Rebutting accusations: When does it work,when does it fail?

Three studies address the question of how observers react to rebuttal statements and which variables are crucial in determining observers' evaluations of the initiator of the rebuttal. The first study showed that devaluation of the initiator of the rebuttal was higher when observers were confronted with the isolated rebuttal than when observers first learned about an existing accusation and then about the corresponding rebuttal. The second study qualified this finding by revealing that the devaluating effect of an isolated rebuttal was especially pronounced if the event in question was of high impact for observers. The third study included an additional variable, namely, the credibility of the source of the accusation. The drop in devaluation from rebuttal-only to accusation + rebuttal conditions was obtained only for high impact observers when the accusation came from a noncredible source. The findings are explained within a framework of attributional and belief perseverance notions. Implications are discussed.     

Temporal isolation does not facilitate forward serial recall—or does it?

In numerous recent studies in short-term memory, it has been established that forward serial recall is unaffected by the temporal isolation of to-be-remembered items. These findings contradict the temporal distinctiveness view of memory, which expects items that are temporally isolated from their neighbors to be more distinct and hence remembered better. To date, isolation effects have only been found with tests that do not constrain output order, such as free recall. This article reports two experiments that, for the first time, report a temporal isolation effect with forward serial recall, using a running memory task in which the end of the list is unpredictable. The results suggest that people are able to encode and use temporal information in situations in which positional information is of little value. We conclude that the overall pattern of findings concerning temporal isolation supports models of short-term memory that postulate multidimensional representations of items.     

When does grouping happen?

Recent research on perceptual grouping is described with particular emphasis on identifying the level(s) at which grouping factors operate. Contrary to the classical view of grouping as an early, two-dimensional, image-based process, recent experimental results show that it is strongly influenced by phenomena related to perceptual constancy, such as binocular depth perception, lightness constancy, amodal completion, and illusory contours. These findings imply that at least some grouping processes operate at the level of phenomenal perception rather than at the level of the retinal image. Preliminary evidence is reported showing that grouping can affect perceptual constancy, suggesting that grouping processes must also operate at an early, preconstancy level. If so, grouping may be a ubiquitous, ongoing aspect of visual organization that occurs for each level of representation rather than as a single stage that can be definitively localized relative to other perceptual processes.     

What does doodling do?

Doodling is a way of passing the time when bored by a lecture or telephone call. Does it improve or hinder attention to the primary task? To answer this question, 40 participants monitored a monotonous mock telephone message for the names of people coming to a party. Half of the group was randomly assigned to a ‘doodling’ condition where they shaded printed shapes while listening to the telephone call. The doodling group performed better on the monitoring task and recalled 29% more information on a surprise memory test. Unlike many dual task situations, doodling while working can be beneficial. Future research could test whether doodling aids cognitive performance by reducing daydreaming. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Complex semantic processing in old age: does it stay or does it go?

Old adults' (N = 24) and young adults' (N = 24) speed of producing exemplars of semantic categories (i.e., semantic fluency) varying in difficulty was assessed both in a standard condition and in a "set-switching" condition where exemplars had to be produced from 2 categories in an alternating manner. "Retrieval-position function" parameters were used to assess speed of semantic access independent of nonsemantic factors. Results suggested age effects in nonsemantic components but not in semantic retrieval per se. Also, age deficits in set switching were relatively subtle. Findings are discussed with relation to issues of domain specificity of age effects as well as of the role of executive control during semantic retrieval and age differences therein.     

Why does coherence appear truth-conducive?

This paper aims to reconcile (i) the intuitively plausible view that a higher degree of coherence among independent pieces of evidence makes the hypothesis they support more probable, and (ii) the negative results in Bayesian epistemology to the effect that there is no probabilistic measure of coherence such that a higher degree of coherence among independent pieces of evidence makes the hypothesis they support more probable. I consider a simple model in which the negative result appears in a stark form: the prior probability of the hypothesis and the individual vertical relations between each piece of evidence and the hypothesis completely determine the conditional probability of the hypothesis given the total evidence, leaving no room for the lateral relation (such as coherence) among the pieces of evidence to play any role. Despite this negative result, the model also reveals that a higher degree of coherence is indirectly associated with a higher conditional probability of the hypothesis because a higher degree of coherence indicates stronger individual supports. This analysis explains why coherence appears truth-conducive but in such a way that it defeats the idea of coherentism since the lateral relation (such as coherence) plays no independent role in the confirmation of the hypothesis. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the workshop Coherence: Interpreting the Impossibility Results held in Lund, Sweden. I would like to thank the participants of the workshop, especially Erik J. Olsson who subsequently sent me written comments. I would also like to thank Ken Akiba for comments on precursors of this paper     

Happiness: When does it lead to self-indulgence and when does it lead to self-denial?

