It’s Not About Technology

It is argued that the question “Can we trust technology?” is unanswerable because it is open-ended. Only questions about specific issues that can have specific answers should be entertained. It is further argued that the reason the question cannot be answered is that there is no such thing as Technology simpliciter. Fundamentally, the question comes down to trusting people and even then, the question has to be specific about trusting a person to do this or that.     

Foucault's Genealogy and Teaching Multiculturalism as a Subversive Activity

It is being argued, in this article, that multicultural education is subversive because it challenges the assumed inevitability and superiority of the dominant culture by presenting alterna-tives to it. For multicultural education to be subversive, however, culture has to be understood as an order of things mapped across truth and power axis à la Foucault. These order of things are sup-pressed by the dominant culture in order to maintain its hegemony. It is being further argued that with the help of Foucault's genealogy we can understand how multicultural education can liberate subjugated order of things.     

Not evidence for separable controlled and automatic influences in artificial grammar learning: comment on Higham, Vokey, and Pritchard (2000)

P. A. Higham, J. R. Vokey, and J. L. Pritchard (2000) claimed to provide evidence for separable controlled and automatic processes in artificial grammar learning. It is argued that their results are compatible with a single controlled influence: Participants might mistakenly identify more grammatical items than nongrammatical items as belonging to the other grammar, because the grammars are very similar to each other, and the nongrammatical items are relatively highly dissimilar. Participants' knowledge may be ambiguous, rather than automatic. It is further argued that even if Higham et al.'s data do support automatic effects, opposition logic, in this case, cannot be said to have succeeded where dissociation logic has failed, because it is used to address the issue of whether participants have conscious control over the knowledge they acquire, rather than whether they possess conscious awareness of that knowledge.     

On the formal connection of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument to quantum mechanics and reality

It is argued that formal reconstructions of the EPR-argument do not only show semantical incompleteness, but also incorrectness of quantum mechanics together with the projection postulate. The latter has to be rejected because it contradicts Schrödinger's equation. A logical analogon to the problem is given.     

Against natural kind eliminativism

Synthese - It has recently been argued that the concept of natural kinds should be eliminated because it does not play a productive theoretical role and even harms philosophical research on...     

Do the bishops have it right on health care reform?

The National Conference of Catholic Bishops has argued for significant government involvement in health care in order to assure respect for what they regard as the right to health care. Critics charge that the bishops are wrong because health care is not a right. In this article, it is argued that these critics are correct in their claim that health care is not a right. However, it is also argued that the premise that health care is not a right does not imply that the market is the most equitable and just system for providing health care. Natural law arguments in the tradition of Roman Catholic social teaching lead to the conclusion that a just and prosperous society has a moral obligation to provide health care even if there is no such right. Further, there are strong moral grounds for concluding that the bishops are correct in their claim that health care ought not to be considered a market commodity. It is argued that if health care ought not to be considered a commodity, then national health insurance is the best available alternative for fulfilling the social obligation to distribute health care resources justly and fairly at this time in American history. The bishops' case for government involvement can be made on the strength of the Catholic tradition in theological argumentation, independent of the claim that health care is a right.     

Contractarianism and Secondary Direct Moral Standing for Marginal Humans and Animals

It is commonly thought that neo-Hobbesian contractarianism cannot yield direct moral standing for marginal humans and animals. However, it has been argued that marginal humans and animals can have a form of direct moral standing under neo-Hobbesian contractarianism: secondary moral standing. I will argue that, even if such standing is direct, this account is unsatisfactory because it is counterintuitive and fragile.     

Mystery of the anti-McCollough effect

The McCollough Effect (ME) is a complex perceptual aftereffect that remains of interest half a century after its discovery. It is argued that a recently reported variant, dubbed the anti-McCollough effect, is not the reverse of the ME, with aftereffect colors in the same direction as the inducing stimuli. A red-horizontal stimulus leads to a reddish aftereffect not because of red-horizontal parings, but despite them. The anti-ME is a weak standard-direction ME produced by complementary afterimage colors (afterimage green with horizontal), rather than by environmental colors, first shown decades ago. It is not a new type of contingent aftereffect. The red-horizontal pair does not interfere with the afterimage green-horizontal pair it produces because a single color-orientation pairing provides more ambiguous input than does the standard two orientation-color pairings (red-horizontal, green-vertical) of the ME. It is also argued that not even one orientation-contingent color aftereffect is convincingly shown in the "anti"-ME, let alone, as has previously been suggested, two simultaneous orientation-contingent color aftereffects in opposite directions at different levels of the visual system, in which the higher-level effect suppresses the downstream effect from reaching consciousness. The "anti"-ME can be explained by existing theories of contingent aftereffects, including perceptual-learning theory.     

