The “good” professional: Effects of trait-profile gender type,androgyny, and likableness on impressions of incumbents of sex-typed occupations

Three studies utilizing an impression formation paradigm assessed perceived desirability of masculine, feminine, and androgynous trait profiles attributed to incumbents of sex-typed occupations. Participants in all three studies were predominantly upper middle class Caucasians. Approximately 60% were women and 40% were men. While a general masculinity bias was observed, several important qualifications to this bias were suggested. In Study I, trait likableness had a greater influence than did trait gender typing on impressions across occupations, suggesting the occurrence of centrality effects. Context effects also occurred in impressions of various combinations of particular masculine and feminine traits. Study 2 controlled trait likableness, and while a masculinity bias was still observed, androgynous profiles were rated as equally desirable as masculine profiles across occupations. Study 3 demonstrated that high levels of both masculinity and femininity resulted in favorable impressions, and support was obtained for an “interactive model” of androgyny, i.e., androgynous profiles were rated as more desirable than either gender-typed masculine or feminine profiles across occupations. Nonetheless, some evidence of a “matching bias” between trait gender typing and occupational sex typing was obtained in all three studies, especially for the male-typed occupation of lawyer and the female-typed occupation of nurse. The results are discussed in terms of the operation of “occupational role schemas” in perceptions of incumbents.     

Aspects of analytic deduction

Let ? be the ordinary deduction relation of classical first-order logic. We provide an “analytic” subrelation ?³ of ? which for propositional logic is defined by the usual “containment” criterion $$\Gamma \vdash ^a \varphi iff \Gamma \vdash \varphi and Atom(\varphi ) \subseteq Atom(\Gamma ),$$ whereas for predicate logic, ?^a is defined by the extended criterion $$\Gamma \vdash ^a \varphi iff \Gamma \vdash \varphi and Atom(\varphi ) \subseteq ' Atom(\Gamma ),$$ where Atom(?) $ \subseteq '$ Atom(Γ) means that every atomic formula occurring in ? “essentially occurs” also in Γ. If Γ, ? are quantifier-free, then the notions “occurs” and “essentially occurs” for atoms between Γ and ? coincide. If ? is formalized by Gentzen's calculus of sequents, then we show that ?^a is axiomatizable by a proper fragment of analytic inference rules. This is mainly due to cut elimination. By “analytic inference rule” we understand here a rule r such that, if the sequent over the line is analytic, then so is the sequent under the line. We also discuss the notion of semantic relevance as contrasted to the previous syntactic one. We show that when introducing semantic sequents as axioms, i.e. when extending the pure logical axioms and rules by mathematical ones, the property of syntactic relevance is lost, since cut elimination no longer holds. We conclude that no purely syntactic notion of analytic deduction can ever replace successfully the complex semantico-syntactic deduction we already possess.     

Quantifying disablers in reasoning with universal and existential rules

People accept conclusions of valid conditional inferences (e.g., if p then q, p therefore q) less, the more disablers (circumstances that prevent q to happen although p is true) exist. We investigated whether rules that through their phrasing exclude disablers evoke higher acceptance ratings than rules that do not exclude disablers. In three experiments we re-phrased content-rich conditionals from the literature as either universal or existential rules and embedded these rules in Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens inferences. In Experiments 2 and 3, we also used abstract rules. The acceptance of conclusions increased when the rule was phrased with “all” instead of “some” and the number of disablers had a higher impact on existential rules than on universal rules. Further, the effect of quantifier was more pronounced for abstract rules and when tested within subjects. We discuss the relevance of phrasing, quantifiers and knowledge on reasoning.     

儿童行为与心理水平的特质推理的发展

选取4岁组、5岁组、7岁组、10岁组、12岁组儿童和成人共192名(各年龄组32名, 男女各半)为被试, 采用个别测查法考察学前和小学儿童行为与心理水平的特质推理发展。结果表明: (1)4岁时儿童已能进行行为水平的特质推理, 5岁时才能进行心理水平的特质推理, 即使用特质引发规则进行特质推理, 10岁时两者均达到成人水平。(2)4岁、5岁时儿童心理水平的特质推理显著落后于行为水平的特质推理, 至少7岁时两者处于同一水平上。(3)儿童使用概念相似规则而不是情境匹配规则进行行为预测。(4)4岁儿童不使用简单效价规则进行行为预测, 5岁及以上儿童使用简单效价规则, 但他们是在区分同一特质范畴和不同特质范畴的基础上、在较低的确定程度上使用该规则。     

On the relation between spontaneous trait inferences and intentional inferences: An inference monitoring hypothesis

