Paralogical reasoning: Evans, Johnson-Laird, and Byrne on liar and truth-teller puzzles

People's performance on knight/knave problems is deliberate. They make assumptions, draw deductive inferences from them, and evaluate the consequences of these inferences. In an initial paper on this topic (Rips, 1989), I proposed a model for a subset of such problems that depend on sentential reasoning. The main component of the model is a set of natural-deduction rules, drawn from prior work on propositional inference. This natural-deduction framework seems well suited to explain the reasoning that subjects display on these problems, since it incorporates a mechanism for making assumptions and following them up. Moreover, the number of assumptions and rule applications needed to solve a problem yields an intuitively appealing measure of how difficult the problem should be. In accord with this prediction, the experiments found increases in error rates and reaction times as a function of the assumptions-plus-inferences measure. In their note, Johnson-Laird and Byrne sketch a possible alternative. Their account posits five processing strategies tailored to this problem domain and a mechanism for evaluating sentential arguments based on mental models. The mental-model component is a variation on the usual truth-table method, where individual models correspond to truth-table rows. The main prediction of this component is that the more models subjects must consider, the harder the problem. However, the experiment reported here found no evidence for this prediction. Problems with larger numbers of models do not yield higher error rates than those with few. What does cause difficulties for subjects is scope relations among connectives, a fact that inference-rule theories can easily explain. Given these findings, it's not surprising that the predictive burden for knight/knave problems must be carried by Johnson-Laird and Byrne's strategies, rather than by mental models. These strategies control the order in which subjects consider parts of the problem, and they provide possible stopping points. There are, however, several difficulties with these strategies. Of their four new strategies, Johnson-Laird and Byrne offer no evidence at all for two of them. Of the remaining two, only one accounts for a significant proportion of the variance when allowance is made for confounding variables. Moreover, all four strategies are ad hoc, rather than being derived from some more general theory. Certainly, much remains to be done in filling out the picture of how such problems are handled, as both Evans and Johnson-Laird and Byrne point out.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Moderators of the Relationship Between Cognitive Ability and Performance: General Versus Context–Specific Achievement Motivation1

Despite positing a multiplicative model of performance, 3 recent studies failed to find support for a theoretically meaningful interaction between cognitive ability and trait motivation in predicting performance. We suggest that it is important to consider that these studies used trait–motivation constructs that are general in nature, rather than context–specific. Yet, existing theory and research suggests that it may be beneficial to use trait–motivation constructs that are expressly contextual, especially when investigating a multiplicative performance model. This study, therefore, compared general versus context–specific achievement motivation as moderators of the relationship between cognitive ability and performance. The proposition that only context–specific achievement motivation should interact with cognitive ability in predicting performance was supported. Implications are discussed.     

An Integrative Model of Work Attitudes,Motivation, and Performance

A comprehensive theoretical model of work attitudes, motivation, and performance is presented that integrates key constructs prevalent in more limited theories. The constructs were selected on the basis of their importance as shown by past research and because of their seeming complementarity rather than redundance with one another. The framework connects the constructs causally on the basis of both logic and empirical evidence. It is expressed in the form of a path diagram amenable to empirical test, in the hope that it will have heuristic value. It is expected that such an integration will provide a better basis for understanding and improving work attitudes, motivation, and performance than do the more limited approaches.     

The Individual or the Institution? Ethics and Behavioural Responses to Social Insurance

abstract   Individuals tend to change their behaviour as a response to insurance. Such behavioural responses to insurance are commonly seen as ethically and morally problematic. This is especially true of effects on behaviour from social insurance. These effects have been seen as an ethical problem, associated with irresponsibility, fraud and an immoral character. This article discusses the relevance of four different types of reasons for claims that behavioural responses to social insurance are immoral. These reasons are (1) independent reasons (2) con-tract related reasons (3) reasons related to fraud and (4) reasons related to justice. I argue that reasons related to justice are most relevant, but that this type of reason does not render the individual morally blameworthy. Hence, insofar as behavioural responses to social insurance are an ethical problem it is a problem that concerns the institution, i.e. what incentives social insurance exhibits, rather than the individual, i.e. the morality of the individual responding to it. Insofar as behavioural responses to social insurance are an ethical problem it is a problem for political philosophy rather than individual ethics.     