Previous research on self-gratification in children has found that happiness, compared to a neutral affective state, sometimes causes self-indulgence and sometimes causes self-denial. Review of this research led to the hypothesis that happiness leads to self-indulgence when children have no reason to believe that excessive self-gratification is morally wrong but that happiness promotes selfdenial when children fear that excessive self-gratification would violate a moral rule. In the present study, children were first placed in either a happy or neutral mood. They were then given an opportunity to help themselves freely to a reward supply, but half the children in each affect condition were warned that excessive self-gratification would violate a moral rule whereas the other half were not. In the absence of information that excessive self-gratification would violate a moral standard, happiness produced self-indulgence, but when children were told that excessive self-gratification would be wrong, happy children denied themselves significantly more than neutral-mood children. It was suggested that happiness motivates children to try to sustain their elevated mood; the behavioral route to maintaining positive mood, however, depends on how children perceive the moral implications of their actions.     

Why does self-reference promote incidental encoding?

Answering a question regarding a stimulus word can cause incidental encoding of the word itself. The thoroughness of the encoding depends in part upon what question is answered. For example, saying whether a word describes oneself causes a particularly high degree of incidental encoding. The study reported here investigated several variables that have been proposed as mediators of that effect. As in previous research, subjects completed an incidental-encoding and recall procedure. They then rated (a) the quality and degree of affect that they would experience if each stimulus word were to be applied to them, (b) the importance to them of the behavioral/psychological dimension implied by the stimulus word, and (c) the degree to which they saw themselves as distinctive on that dimension. As in previous studies, deciding whether a word described the self increased the likelihood of subsequent recall. There also was a highly significant interaction such that words judged to be applicable to self were recalled better than those judged not to be applicable. There was no evidence, however, of a mediational role for any other variable studied. Discussion centers on theoretical implications of the data.     

When does mimicry affect evaluative judgment?

We investigated the effect of subliminally presented happy or angry faces on evaluative judgments when the facial muscles of participants were free to mimic or blocked. We hypothesized and showed that subliminally presented happy expressions lead to more positive judgments of cartoons compared to angry expressions only when facial muscles were not blocked. These results reveal the influence of socially driven embodied processes on affective judgments and have also potential implications for phenomena such as emotional contagion. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved).     

When does algorithmic decomposition help? commentary

Algorithmic decomposition is a way of extending thinking. It will help when thinking is otherwise poor, and it may hinder when thinking is otherwise adequate. It may help decision making more than it helps numerical estimation.     

How does running memory span work?

In running memory span, a list ends unpredictably, and the last few items are to be recalled. This task is of increasing importance in recent research. We argue that there are two very different strategies for performing running span tasks: a low-effort strategy in which items are passively held until the list ends, when retrieval into a capacity-limited store takes place; and a higher-effort strategy in which working memory is continually updated using rehearsal processes during the list presentation. In two experiments, we examine the roles of these two strategies and the consequences of two types of interference.     

How does mindfulness-based cognitive therapy work?

Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT) is an efficacious psychosocial intervention for recurrent depression ( [Kuyken et?al., 2008], [Ma and Teasdale, 2004] and [Teasdale et?al., 2000]). To date, no compelling research addresses MBCT’s mechanisms of change. This study determines whether MBCT’s treatment effects are mediated by enhancement of mindfulness and self-compassion across treatment, and/or by alterations in post-treatment cognitive reactivity. The study was embedded in a randomized controlled trial comparing MBCT with maintenance antidepressants (mADM) with 15-month follow-up (Kuyken et al., 2008). Mindfulness and self-compassion were assessed before and after MBCT treatment (or at equivalent time points in the mADM group). Post-treatment reactivity was assessed one month after the MBCT group sessions or at the equivalent time point in the mADM group. One hundred and twenty-three patients with ≥3 prior depressive episodes, and successfully treated with antidepressants, were randomized either to mADM or MBCT. The MBCT arm involved participation in MBCT, a group-based psychosocial intervention that teaches mindfulness skills, and discontinuation of ADM. The mADM arm involved maintenance on a therapeutic ADM dose for the duration of follow-up. Interviewer-administered outcome measures assessed depressive symptoms and relapse/recurrence across 15-month follow-up. Mindfulness and self-compassion were measured using self-report questionnaire. Cognitive reactivity was operationalized as change in depressive thinking during a laboratory mood induction.MBCT’s effects were mediated by enhancement of mindfulness and self-compassion across treatment. MBCT also changed the nature of the relationship between post-treatment cognitive reactivity and outcome. Greater reactivity predicted worse outcome for mADM participants but this relationship was not evident in the MBCT group.MBCT’s treatment effects are mediated by augmented self-compassion and mindfulness, along with a decoupling of the relationship between reactivity of depressive thinking and poor outcome. This decoupling is associated with the cultivation of self-compassion across treatment.