The uses and misuses of attribution theory

This article is based on the view that attribution theory in the psychology of religion does not offer for use, or imply, the evaluative methodological position of “misattribution” that is assumed by Stephen Kent in his study of the Children of God in the Spring, 1994 issue of this journal. Members of the Children of God, or The Family, have not, the writer thinks, been duped in their struggle to construct meaning, control and esteem together. That members of this new religion have successfully attributed these values to their communal religious life is especially evident given the courage and patience with which they have endured and met allegations of child (sexual) abuse, all of which have proven false in courts world-wide. Thus, the use of “misattribution” in such studies in the psychology of religion is unwarranted and methodologically fallacious in the view of this author.     

Deciding for a child: a comprehensive analysis of the best interest standard

This article critically examines, and ultimately rejects, the best interest standard as the predominant, go-to ethical and legal standard of decision making for children. After an introduction to the presumption of parental authority, it characterizes and distinguishes six versions of the best interest standard according to two key dimensions related to the types of interests emphasized. Then the article brings three main criticisms against the best interest standard: (1) that it is ill-defined and inconsistently appealed to and applied, (2) that it is unreasonably demanding and narrow, and (3) that it fails to respect the family. Finally, it argues that despite the best interest standard??s potent rhetorical power, it is irreparably encumbered by too much inconsistency and confusion and should be rejected.     

The best interest standard: both guide and limit to medical decision making on behalf of incapacitated patients

In this issue of JCE, Douglas Diekema argues that the best interest standard (BIS) has been misemployed to serve two materially different functions. On the one hand, clinicians and parents use the BIS to recommend and to make treatment decisions on behalf of children. On the other hand, clinicians and state authorities use the BIS to determine when the government should interfere with parental decision-making authority. Diekema concedes that the BIS is appropriately used to "guide" parents in making medical treatment decisions for their children. But he argues that the BIS is inappropriately used as a "limiting" standard to determine when to override those decisions. Specifically, Diekema contends that the BIS "does not represent the best means for determining when one must turn to the state to limit parental action." He argues that this limiting function should be served by the harm principle instead of by the BIS. I contend that we should not reassign the BIS's limiting function to the harm principle. In this article I make two arguments to support my position. First, the BIS has effectively served, and can serve, both guiding and limiting functions. Second, the harm principle would be an inadequate substitute. It cannot serve the limiting function as well as the more robust BIS.     

Revisiting Viktor Frankl: his contributions to the contemporary interest in spirituality and health care

The case is made for location of spirituality to be in the body, and at the same time for the power of the spirit to transcend the body when it is afflicted. The author highlights Viktor Frankl's strongest convictions that one can survive through the shear power of one's spirit. Correspondingly, the promise of resurrection can help a Christian to maintain a vision of life, stay courageous though there may be no hope of tomorrow as we have known it. The author asserts the role of the hospital chaplain in helping the sick person to draw upon his or her spiritual strength to cope with their physical illness or affliction.     

Deciding in the best interest of clients with dementia: the experience of public guardians

We conducted an in-depth interview study of public guardians in three local jurisdictions in the state of Maryland to explore the decision-making process utilized by court-appointed public guardians making medical and EOL care decisions on behalf of their clients with dementia. Overall, public guardians appeared to make their decisions in the context of relevant ethical principles and relevant case law and state statute, and the basis upon which they made informed decisions was dependent on their training and experience. The stated goal of public guardians is to make decisions that they believe are in the best interest of their clients. In the case of a healthcare decision, their goal is to maximize quality of life; and in the case of an EOL care decision, their goal is to minimize pain and suffering. In general, public guardians gathered information in order to identify previous preferences of their now-incapacitated clients, so that they could develop a preference profile to assist both an initial decision on whether an individual ought to have a court-appointed public guardian, and with healthcare and EOL decisions once an appointment was made. When guardians were unable to develop a preference profile for a particular client, they relied on past decisions in similar situations. Healthcare and EOL decisions were most often triggered by a recommendation by the client's healthcare provider. Once a decision-point was identified, the public guardian considered the risks and benefits of the proposed intervention in light of the client's current condition. At times the guardians reviewed informational resources such as textbooks and the Internet. In addition, most guardians sought advice from a medical consultant who is available to all public guardians in Maryland. Some guardians sought the advice of this medical consultant only when faced with more complex decisions. Guardians challenged physicians' recommendations when they believed the physicians were recommending an intervention that was not in the best interest of the client--that is, they advocated against either overtreatment or undertreatment. Ultimately, guardians took particularly difficult issues to the court and obtained a judge's opinion.     

Revisiting Case IV: A reassessment of bias and standard errors of Case IV under range restriction

In 2004, Hunter and Schmidt proposed a correction (called Case IV) that seeks to estimate disattenuated correlations when selection is made on an unmeasured variable. Although Case IV is an important theoretical development in the range restriction literature, it makes an untestable assumption, namely that the partial correlation between the unobserved selection variable and the performance measure is zero. We show in this paper why this assumption may be difficult to meet and why previous simulations have failed to detect the full extent of bias. We use meta‐analytic literature to investigate the plausible range of bias. We also show how Case IV performs in terms of standard errors. Finally, we give practical recommendations about how the contributions of Hunter and Schmidt (2004) can be extended without making such stringent assumptions.     

