What Is an Antique?

Antiques are undoubtedly objects worthy of aesthetic appreciation, but do they have a distinctive aesthetic value in virtue of being antiques? In this article we give an account of what it is to be an antique that gives the thesis that they do have a distinctive aesthetic value a chance of being true and suggests what that distinctive value consists in. After introducing our topic in Section I, in Section II we develop and defend the Adjectival Thesis: the thesis that the concept of being an antique is an adjectival concept. This provides us with the means to formulate our definition, which we do in Section III. In Section IV we further explicate and defend our definition. In Section V we conclude by briefly saying where we think our definition could be improved, by making a few comments about the aesthetics of antiques and by stating an interesting consequence of our definition: that it is not analytic that antiques are old.     

Is guilt an emotion?

Abstract

When unequivocal examples of emotion adjectives occur in the linguistic context of “being” (e.g. being angry) they can be seen to refer to emotions as readily as when they occur in the linguistic context of “feeling” (e.g. feeling angry). This is not true of poor 'or non-examples of emotion words. A psycholinguistic analysis of this phenomenon is proposed, in the light of which it is suggested that words such as “abandoned” and “guilty” do not refer to emotions. The possibility that the word “guilty” has a distinct emotional sense meaning “feeling guilty” is discussed, and the implications of this proposal for theories of emotions are examined. Also discussed are the implications of the inclusion of poor or non-examples of emotions in lists of “basic” emotions. Data are presented indicating that many of the states that emotion theorists have included as emotions, and in some cases as “basic” emotions, are not generally rated as such, and that they fail to exhibit the patterns using the feel-be test that characterise unequivocal examples. It is suggested that a problem in delimiting the domain of theories of emotions may reside in a confusion between emotions on the one hand, and their typical causes and concomitants on the other.     

Is God an Adaptation?

In this critical notice to Robert Wright’s The Evolution of God, we focus on the question of whether Wright’s God is one which can be said to be an adaptation in a well defined sense. Thus we evaluate the likelihood of different models of adaptive evolution of cultural ideas in their different levels of selection. Our result is an emphasis on the plurality of mechanisms that may lead to adaptation. By way of conclusion we assess epistemologically some of Wright’s more controversial claims concerning the directionality of evolution and moral progress.     

Is thinking an action?

I argue that entertaining a proposition is not an action. Such events do not have intentional explanations and cannot be evaluated as rational or not. In these respects they contrast with assertions and compare well with perceptual events. One can control what one thinks by doing something, most familiarly by reciting a sentence. But even then the event of entertaining the proposition is not an action, though it is an event one has caused to happen, much as one might cause oneself to see a book by looking at it. I also discuss how this may support the view that thinking about the world is a source of information about it.     

Is God an Aspect?

Neither logical deduction nor empirical induction is capable of mediating the dispute between religious disciples and non-disciples. The case is particularly acute when it comes to the divine Reality (God). Within Wittgenstein’s theoretical framework, some scholars start from the perspective of language games, contending that this dispute is meaningless and should be abandoned, while others are not satisfied with such a settlement and extend Wittgenstein’s aspect theory to religious issues, arguing that God is an aspect. The extension includes analogous and theoretical extensions. This article will show that even if these two extensions are successful, their interpretations with regard to the disputes between religious disciples and non-disciples are not convincing. Worse still, the extension from aspect theory to religious issues is by no means successful in proving that God is an aspect.     

Is writing as difficult as it seems?