Some Problems About Affectivity

Neu's work is splendid. In addition to offering wonderfully illuminating characterizations of various emotions, it helps show that these individual characterizations, rather than an overall characterization of emotions or affectivity, have always been Neu's main concern. Nonetheless he is concerned with specific instances of, and often the general nature of, affectivity: what differentiates mere thoughts, desires, and values from emotions where the complex is affectively charged. I argue that his accounts of affectivity do not succeed — in that they can be satisfied by what is affectless.     

Individual versus provided constructs, cognitive complexity and extremity of ratings in person perception

Abstract.— Bruner & Tagiuri's (1954) concept of implicit personality theory, and Kelly's (1955) theory of personal constructs were used as a basis for a hypothesis that an individual's own constructs mediate more differentiated perceptions of other people than constructs provided by the experimenter. The hypothesis was tested by using four indices of cognitive complexity and one index of extremity of ratings to measure differentiation. The individual constructs were derived by using Reptest. The provided constructs were Semantic Differential and Personality Differential scales. The subjects were 36 psychology students. Two experimenters were employed to control experimenter effects. The data did not support the hypothesis but showed that differences between individual constructs and provided constructs are dependent upon which criterion is chosen to contrast the two types of constructs, which indices are used to measure the chosen criterion, and what type of provided constructs are compared with individual constructs.     

A New Quasi‐Transcendental Approach to Kant's Theory of Radical Evil

How to make sense of Kant's theory of radical evil is a controversial problem, for the solution of which three approaches have been attempted: (1) the anthropological, (2) the transcendental, and (3) the quasi‐transcendental. This article aims at developing a new quasi‐transcendental approach to radical evil, and its main innovation consists in reinterpreting the propensity to evil as a potential for moral evil, whose nuanced modality (i.e., potentiality) lies between full actuality and logical (empty) possibility. This evil potential inherent to our species' nature can be actualized by individual Willkür in one's evil Gesinnung. Thanks to this reinterpretation, not only the compatibility of radical evil with individual freedom will be convincingly demonstrated, because the potential for evil only strongly pushes rather than necessitating individuals to do evil, but also Kant's bold statement “the human being is by nature evil” becomes easily confirmable, because even a single individual's illegal action provides sufficient empirical evidence to a regressive argument for the transcendental precondition for evil in his species' nature.     

Commentaries on “Beyond statistical significance: Five principles for the new era of data analysis and reporting”

Three commentaries below provide different perspectives on data analysis and reporting. They generally focus on how the quality of the measures and manipulations determines the value of the analysis. Norbert Schwarz and Fritz Strack's comment is less on the right statistic and more on “sloppy reasoning, gaps between theoretical concepts and their operationalizations, and blissful ignorance of the situated nature of human thinking, feeling, and doing contribute more to the limited reproducibility of empirical findings than the choice of a particular test statistic.” They propose that particular effects are contextual and inappropriately labeled as true or false. Instead, our job is to focus on general constructs that make sense of the diversity of human experience and psychological reactions. Too often studies replicating psychological effects in the noisy and confounded conditions of the marketplace result in statistical uncertainty of garbage in, garbage out. Researchers instead need to look toward tests of specific interactions, which can clarify the influencing factors based on theoretical considerations. The second comment is by Andrew Gelman, an outstanding psychological statistician. He proposes that “once the data have been collected, the most important decisions have already been done.” He then provides four recommendations that enable the statistics to work appropriately. The first requirement of an effective study is to be sure that the measures address the construct of interest. Similar to the position of Schwarz and Strack, it is important to articulate the relevance of a statistically significant finding. The second recommendation seeks to curb large number of studies with inflated effect sizes built from narrow studies and unwarranted optimism. The third recommendation is to simulate data from a model and consider the distribution of possible results. That is often done to test a new analysis method, but it can be even more important in marketplace studies where novel characteristics of the sample and experimental conditions are included in the analysis. Finally, he recommends that one consider likely analyses needed before getting the data. Such foresight would encourage, for example, thinking about the kind of data needed to defend the equality of the control demographics against the treatment. The final commentary is by Stijn van Osselaer. He agrees that p-values reflect the detailed methods from a given study but do not focus on the problem of generalizability. Like Gelman, he sees designs focused on effect sizes may have generated too many studies that do not replicate. He contrasts broad explorations with narrowly defined existence tests that provide evidence that an effect exists somewhere but are mute on other contexts where they may apply. For theoretical problems relevant to applications, it is important to identify moderators through broad sampling across population characteristics, stimuli, and situations. He proposes that consumer psychologists should not try to do everything in one paper, but to build practically relevant, applicable knowledge across multiple articles. Different articles, authors, and research methods play various roles, with each article focusing on important stages in the process from generating hypotheses, providing existence proofs, and exploring their broad applicability. That pragmatic approach can integrate theoretical silos that seek to resolve complex human problems and has promise as a criterion for relevant publications.     

