论医务人员在医疗事故技术鉴定过程中的法律地位

目前,医疗事故技术鉴定过程中忽视了医务人员应有的地位。从法律规定和程序正义、当事人理论等方面明确了医务人员在鉴定中的法律地位。论述了医务人员应当是医疗事故技术鉴定的当事人,其在鉴定中享有当事人的权利和义务,这对保护医务人员的合法权益有着重要意义。     

当前心灵哲学中的核心课题

本文的目的是以心灵哲学中的核心课题为线索,试图对当前心灵哲学的研究状况作一个总体的介绍和讨论。文章将围绕意识、心灵内容、心灵形而上学和认知科学这四个主题来展开,对于每一个主题,我在评介各种重要课题的同时,也注意给出这一方面的主要哲学家的代表性著作的文献出处,以便对具体问题感兴趣的读者进一步专研。     

医疗事故技术鉴定公正性初探

医疗事故技术鉴定是解决医患纠纷的重要环节,鉴定公正与否直接关系到医患双方的合法权益能否得到有效的保护,关系到社会的和谐与稳定。医疗事故技术鉴定在解决医患纠纷上发挥了积极的作用,但也存在一些缺憾。对目前鉴定的公正性进行了分析,并提出相应的对策。     

医疗事故技术鉴定公正性初探

医疗事故技术鉴定是解决医患纠纷的重要环节,鉴定公正与否直接关系到医患双方的合法权益能否得到有效的保护,关系到社会的和谐与稳定.医疗事故技术鉴定在解决医患纠纷上发挥了积极的作用,但也存在一些缺憾.对目前鉴定的公正性进行了分析,并提出相应的对策.     

戴维森在哲学上的主要贡献

主持人的话:在当代美国哲学中,唐纳德·戴维森是继奎因之后与普特南齐名的著名哲学家;在我国哲学界,戴维森也是一个响当当的名字:这不仅由于他关于真和意义的理论挑起了当代语言哲学中的重大讨论,而且因为他对多元文化中的理性活动的关注,使得他被看作当代美国新实用主义的领军人物之一。2003年8月30日,戴维森不幸仙逝,使得他与中国哲学家们之间的一个被推迟了的约会成为永远的遗憾。现任教于美国的牟博是这个约会的发起人,而北京的王路和台湾的方万全则是这个约会中众多参与者的成员,他们既是戴维森的学生和朋友,更是戴维森思想的见证人。这里编发的一组文章不仅向我们展现了戴维森的深厚思想,而且真实地记录了戴维森哲学与中国哲学交往的历史进程。     

作为哲学性质和路向的实践哲学概念——兼论历史唯物主义在西方哲学实践转向中的地位

哲学性质意义上的实践哲学概念是在与西方传统认识论哲学路向相对照的意义上得以确立的。它标志着后形而上学时代即后黑格尔哲学时代的到来。从认识论路向转向实践哲学路向,是当代哲学的基本趋势。历史唯物主义是当代实践哲学路向的开启者和典型代表,它具有多重不同于认识论哲学路向的基本规定。从认识论哲学路向到实践哲学路向的转变并不只是人类思想内部的自我变革,而且是时代变迁和时代精神的哲学表征。从与当今时代精神内在关联的角度看,实践哲学体现了当今时代的世俗性、包容性、创造性、可能性、主体性等五个方面的基本特征。     

论知性在认识过程中的地位和作用

过去,在国内的认识论研究和教学中,一般只讲感性、理性,很少或根本不涉及知性。现在,知性问题突然闯进了认识论园地,引起了人们的关注。知性问题的提出,对于认识论的研究,对于思维方式的考察,无疑是很有意义的。不过,究竟什么是知性,划分知性和理性有无意义,这种划分的根据是什么,以及有关知性的其他问题,学术界都有很大的分歧。本文拟就上述问题,发表若干意见。     

完善我国医疗事故技术鉴定制度的思考

在我国,如何建立一个科学、完善、认同性高的医疗事故技术鉴定制度是社会各界十分关注的焦点.新<医疗事故处理条例>中关于医疗事故技术鉴定的相关规定较之旧<医疗事故处理办法>有了很大的进步.但随着实践的不断深入,发现现行鉴定制度存在医疗事故技术鉴定的组织者尚未真正的独立、鉴定组成人员实质没有改变、专家回避制度操作性差、集体鉴定制有悖法理的弊端,对此提出了相应的对策.     