Experiment 1 assessed the time and effort allocated to writing subprocesses while generating written and verbal protocols over 10 weekly writing sessions. Within a 40-min session, planning time consumed about 45% in the first 5 min, but stabilized at near 30% thereafter. Generating text initially consumed 40% of the writers’ time, peaked at 50% midway, and then declined to its original level. The time spent revising and reviewing was negligible early in writing sessions, but increased substantially late in the sessions. The highest and lowest quality documents could be differentiated on the basis of the amount of time the writers devoted to revising and to the magnitude of their RTs in a secondary interference task. Writers showed consistent, distinctive patterns of transitional probabilities between writing subprocesses both within and across sessions, yielding quantitative representations of their writing styles. In Experiment 2, writers overestimated the amount of time they devote to revising and overestimated the amount of effort they allocate to planning and text generation. Their estimations did not improve after 10 weeks of composing. A time-and-effort-based analysis of writing is proposed to account for these data.     

What Is an Affordance?

What should and should not be considered an affordance is still an open issue. At the 2002 North American meeting of the International Society for Ecological Psychology, a symposium was held concerning this topic. The articles in this special issue are expanded versions of the papers presented at that symposium. To set the stage for those discussions, this article presents an analysis of the evolution of J. J. Gibson's thinking on this issue, from some of his earliest writings (i.e., J. J. Gibson & Crooks, 1938) through his most recent writings (i.e., J. J. Gibson, 1979/1986). It is hoped that this forum will stimulate thinking concerning this important ecological concept.     

Debriefing the Family: Is Research an Intervention?

The primary focus of this article is to examine the general assumption that families are left largely unchanged by their participation in research, and to question whether family research can have unintended positive or negative effects on participants. The present article reports feedback from families participating in the Nonshared Environment and Adolescent Development project, a longitudinal study of family process and adolescent development. Families differed in their perceptions about whether the research experience was positive, detrimental, or inconsequential. This feedback underscores the researcher's ethical responsibility to detect and remove deleterious effects of participation. Suggestions are made for providing adequate debriefing to subjects and for using debriefing as a research tool to study the interaction between researcher and families.     

Is state-trace analysis an appropriate tool for assessing the number of cognitive systems?

There is now much evidence that humans have multiple memory systems, and evidence is also building that other cognitive processes are mediated by multiple systems. Even so, several recent articles have questioned the existence of multiple cognitive systems, and a number of these have based their arguments on results from state-trace analysis. State-trace analysis was not developed for this purpose but, rather, to identify data sets that are consistent with variation in a single parameter. All previous applications have assumed that state-trace plots in which the data fall on separate curves rule out any model in which only a single parameter varies across the two tasks under study. Unfortunately, this assumption is incorrect. Models in which only one parameter varies can generate any type of state-trace plot, as can models in which two or more parameters vary. In addition, it is straightforward to show that both single-system and multiple-systems models can generate state-trace plots that are considered in the literature to be consistent with either one or multiple cognitive systems. Thus, without additional information, there is no empirical state-trace plot that supports any inferences about the number of underlying parameters or systems.     

Hope as an Intellectual Virtue?

Hope is a ubiquitous feature of human experience, but there has been relatively little scholarship within contemporary analytic philosophy devoted to the systematic analysis of its nature and value. In the last decade, however, there has been a resurgence of interest in the study of hope and, in particular, its role in human agency. This scholarly attention reflects an ambivalence about hope's effects. While the possession of hope can have salutary consequences, it can also make the agent vulnerable to certain kinds of personal risk. The pervasiveness of hope is not a sign of its quality; only a well‐tuned hope can be a virtue. Recently, Nancy Snow has argued that hope can be an intellectual virtue. Framing her account as a contribution to regulative epistemology, she contends that the intellectual virtue of hope can (i) motivate the pursuit of important epistemic ends, (ii) create dispositions that enable the successful pursuit of these aims, and (iii) generate a method for enduring intellectual projects. In this paper, I provide a critical appraisal of Snow's account of hope as an intellectual virtue. One important implication of this critique is that hope can function as an intellectual virtue only to the extent that it has benefitted from the correcting and perfecting influence of other cognitive excellences.     

Analogues of Ourselves: Who Counts as an Other?