More than twenty five years after the beginning of research on spontaneous trait inferences (Winter & Uleman, 1984) an intriguing paradox in the impression formation literature remains: if traits are spontaneously inferred, why aren't they used to organize behavioral information and thereby facilitate recall under memory instructions (Hamilton, Katz, & Leirer, 1980)? We hypothesized that organization by traits is more evident under impression formation goals because only in that case then are inferences sufficiently monitored to permit their use in organizing impressions. As a consequence, such monitored traits can then be used strategically as retrieval cues. Merging the main features of the Winter and Uleman and the Hamilton et al. experimental paradigms, Experiment 1 simultaneously replicated the main results of both studies. Using a new recognition paradigm, Experiments 2 and 3 further tested this inference monitoring hypothesis by showing that monitoring of trait inferences only occurs under particular processing goals, and is dependent on the availability of cognitive resources.     

The Effects of Practice on Children's Ability to Apply Ground Rules in a Narrative Interview

Despite the widespread use of ground rules in forensic interview guidelines, it is unknown whether children retain and apply these rules throughout narrative interviews. We evaluated the capacity of 260 five- to nine-year-olds to utilize three ground rules. At the beginning of the interview all children heard the rules; half also practiced them. Children then responded to open-ended prompts about a repeated laboratory event and were assessed for their application of the rules. Logistic regressions revealed that practice only benefitted the use of the “don't know” rule. Although the children accurately answered “don't understand” and “correct me” practice questions, practice appeared to give no greater benefit than just hearing the rules. Results suggest that the current format of ground rule practice in interview guidelines is appropriate for the “don't know” rule, but the other rules may require more extensive practice with this age group. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

组织政治环境如何影响领导者公正准则遵从？

论文基于自我控制的强度模型,研究了组织政治环境作为情境因素影响领导者公正准则遵从的作用机制和边界条件。对来自某国有商业银行73位网点主任连续10个工作日的570个经验取样法的数据分析结果发现：(1)在个体内层次,领导者组织政治感知提高了自我耗竭,领导者职位任期削弱了该正向关系。(2)个体内层次自我耗竭对公正准则遵从的作用取决于个体间层次领导身份认同的程度：当领导身份认同较高时,二者关系为正;当领导身份认同较低时,二者关系为负。(3)当领导者职位任期较短且领导身份认同较高时,组织政治感知通过自我耗竭促进公正准则遵从;当职位任期较短且领导身份认同较低时,组织政治感知通过自我耗竭阻碍公正准则遵从。上述研究结论将公正准则遵从的前因研究从行为者中心视角拓展到情境中心视角,率先研究了组织政治感知的个体内变化及其影响,同时增进了对自我耗竭作用机制和边界条件的认识。     

People think about what is true for conditionals,not what is false: Only true possibilities prime the comprehension of “if”

We report the results of two priming experiments that examine the comprehension of conditionals—for example, “if there are apples then there are oranges”—and biconditionals—for example, “if and only if there are apples then there are oranges”. The first experiment showed that participants read a biconditional faster when it was primed by a true possibility, “there were apples and there were oranges” than when it was primed by a false possibility, “there were no apples and there were oranges”; a conditional was primed equally by both possibilities. The second experiment showed that participants read the negated-antecedent conjunction faster when it was primed by a conditional than when it was primed by a biconditional; the affirmative conjunction was primed equally by both connectives. The experiments show that (a) when people understand “if A then B”, they access the true possibilities, “A and B”, and “not-A and B”, and (b) when they understand “if and only if A then B” they access “A and B”, but they do not access “not-A and B”. We discuss their implications for current theories of reasoning.     

The Fundamental Attribution Error and Harman's Case against Character Traits

Abstract

Gilbert Harman argues that the warrant for the lay attribution of character traits is completely undermined by the “fundamental attribution error” (FAE). He takes it to have been established by social psychologists, that the FAE pervades ordinary instances of lay person perception. However, examination of recent work in psychology reveals that there are good reasons to doubt that the effects observed in experimental settings, which ground the case for the FAE, pervade ordinary instances of person perception. Furthermore, it is possible to make sense of these experimental results without invoking the FAE. Harman's argument against lay character trait attribution is unsubstantiated.     