论财富问题在马克思哲学中的地位和作用

如果有人提起财富问题与马克思哲学之间的关系,大多数研究者会认为,两者之间并没有什么实质性的关系。试问,有谁能够在已经出版的关于马克思哲学的研究著作中,找到论述财富问题的专门章节?的确,财富问题从未真正地进入过马克思哲学研究者们的视野。然而,这种现象的存在并不表明它本身就是合理的,反倒表明研究者们从未真正地理解过马克思哲学,因为他们是从传统哲学而不     

论证券商的法律地位

论证券商的法律地位马其家在证券的发行与转让过程中,证券商扮演着极为重要的角色。没有证券商也就无所谓证券市场,也无所谓证券业。明确证券商在法律上的地位,可以使其更好地发挥作用,促进整个证券业的健康发展。证券商是指依法从事证券的承销、自营买卖及代理买卖等...     

Philosophy of Mind,Past and Present

This article attempts to summarize a few criteria of progress in philosophy—clarifying problems; rejecting false theories; opening new perspectives in familiar fields; inventing new arguments or thought experiments; and so on—and to apply them to contemporary philosophy of mind. As a result, the article concludes that while some progress was obvious in the past fifty years, there is much work yet to be done. It then tries to outline a transformation of conceptual analysis needed for further developments in this field. The author argues that conceptual analysis might be revived if it is treated as a clarification of the relations among our natural beliefs.     

西方哲学心智转向对心理学的影响

心智哲学是20世纪中末期西方哲学所发生的继语言(义)学转向和语用学转向之后的一次重要转向,它为心理学提供了新的元理论和方法论。(1)为心理学提供了"心智-语言-世界"新的世界观;(2)从哲学角度对人的心理进行了探讨,促进了哲学与心理学的结合并互哺;(3)促使人们对"人是什么"重新审视与理解;(4)引发了对以往心理学尤其是主流心理学的基石——身心二元论的质疑;(5)催生了第二代认知科学、活动主义、情境认知等新取向的兴起。它对心理学有很大启示:第一,人工智能、动物研究等研究是有限度的;第二,应重视身体的作用;第三,应重视人的意向性,注重隐喻分析;第四,应关注人的存在,尤其是生命的意义。     

Mind,State, and Metaphor

This article examines the post‐Ryle developments in philosophy of mind and psychology, in particular tracing the emergence of the concept of a mental state. The climate immediately following the large‐scale rejection of Descartes seems rather hostile to the idea of mental properties as internal states that cause behaviour. In this context, the emergence of the reificatory view of mental states is quite surprising, and it appears to stem from Putnam's adoption of the Turing machine (including the Turing state) as a model for human psychology. I conclude that the success of the “mental state” is down to the fact that it neatly conforms to the picture painted by the metaphorical expressions we use when talking about minds and mental things, and that its success is more accidental than inevitable.     

Mind,Consciousness, and Free Will

This commentary discusses how philosophy and science can collaborate to understand the human mind, considering dialogues involving three philosophers and three cognitive scientists. Their topics include the relation of philosophy and science, the nature of mind, the problem of consciousness, and the existence of free will. I argue that philosophy is more general and normative than science, but they are interdependent. Philosophy can build on the cognitive sciences to develop a theory of mind I call “multilevel materialism,” which integrates molecular, neural, mental, and social mechanisms. Consciousness is increasingly being understood as resulting from neural mechanisms. Scientific advances make the traditional concept of free will implausible, but “freeish” will is consistent with new theories of decision making and action resulting from brain processes. Philosophers should work closely with scientists to address profound problems about knowledge, reality, and values.     

Rethinking Neuroethics in the Light of the Extended Mind Thesis

The extended mind thesis is the claim that mental states extend beyond the skulls of the agents whose states they are. This seemingly obscure and bizarre claim has far-reaching implications for neuroethics, I argue. In the first half of this article, I sketch the extended mind thesis and defend it against criticisms. In the second half, I turn to its neuroethical implications. I argue that the extended mind thesis entails the falsity of the claim that interventions into the brain are especially problematic just because they are internal interventions, but that many objections to such interventions rely, at least in part, on this claim. Further, I argue that the thesis alters the focus of neuroethics, away from the question of whether we ought to allow interventions into the mind, and toward the question of which interventions we ought to allow and under what conditions. The extended mind thesis dramatically expands the scope of neuroethics: because interventions into the environment of agents can count as interventions into their minds, decisions concerning such interventions become questions for neuroethics.     