What attributions must any actor make to an other in order to engage in face-to-face interaction with that other? Edmund Husserl's use of “analogues” suggests that actors use their own experiences of themselves as a starting pointin making such attributions. Alfred Schutz and Erving Goffman claim that for face-to-face interaction to occur, an other must be recognized as copresent and reciprocity must be established. I assert here that the means for determining that these conditions have been met will vary. I explore a varietyof actors and in particular their differing identifications of interactionally available others and I take as problematicthe establishment of co-presence and reciprocity. Taking others to be “analogues of ourselves” serves as a useful starting point, but worthy of detailed analysis is howand with whom an actor draws the analogy, under what circumstances it comes in for revision, and the interactional consequences of the decisions made.     

Is an Apophatic Trinitarianism Possible?

A good deal of recent theology has been characterized by a robust, self‐confident trinitarianism. Is it possible, by contrast, to develop something like an apophatic trinitarianism? This article attempts to sketch what such a thing might look like and defend it against some obvious objections.     

What Is an Immature Science?

Cognitive and social sciences such as psychology and sociology are often described as immature sciences. But what is immaturity? According to the received view, immaturity is disunity, where disunity can usefully be cashed out in terms of having a plurality of disunified frameworks in play, where these frameworks consist of concepts, theories, goals, practices, methods, criteria for what counts as a good explanation, etc. However, there are some reasons to think that the cognitive and social sciences should be disunified in this sense. If that is right, either these sciences should remain immature, or we need a new account of immaturity. The former option is unappealing. I therefore provide an alternative account of immaturity, based on Dudley Shapere’s work on the internal/external distinction. I then go on to use this account to argue against the imposition of unification on the cognitive and social sciences. Acceptance of disunity may be the route to maturity, rather than a sign of immaturity.     

Is attempted suicide an offense?

The English poet William Ernest Henley wrote: “I am the master of my fate, I am the captain of my soul.” However, Hamlet's dilemma of “to be or not to be” faces many a soul in times of distress, agony and suffering, when the question asked is “to die or not to die”. If the decision were to die and the same is implemented to its fructification resulting in death that is the end of the matter, the dead is relieved of the agony, pain and suffering and no evil consequences known to our law follow. But if the person concerned were unfortunate to survive, the attempt to commit suicide becomes punishable with imprisonment and fine under Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Petitions have assailed the validity of Section 309 IPC praying time and again to declare the section void. On the other hand, euthanasia and physician assisted suicide have become prominent public issues in many countries over the past few years. Several countries or regions of countries have debated legislation on euthanasia and/or physician assisted suicide. Although there is growing public acceptance of physician-assisted deaths all over the world, many professional organizations remain opposed to it. Most of the debates on the issue are usually framed as issues of morality while many basic empirical questions remain unanswered. This paper attempts to examine the causes and consequences of attempted and completed suicide.     

Is Patriotism an Associative Duty?

Associative duties—duties inherent to some of our relationships—are most commonly discussed in terms of intimate associations such as of families, friends, or lovers. In this essay I ask whether impersonal associations such as state or nation can also give rise to genuinely associative duties, i.e., duties of patriotism or nationalism. I distinguish between the two in terms of their objects: the object of patriotism is an institutionalized political community, whereas the object of nationalism is a group of people who share a common identity, often grounded in a belief in shared history, and an aspiration for collective self-government together. I explore three arguments for the thesis that a special concern for one’s polity and fellow-citizens, or one’s nation and co-nationals, is an associative duty: from reciprocity, from collective self-determination, and from the well-being of compatriots or co-nationals. I argue that the relationship among compatriots is a more plausible contender for generating associative duties than the relationship among co-nationals, although even in this case there are questions whether these are genuinely associative duties, or simply special duties. Although the relationship among co-nationals is a less plausible contender for associative duties, the well-being argument does apply to the relationship among both co-nationals and compatriots. I also suggest that there is a certain privileging of the status quo in the way that associative duties arguments work, because they tend to operate from existing relations and associations.