The labours of Hercules: some good reasons why social workers should not try to be different, and practice family therapy

Family therapy, despite being an approach to problems in a social context, has, for the most part, been developed and refined in medical settings (Adams, 1979). Family therapy propounds a methodology based on social rather than medical techniques of intervention. It is logical to suggest that workers based in socially-orientated agencies, rather than medical settings, could be predicted to be better placed to utilize and develop this particular approach to human problems. How can it be explained that the main bulk of the innovations are still coming from practitioners who have trained primarily in medical approaches and settings? This article looks at some of the reasons why family therapy practice and development is not flourishing in Social Services Departments as it is in, for example, hospitals and clinics. The authors do not offer any positive conclusions at this stage, but will show, in a later publication, what has been achieved in some Social Services Departments, and how practice has been established despite the organizational and operational constraints implicit in the introduction of a family, or systems orientated method, to an agency traditionally and statutorily focused upon the individual.     

Androgyny and Sex-Typing as Continuous Independent Factors,and a Glimpse of the Future

Models for operationalizing the sex-role constructs androgyny and sex-typing are reviewed, and problems discussed. A new (principal components) model representing an exact solution is derived and shown to solve existing problems. In this model, androgyny is a function of the sum of standardized instrumentality and expressiveness scores, and sex-typing a function of the difference between these scores. Formal operationalization of these constructs reveals that they may have theoretical utility in only very contrived contingencies, and an alternative profile matching model is proposed. This latter theory, which is not yet fully specified, hypothesizes that an individual's performance is maximized when the critical operating characteristics of a contingency (i.e., instrumental and expressive behaviors required for maximal performance to result) exactly match the individual's specific instrumental and expressive predispositions, and that performance decreases as the discrepancy between the instrumental/expressive profiles of the individual and the contingency increases.     

Vocational behavior and career development, 1980: A review

Papers were reviewed in the sections where their major findings seemed to have the most important implications. Since it typically was not possible to do justice to individual studies in a few lines of summary, readers are referred to the specific articles of their interest for further information regarding other findings.As has been the case in the past several years, the number of studies related to vocational behavior and career development appears to be expanding, along with perceptions of what is relevant to the field. As greater emphasis is placed on the working life of individuals after initial occupational choices are made, researchers on vocational behavior and career development will increasingly find it necessary to synthesize research findings from the areas of industrial/organizational psychology, organizational sociology, and organizational behavior and theory. This factor may suggest greater collaboration among researchers across these fields in the future. In any event, the broadening base of relevant research, while challenging, also is an exciting development with rich potential for increased knowledge of vocational behavior.As Walsh mentioned in his review of 1978 literature, there is a vital need for more work of a longitudinal nature. We see some increase this year, but we are too frequently forced to draw conclusions regarding long-term vocational development from studies which are mainly crosssectional and correlational in nature.Among the research directions of note this year is the increasing emphasis on information processing/decision-making frameworks as a means of studying the vocation development process. Other trends were the growing concern with the relationship between work and nonwork, interest in recruitment processes, and the emphasis on situational as well as individual factors in predicting vocational behavior.     

A multilevel framework for understanding relationships among traits,states, situations and behaviours

A conceptual and analytic framework for understanding relationships among traits, states, situations, and behaviours is presented. The framework assumes that such relationships can be understood in terms of four questions. (1) What are the relationships between trait and state level constructs, which include psychological states, the situations people experience and behaviour? (2) What are the relationships between psychological states, between states and situations and between states and behaviours? (3) How do such state level relationships vary as a function of trait level individual differences? (4) How do the relationships that are the focus of questions 1, 2, and 3 change across time? This article describes how to use multilevel random coefficient modelling (MRCM) to examine such relationships. The framework can accommodate different definitions of traits and dispositions (Allportian, processing styles, profiles, etc.) and different ways of conceptualising relationships between states and traits (aggregationist, interactionist, etc.). Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Content-blind norms, no norms, or good norms? A reply to Vranas