INTRINSIC FINKS

Dispositions can be finkish, prone to disappear in circumstances that would commonly trigger their characteristic manifestations. Can a disposition be finkish because of something intrinsic to the object possessing that disposition? Sungho Choi has argued that this is not possible, and many agree. Here it is argued that no good case has been made for ruling out the possibility of intrinsic finks; on the contrary, there is good reason to accept it.     

From species ethics to social concerns: Habermas’s critique of “liberal eugenics” evaluated

Three arguments of Habermas against “liberal eugenics”—the arguments from consent, responsibility, and instrumentalization—are critically evaluated and explicated in the light of his discourse ethics and social theory. It is argued that these arguments move partly at a too deep level and are in part too individualistic and psychological to sufficiently counter the liberal position that he sets out to criticize. This is also due to limitations that prevent discourse ethics from connecting effectively to the moral and political domains, e.g., through a discussion of justice. In spite of these weaknesses, Habermas’s thesis is of major relevance and brings up neglected issues in the discussion about eugenic reproductive practices. This relevance has not been duly recognized in bioethics, largely because of the depth of his speculations of philosophical anthropology. It is argued that Habermas’s notion of the colonization of the lifeworld could provide the analytical tool needed to build that bridge to the moral and political domain.     

Reflexivity, the role of history, and the case of mesmerism in early Victorian Britain

As part of a wider argument that history is essential to psychological understanding because of the reflexive nature of psychological knowledge, this article examines the case of mesmerism in early Victorian Britain as an example of how psychological knowledge is both constructive and constructed. It is argued that the shift from "mesmerism" to "hypnotism" was a change in understanding that created a new kind of psychological experience. It is also argued that demonstrations of mesmerism, far from being self-evident facts, could be framed as evidence either for or against the central claims of mesmerism. It is concluded that the case of mesmerism in early Victorian Britain provides a further example of the need for historical understanding within Psychology.     

EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE RATIONALITY OF FAITH

This paper evaluates the role that evolutionary psychology can play in examining the rationality of faith in the Christian sense. It is argued that because evolutionary psychology enables us to understand human nature, it can help us understand what faith is. I argue that faith is not a universal human instinct that all religions tap into. Rather, we must understand how the early Christian community used the basic building blocks provided by human nature in a particular way. It is argued that it is a misunderstanding of the nature of faith to assert that faith is intrinsically irrational. However, evolutionary psychology cannot tell us whether or not faith is rational.     

Indoctrination, Coercion and Freedom of Will

Manipulation by another person often undermines freedom. To explain this, a distinction is drawn between two forms of manipulation: indoctrination is defined as causing another person to respond to reasons in a pattern that serves the manipulator's ends; coercion as supplying another person with reasons that, given the pattern in which he responds to reasons, lead him to act in ways that serve the manipulator's ends. It is argued that both forms of manipulation undermine freedom because manipulators track the compliance of their victims, while neutral causal mechanisms do not. Manipulators see to it that their victims comply even in the face of forces that threaten to derail them from the manipulator's desired course. It is suggested that this has an impact on freedom because part of what we desire in wanting to be free is the availability of forms of life very different from those we actually enjoy.     

On believing indirectly for practical reasons

Philosophical Studies - It is often argued that there are no practical reasons for belief because we could not believe for such reasons. A recent reply by pragmatists is that we can often believe...     

Making the case for dedicated infant mental health services

SUMMARY

This paper seeks to demonstrate the case for establishing dedicated Infant Mental Health Services. It is argued that the 0–3 age-group is not well served by the current arrangement for the provision of mental health services along child/adult lines, and falls between these two stools. It is further argued that priority should be given to services for this group because of the immense potential of early intervention programmes. The nature and ethos of such services are discussed, and it is suggested that the time is now ripe for Infant Mental Health to be given institutional recognition as a distinct specialism in its own right.     

