On the Death of God in Lacan – A Nuanced Atheism

This article examines the death of God theme in the work of Jacques Lacan and indicates some convergences with Christian theology. It distinguishes the ‘atheism’ of Lacan from the atheism of Freud. And it demonstrates that if Lacan does not believe in the God equated with Being, the God of the philosophers, the later Lacan’s argument for what he calls the ‘eksistence’ of God beyond language, the God of the mystics, makes for a highly nuanced atheism.     

Melanie Klein’s letters addressed to Marcelle Spira (1955–1960)1

Between 1955 and 1960, Melanie Klein wrote some 45 hitherto unpublished letters to Marcelle Spira, the Swiss psychoanalyst living at that time in Geneva. In 2006, after Spira’s death, these letters were deposited with the Raymond de Saussure Psychoanalysis Centre in Geneva. They are the only known letters that Klein addressed to her psychoanalyst colleagues. Several topics are mentioned in them: (1) the meetings between the two women in Geneva and London; (2) Spira’s contribution to Boulanger’s translation into French of The Psychoanalysis of Children, which Klein herself carefully revised; (3) the papers that Klein was at that time working on, including Envy and Gratitude; (4) Spira’s own work; (5) the difficulties that Spira, a Kleinian psychoanalyst who trained in Buenos Aires, was encountering in her attempt to be admitted to the Swiss Psychoanalytical Society; and (6) a few items of personal and family news. In addition to the invaluable historical information that these letters provide, they offer us a very moving epistolary self‐portrait of Melanie Klein, enabling us to discover her personality in the final years of her life – she died in September 1960, just two months after writing her last letter to Spira.     

The significance of Jacques Lacan.

The contemporary French psychoanalyst, Jacques Lacan, has offered a reinterpretation of basic Freudian concepts that is to a great extent based on the structural linguistics of F. de Saussure. Certain fundamental ideas of Lacan, such as his views that "the unconscious is structured like a language" and that "the unconscious is the discourse of the Other" are examined here, and an attempt is made to place them in perspective in psychoanalysis.     

Lacan1

Jacques Lacan belonged to the second generation of French psychoanalysts which, thanks to the arrival in France of Rudolf Loewenstein, was the first to benefit from a training analysis of sufficient quality and duration. Lacan left the Société Psychanalytique de Paris and the International Psychoanalytic Association in 1953, following a controversy over the short sessions he gave his patients. For Lacan, the anxiety of being absorbed by the object is the principal anxiety from which the anxieties of separation, castration or fragmentation are derived, which may explain why he did not keep his patients for a sufficient length of time. Lacan transformed his difficulty into an advocated technique, which he justified by making a critique of the classical technique. He founded his own international psychoanalytic association, in which selection only occurs when the analyst is already at a very advanced stage in his career (‘the authorization of an analyst can only come from himself’). We are indebted to Lacan for having drawn the attention of analysts to the role of language, and especially of words with a double meaning, in the genesis of interpretation, but his theory of language, founded on the assimilation of psychoanalysis to structural linguistics and anthropology, has collapsed. Many of Lacan's other theoretical contributions, such as the renewed interest in the après‐coup, the place of mirror relations in narcissism, the distinction between what he calls jouissance and the orgasm, or between the ‘real’ and reality, have been gradually integrated by analysts who accept neither his technique nor his laxity in training.     

The Neighbor Between Rosenzweig and Lacan

Death is the persistent kernel of a human life in both Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory and Franz Rosenzweig’s theology. Lacan’s reformulation of the Freudian drive conceives of death as the annihilating force behind each person’s desire. Accordingly, the other assumes death’s absolute impenetrability. Rosenzweig likewise insists that perpetual acknowledgement of death must individuate a human life; however, his theology of revelation allows for the disclosure of the absolute Other in a commandment to love. Two ethics proceed from these two figures of death: a Lacanian ethics of distance and a Rosenzweigian ethics of communitarian love. Finally, I consider whether a Rosenzweigian posture toward the neighbor must be predicated on a transcendent faith.     