Validating a new method for quantifying traits: The computer-administered visual analog

This article introduces a new method for assessing personality traits that uses graphic rather than written items to facilitate the convergent validation of personality traits. A computer-administered visual analog procedure is presented that samples 40 equally spaced positions along a trait continuum five times. Examinees initiate each trial by pressing the space bar and end it by pressing either a “True” or “False” key indicating if that location describes them or not. Response time is measured in milliseconds. The majority answer determines the aggregate response and the median response time determines the latency for the aggregate response to each location on the trait continuum. This procedure enables an empirical measure of trait variability. Results indicated theoretically meaningful responses in 94 college students on each of two personality dimensions; extraversion and trait anxiety. The predicted inverted-U function was obtained for both personality dimensions such that the fastest response times were associated with 0 and 5 “True” responses, somewhat longer response times were associated with 1 and 4 “True” responses, and the longest times were associated with 2 or 3 “True” responses. Statistically significant and substantial validity coefficients were obtained with the Eysenck personality inventory extraversion scale, and the state-trait anxiety inventory, form Y-2.     

Differential methods of causal attributions for strangers vs acquaintances

Previous research has demonstrated that people are more likely to attribute a stranger's behavior to external causes if that behavior is common in a given population than if it is relatively unique (the consensus rule). It was proposed in the present paper that another and perhaps simpler rule is available for causal attributions for an acquaintance's behavior, such that more external attributions are made as the behavior becomes increasingly inconsistent with extant impressions of the target (the goodness-of-fit rule). It was found that the goodness-of-fitrule, but not the consensus rule, was used in the attribution of causality for acquaintances when the behavior could be made to fit with extant impressions. When the behavior was completely inconsistent with extant impressions, both consensus and goodness-of-fit rules were used, such that the most external attributions were made in the poor fit/high consensus condition.     

Learning and encoding higher order rules in neural networks

Some researchers state that whereas neural networks are fine for pattern recognition and categorization, complex rule formation requires a separate “symbolic” level. However, the human brain is a connectionist system and, however imperfectly, does complex reasoning and inference. Familiar modeling principles (e.g., Hebbian or associative learning, lateral inhibition, opponent processing, neuromodulation) could recur, in different combinations, in architectures that can learn diverse rules. These rules include, for example, “go to the most novel object,” “alternate between two given objects,” and “touch three given objects, without repeats, in any order.” Frontal lobe damage interferes with learning all three of those rules. Hence, network models of rule learning and encoding should include a module analogous to the prefrontal cortex. They should also include modules analogous to the hippocampus for episode setting and analogous to the amygdala for emotional evaluation.     

Rule consequentialism and disasters

Rule consequentialism (RC) is the view that it is right for A to do F in C if and only if A’s doing F in C is in accordance with the set of rules which, if accepted by all, would have consequences which are better than any alternative set of rules (i.e., the ideal code). I defend RC from two related objections. The first objection claims that RC requires obedience to the ideal code even if doing so has disastrous results. Though some rule consequentialists embrace a disaster-clause which permits agents to disregard some of the rules in the ideal code as a necessary means of avoiding disasters, they have not adequately explained how this clause works. I offer such an explanation and show how it fits naturally with the rest of RC. The second disaster objection asserts that even if RC can legitimately invoke a disaster-clause, it lacks principled grounds from distinguishing disasters from non-disasters. In response, I explore Hooker’s suggestion that “disaster” is vague. I contend that every plausible ethical theory must invoke something similar to a disaster clause. So if “disaster” is vague, then every plausible ethical theory faces a difficulty with it. As a result, this vagueness is not a reason to prefer other theories to RC. However, I argue, contra Hooker, that the sense of “disaster” relevant to RC is not vague, and RC does indeed have principled grounds to distinguish disasters from non-disasters.     

Mistaking the instance for the rule: A critical analysis of the truth-table evaluation paradigm

Many studies probe for interpretations of < if A then C> by having people evaluate truth-table cases (<A and C>, < A and not-C>, < not-A and C>, < not-A and not-C>) as making the rule true or false, or being irrelevant. We argue that a single case can never prove a general rule to be true, as philosophy of science has taught any researcher. Giving participants the impossible “true” option would therefore bias results away from this response. In Experiment 1 people judged instead whether cases make a rule false, do not make the rule false, or are irrelevant to the rule. The experimental group (N = 44) showed a significant increase in not-false responses compared with true responses of the control group (N = 39). In Experiments 2 and 3 the experimental groups judged whether cases make a rule true, corroborate it (i.e., make the rule more plausible, but neither true nor false), make it false, or are irrelevant. There was a significant reduction of irrelevant responses as compared to the default true/false/irrelevant task for the control groups. Even < A and C> cases were often no longer considered to make an < if A then C> rule true and were correctly judged to corroborate (vs. verify) rules. Results corroborate our conceptual analyses of the unsuitable “true” response option and put into question arguments that hinge on the presumed likelihood by which people consider truth contingencies to make a rule “true”.     

