the two numeracy groups relied on different outcome‐based heuristics: More numerate participants often followed the minimax heuristic, and less numerate participants the affect heuristic. The observed strategy differences suggest that attempts to improve decision‐making need to take into account individual differences in numeracy as well as cultural‐specific experiences in making trade‐offs. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Enhancing Effect of Overconfidence on Subsequent Learning Performance: Potential Mediation Effects of Dissatisfaction and Effort

Three studies were conducted to investigate whether individuals whose performance on a learning task fell short of their previous overconfident self‐assessment would apply more effort on a subsequent task to resolve their dissatisfaction and thereby achieve better subsequent performance than individuals who made accurate or underconfident self‐assessments. Specifically, Study 1 and Study 2 used overestimation, and Study 3 used overplacement to predict subsequent performance by measuring students' self‐assessments before the first task, their level of dissatisfaction with their actual performance on that task, the effort they applied in learning, and their performance on the subsequent task. Furthermore, Study 3 divided the participants randomly into a false feedback group (the control group) and a real feedback group (the experimental group). The results showed that when controlling for prior performance, participants who were more overconfident tended to express greater dissatisfaction and increase more effort to achieve their desired outcomes when they perceived a gap between their desired performance and their actual performance. Notably, they achieved better subsequent performance, whereas those in the control group who were overconfident neither applied more effort in subsequent learning nor increased their subsequent performance when they received “unbiased feedback.” The implications of these findings for education are discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When Accomplishments Come Back to Haunt You: The Negative Effect of Competence Signals on Women's Performance Evaluations

This research explores the possibility that the very accomplishments that are critical to success during the hiring process (e.g., educational attainment, promotion history) can lead to a drop in future performance evaluations for women. We theorized that evaluators may see such competence signals as a threat to the traditional gender hierarchy, which leads to a negative bias when evaluating women's on‐the‐job performance. In Study 1, we examined this hypothesis among commanding officers in the U.S. military, who gave lower performance ratings to female subordinates whose pay grade approached their own. The same was not true for male subordinates. Studies 2, 3a, and 3b experimentally tested the boundary conditions of this effect using two additional competence signals (educational attainment and past career successes) and 2 different populations. Across these studies, we replicated the negative relationship between competence signal strength and performance evaluations for female subordinates but only under conditions in which the evaluator would be particularly likely to experience gender hierarchy threat. Specifically, it emerged when the evaluator was male and high social‐dominance oriented and when the female subordinate's objective on‐the‐job performance was high. Finally, Study 3a demonstrated how organizations can mitigate this negative bias by using objective (rather than subjective) performance evaluations.     

Procedural Multimedia Presentations: The Effects of Working Memory and Task Complexity on Instruction Time and Assembly Accuracy

Procedural text conveys information of a series of steps to be performed. This study examined the role of verbal and visuo‐spatial WM in comprehension and execution of assembly instructions, as a function of format (text, images, multimedia) and task complexity (three or five steps). One hundred and eight participants read and executed 27 instructions to assemble a LEGO^TM object, in single and dual task conditions. Study times and errors during assembly were measured. Participants processed faster pictorial and multimedia instructions than text instructions, and made fewer errors in the execution of multimedia instructions. Dual task affected more text or picture‐only, than multimedia presentation. A verbal secondary task caused more errors in text or picture‐only presentations, and spatial secondary task also caused interference in text‐only instructions. Overall, these results support the multimedia advantage, and the role of both verbal and visuo‐spatial WM, when understanding instructions. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Don't Fuss,Focus: The Mediating Effect of On‐Task Thoughts on the Relationship between Error Approach Instructions and Task Performance

People working on a task can make errors along the way. How people deal with an error, however, depends on the type of error approach they apply. One approach, error management, focuses on increasing the positive and decreasing the negative consequences of errors. A second approach, error prevention, focuses on working faultlessly. In two experiments, we manipulated error approach through task instructions and measured on‐task thoughts and off‐task thoughts. In Experiment 1 (N = 78), error management resulted in more on‐task thoughts, but no differences were found for off‐task thoughts. Experiment 2 (N = 76) replicated the findings of Experiment 1, and further demonstrated that error management resulted in better analogical and adaptive transfer performance, and that these effects were mediated by on‐task thoughts. Our findings point toward the benefits of error management instructions for people and organisations. Specifically, error management instructions make people more focused on the task during practice, as indicated by on‐task thoughts, which in turn results in higher performance after practice.     

The role of mental rotation and age in spatial perspective‐taking tasks: when age does not impair perspective‐taking performance

The relationship between self‐evaluation of sense of direction, mental rotation, and performance in map learning and pointing tasks has been investigated in a life‐span perspective. Study 1 compared younger and older people in the Mental Rotation Test (MRT) and on the Sense of Direction and Spatial Representation (SDSR) Scale. Older people achieved higher scores on the SDSR Scale, but a lower performance in MRT compared with younger participants. In Study 2, groups of younger and older adults, one of each, were matched in the MRT, and pointing tasks in aligned and counter‐aligned perspectives were administered. Our results showed that, when so matched, older participants performed better than the younger counterparts in perspective‐taking tasks, but their performance was worse in map learning. Aligned pointing was performed better than the counter‐aligned task in both age groups, showing an alignment effect. Furthermore the performance in the counter‐aligned pointing was significantly correlated with MRT scores. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Judging near and distant virtue and vice

We propose that people judge immoral acts as more offensive and moral acts as more virtuous when the acts are psychologically distant than near. This is because people construe more distant situations in terms of moral principles, rather than attenuating situation-specific considerations. Results of four studies support these predictions. Study 1 shows that more temporally distant transgressions (e.g., eating one’s dead dog) are construed in terms of moral principles rather than contextual information. Studies 2 and 3 further show that morally offensive actions are judged more severely when imagined from a more distant temporal (Study 2) or social (Study 3) perspective. Finally, Study 4 shows that moral acts (e.g., adopting a disabled child) are judged more positively from temporal distance. The findings suggest that people more readily apply their moral principles to distant rather than proximal behaviors.     