In the psychology of thinking, little thought is given to what constitutes good thinking. Instead, normative solutions to problems have been accepted at face value, thereby determining what counts as a reasoning fallacy. I applaud Vranas (Cognition 76 (2000) 179) for thinking seriously about norms. I do, however, disagree with his attempt to provide post hoc justifications for supposed reasoning fallacies in terms of 'content-neutral' norms. Norms need to be constructed for a specific situation, not imposed upon it in a content-blind way. The reason is that content-blind norms disregard relevant structural properties of the given situation, including polysemy, reference classes, and sampling. I also show that content-blind norms can, unwittingly, lead to double standards: the norm in one problem is the fallacy in the next. The alternative to content-blind norms is not no norms, but rather carefully designed norms.     

A formalisation of violation, error recovery, and enforcement in the bit transmission problem

The design of complex multi-agent systems is increasingly having to confront the possibility that agents may not behave as they are supposed to. In addition to analysing the properties that hold if protocols are followed correctly, it is also necessary to predict, test, and verify the properties that would hold if these protocols were to be violated. We illustrate how the formal machinery of deontic interpreted systems can be applied to the analysis of such problems by considering three variations of the bit transmission problem. The first, an example in which an agent may fail to do something it is supposed to do, shows how we deal with violations of protocols and specifications generally. The second, an example in which an agent may do something it is not supposed to do, shows how it is possible to specify and analyse remedial or error-recovery procedures. The third combines both kinds of faults and introduces a new component into the system, a controller, whose role is to enforce compliance with the protocol. In each case the formal analysis is used to test whether critical properties of the system are compromised, in this example, the reliable communication of information from one agent to the other.     

Toward a general theory of persons.

The fundamental question I consider is the following: What is it that makes one thing a person and another thing not? I do not provide a complete answer; rather I begin to develop a framework for answering the question. In this essay I do the following: (1) distinguish between the powers possessed by persons and the constitutions of persons, and propose some metaphysical conjectures concerning the relationship between persons' powers and their constitutions; (2) propose for Christians, as well as for others, an hylomorphic soul-body alternative to Cartesianism; (3) highlight some prominent differences between the nature of human persons to problems in biomedical ethics concerning the ontological and moral status of human embryos and of the comatose.     

SOCIOLOGISM IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE*

In a nutshell, the present essay claims this: First, the classical problem of knowledge has recently shifted from, How do I know? to, How do we know?–from psychology to sociology. As a phenomenological matter this is a great improvement, as a solution to the problem of rationality it is erroneous and immoral. The problem, (Why) should I act, believe, etc., this or that? is answered: You should do so on the authority of your reason. But change the problem of rationality in accord with the change in the problem of knowledge, and ask, (Why) should we–rather than I–act or believe as we do? and the answer is clear: We should act and believe as we do, because our society is as it is, and should be as it is. This is clearly the same as, we should because we should. Not very enlightening. Sociologism appears as the authoritarian solution to the problem of rationality in works of Polanyi and Kuhn; a variant of it appears as a liberal theory in the studies of Popper and his former students who, however, do not offer any positive theory of what to believe or do; rather, they offer a negative theory of what to reject. They view this as a better solution to the problem of rationality, if not even a better formulation of it (not what and why should I/we etc., but what and why should I/we not etc.).     

A Visual Representation to Quantitate,Diagnose, and Improve Creativity in Insight Problem Solving

A new visual representation for insight problems permits 22 new quantitative measures; which leads to a detailed diagnosis of a person's (or team's) creative weaknesses; which then leads to prescribing targeted, effective counter‐techniques for each weakness. Currently, only two measures are consistently used for insight problem solving: the number of problems solved and the time to solve the problems. These coarse measurements do not reveal the intricate dynamics of solving insight problems. Furthermore, four commonly used creativity measures (i.e., fluency, originality, flexibility, and elaboration) are often not applied to insight problems. This new visualization permits the easy application of all four creativity measures. I challenge creativity researchers to help determine which of the 22 proposed quantitative measures are the most diagnostic for insight problem solving in isolation and, in a weighted linear combination, which might yield an effective quotient (i.e., overall measure) of insight problem solving ability.