The cabinet of Dr. Lacan

Conclusion Obscurity is not the worst failing, and it is philistinism to pretend that it is. In a series of brilliant essays written over the last fifteen years Stanley Cavell has consistently argued that more important than the question whether obscurity could have been avoided is whether it affects our confidence in the author.Confidence raises the issue of intention, and I would have thought that the primary commitment of a psychoanalytic writer was to pass on, and (if he can) to refine while passing on, a particular way of exploring the mind. Indeed this is how Lacan himself proposes that his work should be judged. The aim of my teaching, he writes, has been and still is the training of analysts.For decades now Lacan has been insisting that the nature of this commitment has been systematically obscured, particularly in North America. Training has become routinized, and analysis itself has become distorted into a process of crude social adaptation. There is much here to agree with. Yet two questions must be raised. Has Lacan devised a more effective method of training analysts? And, would one expect this from his writings?Neither question gets a favourable answer. All reports of his training methods, over which he has now brought about three distinct secessions within the French psychoanalytic movement, are horrifying.¹³ It is now, I am told, possible to become a Lacanian analyst after a very few months of Lacanian analysis. And what pedagogic contribution could we expect from a form of prose that has two salient characteristics: it exhibits the application of theory to particular cases as quite arbitrary, and it forces the adherents it gains into pastiche.¹⁴ Lacan's ideas and Lacan's style, yoked in an indissoluble union, represent an invasive tyranny. And it is by a hideous irony that this tyranny should find its recruits among groups that have nothing in common except the sense that they lack a theory worthy of their cause or calling: feminists, cinéastes, professors of literature.Lacan himself offers several justifications for his obscurity, about which he has no false modesty. At times he says that he is the voice, the messenger, the porte-parole, of the unconscious itself. Lacan's claim stirs in my mind the retort Freud made to a similar assult upon his credulity and by someone who had learned from Lacan. It is not the unconscious mind I look out for in your paintings, Freud said to Salvador Dali, it is the conscious.This article originally appeared as a review (The New York Review of Books, January 25, 1979) of the three books listed under References.     

The ecstatic and the theory of Jacques Lacan

Historically, psychology attempted to become a science of the mind, but failed for various reasons. These included (a) the apparent barrier between objective and subjective data, (b) ignoring of individual differences, (c) experimenter bias, (d) culture boundedness, (e) insufficient training of observers, and (f) a limited, Newtonian physics view of reality. This article argues that humanistic and transpersonal psychology can lead the way to a more comprehensive and effective science of mind because we have new methods today to deal more effectively with the limits imposed by these problems.     

Relationships as dialogues

This article discusses five interrelated conceptions of dialogue in the works of Russian scholar Mikhail Bakhtin that ground relational dialectics theory: (a) dialogue as constitutive process, (b) dialogue as dialectical flux, (c) dialogue as aesthetic moment, (d) dialogue as utterance, and (e) dialogue as critical sensibility. The author's recent research in relational dialectics is discussed, as are directions for future research. Relational dialectics is positioned as a sensitizing theory different from systems theory and other dialectically oriented approaches.     

Lacan and Social Psychology

Jacques Lacan kept silent on the topic of social psychology, never referring to it, not even to criticize it. But this has not impeded Lacanian theory from inspiring diverse critical approaches to social psychology. After reviewing these approaches, the article examines Lacan's different explicit positions with respect to psychology, the social and what he called psychology of the social field. This allows us to infer the implicit manner in which Lacan would establish his silent relationship with social psychology. On the basis of this relationship, we outline an original proposal for a Lacanian critical approach to social psychology that might lead to an alternative transindividual metapsychology. Our proposal precisely differs from others in that it attempts to consider and elucidate Lacan's own attitude regarding social psychology.