Justice sensitivity and the processing of justice‐related information

We investigated how Justice Sensitivity (JS) shapes the processing of justice‐related information. We proposed that due to frequently perceiving and ruminating about injustices, persons high in JS develop highly accessible and differentiated injustice concepts that shape attention, interpretation and memory for justice‐related information. Three studies provided evidence for these assumptions. After witnessing injustice, persons high in JS attended more strongly to unjust stimuli than to negative control stimuli (Study1) and interpreted an ambiguous situation as less just than persons low in JS (Study2). Finally, they displayed a memory advantage for unjust information (Study3). Results suggest that JS involves the availability and accessibility of injustice concepts as parameters of cognitive functioning and offer explanations for effects of JS on justice‐related behaviour. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Discrepancies Between Implicit and Explicit Self‐concepts of Intelligence Predict Performance on Tests of Intelligence

Three studies investigated the correspondence between implicit and explicit self‐concepts of intelligence and how that correspondence is related to performance on different intelligence tests. Configurations of these two self‐concepts were found to be consistently related to performance on intelligence tests in all three studies. For individuals who self‐reported high intelligence (high explicit self‐concept), a negative implicit self‐concept (measured with the Implicit Association Test) led to a decrease in performance on intelligence tests. For participants whose self‐report indicated a low self‐concept of intelligence, positive automatic associations between the self and intelligence had a similar effect. In line with a stress hypothesis, the results indicate that any discrepant configuration of self‐concepts will impair performance. Importantly, the prediction of performance on intelligence tests by the self‐concept of intelligence was shown to be independent of self‐esteem (Study 3). Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Expecting tasks to help or hurt subsequent cognitive performance: Variability,accuracy, and bias in forecasted after-effects

After-effects on cognition—where a prior activity either benefits or hinders subsequent cognitive performance—are empirically inconsistent. Do people have insight into when their subjective energy and cognition will be helped or hurt by engaging in prior activities? Studies 1a and 1b (combined N  =  316) find that people expect more demanding and unenjoyable tasks to hinder their subsequent energy and cognitive performance, regardless of their willpower lay theory. Study 2 (N  =  167) examines the accuracy of these forecasts using a within-subject design. Participants’ forecasts of their future subjective states did predict their actual experienced subjective states, but participants were not able to accurately forecast their subsequent maths performance. Additionally, they significantly overestimated the detrimental effects of demanding prior activities on both subjective state and performance. Study 3 (N  =  210) found that participants’ overestimation of detrimental after-effects could result in unnecessary financial costs, suggesting these biased forecasts can have consequences.     

The impostor phenomenon: self-perceptions, reflected appraisals, and interpersonal strategies

Three studies tested theoretical assumptions regarding the impostor phenomenon. In Study 1, participants completed measures of impostorism, rated themselves, and indicated how they thought other people regarded them. Contrary to standard conceptualizations of impostorism, high impostors were characterized by a combination of low self-appraisals and low reflected appraisals. Study 2 was an experiment designed to determine whether the behaviors associated with the impostor phenomenon are interpersonal strategies. Participants were told that they were expected to perform either better or worse than they had previously predicted on an upcoming test, then expressed their reactions anonymously or publicly. High impostors expressed lower performance expectations than low impostors only when their responses were public. When expectations for performance were low, participants high in impostorism responded differently under public than private conditions. Study 3 examined the possibility that high scores on measures of impostorism may reflect two types of impostors--true impostors (who believe that others perceive them too positively) and strategic impostors (who only claim that they are not as good as other people think). The results did not support this distinction; however, evidence for the strategic nature of impostorism was again obtained. Although people may experience true feelings of impostorism, these studies suggest that the characteristics attributed to so-called impostors are partly interpersonal, self-presentational behaviors designed to minimize the implications of poor performance.     

The effects of priming legal concepts on perceived trust and competitiveness, self-interested attitudes, and competitive behavior

Socio-legal scholars have suggested that, as a ubiquitous social system, law shapes social reality and provides interpretive frameworks for social relations. Across five studies, we tested the idea that the law shapes social reality by fostering the assumptions that people are self-interested, untrustworthy, and competitive. In Studies 1 and 2, we found that people implicitly associated legal concepts with competitiveness. Studies 3-5 showed that these associations had implications for social perceptions, self-interested attitudes, and competitive behavior. After being primed with constructs related to the law, participants perceived social actors as less trustworthy and the situation as more competitive (Study 3), became more against a political issue when it conflicted with their normative self-interest (Study 4), and made more competitive choices during a prisoner’s dilemma game when they believed that social relations were basically zero-sum in nature (Study 5). The implications and applications of these results are discussed.