Elaborating Expressivism: Moral judgments,Desires and Motivation

According to expressivism, moral judgments are desire-like states of mind. It is often argued that this view is made implausible because it isn’t consistent with the conceivability of amoralists, i.e., agents who make moral judgments yet lack motivation. In response, expressivists can invoke the distinction between dispositional and occurrent desires. Strandberg (Am Philos Quart 49:81–91, 2012) has recently argued that this distinction does not save expressivism. Indeed, it can be used to argue that expressivism is false. In this paper I argue that expressivism is a much more complex thesis than Strandberg assumes. Once these complexities are acknowledged, Strandberg’s arguments are rendered ineffective and expressivism rendered more plausible.     

The Levels Hypothesis: A Re-Examination and Reorientation

The levels-hypothesis appears to be derived from psychoanalytic theory, and in its most popular interpretation is concerned with levels of consciousness. However, it is argued that a gradient of consciousness has no application to projective techniques, essentially because there are no principles of differentiation. It is for this reason that the studies which have been done have concerned themselves with such concepts as pathology, concepts which have a tenuous relation to the original levels-hypothesis. The paper has proposed that consciousness in the sense of awareness can more meaningfully be applied to projective material, and that when it is used in this sense a levels-hypothesis can be derived which is both testable and has an adequate rationale.     

Does doxastic responsibility entail the ability to believe otherwise?

Whether responsibility for actions and omissions requires the ability to do otherwise is an important issue in contemporary philosophy. However, a closely related but distinct issue, namely whether doxastic responsibility requires the ability to believe otherwise, has been largely neglected. This paper fills this remarkable lacuna by providing a defence of the thesis that doxastic responsibility entails the ability to believe otherwise. On the one hand, it is argued that the fact that unavoidability is normally an excuse counts in favour of this thesis. On the other hand, three objections against this thesis are discussed and criticized. First, one might think that what suffices for doxastic responsibility is control over or influence on certain desirable or undesirable properties of beliefs. It is argued that this objection misrepresents the issue under consideration. Second, it may be objected that the thesis is contradicted by our intuitions in doxastic analogues of Frankfurt-style scenarios. It is argued that distinguishing between belief-universals and belief-particulars helps to see why this argument fails. Third and finally, one might draw an analogy with the asymmetry thesis in ethics by arguing that even if blameworthy belief requires the ability to believe otherwise, praiseworthy belief does not. It is argued that the main arguments in favour of this presumed asymmetry are wanting, partly because they fail to distinguish between two different kinds of praiseworthiness. Finally, the author sketches three implications of the thesis that doxastic responsibility entails the ability to believe otherwise: counterfactual construals of responsible belief might be tenable, the deontological conception of epistemic justification needs revision on an important point, and there might be an important asymmetry between beliefs on the one hand and actions and many non-doxastic consequences on the other.     

Transitivity and the ontology of causation

It is argued that it is very hard to analyse causation in such a way that prevents everything from causing everything else. This is particularly true if we assume that the causal relation is transitive, for it all too often happens that causal chains that we wish to keep separate pass through common intermediate events. It is also argued that treating causes as aspects of events, rather than the events themselves, will not solve this problem. This is because aspects have to be highly disjunctive, and disjunctive conditions tend to undermine causal connections, a fact that is most clearly seen when causation is analysed in terms of INUS conditions. It is concluded that reductive analyses of causation do not work, and that transitivity can only be guaranteed in cases where the elements of the causal chain constitute an independently understood causal process.     

The effect of movement amplitude and target diameter on reaction time: comments on Siegel (1977)

Siegel's (1977) interpretation that his reaction time results were solely a function of response factors (movement amplitude and target diameter) was discussed and criticized. It was argued that Siegel's interpretation was inappropriate because stimulus factors (eccentric and visual angle) and response factors were confounded. It was also argued that the surprising U-shaped relation between reaction time and movement amplitude was probably the result of the confounding between stimulus and response factors.