Uses and misuses of habituation and related preference paradigms

Houston‐Price and Nakai raise an important problem researchers face when attempting to interpret infant visual preference data. This problem stems from paradigms in which infants are only partially familiarized to a stimulus, and it is unclear whether they should show a novelty or familiarity preference to that stimulus in a subsequent test. As Hunter and Ames' (1988) noted in their important chapter, infants will sometimes show a familiarity preference rather than a novelty preference, particularly when the infants are relatively young and the stimuli are relatively complex. In this commentary, I shall make three points regarding this issue: first, that the familiarity preference problem is real; second, that in most cases there is a simple solution to the problem; and third that certain popular infant paradigms can exacerbate the problem. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Revisiting the Psychoanalytic Object: Introduction

Senior analysts from different theoretical orientations are invited to express their conceptions of the nature of the psychoanalytic object and its place in their clinical approaches. I provide the rationale for this updated survey on the object, drawing on recent procedural notions of its formation, and on the broader range of patients now seeking help whose difficulties foreground use of the analyst-as-object. Certain common themes among the writers emerge, including concern with the dialectic of the separability and unity of subject and object. Most strongly, the object’s personalized meaning for each writer, as for all analysts, confirms its robustness and generativity as a psychoanalytic concept and entity.     

Testing therapies less effective than the best current standard: ethical beliefs in an international sample of researchers

To test the range of beliefs regarding the ethics of testing, in resource poor settings, new therapies that are less efficacious but more affordable and feasible than the best current therapeutic standard.     

Moral Feedback and Motivation: Revisiting the Undermining Effect

Social psychologists have evidence that evaluative feedback on others’ choices sometimes has unwelcome negative effects on hearers’ motivation. Holroyd’s article (Holroyd J. Ethical Theory Moral Pract 10:267–278, 2007) draws attention to one such result, the undermining effect, that should help to challenge moral philosophers’ complacency about blame and praise. The cause for concern is actually greater than she indicates, both because there are multiple kinds of negative effect on hearer motivation, and because these are not, as she hopes, reliably counteracted by implicit features of praise and blame. The communicative ideal that she articulates does point us in the right direction, but it requires further elaboration. Once it is spelled out, we find that realizing this ideal, in light of the empirical research, requires rethinking the role of verdict-like judgments within moral feedback.

An interest in fame: Confirming the measurement and empirical conceptualization of fame interest

The following paper introduces and develops the conceptualization of Fame Interest. Study 1 (N=1,978), through the use of factor analysis techniques, introduces the Fame Interest Scale which comprises six dimensions of Fame Interest (intensity, vulnerability, celebrity life‐style, drive, perceived suitability, and altruistic) with evidence for the reliability and validity of the scale. Study 2 (N=376) examined the relationship between an interest in fame and measures of the five‐factor model of personality, narcissism, self‐esteem, curiosity, attachment style and perceived family, and peer and media influence. From this second study four findings emerge; (1) Fame Interest typified by a perceived suitability and intensity for a celebrity life‐style was associated with perceived family, peer and media influence, (2) Fame Interest that arises from a vulnerability is a reflection of neuroticism, low self‐esteem, and problematic attachments, (3) Fame Interest for altruistic reasons is associated with agreeableness, and (4) Fame Interest that reflects an overall drive is associated with conscientiousness.     

Revisiting Ego Depletion: Moderators and Measurement

We developed and validated two web-based tasks to induce and measure ego depletion in two online experiments (N?=?122 and N?=?788). Ego depletion describes the phenomenon that exerting self-control temporarily reduces people’s capacity to subsequently control themselves. To induce ego depletion, we adapted the e-crossing task, and to measure ego depletion, we adapted the color Stroop task. We successfully induced ego depletion. Participants’ implicit theories about willpower as well as their mood moderated ego depletion. We also discuss several methodological issues and compare different approaches of measuring ego depletion using aggregated reaction times.     

Knowledge and its Objects: Revisiting the Bounds of Sense

The Kantian project of investigating the necessary structure of experience presupposes answers to three questions: what is the purpose of such an investigation, what is the source of necessary features of experience, and by what means is it possible to establish the necessary structure of experience? This paper is a critical examination of Strawson's answers to these questions in The Bounds of Sense and his later work. The realism that is implicit in The Bounds of Sense is much more explicit in Strawson's later work but relies on problematic assumptions about the relationship between epistemology and metaphysics.     

Constructivism and the Limits of Reason: Revisiting the Kantian Problematic

The main focus of this paper ison ways in which Kantian philosophy can informproponents and opponents of constructivismalike. Kant was primarily concerned withreconciling natural and moral law. His approachto this general problematic was to limit andseparate what we can know about things(phenomena) from things as they are inthemselves (noumena), and to identify moralagency with the latter. Revisiting the Kantianproblematic helps to address and resolve longstanding epistemological concerns regardingconstructivism as an educational philosophy inrelation to issues of objectivity andsubjectivity, the limits of theoretical andpractical reason, and the relation betweenhuman experience and the world. It also servesto address ethical concerns regardingliberation from limited self-interests andcontexts conditioned by localised beliefs andinclinations. In light of revisiting theKantian problematic, both Glasersfeld's radicalview of constructivism and Jardine's socialcritique of constructivism are found wanting.Beyond constructivism, Kant's distinctionbetween phenomena and noumena and the limits ofreason that follow from it are brieflyconsidered in terms of Merleau-Ponty's noveldouble-embodied notion of flesh as anontological primitive – as a matter of beingboth in, and of, the world – with an aim tomore intimate connections between epistemologyand ethics.