Need for closure and compensatory rule-based perception: The role of information consistency

When making comparisons, people tend to use routinized standards, rules, and knowledge structures. Compensatory rules (e.g., “if competent, then cold”, “if incompetent, then warm”) allow for the quick and easy evaluation of groups when they are compared. We claim that the application of these rules is especially attractive for people who are motivated to seek quick and firm answers (people high in the need for closure—NFC). However, we assume that when people are confronted with expectancy-inconsistent information, higher levels of NFC lead to a lower reliance on these rules. This is because the inconsistency may serve as a signal that the rules no longer provide guidance on how to act. We demonstrated these effects in three studies set in different group contexts, where we manipulated expectancy-consistent and expectancy-inconsistent information. These findings allow for a more comprehensive view of the dynamic and diverse effects of NFC.     

Cue-type manipulation dissociates two types of task set inhibition: backward inhibition and competitor rule suppression

Backward inhibition (BI) reflects the suppression of a recently abandoned task set to allow for smooth transition to a new task even when the rules do not generate a response conflict. Competitor rule suppression (CRS) reflects the inhibition/suppression of irrelevant task rules when these rules generate a response conflict even if they have not recently been abandoned. We assessed whether BI and CRS are differentially affected by the difficulty in retrieving category-response mappings from memory. Retrieval demands were manipulated via the information provided by the task cues, which either indicated the relevant dimension (dimension cues; “color”) or the relevant dimension with its category-to-key mapping (mapping cues; “red green”, indicating that “red” and “green” go with the left/right responses, respectively). CRS was larger with dimension compared to mapping cues when cue-type varied between groups and was larger after trials involving dimension cues when cue-type varied on a trial-by-trial basis. In contrast, BI was not influenced by cue-type. These results suggest that task switching involve at least two distinct inhibitory processes, with CRS being related to the ease of retrieval of category-response mappings from memory.     

The initial representation in reasoning towards an interpretation of conditional sentences

All accounts of human reasoning (whether presented at the symbolic or subsymbolic level) have to reckon with the temporal organization of the human processing systems and the ephemeral nature of the representations it uses. We present three new empirical tests for the hypothesis that people commence the interpretational process by constructing a minimal initial representation. In the case of if A then C the initial representation captures the occurrence of the consequent, C, within the context of the antecedent, A. Conditional inference problems are created by a categorical premise that affirms or denies A or C. The initial representation allows an inference when the explicitly represented information matches (e.g., the categorical premise A affirms the antecedent “A”) but not when it mismatches (e.g., “not-A” denies A). Experiments 1 and 2 confirmed that people tend to accept the conclusion that “nothing follows” for the denial problems, as indeed they do not have a determinate initial-model conclusion. Experiment 3 demonstrated the other way round that the effect of problem type (affirmation versus denial) is reduced when we impede the possibility of inferring a determinate conclusion on the basis of the initial representation of both the affirmation and the denial problems.     

Stereotypes and the confirmability of trait concepts

Two studies tested the hypothesis that rules of trait inference may differ depending on trait stereotypicality and the social group membership of the target being judged. Specifically, traits that are stereotypic of a group were expected to instantiate lower evidentiary standards (require fewer behaviors to confirm), but only in members of that group. Study 1 focused on race and found that across 180 traits, trait stereotypicality was associated with fewer behaviors required to confirm and more to disconfirm in outgroup targets (in Black actors for White judges and in White actors for Black judges). Study 2 focused on gender and again found that stereotypic traits were tied to low evidentiary standards only when judging outgroup targets. The findings are discussed with reference to the literatures on trait inference, stereotyping, and shifting judgment standards.     

Refining the Inferential Model of Scientific Understanding

In this article, I use a mental models computational account of representation to illustrate some details of my previously presented inferential model of scientific understanding. The hope is to shed some light on possible mechanisms behind the notion of scientific understanding. I argue that if mental models are a plausible approach to modelling cognition, then understanding can best be seen as the coupling of specific rules. I present our beliefs as ‘ordinary’ conditional rules, and the coupling process as one where the consequent of one ordinary rule (OR) matches and activates the antecedent of the rule to which it is coupled in virtue of the activation of an intermediate ‘inference’ rule. I argue that on this approach knowledge of an explanation is the activation of ORs in a cognitive hierarchy, while understanding is achieved when those activated ORs are also coupled via correct inference rules. I do not directly address issues regarding the plausibility of mental models themselves. This article should therefore be seen as an exercise in refining the inferential model within an already presupposed computational setting, not one of arguing for the psychological adequacy of computational approaches.