THE PHYSICALIZED MIND AND THE GUT‐BRAIN AXIS: TAKING MENTAL HEALTH OUT OF OUR HEADS

As it becomes increasingly plausible that the mind–brain is explicable in naturalistic terms, science‐and‐religion scholars have the opportunity to engage creatively and proactively with facets of brain‐related research that better inform our understanding of human well‐being. That is, once mental health is recognized as being a whole‐body phenomenon, exciting theological conversations can take place. One fascinating area of research involves the “gut–brain axis,” or the interactive relationship between the microbiome in the gastrointestinal tract (i.e., gut bacteria), the central nervous system, and mental health. A growing body of literature explores the immensely significant interactions between the gut microbiome and mental health issues involving depression, anxiety, gene expression, and stress responses. One's mental health does not occur in a disembodied state, but in a complex physical environment that is strongly influenced by environmental factors, many of which we can control. This article argues that science‐and‐religion can welcome scientific research in this area, creatively incorporating such insights into a theology of mental health and physical well‐being.     

Cosmology of Mind

In Il’enkov’s “Cosmology of mind,” written in his younger days in the tradition of Spinoza and Engels, the thinking mind appears as a necessary attribute of matter. Like all other main forms of matter in motion, the mind has its cosmic purpose and predestination. Il’enkov argued that it has to close the beginning and the end of the Big Cycle in order to return the dying Universe to its fiery youth. Il’enkov believed that this is the sole way to save the Universe from “thermal death” following the inevitable increase in entropy.     

Animal Mind: Science,Philosophy, and Ethics

Although 20^th-century empiricists were agnostic about animal mind and consciousness, this was not the case for their historical ancestors – John Locke, David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and, of course, Charles Darwin and George John Romanes. Given the dominance of the Darwinian paradigm of evolutionary continuity, one would not expect belief in animal mind to disappear. That it did demonstrates that standard accounts of how scientific hypotheses are overturned – i.e., by empirical disconfirmation or by exposure of logical flaws – is inadequate. In fact, it can be demonstrated that belief in animal mind disappeared as a result of a change of values, a mechanism also apparent in the Scientific Revolution. The “valuational revolution” responsible for denying animal mind is examined in terms of the rise of Behaviorism and its flawed account of the historical inevitability of denying animal mentation. The effects of the denial of animal consciousness included profound moral implications for the major uses of animals in agriculture and scientific research. The latter is particularly notable for the denial of felt pain in animals. The rise of societal moral concern for animals, however, has driven the “reappropriation of common sense” about animal thought and feeling.     

儿童理解误信念的心理机制假设

儿童心理理论是近20年来发展心理学研究热点,对其研究主要是在误信念实验范式之下进行的。儿童理解误信念的心理机制问题是误信念研究的核心问题之一,研究者从不同的角度出发,采用不同的方法,提出了儿童如何理解误信念的几个重要假设,包括：元表征假设、事实掩盖假设、心理理论机制假设、计算资源假设。此文综述了这些假设,以期借鉴使用。     

The Purpose and Neurobiology of Theory of Mind Functions

Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to a cognitive process which allows an individual to “place him/herself” in the other person’s “mind,” so as to comprehend the latter’s cognitive and emotional status, so as to predict his/her behavior and emotional response to a particular situation. ToM is necessary for everyday interaction among individuals and accounts for such human traits as empathy, compassion, and deceit. It is also particularly important in the relationship between a healer and his or her client, as well as in the God–human relationship. Recent research in the area of neurosciences has identified a specific brain “system” responsible for ToM, as well as described how these functions may be affected in certain neuropsychiatric conditions. In this article, we discuss the definition and neurobiological substrate of ToM. In addition, we discuss the cognitive steps important to achieve an “accurate” theory of mind, its relevance to “self-knowledge,” and its limitations. We also review some of the data concerning abnormalities and “distortion” of ToM in neuropsychiatric disorders and aberrant human behavior.